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Abstract 
Money laundering and terrorism financing are global crimes capable of transcending 
geographic boundaries. Increasingly sophisticated and transnational in nature, such crimes 
have the ability to inconspicuously exploit the differences between the laws, regulations and 
financial systems of different nation states. As such, they are capable of undermining the 
integrity of the global financial system, heightening the volatility of international capital 
flows, and destabilising financial institutions. 
The events of II September 2001 (September 11) have had a profound impact on the way that 
many financial institutions must now conduct their business and manage their money 
laundering/terrorism financing (MLffF) risk. The terrorist attacks catried out on that day 
generated unprecedented concern for money laundering and terrorism financing, and became the 
precursor for a raft of new institutional risk management obligations. They ushered in a new 
regulatory era and are responsible for the sizeable role that many institutions are now expected to 
play in protecting the sanctity of national and international financial systems. 
Following the September II attacks, a number of national governments enacted risk-based Anti-
Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) legislation. In recognising their 
role as gatekeepers of the international financial system, such legislation requires financial 
institutions to proactively assess their own levels ofMLITF risk, and implement appropriate 
systems and controls commensurate to that risk. Typically, these systems and controls must 
include an AMLICTF compliance program, customer due diligence procedures, AMLICTF 
training, transaction monitoring and regulatory reporting. 
Whilst there has been much rhetoric about the risks that institutions face when operating 
under risk-based AMLICTF regimes, there is seemingly little evidence to support it. Many 
commentators have held that any involvement in a money laundering or terrorism financing 
event will carry disastrous, financially debilitating, and at times irreversible consequences for 
an organisation. However, when the experiences of institutions operating in the U.S. and the 
U.K. (two of the most developed and long-standing AMLICTF regimes) are reviewed, these 
claims appear to be largely unfounded. 
vii 
Whilst there are certainly a number of financial, reputational and legal consequences that may 
stem from an institution's breach of AMLICTF legislation, these consequences appear to be 
significantly overstated- least of all by financial institutions themselves. During the past few 
years, a number of regulatory and law enforcement authorities have deliberately shifted their 
activities away from the initiation of criminal proceedings, towards the use of cooperative 
regulatory outcomes and agreements. Thus, the level of risk faced by many institutions is 
certainly not as pronounced as it was several years ago, in the immediate aftermath of 
September II. 
That is not to say that financial institutions will always have the ability to avoid the legal 
penalties, financial loss and reputational damage attached to an AMLICTF compliance 
failure. Indeed, there are some notable limitations on the ability of institutions to manage 
their risks, and an unmitigated risk exposure can translate into domestic and/or extraterritorial 
enforcement actions. Even in risk-based regimes where regulatory authorities display a 
preference for less intrusive, more cooperative outcomes, decisive action may nevertheless be 
taken against institutions that have committed legislative contraventions considered to be 
pervasive, unresolved, or of serious regulatory concern. 
A greater understanding of risk-based approaches to AMLICTF can enrich institutional 
understandings of the phenomena of risk. By gaining greater knowledge about the types and 
levels of risk apparent in several risk-based regimes, institutions may be better placed to identify 
and address their individual risk exposures. Further, they may be better able to determine the 
likely ramifications associated with any breach of risk-based legislative requirements. Without 
such an acute understanding of the operation of risk-based approaches, institutions may find 
themselves adopting flawed risk management strategies, spending copious amounts of money on 
poorly designed AMLICTF controls, and/or otherwise taking steps to undermine the alleged 
benefits of risk-based regimes- flexibility, cost-effectiveness, and enhanced engagement with 
the concepts of AML and CTF. 
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Glossary of Primary Terms and Acronyms 
AML 
AML/CTFAct 
AML/CTF Compliance 
Officer 
AML/CTF Program 
APGML 
AUSTRAC 
Bank Secrecy Act 
Basel Committee 
Correspondent 
Banking 
CTF 
Constructive Trust 
Egmont Group 
Anti-Money Laundering -laws, regulations, rules and practices 
associated with combating the crime of money laundering. 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 
2006 (Cth)- Australia's primary piece of AMLICTF legislation 
became effective on 13 December 2006. 
Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism Financing 
Compliance Officer- under the AMLICTF Act, all regulated 
entities must nominate an individual to independently oversee 
their AMLICTF compliance. 
Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism Financing Program 
- under many AMLICTF regimes, regulated entities must 
implement an AMLICTF program that involves undertaking 
certain levels of customer due diligence, screening employees 
and training staff. 
Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering- a regional 
organisation concerned with assessing the AMLICTF 
compliance of member states, coordinating AMLICTF technical 
assistance and training, and conducting research into ML and TF 
trends. 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre- Australia's 
FlU and federal AMLICTF regulator. 
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970- a U.S. Act that requires U.S. 
financial institutions to assist U.S. government agencies to detect 
and prevent money laundering. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision - an international 
organisation that seeks to foster cooperation around, and an 
understanding of, banking supervisory matters. 
A banking relationship established to receive deposits from, 
make payments on behalf of, or handle other financial 
transactions related to, a foreign financial institution. 
Counter-Terrorism Financing- laws, regulations, rules and 
practices associated with countering the crime of terrorism 
financing. 
A trust that arises by operation of law where an individual or 
institution that has not been appointed as a trustee, nevertheless 
invokes the liabilities oftrusteeship by conducting themselves as 
trustees in relation to certain property. 
The peak body for FlUs such as AUSTRAC, regulated entities 
may decide to use membership of the Egmont Group as one 
factor in measuring jurisdiction risk. 
ix 
Employee Due 
Diligence 
A risk-based process that generally involves collecting and 
verifying (and potentially re-verifying) information about an 
employee, and monitoring their compliance with organizational 
AML/CTF standards. 
FATF 
FATF 9 Special 
Recommendations 
Financial Action Task Force- an inter-governmental body that 
sets standards, and develops and promotes policies relating to 
AMLICTF. Its 40+9 Recommendations are now regarded as 
international best practice standards for the management of 
AMLICTF. 
Nine special recommendations made by FA TF specifically in 
relation to the management of CTF. 
FATF40 
Recommendations 
Forty recommendations made by FA TF in relation to the 
jurisdictional, regulatory and institutional management of AML. 
FATF40+9 
Recommendations 
A reference to both the FATF's 40 Recommendations and 9 
Special Recommendations. 
FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network- an agency established 
to enhance U.S. national security, deter/detect criminal activity, 
and safeguard financial systems from abuse. 
FlU Financial Intelligence Unit- a central, national agency 
responsible for receiving, processing, analysing and 
disseminating information relating to threshold and suspicious 
transactions. 
KYC Know Your Customer- the process of collecting and verifying 
(and potentially re-verifying) information about a customer in 
order to reasonably ensure that they are who they represent 
themselves to be. 
MAM Monetary Authority of Macau- a statutory body established to 
exercise the functions of a central monetary depository, and 
monitor the stability of Macau's currency and financial system. 
MLCA Money Laundering Control Act of 1986- a U.S. Act that 
criminalised money laundering as a federal offence. 
MLRO Money Laundering Reporting Officer - an individual working 
for aU .K. regulated entity who is nominated to oversee aspects 
of the entity's AMLICTF compliance (including the filing of 
SARs). 
ML/TF Risk Money Laundering/Terrorism Financing Rjsk- the risk that 
providing financial products/services may facilitate money 
laundering or terrorism financing activities. 
Money Laundering The process of trying to "clean" the proceeds of crime by 
placing them in the financial system and disguising their source 
through layers of different transactions, so they can be accessed 
legitimately thereafter. 
X 
OFAC 
PEP 
Prescriptive 
Requirements 
Regulated Entity 
Risk-Based Approach 
Risk-Based 
Requirements 
SAR 
SheD Bank 
Office of Foreign Assets Control- an agency established to 
administer and enforce economic and trade sanctions based on 
U.S. foreign policy and national security goals. 
Politically Exposed Person- Any individual who is or who has 
been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign 
country. This includes foreign Heads of State, senior politicians, 
and important political party officials. 
Legislative AMLICTF requirements that operate, and must be 
complied with, irrespective of an organisation's MLITF risk. 
Any individual or legal person that falls under the ambit of 
AMLICTF legislation. 
A regulatory and legislative approach that requires regulated 
entities to design and implement appropriate risk-based systems 
and controls. What is appropriate in each case will depend upon 
a regulated entity's size, complexity, and levels ofMLITF risk. 
Legislative AMLICTF requirements that empower regulated 
entities to consider their MLITF risk profiles when determining 
how to meet their compliance obligations. 
Suspicious Activity Report- a report filed by regulated entities 
with an FlU, to communicate any suspicions around a 
customer's identity, transactional behaviour, or potential 
connection to crimes such as money laundering and terrorism 
financing. 
A bank that does not have a physical presence (for instance, a 
place of business that is located at a fixed address) in any 
country. 
Six-party Talks Multilateral negotiations conducted in 2005/2006 with the aim 
of dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons development 
program. 
Terrorism Financing Directly or indirectly providing or collecting funds with the 
intention/knowledge that they will be used to finance acts of 
terrorism, or persons associated with terrorists and terrorist 
Three bases 
Threshold 
Transactions 
organisations. 
Three bases of risk - the title used by some banking and 
AMLICTF professionals to collectively refer to customer risk, 
product/channel risk and jurisdiction risk. 
These cash transactions, which involve at least a specified 
amount of funds, must be reported to the local FlU within a 
specified time frame. 
Tipping off The criminal offence of disclosing information about the fruition 
of a suspicion, or the filing of a SAR. 
Transaction 
Monitoring 
Systems and/or controls intended to monitor customers' 
transactional behaviour for the purposes of identifying any 
suspicious activities. 
xi 
U.K. FSA United Kingdom Financial Services Authority- a statutory body 
established to maintain market confidence, protect consumers 
and reduce financial crime. 
USA PATRIOT Act Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of2001 
-a U.S. Act that expands the AMLICTF compliance obligations 
placed upon U.S. regulated entities, and the investigative, 
information-sharing and enforcement powers of regulatory/law 
enforcement bodies. 
Wolfs berg Group An association of twelve global banks that aims to develop 
common, industry standards in relation to KYC and AMLICTF. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to a New Political Agenda and a 
New Set of Risk Management Challenges 
"The War on Terrorism will not be fought on the battlefield . (It will be)fought in the halls 
of our financial institutions"- Andrew M. Ayers 
1.1 A new era 
Money laundering and terrorism financing are global crimes capable of transcending 
geographic boundaries. Increasingly sophisticated and transnational in nature, such crimes 
have the ability to inconspicuously exploit the differences between the laws, regulations and 
financial systems of different nation states. As such, they are capable of undermining the 
integrity of the global financial system, heightening the volatility of international capital 
flows, and destabilising financial institutions. 1 Both money laundering and terrorism 
financing entrench crime by enabling individuals to abuse financial institutions and other 
entities for the purposes of disguising crimes they have already perpetrated, or are yet to 
commit. 
The events of II September 2001 (September 11) provide a confronting and inescapable 
example of the damage that money laundering and terrorism financing can cause when 
translated into physical, human acts.2 Accordingly, the attacks carried out on that day have 
had a profound impact on the way that many financial institutions must now conduct their 
business and manage their money laundering/terrorism financing (MLfi'F) risk. They were 
the precursor for a raft of new institutional risk management obligations, and are responsible 
for the sizeable role that many financial institutions are now expected to play in protecting 
the sanctity of national and international financial systems. 
1 International Monetary Fund, The IMF and the Fight against Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism: A Factsheet (2005) <http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/aml.htm> at 17 May 2006. 
2 Godse, V., Anti-Money Laundering, L&T Infotech Confidential 2 
<http://202.81.207.25/lntinfotech/WhitePapers/AML%20Whitepaper.pdf> at 15 June 2007. 
1 
September 11 generated unprecedented concern for money laundering and terrorism 
financing. Although such crimes had previously received some attention from various 
national and international bodies, it was not until 2001 that a new regulatory era was ushered 
in and Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) issues were 
thrust at the top of the international political agenda. Following the September II terrorist 
attacks, national governments became acutely aware of the fact that the success of their 
efforts to curb money laundering and terrorism financing hinged largely on the cooperation 
of financial institutions. In recognising their role as gatekeepers of the international financial 
system, a number of governments began to make institutions equal partners in AMLICTF 
regulation. They enacted risk-based AMLICTF legislation and, in many instances, required 
institutions to start assessing, monitoring, mitigating and managing their individual levels of 
MLITF risk for the first time. 
1.2 Money laundering defined 
As noted by Thomas J in Humberto Fidel Regalado Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 
(2008), legal definitions of money laundering have at times varied widely. Whilst some legal 
texts have broadly defined money laundering as the process by which the source or nature of 
illegal funds is disguised, others have defined it more narrowly as "[t}he act of transferring 
illegally obtained money through legitimate people or accounts so that its original source 
cannot be traced". 3 To the extent that such legal definitions have been inconsistent, U.S. 
courts have typically been guided by the wording of the relevant statutory provisions, rather 
than any common meaning attributed to the process of money laundering.4 
According to a number of commentators, the last few decades have seen the definition of 
money laundering significantly widened. They argue that since the enactment of the 
Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions Act of 1970 
(31 U .S.C. § I 051, et seq.) (Bank Secrecy Act) by the U.S. legislature, the definition of 
money laundering has departed from its original conceptualisation and been expanded to 
3 Gamer, B.A., Black's Law Dictionary(S"' ed, 2004) 1027. 
4 For instance, see Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998). 
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"cover almost any financial crime "5 At first glance, the observations of these commentators 
certainly appear to be correct. As U.S. prosecutors have tried to aggressively interpret and 
apply money laundering charges (which typically carry far greater penalties than similar 
charges, such as bulk cash smuggling), the past few years have seen a plethora of criminal 
activities caught "in the penumbra of money laundering charges". 6 In many instances, the 
original drafters of U.S. money laundering legislation could not have foreseen the breadth of 
the criminal activities that may now fall within legislative definitions of money laundering.7 
Whilst cases such as Humber/a Fidel Regalado Cuellar v. United States have recently sought 
to clarify the boundaries of particular money laundering definitions and offences, their 
impact on future money laundering cases is yet to be seen. 
In contrast to potentially complex legal interpretations of money laundering, operational and 
regulatory definitions are typically clearer and less contentious. Whilst a number of 
regulatory authorities, including the U.K. Financial Services Authority (U.K. FSA), define 
money laundering relative to their domestic criminal laws and AML/CTF legislation, 8 others 
appear to be comfortable using less technical and more operational definitions of money 
laundering. 
By way of example, Australia's AMLICTF regulator, the Australian Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), simply defines money laundering as "the process by which 
illegally obtained fonds are given the appearance of having been legitimately obtained". 9 
Unless otherwise stated, it is this regulatory definition of money laundering that will be used 
throughout this thesis. Apart from avoiding the potential vagueness around, and divergence 
between, different legal definitions of money laundering, the use of such an operational 
definition has greater utility with respect to the identification and investigation of money 
5 Androphy, J., 'The Government's Dirty Laundry', Forbes, No.7, 7 April2008. 
6 Carrol, D., 'Ambiguity in Contemporary Money Laundering Statutes' (2008) 11/inoi's Business Law Journal 
<http://iblsjoumal.typepad.com/illinois business law soc/2008/04/i-introductio-2.html> at 27 July 2008. 
7 Op cit n5. 
8 In its Handbook on Financial Crime, Market Abuse and Money Laundering, the U.K. FSA narrowly 
defines money laundering to be any act which constitutes an offence (or aiding, abetting, counselling or 
procuring an offence) under certain provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000 (U.K.) and/or the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 (U.K.). 
9 See Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, Introduction to AMVCTF 
<http://www.austrac.gov.au/elearning/modl/mod I money laundering 3.html> at 27 July 2008. 
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laundering activities by regulatory and law enforcement bodies. Given both its breadth and 
its simplicity, it recognises that conduct which may be criminally considered to be money 
laundering in one country may in fact be legal in another. 10 
Apart from its ease of reference, the use of an operational definition is seemingly more 
valuable for the purposes of discussing risk-based approaches to AMLICTF. Such 
approaches are not concerned with how institutions can legally or technically escape 
culpability in relation to a money laundering offence, but rather how they can effectively 
implement systems and controls to counter money laundering activities. Accordingly, the use 
of an operational definition of money laundering will more closely align with the 
interpretations given to it by many compliance professionals and AMLICTF practitioners. 
These individuals are typically less concerned with cleverly drafted legal definitions, and 
more concerned with broader, working definitions which they can operationalise for the 
purposes of designing internal risk management controls. 
1.3 The purpose of AML/CTF efforts and the shift towards risk-
based regimes 
Given that money laundering and terrorism financing are, fundamentally, flows of funds 
intended to legitimise monies related to criminal activities (whether or not those activities 
have already occurred or are yet to occur), it may be argued that- in and of themselves-
they are not important harms. As distinct from predicate offences11 and terrorist acts, the 
'victims' of money laundering and terrorism financing can often be difficult to identify. 
Accordingly, it is apparent that the significant AMLICTF efforts undertaken by national 
governments, regulatory authorities, law enforcement officials and financial institutions in 
the past few decades, have not solely been geared towards combating these two crimes. 
10 See Chaikin, D., 'Investigating Criminal and Corporate Money Trails' in Fisse, B., Fraser, D., and Coss, 
G. (eds), The Money Trail: Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, Money Laundering and Cash Transaction 
Reporting ( 1992) 257. 
11 For the purposes of this thesis, a ''predicate offence" is defined as the underlying criminal activity that 
generates proceeds which, when laundered, result in the offence of money laundering. See Schott, P.A., 
Comprehensive Reference Guide to AMLICTF, World Bank 3 
<http://wwwl.worldbank.org/finance/htmlfamlcft!docs/Ref Guide EN/v2/0l-Ch0l EN v2.pdt> at 20 
December 2008. 
4 
A number of regulatory officials, commentators and academics have held that AMLICTF 
efforts have a number of goals that are far broader than the prevention, identification and 
prosecution of money laundering and terrorism financing activities. They contend that, 
primarily, AMLICTF efforts are geared towards the reduction of predicate offences, the 
protection of financial integrity, and the countering of 'public bads' such as terrorism. 12 
Subsidiary to these goals is the desire for AMLICTF regimes and regulations to 
inconvenience criminals and terrorists, and render their activities more arduous to 
orchestrate. Thus, it may be contended that when financial institutions breach applicable 
AMLICTF legislation, they are not only falling short of their statutory obligations but also 
committing a public disservice; undermining the attempts of regulatory, law enforcement and 
government officials to detect, disrupt and deter criminal acts. 
Given the importance of AMLICTF efforts, they have become the subject of sustained 
interest in the afterrnath of September II terrorist attacks. 13 International organisations such 
as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(Basel Committee) and Wolfsberg Group have promulgated a number of best practice 
standards with respect to the management of money laundering and terrorism financing, and 
the mitigation of MLITF risk. In order to incorporate these best practice standards into their 
municipal legislation, a number of national governments have built risk-based concepts into 
their AMLICTF statutory definitions and mechanisms. 14 The result of this has been a 
deliberate shift away from purely prescriptive AMLICTF regimes, towards risk-based 
approaches and models of regulation. 
In contrast to risk-based approaches to AMLICTF, prescriptive regulatory regimes have often 
been criticised for their perceived inflexibility, expense and emphasis on legalism rather than 
regulatory effectiveness. 15 Often considered to be rigid in terrns of their requirements, 
12 Reuter. P ., 'Assessing the Effects of the AML Regime: ldentifying Success, the Relevant Outcomes and 
Metrics' (Speech delivered at the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Conference 
2009, Sydney, I April 2009). 
13 Stessens, G., Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model (2008) 84. 
14 Ross. S., and Hannan, M., 'Money Laundering Regulation and Risk-Based Decision-Making" (2007) 10(1) 
Journal of Money Laundering Contrail 06. 
15 See Hutter, B.M., The Attractions of Risk-Based Regulation: Accounting for the Emergence of Risk Ideas 
in Regulation (Discussion Paper 33, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2005). 
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prescriptive approaches to AMLICTF are generally more preoccupied with detailed rules 
than regulatory outcomes. Unlike risk-based regimes, they set clear legislative expectations 
for all institutions, regardless of their size, scope of operations, customer base and levels of 
ML/TF risk. They do not pivot upon the concept of risk, they do not require institutions to 
assess their own levels of risk, and they certainly do not empower entities to design and 
implement controls specifically tailored to such risk. As such, they can inadvertently give 
rise 'tick box' approaches, with institutions focussing more on meeting regulatory demands 
than combating money laundering or terrorist financing activities. 16 
Whilst some regulatory initiatives have previously seen financial institutions placed at the 
forefront of government efforts to combat money laundering, risk-based approaches to 
AMLICTF have cemented their position there. They require institutions to proactively 
identify their own levels ofMLITF risk, and implement systems and controls commensurate 
to that risk (i.e. over and above a number of minimum legislative requirements). Typically, 
these systems and controls must include an AMLICTF compliance program, customer due 
diligence procedures, transaction monitoring and formal regulatory reporting. 
Institutions operating under risk-based AMLICTF regimes are neither required, nor expected, 
to entirely safeguard their businesses from exploitation at the hands of money launderers or 
terrorism financiers. Risk-based approaches implicitly accept that crime cannot be totally 
eliminated in a free society, and that institutions will always face a certain degree ofMLITF 
riskn Accordingly, they do not seek to entirely eradicate institutions' MLITF risk. Rather 
than expecting entities to implement 'zero-failure' controls, such approaches acknowledge 
the legal and operational limits on the ability of institutions to control their MLITF risk. They 
simply seek to ensure that institutions identify their respective levels of MLITF risk and 
implement systems and controls stylised to that risk. 
16 Financial Action Task Force, Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing- High Level Principles and Procedures (2007) Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 2 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/46/38960576.pdf> at 29 April 2008. 
17 The FATF itself has recognised that despite the best efforts of financial institutions, money launderers 
will at times succeed in moving illicit funds through the financial sector undetected. See Financial Action 
Task Force, Op cit nl6, 3. 
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Under risk-based approaches to AMLICTF, financial institutions generally assess their levels 
of MLITF risk by looking at their customer risk, product/channel risk and jurisdiction risk. 
Whilst the individual or collective weight given to these three risk criteria will vary amongst 
regulated entities, it is believed that by assessing their MLITF risk in terms of these three risk 
types, financial institutions will be able to identify- and gear their resources towards- the 
most vulnerable parts of their business. Indeed, the fundamental premise of risk-based 
approaches is that the implementation and enforcement of AMLICTF laws should be tailored 
to institutions' individual MLITF risk profiles. 
Often considered critical to the "effective and proportionate functioning" of countries' 
AMLICTF regimes, 18 risk-based approaches not only drive the way that institutions 
discharge their AMLICTF obligations, but also the way in which regulatory authorities carry 
out their functions. 19 Just as risk-based approaches do not anticipate that financial institutions 
will be able to prevent all instances of money laundering/terrorism financing, they do not 
expect that regulatory authorities will be capable of preventing the failure of all financial 
institutions. According to the U.K. FSA, it is not only unavoidable that some institutions 
should fail, but also "undesirable because reward and risk are linked, and an attempt to 
control risk to the extent of preventing all financial failure would unreasonably constrain 
financial institutions "20 
Whilst prescriptive regulatory approaches generally see government resources applied evenly 
across all regulated entities, risk-based approaches allow regulatory authorities to use their 
resources more effectively by diverting them to those institutions/industries deemed to 
represent a greater MLITF risk. Whilst size is not the sole criterion that regulatory authorities 
will use to determine the MLITF risk represented by an institution, it is nevertheless an 
important indicator. At the very least, an institution's size will often be indicative of the 
diversity in its product offerings/customer base, and the potential consequences that its 
18 Ibid. 
19 United Kingdom Financial Services Authority, A Risk-Based Approach to Anti-Money Laundering 
Supervision in the UK (2008) I 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uklpages/ About/What/financial crime/pdf/amlsf mar08.pdf> at 20 January 2009. 
20 McCarthy, C., 'Risk Based Regulation: The FSA's Experience' (Speech delivered via video link to the 
Australian Securities & Investment Commission, Sydney, 13 February 2006). 
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failure may have for customers, employees, other institutions and, in some circumstances, a 
country's economy. 
Indeed, risk-based regulation typically sees regulatory authorities spending more time on 
larger institutions and those that have previously experienced significant AMLICTF 
compliance failures (i.e. committed notable breaches of AMLICTF legislation). Whilst 
institutions deemed to represent a higher risk will often attract "close and continuous" 
regulation,21 those representing a much lower risk will generally only be subject to periodic, 
themed reviews and ad hoc regulatory engagement. 
1.4 Risk management and meta monitoring 
According to the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), 'risk' is the "effect of 
uncertainty on objectives "22 or, phrased another way, the likelihood that a particular event 
may happen and the degree of damage or loss that may result from its occurrence.23 
Following on from this: 
• 'risk assessment' is considered to be the overall process of identifying, analysing and 
I . . k 24 d eva uatmg ns s; an 
• 'risk management' is regarded as the process of addressing uncertaint/5 by identifying, 
assessing and prioritising risks, and applying resources to minimise, monitor and control 
them.Z6 
Although risk has long been integral to ways of thinking about money laundering, it is only 
during the past decade that the concepts of 'risk', 'risk assessment' and 'risk management' 
have become central components of achieving AMLICTF compliance.27 Whilst not formally 
21 Ibid. 
22 International Organization for Standardization, Committee Draft of ISO 3IOOO Risk Management (2009) 
I <http://www.npc-se.eo.th/pdf/iso3 1000/ISO FDIS 3 I 000 IEl.pdf> at 6 October 2009. 
23 See International Organization for Standardization, Risk Management- Vocabulary- Guidelines for 
Use in Standards (2002). 
24 Op cit n22, 4. 
25 Op cit n22, 7. 
26 Hubbard, D .• The Failure of Risk Management: Why It "s Broken and How to Fix It (2009) 46. 
27 Opcitn14, 107. 
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defined in the risk management literature produced by organisations such as the ISO, the 
terms 'MLITF risk' and 'MLITF risk assessment' have now become common parlance 
amongst many risk management and AMLICTF compliance professionals. Although two of 
the peak international AML/CTF bodies, the FA TF and the Wolfsberg Group, have yet to 
specifically define these terms (despite referencing them heavily in their publications and 
best practice standards for addressing money laundering and terrorism financing),28 
international consensus has been building regarding their meaning. Indeed, the need for 
clarity around the concept ofMLITF risk and MLITF risk assessment has only become more 
pronounced with the growing popularity of risk-based regulatory approaches. 
In accordance with the concept of the 'risk society' devised by Ulrich Beck, risk-based 
approaches have effectively seen AMLICTF compliance reflexively remade into a risk 
paradigm. In jurisdictions with risk-based regimes, the activities of regulatory authorities 
have shifted steadily towards "externally monitored self-coordination "29 
To use terms coined by academics John Braithwaite and Peter Grabosky, risk-based 
approaches to AMLICTF seemingly foster a regulatory environment characterised by 'meta 
risk management' and 'meta monitoring'. 30 In jurisdictions with risk-based regimes, 
regulatory authorities generally appear to be regulating institutions' self-regulation. Rather 
than necessarily enforcing legislative requirements directly, many regulatory officials are 
now simply ensuring that institutions are internally monitoring, reviewing and enforcing 
compliance with their AML/CTF legislative obligations. Institutions are expected to be 
largely self-auditing, with regulatory authorities maintaining the ability to monitor, review 
and redesign their internal risk management controls, as appropriate. In many ways, risk-
based approaches to AMLICTF have seen the 'regulated' become the 'regulating'. 
28 For instance, in its report "Risk-Based Approach: Guidance for Money Services Businesses", the FATF 
refers to the concept of MLITF risk no less than nine times, but neglects to define the tenn (along with the 
many others its defines) in the document's glossary. See Financial Action Task Force, Risk-Based 
Approach: Guidance for Money Services Businesses (2009) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd!4511/43249256.pdf> at 7 October 2009. 
29 Beck, U., Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) 232. 
30 See Braithewaite, J., 'Meta Risk Management and Responsive Governance' (Paper presented at the Risk 
Regulation, Accountability and Development Conference, Manchester, 26 June 2003). 
9 
Given this transfer of responsibility from regulatory authorities to financial institutions, the 
effectiveness of risk-based regulation may depend upon the existence of a clear 
understanding of how various MLITF risks should be assessed, prioritised and mitigated. 31 
However, such an understanding may at times be elusive or difficult to achieve, considering 
that MLITF risk can be framed in one or more of the following ways: 
• probabilistic risk- the risk represented by the strength of the relationship between certain 
attributes (for instance, identity fraud) and a money laundering/terrorism financing event 
or activity; 
• consequence risk- the risk represented by the potential seriousness of a money 
laundering/terrorism financing event or activity; and 
• regulatory risk- the risk represented by an institution's vulnerability to a money 
laundering/terrorism financing event or activity.32 
The emphasis placed on the three abovementioned constructions of MLITF risk by an 
individual or entity, may depend upon their position within the broader regulatory system. 33 
For instance, given their varying aims and responsibilities, regulatory officials, Jaw 
enforcement authorities and financial institutions may invariably focus on very different 
types of risks and institutional behaviours. Whilst law enforcement officials might be 
primarily concerned with those activities that are associated with important predicate 
offences (probabilistic risk), regulatory authorities may focus on those business 
areas/functions that are easier to subvert and/or more difficult to monitor (regulatory risk). 
Further, whilst financial institutions must necessarily have regard to all three constructions of 
MLITF risk, some may gear their compliance efforts towards identifying and managing those 
activities that carry the most financial, reputational and/or legal risk (consequence risk). 
Nevertheless, despite the divergence that might exist between the way that different 
individuals and entities construct MLITF risk, risk-based regimes require regulatory 
authorities to understand how institutions frame, assess and manage their levels ofMLITF 
risk. Indeed, one premise of risk-based approaches is that regulators should judge the 
31 Opcitn14, 114. 
32 Op cit n14, 110. 
JJ Op cit n 14, Ill. 
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proportionality and appropriateness (or otherwise) of an institution's AMLICTF controls in 
light of its MLITF risk profile and the manner in which it has assessed its risk. This is the 
regulatory flexibility that has previously seen risk-based AMLICTF approaches replace more 
prescriptive, mechanical approaches to AMLICTF regulation and compliance. 
1.5 Research aims, methodology and structure 
1.5.1 Research questions, scope and methodology 
Through the use of qualitative research techniques, this thesis seeks to assist in an 
understanding of the phenomenon ofrisk.34 By synthesising and collating a significant 
number of materials in a new way, it seeks to improve the risk identification, assessment, 
evaluation35 and treatmene6 activities of financial institutions by answering the following 
research questions: 
• what are the various types of risk that institutions may face (either locally or 
extraterritorially) when operating in jurisdictions with risk-based approaches to 
AMLICTF; 
• what are some of the more likely consequences of non-compliance with AMLICTF 
legislation; 
• have the risks and consequences commonly associated with non-compliance been 
misrepresented or otherwise overstated/understated; and 
• what are the practical approaches and strategies that institutions can employ to manage 
their MLITF risk and/or mitigate the fallout stemming from any money laundering or 
terrorism financing event? 
34 For a discussion on the advantages and potential limitations of using qualitative research techniques, see 
Moll, J., Major, M., and Hoque, Z., 'The Qualitative Research Tradition', Chapter 18 in Hoque, Z. (ed). 
Methodological Issues in Accounting Research: Theories and Methods (2006) 375. 
35 Based on the outcomes of risk analysis/assessment activities, 'risk evaluation' seeks to assist in making 
decisions about which risks need treatment and should be prioritised in terms of treatment implementation. 
See International Organization for Standardization, Op cit n22, 18. 
36 
'Risk treatment' involves selecting one or more options for modifying risks, and implementing those 
options. Examples of risk treatment options include avoiding the risk, taking or increasing the risk, 
removing the risk source, and sharing the risk with other parties. See International Organization for 
Standardization, Op cit n22. 19. 
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Given the nature of money laundering and terrorism financing activities, and the lack of 
reliable statistics available in relation to both the prevalence of such crimes and the number 
of institutions formally reprimanded for AMLICTF compliance failures, 37 quantitative 
research methods were deemed to be unsuitable for the purposes of this research. 
Accordingly, this thesis relies heavily upon qualitative research techniques. It draws upon 
both primary materials (including AMLICTF legislation and court documents) and 
secondary, supporting materials (such as journal and newspaper articles). Aside from 
drawing on personal industry insights gained through years of experience as both an 
AMLICTF consultant and an AMLICTF Compliance Officer for a large Australian retail 
bank, this thesis relies on informal discussions with AMLICTF and banking professionals to 
provide clarity and context around the otherwise unchecked and untested claims of some 
commentators. 
Though this thesis tends to address the issues of money laundering and terrorism financing 
simultaneously, the clear focus is on money laundering and the applicability of risk-based 
approaches to AML. As discussed in subsequent Chapters of this thesis, the inherent nature 
of terrorism financing renders it difficult for institutions to proactively detect, identify and 
address. Though risk-based regimes are typically held to apply to both AML and CTF, the 
inability of regulated entities (and indeed, regulatory authorities) to identify transactions that 
might relate to future acts of terrorism, certainly limits their applicability- and the 
applicability of this research- to issues solely relating to CTF. 
Whilst the research contained herein is primarily concerned with the consequence risk and 
regulatory risk apparent in several risk-based regimes, it does not seek to provide a detailed 
evaluation of the relative success or appropriateness of those regimes. Such analysis falls 
outside the scope of this thesis and should be the subject of further research. Nevertheless, by 
assessing the potential ramifications attached to non-compliance with AMLICTF legislation, 
some reflections on the apparent effectiveness of risk-based approaches can be made. These 
relate to the levels of visible regulation in risk-based regimes, the alignment between such 
37 As noted in subsequent Chapters of this thesis, in many jurisdictions enforcement proceedings for breaches 
of AML/CTF legislation can remain confidential and shrouded in secrecy. 
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regulation and risk-based legislative provisions, and the extent to which risk-based regimes 
actually fulfil their desired aims and objectives. 
Given that they are two of the most developed and long-standing risk-based AMLICTF 
regimes, this thesis significantly focuses on the U.S. and the U.K. As opposed to less 
developed and more nascent regimes, both jurisdictions have seen several iterations of their 
AMLICTF laws, a development of their regulatory environments, and the initiation of several 
AMLICTF enforcement actions. Whilst this thesis contains discussion on the emerging 
AMLICTF regimes in Australia and a number of other Asia-Pacific nations, the U.S. and the 
U.K. provide a wealth of information relevant to the analysis of the levels and types of risk 
faced by institutions operating under risk-based approaches to AMLICTF. Both jurisdictions 
have some of the most onerous and visibly enforced AMLICTF laws, as well as some of the 
strongest legislative expressions of extraterritoriality. They have not only hosted many of the 
most highly publicised AMLICTF enforcement actions, but have also seen some of the more 
damaging penalties given to institutions for such breaches. 
This thesis primarily considers the concept ofMLITF risk, as well as the operation of various 
AMLICTF regimes, from an institutionalist perspective. Accordingly, much of the analysis 
contained herein is limited to financial institutions. Defined broadly to encompass all types 
of corporate organisations involved in the provision of financial products/services, "financial 
institutions" have often been expected to act as the first line of defence in government efforts 
to curb money laundering and terrorism financing. They have often been subject to the most 
expansive AMLICTF requirements, and been key players (either actively or passively) in 
some of the most notable money laundering operations. As such, the risks faced by financial 
institutions operating under risk-based approaches to AMLICTF are more visible and readily 
assessable than the risks faced by organisational types not commonly considered to be 
conduits for financial crime. 
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1.5.2 Structure and presentation of research 
Through the use of a detailed literature review, this thesis begins by charting the 
development of risk management as an independent discipline and, more specifically, its 
application to the concepts of AML and CTF. Chapter 2 details the growing emergence of 
risk-based approaches to AMLICTF, and explains why they are often considered to be the 
"best possible means by which to identifY potential money laundering" and the "most 
effective and relevant response to the way in which [a} business operates"38 By providing 
an introduction to the concept ofMLITF risk and attempting to contextualise such risk in 
terms of older, more traditional risk types, the Chapter seeks to identify the various risks that 
institutions may face when operating under risk-based AMLICTF regimes. Whilst it 
ultimately acknowledges that the concept of MLITF risk will not always fit neatly within the 
confines of traditional risk types, the Chapter asserts that attempting to frame it in such a way 
may better enable institutions to: 
• identify their AMLICTF-related risk exposures; and 
• quantify the potential consequences of a money laundering/terrorism financing event, 
and/or an AMLICTF compliance failure. 
In addition to contextual ising the concept ofMLITF risk in terms of several traditional risk 
types, Chapter 2 outlines the oft-cited consequences of an AMLICTF compliance failure. It 
notes that during the past decade, many commentators and industry participants have claimed 
that institutions connected to money laundering or terrorism financing activities (whether or 
not due to their ineptitude, malfeasance or bad luck)39 are likely to incur significant financial 
damage and irreparable reputational damage.40 It observes that others still have held that in 
38 SAS Institute and Lepus, Anti-Money Laundering Reappraised: The Benefits of a Holistic, Risk Based 
Approach (2006) West Coast Anti-Money Laundering Forum 28 <http://www.wcamlforum.org/pdt) Anti-
Money%20Laundering%20Reappraised%20-%20SAS%20-%202006-05.pdf> at 30 April 2008. 
" Harris, R., Picking Up the Pieces (2004) CFO Magazine 
<http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/30 15379?f~o0tions> at 19 April 2006. 
40 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Anti-Money Laundering: A Global Financial Services Issue (2005) 
<http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/E8069E5A5B82FDDD8525706F00567905/$filc/a 
ml.pdf> at I April 2006. 
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more severe cases, an institution associated with poor AMLICTF controls or the active 
facilitation of money laundering/terrorism financing might even face closure.41 
Whilst there appears to have been an almost unquestioned acceptance of the claims that any 
involvement in a money laundering or terrorism financing event will carry disastrous and, at 
times, irreversible consequences for an institution, Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis seek to 
test their veracity. Firstly, Chapter 3 starts by introducing the concept oflegal risk and 
discussing the levels of' AMLICTF legal risk' that institutions have seemingly faced 
following the enactment of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of2001 (P.L. I 07-56, I I 5 Stat. 272) 
(USA PATRIOT Act). Focussing primarily on an institution's potential criminal liability 
under municipal and/or extraterritorial AMLICTF legislation, it then moves on to identify the 
types of criminal penalties available for certain AMLICTF offences. 
By outlining the types of criminal penalties that may attach to an AMLICTF compliance 
failure, and analysing the frequency with which they are invoked, the Chapter seeks to assess 
the validity of the widely publicised claims that non-compliance with AMLICTF legislation 
will be tenaciously enforced by regulators and the courts. Contrary to popular belief, it finds 
that in several risk-based regimes, criminal enforcement actions are only pursued in the most 
brazen cases of money laundering or terrorism financing. Due to the commercial 
consequences and collateral damage that may stem from the indictment of a large financial 
institution, many regulatory and prosecutorial officials now appear to be relying heavily on 
civil courses of action to address institutions' AML/CTF compliance failures and money 
laundering offences. With their lower standard of proof, such actions can be effectively used 
to secure positive regulatory results without the disruption, delay and expense often attached 
to criminal prosecutions. 
In extending the analysis contained in Chapter 3 of this thesis, Chapter 4 views AMLICTF 
legal risk in terrns of the civil Jaw repercussions that may stem from an institution's 
41 Ginzl, D., Risk Management and the Money Laundering Challenge (2005) 20(4) Commercial Lending 
Review 41. 
IS 
involvement in a money laundering or terrorism financing event, and/or contravention of 
AMLICTF legislation. Throughout the Chapter, the term "civil" is used in an inclusionary 
fashion; encompassing all legal courses of action, types of legal proceedings and penalties 
that are not strictly "criminal" in nature. Thus, unless otherwise stated, the definition of civil 
law necessarily includes those areas of the law that might otherwise be considered to fall 
under the umbrella of equity. 
In Chapter 4, consideration of an institution's AMLICTF legal risk falls into several parts. 
After initially discussing the kinds of civil enforcement actions and civil penalties that might 
accompany a contravention of AMLICTF legislation, the Chapter details how an institution's 
AMLICTF legal risk may be heightened as a result of tension between its AMLICTF 
obligations at civil and criminal law. Drawing on the experiences of institutions in the U.K., 
the Chapter determines that regulated entities can find themselves in a precarious legal 
position (and find that their AMLICTF legal risk at civil law is increased) in circumstances 
where there is a lack of clarity around the interplay between their legislative requirements, 
contractual obligations, and constructive trust principles. Any uncertainty around their 
obligations and, more specifically, which obligations should take precedence in terms of their 
compliance efforts, can create a situation where some entities are compelled to trade off 
compliance with their civil obligations in order to avoid incurring liability at criminal law (or 
vice versa). 
Whilst Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the concept of AMLICTF legal risk, detail the likely 
consequences of non-compliance with AMLICTF laws, and assess the levels of risk faced by 
institutions operating under risk-based regimes, Chapter 5 of this thesis addresses the ways 
in which an institution might seek to mitigate its ongoing AMLICTF legal risk in the 
aftermath of an AMLICTF compliance failure. It identifies a number of practical risk 
mitigation strategies for institutions, and outlines the types of regulatory outcomes that may 
arise where an institution is prepared to voluntarily report its legislative breaches and 
implement corrective actions. 
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Whilst the Chapter looks at several ways that institutions can manage their reputational and 
financial risk, it primarily focuses on the ongoing management and mitigation of AML/CTF 
legal risk. It discusses a number of risk management strategies but ultimately recognises that 
the most prudent way for an institution to manage its AMLICTF legal risk is through the 
adoption of an avoidance strategy (and therefore, compliance with all relevant AMLICTF 
laws). That said, the Chapter questions whether such a strategy is the most cost effective way 
for an institution to address its risk, given that the pursuit of formal enforcement proceedings 
appears to be relatively infrequent in many risk-based AMLICTF regimes. Though some 
institutions may believe that the potential consequences of an AML/CTF compliance failure 
make a compelling case in favour of avoidance risk management strategies, the Chapter 
canvasses a number of reasons why others may consider that the costs of achieving 
AMLICTF compliance considerably outweigh the penalties that they are likely to face for 
legislative non-compliance. 
In continuing to identify and assess the levels of risk faced by institutions operating in risk-
based regimes, Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis use detailed case studies to highlight the 
potential inability of institutions to effectively manage and mitigate their AML/CTF -related 
risks. Whilst one of the case studies relates to a clear case of institutional money laundering, 
and the other relates to a perceived case of institutional money laundering, they both provide 
a number of practical teachings relative to the concept of risk. They address the limitations of 
institutions' risk management strategies, and demonstrate how an institution's unmitigated 
risk can translate into domestic and/or extraterritorial enforcement actions. Further, they 
illustrate that whilst regulatory authorities might display a preference for less intrusive, more 
cooperative regulatory outcomes, decisive action may nevertheless be taken against 
institutions involved in legislative contraventions that pervasive, unresolved, or of serious 
regulatory concern. 
Firstly, using Riggs Bank as a case study, Chapter 6 highlights the financial, reputational 
and legal risks that an institution might face as a result of its lax AMLICTF controls. It 
analyses the apparent levels of AMLICTF regulation in the U.S., and the circumstances in 
which U.S. regulatory and law enforcement authorities will seemingly be prepared to launch 
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criminal enforcement proceedings against a bank in breach of its legislative obligations. 
Riggs Bank was specifically chosen as a case study for inclusion in this thesis because it has 
become emblematic of how public and wanton AMLICTF compliance failures can transform 
an institution often billed as "the most important bank in the most important city in the 
world",42 into the most criticised bank in the most unforgiving city in the world. It illustrates 
not only how AMLICTF compliance failures can arise, but also how risk-based regulation 
can work in practice. 
Secondly, using Banco Delta Asia a case study, Chapter 7 details the potential 
consequences of non-compliance- or alleged non-compliance- with AMLICTF legislation 
and international best practice standards. Given the action taken against Banco Delta Asia by 
the U.S. government under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Macau bank was 
selected for inclusion in this thesis because it demonstrates an institution's potential 
AMLICTF legal risk under extraterritorial legislation, and highlights the significant role that 
perception can play in sculpting an institution's legal, reputational and financial risk. It also 
illustrates the potential limits of an institution's risk management capabilities, and the way in 
which AMLICTF regulation and enforcement may be influenced by international relations 
and the delicate political relationships between particular nation states. 
Finally, Chapter 8 of this thesis addresses each of the previously identified research 
questions. Drawing on the conclusions reached in the preceding Chapters, it identifies the 
various risks and the levels of risk that institutions operating under certain risk-based 
regimes are likely to face. In doing so, it challenges the common assertion that breaches of 
AMLICTF legislation may lead to the imposition of financially debilitating, or even 
commercially fatal, penalties. 
Indeed, Chapter 8 finds that whilst AMLICTF compliance failures might theoretically carry 
heavy penalties, these penalties are rarely invoked in practice. During the past few years, a 
42 O'Brien, T.L., 'At Riggs Bank, a Tangled Path Led to Scandal', The New York Times (New York), 19 July 
2004 
<http://www .nvtimes.com/2004/07/1 9/business/19BA N K. final.htm l?eF 124 797 6000&en~cb5 f669d9fc948cd 
&ei~5088&partner~rssnyt> at 15 December 2006. 
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number of regulatory and law enforcement authorities appear to have deliberately shifted 
their activities away from the initiation of criminal proceedings, towards the use of 
cooperative regulatory outcomes and agreements. Accordingly, many assessments of 
AMLICTF legal risk appear to be overstated, not least of all by financial institutions 
themselves. Whilst certain types of offences seemingly carry heavier penalties and a greater 
level of AMLICTF legal risk than others, the level of AMLICTF risk generally faced by 
institutions is not as pronounced as it was several years ago, in the immediate aftermath of 
September II. 
Whilst risk-based approaches to AML/CTF have become increasingly popular since the 2001 
terrorist attacks, the Chapter offers a number of reflections on their relative effectiveness. It 
discusses the perceived benefits of risk-based regimes, and notes that such benefits will not 
always be apparent when the operation of these regimes is observed. In practice, it appears 
that the flexibility and cost-savings often attributed to risk-based regimes may be somewhat 
undermined by the use of benchmarking exercises, uncertainty around risk-based 
requirements, and retrospective application of rules-based compliance models. 
Despite some of their potential shortcomings however, Chapter 8 concludes that a greater 
understanding of risk-based approaches to AMLICTF can enrich institutional understandings 
of the phenomena of risk. By gaining greater knowledge about the types and levels of risk 
apparent in several risk-based regimes, institutions may be better placed to identify and 
address their individual risk exposures. Further, they may be better able to determine the 
potential consequence risk represented by any non-compliance with risk-based legislation. 
Without such an acute understanding of the operation of risk-based approaches, institutions 
may find themselves adopting flawed risk management strategies, spending copious amounts 
of money on poorly designed AMLICTF programs, and/or otherwise taking steps to 
undermine the alleged benefits of risk-based regimes- flexibility, cost-effectiveness, and 
enhanced engagement with the concepts of AML and CTF. 
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Chapter2 
Looking at Money Laundering through the Lens of 
Risk Management 
"The first step in the risk management process is to acknowledge the reality of risk. Denial is 
a common tactic that substitutes deliberate ignorance for thoughtful planning"-
Charles Tremper 
2.1 The big picture 
Whilst there are no reliable figures available with respect to the scale of international money 
laundering activities,43 figures suggest that organised crime has become an industry- and 
money laundering has become a business- capable of "rivalling multinational corporations 
as an economic power". 44 Estimates of annual money laundering flows range from 
USD$1 trillion to USD$2 trillion, or about 2-5 per cent of global Gross Domestic Product.45 
Of this total amount, it is believed that approximately A UD$4.5-11.5billion is laundered 
through Australia each year46 
Money laundering enables people to integrate illegally obtained funds into the financial 
system and, through a series of transactions and financial flows designed to distance them 
from the underlying predicate offences, access the funds legitimately thereafter.47 
Operationally, the process of laundering 'dirty' money involves the following three stages: 
43 Reuter, P., and Truman, E.M., Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight Against Money Laundering (2004) 4. 
44 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report /999 (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1999) 5. 
45 See KPMG, Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey 2007 (2007) 
<http://www .kpm g.com/SiteColl ectionDocuments/G lobal%20 Anti-
money%20laundering%20survey%202007.pdt> at 9 June 2008. 
46 Whilst the Federal Attorney-General's Department believes that AUD$11.5 billion is laundered through 
Australia each year, research released by the Australian Institute of Criminology in October 2007 indicates 
that approximately AUD$4.5 billion is laundered through the country annually. See Fagg, S., $4.5 Billion 
Laundering Estimate (2007) Lawyers Weekly <http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au!articles/4-5-billion-
laundering-estimate zl37203.htm> at 9 June 2008. 
47 Russel, P.S., 'Money Laundering: A Global Challenge' (2004) 5(1/2) Journal of American Academy of 
Business 260. 
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(i) placement- where the illegal funds are placed in the financial system, typically by 
being deposited in a domestic or offshore financial institution, or used to purchase 
expensive goods which may subsequently be resold to obtain payment; 
(ii) layering- where the illegitimate source of the funds is obscured through a complex 
maze of transactions (often involving electronic funds transfers or investments in shell 
operations) designed to effectively destroy any audit trail; and 
(iii) integration- where the 'cleaned' funds are finally incorporated into the monetary 
system so that they can be freely accessed thereafter. 
In comparison to money laundering, which seeks to hide the origin of illegally obtained 
funds, terrorism financing aims to disguise the destination of funds that may be derived from 
either legitimate or illegitimate sources. Accordingly, when compared to money laundering, 
the prevention and detection of terrorism financing presents an array of different challenges 
for governments, regulatory authorities and institutions. Even where terrorism financing 
involves ill-gotten funds, the transactions involving those funds may evade detection because 
they concern small amounts of money and are therefore able to circumvent the AML 
monitoring systems and controls in place at many institutions. As stated by the FA TF in its 
Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing- High Level Principles and Procedures, identifying terrorism financing is often 
significantly more difficult than identifying money laundering and other suspicious activities 
(especially in circumstances where there is a lack of typologies and related 
guidance/intelligence from regulatory authorities).48 Thus, although recent policy responses 
to AML and CTF have generally been fused, the AMLICTF controls implemented by 
institutions will typically be geared more heavily towards the prevention and detection of 
money laundering activities, and may therefore be unable to identizy those terrorism 
financing activities that do not display the traditional hallmarks of money laundering. 
Despite their inherent differences, money laundering and terrorism financing share a number 
of similarities. Firstly, their common goal is to conceal illegal activities that have already 
occurred or are yet to occur. Secondly, neither money laundering nor terrorism financing 
" Op cit n 16, 8. 
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actually targets financial institutions per se; both crimes use such institutions as vehicles for 
transferring and obscuring tainted funds. As financial institutions are simply a means to an 
end for money launderers and terrorism financiers, the primary risks posed by these crimes 
are generally legal and reputational in nature. 
Although money laundering and terrorism financing have long posed risks to financial 
institutions, such risks appear to have been exacerbated in recent years as a result of rapid 
advances in technology, the globalisation of the financial services industry,49 heightened 
levels of regulation, and increased penalties for non-compliance with AMLICTF 
legislation 5° According to many media commentators and industry participants (including 
regulatory officials, lawyers, consultants and others practising in the field of AMLICTF 
compliance), the stakes for combating money laundering and terrorism financing have never 
been higher. They allege that institutions in breach of AMLICTF legislation are likely to 
suffer incalculable reputational damage51 and, in more severe cases, even closure as a result 
of their compliance failures. 52 
Over the past few years, increasing regulatory and industry attention has led to an apparent 
paradigm shift in the way that many financial institutions regard their AMLICTF obligations. 
Despite previously regarding their AMLICTF compliance programs as a mere regulatory 
exercise, many institutions now recognise that such programs might prove to be critical in 
safeguarding their commercial integrity, reputation and financial standing. 53 This Chapter 
seeks to: 
• contextualise AMLICTF within the broader development of risk management as an 
independent discipline; 
• further develop an understanding of the operation and perceived benefits of risk-based 
approaches to AMLICTF; 
49 Fisher, B., Money Laundering- What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, ACI Worldwide, 
<http://www.aciworldwide.com/pdfs/aci trends frauddetect.pdt> at 13 March 2006. 
50 ACI and TowerGroup, Money Laundering: Preserving the Integrity of Financial Institutions (2002) 
<http://www.aciworldwide.com/pdfs/aci trends frauddetect2.pdt> at I April 2006. 
51 Op cit n41. 
52 Op cit n49. 
53 Op cit n49. 
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• detail the way in which institutions typically seek to assess their MLITF risk; 
• frame the concept ofMLITF risk in terms of traditional risk types (with the exception of 
legal risk, which is addressed separately in subsequent Chapters); and 
• address the consequence risk that may stem from an institution's involvement in a money 
laundering or terrorism financing offence and/or contravention of AMLICTF legislation. 
2.2 How risk management has moulded approaches to AML 
Although risk management is not a new phenomenon, the concept of MLITF risk has only 
gained wide recognition during the last decade. However, given that risk management and 
regulatory trends have generally determined the attitudes of financial institutions to risk 
taking at any point in time, it is useful to frame MLITF risk in terms of the broader, historical 
development of risk management. Indeed, it appears that key developments in risk 
management- particularly those that occurred in the U.S. -have influenced modem day 
approaches and attitudes to the risks represented by money laundering and terrorism 
financing. 
2.2.1 The birth of modern risk management (pre 1960s) 
The early Twentieth Century was a formative time for risk management; characterised by 
burgeoning enterprise, the identification of new risks and the aggravation of older 
exposures. 54 Following the U.S. stock market crash in 1929, there was a strong public 
interest in ensuring that regulation of financial markets was effective. 55 This created a 
greater appreciation of systemic risk and, in turn, prompted the U.S. government to enact a 
spate of related federal laws. These laws, which included the Banking Act of 1933 (P.L. 73-
66, 48 Stat. 162) and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (P.L. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133), 
sought to reduce banking risks and protect the soundness ofthe U.S. banking system 56 by 
preventing financial institutions from expanding their activities into new and potentially 
risky areas. 
54 Barlow, D., 'The Evolution of Risk Management' (1993) 40(4) Risk Management 38. 
55 Thel, S .• 'The Original Conception of Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act' (1990) 42 Stanford 
Law Review 385, 394. 
56 For example, in 1933 Regulation Q capped the interest rate that could be paid on savings accounts. 
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Prior to the 1960s, risk management was largely dictated and controlled by government 
authorities. Most institutions had no formal way of managing their risk, and those that did 
tended to delegate the totality of their risk management functions to internal purchasers of 
insurance. 57 This is despite the fact that awareness of the field of risk management had 
grown during the 1950s after two academics, Wayne Snider and Russell Gallagher, 
separately published articles which, for the first time in business literature, used the terms 
'risk managers' and 'risk management' .58 
2.2.2 Beyond in-house insurance (the 1960s and 1970s) 
As recognition of the field of risk management grew during the 1960s and 1970s, the role of 
organisational insurance clerks evolved to that of insurance buyers, and then to insurance 
managers. 59 Reliance on insurance companies as the sole providers of risk services began to 
wane, and risk management started to move away from a narrow, insurance-based 
discipline60 Prompted by several events, including the release of the first risk management 
texts,61 increasing numbers of institutions looked beyond insurance for other methods of 
managing their commercial risks. Management teams started searching for more innovative 
risk-shifting activities and widened their focus beyond profit making to include risk 
intermediation.62 
During this period, some jurisdictions enacted AML legislation requiring ':financial 
institutions to help [their government(s)} catch money launderers"63 For instance, U.S. 
Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act after domestic law enforcement bodies claimed that 
internal bank procedures were hampering their ability to access confidential account 
information, and identify and prosecute organised crime.64 The Act required financial 
institutions to report suspicious transactions, cash transactions in excess of USD$5,000, and 
57 Leimberg, S.R. et al, The Tools & Techniques of Risk Management & Insurance (2002). 
58 Op cit n54. 
59 Whilst insurance buyers are involved in choosing the desired insurers and insurance coverage, insurance 
managers are generally in charge of a department dedicated to insurance. 
60 Thompson, D., 'Risk Management: A Brief History' (2003) Journal of Banking and Financial Services 30. 
61 Englehart, J.P., 'A Historical Look at Risk Management' (1994) 41(3) Risk Management65. 
62 Crouhy, M., Galai, D., and Mark, R., Risk Management (200 I). 
63 Op cit n5. 
64 Ibid. 
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the transportation of currency across U.S. borders.65 Whilst its prescriptive obligations did 
not necessarily encourage U.S. institutions to consider their individual risk profiles or risk 
management practices, they certainly required them to actively consider AML (as well as 
their accompanying obligations) for the first time. 
2.2.3 A change in regulatory approach (the 1980s) 
The early 1980s marked a dramatic change in regulatory philosophy, especially in the U.S. 
where the enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
of 1980 (P .L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132) and Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (P .L. 97-320, 
96 Stat. 1469) substantially deregulated and liberalised the country's banking system. 
These pieces of legislation not only changed the roles and responsibilities of U.S. banking 
regulators, but also significantly increased the regulatory and legal pressure placed upon 
U.S. financial institutions to implement internal risk management measures. 
As opposed to simply setting a broad, industry-based risk management agenda for financial 
institutions, regulatory authorities started to monitor banks' internal risk management 
systems. However, given that the requests of U.K. and U.S. regulators for streamlined 
international capital adequacy standards were largely ignored, the internal risk management 
standards expected of financial institutions continued to be addressed in an ad hoc fashion by 
national governments. It was not until 1988, when the Basel Committee66 released Basel I 
(i.e. an accord requiring banks to hold at least 8 per cent capital to mitigate their credit and 
market risk) that this situation began to change. 
Shortly after the release of Basel], the Basel Committee published the Basel Statement of 
Principles- a set of best practice guidelines designed to increase the soundness of the 
international banking system and assist financial institutions to avoid being stained with the 
opprobrium of money laundering67 These Principles, coupled with the Basel Committee's 
65 See the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970,31 USC§§ 5311-5312. 5316-5324. 
66 The Committee was comprised of the central bank governors of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. 
67 Manger, G., 'Commentary- Part 2' (Speech delivered at the Anti-Money Laundering Symposium, 
Canberra, Sept em her/October 2002) 12. 
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statement on the Prevention ofCriminol Use of the Bonking System for the Purpose of 
Money Laundering, encouraged institutions to implement customer identification procedures, 
comply with all relevant AML laws and regulations, and cooperate with law enforcement 
authorities in any related investigation. Together, the documents signalled a growing 
recognition -on both a national and an international level -of the role that financial 
institutions must play in combating money laundering activities. 
In addition to the release of risk management and money laundering publications by the 
Basel Committee, the 1980s saw the United Nations take a heightened interest in the issue of 
money laundering. In what ultimately proved to be a significant step forward in the 
international fight against money laundering, 68 the United Nations Convention against lllicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention) was adopted 
in 1988. This Convention, which became effective on II November 1990, made money 
laundering an internationally extraditable offence and obliged all ratifying countries to 
criminalise drug trafficking and associated money laundering. As at September 2008, the 
convention had a significant degree of universal acceptance, with 153 State Parties.69 
The 1980s were not only characterised by international efforts to address money laundering 
though. The decade also ushered in the enactment of many municipal AML laws, such as the 
U.S. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-570, I 00 Stat. 3207-18) (MLCA)70 
and the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (U.K.), amongst others. Although these pieces of 
legislation were largely concerned with the criminalisation of money laundering, as opposed 
to the management of its related risks, they nevertheless marked an increased political 
interest in money laundering. At that time, drug use and drug-related crime were politicised 
'problems'/1 and national governments were under immense pressure to provide voters with 
68 Hopton, D., Money Laundering: A Concise Guide for all Business (2006) 7. 
69 See United Nations Infonnation Service, Countries Invited to Sign, Ratify or Accede to Multilateral 
Treaties During the Treaty Event 23-25 and 29 September and I October 2008, UNIS/INF/281, 22 September 
2008. 
70 See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-570, I 00 Stat. 3207-18). 
71 Australian Institute of Criminology, The Global Response to Money Laundering: How Global Politics 
Shaped the Result (2002) <http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/2002-mllbroome.pdf> at 17 February 2008. 
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legal 'solutions' to them.lt was not until the following decade that the broader management 
of money laundering risk began to receive more legislative and regulatory attention.72 
2.2.4 Risk management comes into its own (the 1990s) 
During the 1990s, risk management again received attention after a spate of high-profile 
corporate collapses was attributed to poor corporate governance.73 Risk minimisation 
became a desirable objective of sound financial management/4 and risk management 
emerged as an integral part of company planning and strategy. In following on from this, 
institutions increasingly integrated risk management into their corporate functions, and the 
role of risk management expanded to encompass organisation-wide programs75 
Throughout this decade, the management of money laundering risk gained worldwide 
recognition after a number of international bodies released guidance- aimed at both 
institutions and national governments- with respect to the to the identification, mitigation 
and management of money laundering. Until this time, many national governments had 
perceived AML as a local issue and an issue that did not represent a priority for the banking 
industry76 However, the international attention it received during the 1990s further elevated 
the issue of money laundering to the global stage, and heightened awareness of the ability for 
money laundering activities to undermine the stability, integrity and governance of the 
international financial system. 
The 1990s saw the FATF begin to cement its role as an influential, multi-disciplinary body 
concerned with money laundering trends, the adoption of streamlined AML standards, and 
the progress of member states in implementing AML measures. In April 1990, the body 
72 For instance, whilst Australia first enacted laws covering a number of money laundering offences in 1987, 
it was not until January 2003, when Division 400 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) was amended, that 
such offences received greater legislative attention and money laundering was further criminalised. 
73 Lam, J., 'A New Role: Chief Risk Officer' ( 1999) 64(2) Ivey Business Journal 55. 
74 Manger, G., 'Risk Management and Reputation, Commentary- Part 3' (Speech delivered at the Anti-
Money Laundering Symposium, Canberra, September/October 2002) 23. 
75 Heir, K., Encyclopaedia of Management, Reference for Business 
<http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/management/Pr-Sa/Risk-Management.html> at 14 August 2006. 
76 KPMG, Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey: How Banks Are Facing up to the Challenge (2004) 
<http://www. kpm g.ca/ en/industries/fs/bank in g/ documents/ global Anti Monev LaunderingSurvey .pdf> at 1 
September 2006. 
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released the FATF 40 Recommendations; arguably the most significant AML instrument 
created up until that time. The Recommendations outlined a set of money laundering 
countermeasures covering law enforcement and the criminal justice system, the financial 
system and its regulation, and international cooperation. They sought to increase financial 
transparency, improve regulatory oversight and streamline approaches to AML by 
encouragmg: 
• jurisdictions to ratify the Vienna Convention, reduce their bank secrecy laws and 
cooperate with other nations in the investigation and prosecution of money laundering 
offences; and 
• institutions to implement a number of internal controls including transaction reporting, 
AML training, record keeping and customer due diligence. 
Although the FATF 40 Recommendations were initially intended to combat the misuse of the 
international financial system by people laundering drug money, it quickly became apparent 
that money laundering activities are not confined to the proceeds of the drug trade. National 
banking regulators urged the FA TF to extend the Recommendations beyond those situations 
where drug trafficking was the predicate offence, and the FA TF responded by releasing a 
revised version of its Recommendations in 1996. These new Recommendations were quickly 
regarded as global best practice standards for AML, and several countries (including Brazil, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Nigeria, Switzerland, South Africa and the U.K.) subsequently 
enacted municipal AML legislation modelled on them. 
In addition to prompting the creation of AML legislative regimes in a number of 
jurisdictions, the FATF 40 Recommendations led to the establishment of several other 
regional and international bodies also seeking to assist with the design of AML risk 
management practices. These included the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, Egmont 
Group of Financial Intelligence Units, Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APGML), 
and the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group. 
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2.2.5 Bang for their buck- The era of the risk-based approach (the 2000s) 
Following the turn of the century, the continued development of AML risk management was 
initially marked by the release of Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking by 
the Wolfsberg Group77 Published in October 2000 (and subsequently revised in May 2002), 
these Principles were created to address the growing dissatisfaction with the Basel Statement 
of Principles. They recognised the differential treatment of high net-worth individuals in 
private banking, and acknowledged the higher ML risk typically associated with private 
banking activities. Whilst they have only been accepted by a limited number of financial 
intuitions, the adoption of the Principles by a number of large, multinational banks has seen 
them become the standard for reputable banks operating internationally. As such, they have 
played a role in modernising AML risk management practices with respect to the acceptance 
of new clients, identification of unusual or suspicious transactions, and education of bank 
staff.78 
However, whilst the Wolfsberg Group's Principles/or Private Banking have influenced the 
way that many institutions currently address their AML obligations, no single event has had 
a more sizeable impact on modern day approaches to the identification and management of 
MLITF risk than the September II attacks. Those attacks immediately ushered in a new 
regulatory and legislative era with respect to money laundering. They redefined international 
politics, thrust AMLICTF issues at the top of government agendas, and drove- perhaps with 
a mixture of fear and vengeance- a U.S.-led assault on acts of terrorism and terrorism 
financing. 
Arguably, the events of September II marked the first global acknowledgement of terrorism 
financing and the importance of financial institutions in combating acts of terrorism. Whilst 
terrorism financing had garnered minimal government interest until that time, the images of 
the crumbling World Trade Centre towers- beamed to an ever-watchful international 
audience via television, radio and the internet- provided the impetus for intense legislative 
77 The Wolfsberg Group is a body comprised of twelve leading international private banks, including ABN 
Amro, Banco Santander, Bank ofTokyo-Mitsubishi-UFJ, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, 
Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Societe Generale, and UBS. 
78 Opcitn67, 17. 
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reform. A number of clear links between money laundering and terrorism financing were 
established, and it became clear that the key to some terrorism investigations could be the 
financial transactions that enabled such acts of terrorism to occur in the first place. In the 
case of the 2001 attacks, several debit cards, AUD$600,000 and twenty-four accounts 
opened with fictitious names/social security numbers,79 had cost thousands of lives, sent the 
largest international financial centre into hiatus, and destroyed or damaged more than 
USD$16 billion worth of physical assets. 80 
In the immediate aftermath of the September II attacks, a number of national governments 
passed legislation to better control and curtail potential terrorism financing activity. For 
instance, whilst the U.K. government swiftly enacted the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 (U.K.), the U.S. government enacted the USA PATRIOT Act to amend 
the Bank Secrecy Act and impose a wide range of onerous AMLICTF obligations upon 
institutions operating in the U.S. 81 Whilst the U.S. legislation relates to both AML and 
CTF, its drafting was primarily geared towards combating the financing of terrorism and 
removing the major barriers that historically prevented law enforcement, intelligence and 
defence agencies from sharing certain types of information. The legal impediments that 
previously separated criminal and intelligence investigations were blamed for the failure of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) to identify and detain two of the September II 
hijackers; Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar, prior to the attacks.82 In order to prevent 
such discord from arising again, Sections 203(b) and 203(d) of the USA PATRIOT Act were 
broadly drafted to enable (and in some circumstances, enhance) information sharing with 
the F.B.I and the intelligence community more generally. 
79 Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, Introduction to AMUCTF: Terrorism Financing 
<http://www.austrac.gov.au/elearning/pdf/mod terrorism financing. pdf> at 18 February 2008. 
80 The destruction of physical assets caused by the attacks has been estimated at USD$14 billion for private 
businesses, USD $1.5 billion for state and local government enterprises, and USD$0.7 billion for federal 
enterprises. Including the related rescue and clean up costs (estimated at USD$11 billion), this is an estimated 
total direct cost ofUSD$27.2 billion. See Looney, R., 'Economic Costs to the United States Stemming From 
the 9/11 Attacks' (2002) 1(6) Strategic Insights. 
81 The Act not only targets banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, but affects almost every other type 
of financial service institution operating in the U.S., including broker-dealers, investment companies, money 
service bureaus, and life insurers. 
82 Abramson, L., and Godoy, M., The Patriot Act: Key Controversies (2006) NPR 
<http://www.npr.org/news/specials/patriotact/patriotactprovisions.html> at 1 May 2008. 
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Beyond enhancing the powers of several U.S. government authorities, the USA PATRIOT 
Act is largely responsible for sculpting current approaches to the management ofML/TF risk. 
The legislation clearly recognises the importance of recruiting financial institutions in the 
fight against illicit financial activities. It acknowledges that such institutions are the 
gatekeepers to the international financial system and that without their cooperation and 
support, government efforts aimed at curbing money laundering and terrorism financing may 
be futile. The Act enshrines a risk-based approach to AMLICTF, which requires financial 
institutions to identify their own levels of ML/TF risk, and allocate their compliance 
resources to those areas of their business representing the greatest MLITF risk83 Over and 
above a number of minimum legislative requirements, 84 it essentially empowers institutions 
to define the extent to which they mitigate or tolerate their MLITF risk. 
Whilst the USA PAT RIOT Act marked the first legislatively enshrined risk-based approach to 
AMLICTF, it is important to note that risk-based legislation and regulation were not new 
concepts at the time of its enactment. Following the collapse of several large financial 
services firrns during the 1990s (for instance, the 1996 collapse of Barings Bank in the U.K. 
and the 1999 collapse ofHIH in Australia), risk-based approaches had already started to find 
some favour amongst national governments prior to 200 I. In the years immediately 
preceding the September II attacks, regulatory authorities such as the U.K. FSA, Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority, and Canadian Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions, had started to develop new regulatory methods that built upon the sophisticated 
risk management tools already in use by many financial institutions.85 These methods 
advocated meta monitoring and regulation, and placed greater emphasis on the organisational 
control of inherent risks. Institutions were expected to identify and assess certain risks, and to 
manage and mitigate such risks through the use of internal controls and governance 
83 Fox, W.J., (Untitled speech delivered at the Financial Services Roundtable, Washington D.C., 29 January 
2004). See also Robinson, P., 'Effective AML- the UK Story' (Speech delivered at the Asia· Pacific 
Financial Crime Conference & Exhibition, Singapore, July 27 2006). 
84 For instance, institutions are required to implement an AML/CTF compliance program, undertake more 
onerous 'due diligence' with respect to correspondent and private banking relationships, and conduct certain 
customer identification/verification procedures for all new account openings. 
85 Black, J., The Development of Risk-Based Regulation in Financial Services: Canada, the UK and 
Australia (London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2004) 48. 
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structures. Those deemed by regulatory authorities to represent a lower risk received less 
supervisory attention than those considered to carry a much higher risk. 
Whilst these regulatory regimes (and their accompanying institutional responsibilities) 
signified a shift towards risk-based regulatory regimes prior to 2001, it was not until the 
terrorist attacks that risk-based approaches to AMLICTF were acknowledged and 
implemented in a number of jurisdictions. The events of September II led to the swift 
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act and, in tum, the endorsement of risk-based AMLICTF 
regimes. They set the international pace for the adoption of broad AMLICTF legislation, and 
created a renewed concern for AML amongst various international bodies. 
Following the events of September II, the FATF expanded its mandate and released the 
FATF 9 Special Recommendations. Specifically tailored to terrorism financing, these 
Recommendations supplemented the FATF 40 Recommendations (which were again revised 
in 2003) and urged jurisdictions to ratify the 1999 United Nations Convention on Terrorist 
Financing, criminalise terrorist financing, and create a regime for institutions to report 
suspicious transactions. Collectively, the FATF 40+ 9 Recommendations have today become 
a driving force behind the adoption of risk-based regimes. This is despite the fact that only 
six of the revised FATF 40 Recommendations explicitly consider the concept of risk and the 
importance of institutions identifying their own levels of MLITF risk, and implementing 
measures commensurate to that risk.86 
Given the international importance of the FATF 40+9 Recommendations and the broad 
public interest in money laundering and terrorism financing post-September II, AMLICTF 
has seemingly become the subject of meta monitoring and regulation during the past 
decade. 87 Though they do not constitute a binding international convention, many of the 
Recommendations have formed the basis of the risk-based AMLICTF regimes now adopted 
in a many jurisdictions. 
86 See revised FA TF Recommendations 5, 6, 8, 20, 23 and 24. 
87 As noted in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the concept of meta regulation refers to the governmental monitoring 
of others' self monitoring. See Braithwaite, J., Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue (2005) 85. 
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The FATF periodically subjects jurisdictions to mutual evaluations with respect to how well 
they have adopted and implemented the FATF 40+9 Recommendations. Where a jurisdiction 
is found to have disregarded the Recommendations and/or otherwise failed to create an 
adequate AML/CTF legislative/regulatory environment, that jurisdiction may be included in 
the FATF's List ofNon-Cooperative Countries and Territories.88 Although the use of this list 
is largely redundant now, any jurisdiction identified by the FA TF as having a lax AML/CTF 
regime may nevertheless face significant pressure from the international community to 
formally adopt the Recommendations. This is clear from the Australian Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth)), 
which was primarily enacted by the country's government in response to an unflattering 
2005 FATF Mutual Evaluation report that found Australia was only fully compliant with 
nine of the FATF 40 Recommendations89 
However, whilst the FATF 40+9 Recommendations have played a significant role in the 
development of national AML/CTF legislation and global AMLICTF best practice standards, 
other guidance documents have also played a role in sculpting current AML/CTF regimes 
and risk management methods. For instance, the Wolfsberg Group's Anti-Money Laundering 
Principles for Correspondent Banking have provided institutions with guidance on managing 
their correspondent banking relationships, and preventing other entities with inadequate 
AML controls from accessing the international banking system.90 They endorse the adoption 
of a risk-based approach to AML/CTF by encouraging institutions to pay particular attention 
to 'country risk' and 'customer risk' when assessing the ML/TF risk represented by a 
correspondent banking relationship. Further, they outline a number of jurisdictional and 
customer-based risk factors that might indicate that a certain correspondent banking 
relationship represents a higher ML/TF risk. Although these factors are neither exhaustive 
nor prescriptive, they have nevertheless assisted many institutions to develop their internal 
risk-based approaches and design risk-sensitive correspondent banking programs. 
88 See Shannan, J.C., 'International Organisations, Blacklisting and Tax Haven Regulation' (Paper presented 
at the International Studies Association Meeting, Montreal, 18 March 2004). 
89 See Financial Action Task Force, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism- Australia (2005) Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/35528955.pdt> at 3 May 2008. 
90 Wolfsberg Group, Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Correspondent Banking (2002) 
<http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/fag-correspondent-banking.html> at 3 September 2006. 
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In addition to its Principles for Correspondent Banking, the most notable AML/CTF paper 
released by the Wolfsberg Group is its Guidance on a Risk Based Approach/or Managing 
Money Laundering Risks. Published in March 2006, the Guidance states that whilst there is 
no generally agreed methodology for implementing a risk-based approach to AMLICTF, 
institutions should ideally assess their ML/TF risk profile on the basis of their country risk, 
customer risk and product risk.91 To this end, it outlines a number of risk variables that 
institutions can consider when assessing the money laundering risk represented by a certain 
customer or transaction. These include, amongst other things: 
• the size and frequency of transactions undertaken by a customer; 
• the level of regulation, oversight or governance to which a customer is subject; and 
• any unnecessary use of intermediate corporate vehicles by a customer. 
2.3 Risk perspectives 
As increasing numbers of jurisdictions have adopted risk-based AMLICTF regimes, 
institutions have needed to find ways of accurately assessing, mitigating and managing their 
MLITF risk.92 Whilst many regulatory bodies (including AUSTRAC) have explicitly 
acknowledged the inability of institutions to "operate in a completely risk-free environment 
in terms of MLITF",93 they nevertheless expect organisations to properly identify and control 
the MLITF risks that they might face through their provision of financial products/services. 
Although risk literature has tended to focus heavily on traditional types of risk, such as credit 
risk and financial risk, risk-based approaches generally view MLITF risk through the lens of 
very different risk types. In alignment with guidance from international bodies such as the 
Wolfsberg Group, ML/TF risk is typically assessed using three primary risk criteria; namely, 
customer risk, product/channel risk and jurisdiction risk. Whilst these "three bases" of 
91 Wolfsberg Group, Wolfsberg Statement- Guidance on a Risk Based Approach for Managing Money 
Laundering Risks (2006) <http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/risk-based-approach.html> at 24 May 2006. 
92 Despite the documented differences between money laundering and terrorism financing, and the 
difficulties often associated with identifying terrorism financing activities, institutions often assess their 
ML and TF risk collectively. Accordingly, the term "ML/TF risk" is used throughout this dissertation, even 
though it is recognised that some of the analysis contained herein is more applicable to ML risk alone. 
93 Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, Risk Management: A Too/fOr Small-to-Medium 
Sized Businesses <http://www.austrac.gov.aulrisk management.html> at 6 October 2009. 
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MLITF risk94 have been frequently propounded by bodies such as the FATF,95 the individual 
or collective weight given to them by different institutions is likely to vary.96 
The assessment of MLITF risk is largely an introspective, or inward-looking, process. It is 
not particularly concerned with the external regulatory environment, or even specific 
regulatory obligations per se. Rather, it is fundamentally concerned with assessing what 
some regulatory bodies have termed "business risk", or the internal risk that a particular 
entity will be exploited by money launderers or terrorism financiers97 
Whilst there is no universally accepted standard regarding when a customer, product/channel 
or jurisdiction represents a higher MLITF risk, several factors are commonly used to indicate 
the presence of increased risk. These factors include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(i) customer risk- customers are generally viewed as representing a higher MLITF risk if 
they-
• conduct frequent or unusual transactions with no legitimate or commercial purpose; 
• operate in a cash-intensive industry or an industry which deals primarily in high 
value goods; and/or 
• are identified as a ··politically exposed person" (PEP).98 
(ii) product/channel risk- financial products/services are generally viewed as representing 
a higher MLITF risk if they are-
• heavily reliant upon remote and/or automated technology for their delivery; 
• provided via a delivery channel that shrouds customers' identities in anonymity; 
and/or 
94 Op cit n40. 
95 According to para 1.9 of the F ATF's Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing -High Level Principles and Procedures, institutions operating under 
risk-based regimes should identify their "higher risk customers, products and services, including delivery 
channels, and geographical locations." See Financial Action Task Force, Op cit n 16, 2. 
96 Op cit nl6, 22. 
97 Op cit n93. 
98 Whilst there is no single, globally accepted definition of a PEP, the F ATF definition (which is widely 
employed by most international financial institution) is any individual who is or who has been entrusted with 
prominent public functions in a foreign country (e.g. a Head of State or of government, a senior politician, or 
a senior executive of a state-owned corporation). 
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• able to swiftly facilitate transfers of funds across national geographic boundaries 
(e.g. international wire transfers). 
(iii) jurisdiction risk- countries are generally viewed as representing a higher MLITF risk 
if they are-
• deemed by international organisations such as the FA TF to be lacking appropriate 
AMLICFT laws and adequate AML regulation; 
• subject to any sanctions, embargoes or similar measures issued by the United 
Nations or comparable bodies; and/or 
• regarded as a drug-producing or drug-transit nation. 
As opposed to customer risk and product/channel risk, it is interesting to note that 
jurisdiction risk can be largely driven by cultural and political influences. In the context of 
credit risk, jurisdiction risk has a high level of clarity; often being objectively determined by 
statistical data about a country's finances and credit history. However, in the context of 
MLITF risk, the assessment of jurisdiction risk may be hinged upon the subjective interests 
of national governments. For instance, when determining whether a certain country 
represents a higher MLITF risk due to its status as either a drug-producing or drug-transit 
nation, institutions often consult the U.S. Department of State's Annual Presidential 
Determinations of Major lllicit Drug-Producing and Drug-Transit Countries. This document 
currently cites a number of countries, including Afghanistan, Colombia and Pakistan, held by 
U.S. authorities to be heavily involved in the production or transportation of illicit 
substances. Whilst it remains a common point of reference for institutions seeking to assess 
their jurisdiction risk, the U.S. government will (either deliberately or inadvertently) 
continue to influence what others consider to be higher risk countries. Arguably however, if 
the scope of the document was expanded to include drug-consuming nations, many wealthy 
Western nations- including the U.S.- might also find themselves condemned in its pages. 
Nevertheless, it is perhaps unsurprising that customer risk, product/channel risk and 
jurisdiction risk are driving risk-based approaches to AMLICTF. Risk-based approaches 
compel institutions to holistically assess the risk represented by their businesses, and 
international guidance released by the Wolfsberg Group explicitly urges institutions to assess 
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the MLITF risk represented by their customers, product offerings and different jurisdictions. 
Further, the FA TF and the Basel Committee encourage institutions to assess their MLITF 
risk in terms of the 'three bases' by publishing lists of the types of financial products and 
countries considered to be more susceptible to money laundering activity99 
By framing their overall MLITF risk in terms of customer risk, product/channel risk and 
jurisdiction risk, it is believed that institutions can effectively identify and focus on those 
parts of their business most vulnerable to abuse at the hands of money launderers and 
terrorism financiers. Many commentators and international bodies have noted that, when 
applied effectively, risk-based approaches should ensure that those areas of an institution 
carrying the highest levels ofML/TF risk receive the greatest attention 100 and the largest 
proportion of institutional resources. This is in contrast to other, more prescriptive 
approaches to AMLICTF, which have been criticised for requiring institutions to apply their 
resources evenly to all customers, transactions and products, irrespective of their varying 
degrees of risk. 
At first glance, the 'three bases' of risk used by many institutions to assess their MLITF risk, 
do not fit neatly into the framework of traditional banking risks. At the most basic level, they 
are seemingly much narrower in terms of both their scope and application than more 
traditional banking risks. As risk-based approaches to AMLICTF have elevated awareness of 
relatively new risks, they have shifted focus away from more traditional risks and diminished 
the relevance of the four traditional risk management strategies outlined on the following 
page in Table 1. 
99 Op cit n47, 263. 
100 Opcitn16,2. 
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101 Table 1 I risk 
- •••u..ouvuaa •-........... ~;,. ... .., .... ~•••o.""sa""" 
Strategy Description 
Acceptance A strategy that involves accepting the likelihood and consequences of a certain 
risk. An institution's decision to adopt this strategy may be based upon several 
factors, including the amount of risk inherent in its usual business activities. 
Transfer A strategy that involves shifting (in whole or in part) a risk from one individual, 
entity or activity to another. Importantly, a transfer of an institution's risk will not 
always entail a corresponding transfer of its accountability for that risk. 
Mitigation A strategy that involves undertaking additional efforts to lower the likelihood and/or 
lessen the impact of a risk event occurring. The relevant risk is not entirely 
eliminated, but is monitored, managed and minimised. 
Avoidance A strategy that involves avoiding the likelihood of a risk arising- generally by 
absteining from any activity that carries such risk. Whilst avoiding a risk may 
protect an institution from incurring the negative impacts attached to it, it may also 
deny an entity the possible benefits attached to acceptance of the risk. 
Whilst traditional risk management strategies may be readily applied to prescriptive 
AMLICTF obligations (for example, the requirement to screen customers against certain 
sanctions and watch lists), their potential application to MLITF risk and risk-based 
legislative requirements is unclear. As risk-based approaches enable institutions to choose 
the extent to which they address their MLITF risk, any decision to implement particularly 
extensive or lax risk management controls may not be framed at all in terms of traditional 
risk management strategies. Rather than making a conscious decision to employ a 'risk 
avoidance' or 'risk mitigation' strategy for instance, an institution may simply contextualise 
its decision to adopt tight risk management controls, in terms of its overall risk-based 
approach. Likewise, an institution that implements minimal or relatively skeletal risk 
management controls is unlikely to view its actions in the context of a 'risk acceptance' 
strategy. Presumably, it will simply frame its actions in terms of its overarching risk-based 
approach, albeit that such an approach demonstrates a greater propensity for risk-taking and 
a greater tolerance of MLITF risk. 
As previously noted, one of the aims of this Chapter is to examine the risks that money 
laundering and terrorism financing pose to financial institutions; not strictly through the lens 
101 See Bowden, A.R., Lane, M.R., and Martin, J.H., Triple Bottom Line Risk Management: Enhancing 
Profit, Environmental Performance and Community Benefit (2001) Ill. See also O'Regan, D., Auditor's 
Dictionary: Terms, Concepts, Processes (2004) 230. 
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of the 'three bases' of MLITF risk, but within the context of broader, more traditionally 
recognised categories of risk. A discussion of these risks and their applicability (or 
otherwise) to the risk represented by money laundering and terrorism financing, is contained 
on the following pages. 
2.4 Reputational risk 
In today's competitive financial services market, many corporate executives regard their 
institution's reputation as "an independent good or an instrumental good" that is 
fundamental in attracting and retaining customers, and enhancing profit margins. 102 
Accordingly, reputational risk refers to the possibility that negative publicity regarding an 
institution's business practices, whether founded or not, will result in a loss of revenue, a loss 
of customers, a loss of jobs and, in more severe cases, even closure. 103 Whilst money 
laundering and terrorism financing have long posed reputational risk to financial institutions, 
such risk has been heightened in recent years by rapid technological developments. In 
today's high-speed and interconnected environment, money laundering and terrorism 
financing scandals can be instantaneously broadcast to the world. 
Whilst reputation is generally important for all industry sectors and organisational types, it 
may be argued that it is particularly critical to the ongoing operation of financial institutions. 
As opposed to some organisations based in manufacturing and other industries, banks are 
quasi-public utilities104 and highly dependent on maintaining a certain level of public 
confidence. This is particularly so in the current economic environment, where customers are 
placing increased importance on the safety and security of their funds, and banks may not be 
in a position to refund their customers in the event that there is a run on deposits. 
As far as an institution's reputation is concerned, perception is reality. Consequently, the 
way an institution's constituents perceive what it is doing in the fight against money 
102 Fisse, B., and Braithwaite, J., The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Offenders (1983) 289. 
103 Argenti, P.A., 'The Challenge of Protecting Reputation', Financial Times (London). 30 September 2005 
<http://news.ft.com/cms/s/7da92b26-31 07-llda-acl b-00000e2511 c8.dwp uuid~358e659a-2068-11 da-b59e-
00000e2511 c8.html> at 19 April 2006. 
104 Op cit n43. 
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laundering and terrorism financing, is equally important as what it is actually doing. Claims 
that a financial institution has been involved with money laundering or terrorism financing 
do not need to be publicly substantiated or legally proven to wreak havoc on its reputation. 105 
As is further explored in Chapter 7 of this thesis, this fact has been demonstrated in recent 
years by largely unsubstantiated claims involving Banco Delta Asia, a financial institution 
based in Macau. 
Over the past decade, many consultants, AML/CTF practitioners and regulatory officials 
have touted the potential reputational costs associated with poor AML/CTF controls and/or 
the commission of a money laundering or terrorism financing offence. They have held that 
even where an institution's reputation has been polished for several years, adverse publicity 
tying it to money laundering or terrorism financing activities (whether or not due to 
ineptitude, malfeasance or simply bad luck on the part of the institution)106 may undermine 
public confidence in its integrity and destabilise its operations. 107 Some industry experts have 
gone further and claimed that an institution that fails to identify its ML/TF risk and/or 
implement appropriate AML/CTF controls may develop an "adverse reputation among 
money launderers or financers of terrorism as being an easy channel through which to 
operate ". 108 
The theory that money launderers and terrorism financiers may flock to institutions 
considered to be non-compliant with AML/CTF regulations, is relatively common. However, 
it is largely untested (presumably due to the inherent difficulties in measuring its accuracy) 
and as a result, its validity remains questionable. Contrary to popular belief, it might be that 
money launderers and terrorism financiers actually prefer to conduct their activities through 
institutions that are perceived by regulators to be 'clean'. Whilst it may prove more difficult 
to place 'dirty' funds with AMLICTF compliant institutions, such entities are unlikely to 
105 Economist lntelligence Unit and PricewaterhouseCoopers, Taming Uncertainty: Risk Management for the 
Entire Enterprise (2002) PricewaterhouseCoopers 2 
<http://www.pwc.com/images/gxleng/fs/111802taming.pdf> at II August 2006. 
106 Op cit n39. 
107 Op cit n49. 
108 See O'Callaghan, T., and Alfano, J., Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism: Back to Basics 
(2007) Money Management <http://www.moneymanagement.eom.au/ Article.aspx?Article10=215380> on 23 
March 2008. 
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attract the kind of unwanted regulatory scrutiny and/or review that may uncover the illicit 
source of those funds. Though it may be contrary to common perceptions of reputational 
risk, further research is required to determine if in some cases, a positive reputation may 
actually heighten an institution's vulnerability to more sophisticated money laundering and 
terrorism financing techniques. 
Whilst further study is necessary to determine whether a financial institution's exposure to 
money laundering and terrorism financing will typically be increased or decreased by an 
unfavourable corporate reputation, it is clear that an institution's reputation may be its 
greatest asset. As the business models typically used by financial services firms are founded 
on safety and security, any shadow cast on their integrity can give rise to both reputational 
and financial damage. 
As an institution's reputation is simply a reflection of facts, perceptions and expectations, a 
number of risk management texts claim that it may be a key factor in determining its share 
price. 109 According to some estimates, an entity's reputation may account for as much as four 
per cent of its share price. 110 Given that the value of an institution's shares represents the 
present value of its expected future dividend stream (discounted at a rate which takes into 
account related risk and expected growth) plus its additional reputational assets, 111 it follows 
that an institution's association with money laundering or terrorism financing can potentially 
weaken its share price. 112 Non-compliance with AMLICTF regulations may lead to a 
perception within the market that an institution has a poor control environment that might 
ultimately erode its expected future cash flows or increase its rate of retum. 113 It may give 
109 Doerig, H., Operational Risks in Financial Services: An Old Challenge in a New Environment (Credit 
Suisse Group, Switzerland, 2001) 24. 
11
° Cowan, A., 'Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punishment by Publicity under the New Sentencing 
Guidelines' (1992) 65 Southern California Law Review 2367. 
111 See Louisot, J., "Risk Management in Practice: Reputation' (2004) 6(3) Risk Management: An 
International Journal 35. 
112 Aon Corporation, Corporate Reputation: Not Worth Risking (2003) 
<http://www.aon.com/about/publications/pdf/issues/wharton corp rep r040303.pd1> at 19 April 2006. 
113 Perry, J., and de Fontnouvelle, P., Measuring Reputational Risk: The Market Reaction to Operational 
Loss Announcements (2005) Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
<http://www.bos.frb.org/bankinfo/qau/jppd 1005.pd1> at 30 March 2006. 
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rise to a Joss of current or future customers, an exodus of staff, 114 a reduction in current or 
future business partners, and increased costs associated with fines and other remedial 
actions115 
The ability of reputational damage to cause corresponding financial damage highlights the 
need for institutions to adopt and execute a strategy for managing the reputational risk they 
face as a result of money laundering and terrorism financing. That said, not all of the 
traditional risk management strategies will be appropriate for managing such risk. For 
instance, given that a financial institution's competitiveness is likely to be hinged somewhat 
upon its reputation for safety and security, 116 it would not be commercially sagacious for a 
bank to simply 'accept' its MLITF risk. Rebuilding a tarnished reputation may be a lengthy, 
arduous and costly process,117 and it would be commercially unwise (if not altogether 
reckless) for an institution to identify- but do little about- the risk posed to its reputation by 
money laundering and terrorism financing. 
In addition to an acceptance risk management strategy, risk transfer is also unlikely to offer 
institutions a comprehensive solution to managing their reputational risk. Although insurance 
may address certain facets ofreputational damage, 118 no comprehensive coverage is yet 
available for reputational risk due to the inherent difficulties in determining the value of an 
institution's reputation, and the possible cost of restoring it. 119 Similarly, risk avoidance also 
does not offer financial institutions a complete solution to managing their reputational risk. As 
money launderers and terrorism financiers can theoretically infiltrate any area of an 
institution's business, an institution cannot entirely avoid its related reputational risk without 
foregoing all of its operations. Clearly, this is an impossible outcome for institutions and an 
114 Op cit n I 03. 
115 Opcitnll3. 
116 Opcitnl09. 
117 Lowthers, B., and Shultz, C., 'Integrating Identity Verification into Risk Management' (2004) 25(11) ABA 
Bank Compliance 36. 
118 For instance, liability insurance may cover the costs of any arising litigation, additional coverage may 
cover the costs of business interruption, and limited crisis-communication coverage may cover some of the 
costs associated with necessary public relations and advertising campaigns. 
119 The cost of restoring a company's reputation may be dependent upon factors such as the size of the 
company, the number and nature of markets the company operates in, and the crisis management skills of the 
company's senior management team. See Harris, R., Op cit n39. 
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undesirable one for AMLICTF regulators. Risk-based approaches to AMLICTF do not seek to 
prohibit institutions from conducting business in higher risk areas. On the contrary, they enable 
institutions to conduct activities and enter into relationships representing a higher MLITF risk, 
provided that the risk is addressed through appropriate risk-based systems and controls. 
Although an avoidance strategy does not offer institutions a holistic solution to managing 
their reputational risk, institutions may nevertheless limit their exposure by ceasing to 
operate those parts of their business representing the greatest ML/TF risk. Whilst this might 
cause a significant loss of funds for an institution, it nevertheless appears possible for an 
entity to discontinue its riskiest business activities and still exploit their potential to generate 
profits. To illustrate, private banking is generally regarded as carrying a greater exposure to 
money laundering because it involves the discrete delivery of financial services to high net-
worth individuals. 120 In September 2005, banking giant Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) 
sold its upmarket funds management group and three Swiss private banks to Bank Julius 
Baer for CHF3.8 billion (AUD$3.5 billion) in cash and a 21.5 per cent stake in the Julius 
Baer Group. 121 Presumably, the primary motivation behind this sale had little to do with the 
mitigation of MLITF risk. However, by selling these higher risk businesses and maintaining 
a financial stake in them, UBS has effectively shifted some of its MLITF reputational risk to 
another entity whilst still financially benefiting from their operation. If any of the private 
banking accounts sold to Julius Baer were subsequently tied to money laundering or 
terrorism financing, Julius Baer would likely bear the brunt of any resulting reputational 
damage. Although UBS would likely be financially affected by such an occurrence, the 
bank's brand would presumably be left unscathed due to the fact that Julius Baer maintained 
operational responsibility for those businesses. 
Thus, given that institutions are currently unable to holistically manage their reputational risk 
through acceptance, transfer or avoidance strategies, their most viable option is to mitigate 
such risk. Though unable to eliminate the reputation a! risk they face as a result of money 
120 See Sma11, R.A, 'Vulnerability of Private Banking to Money Laundering Activities' (Testimony before 
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 10 
November 1999). 
121 Wright, T., 'UBS Sells 3 Private Banks to Another Unit of a Rival', The New York Times (New York), 6 
September 2005, C.2. 
43 
laundering and terrorism financing activities, institutions will nevertheless be capable of 
reducing their risk by encouraging sound project management122 and implementing 
AMLICTF controls commensurate to their risk. By establishing an appropriate AMLICTF 
program, an institution may go beyond simply maintaining its reputation, to enhancing it in 
the eyes of both the public and regulatory authorities. 
2.5 Systemic risk 
The concept of systemic risk recognises that risk cannot be compartmentalised because it is 
innately endogenous and capable of being transmitted amongst institutions and between 
markets. 123 According to the Bank for International Settlements, the term 'systemic risk' 
refers to the possibility that a market participant's failure to meet its contractual obligations 
may cause other participants to default and, through a chain reaction, lead to broader 
financial difficulties. 124 However, in recent years that definition has been extended beyond 
the risk inherent in traditional lending, to embrace market participants' interdependencies 
and common risk factors in a far more general sense. 125 The concept of systemic risk now 
embraces the risk attached to a range of operational activities and exposures, including 
exposure to reputational risk. 
Financial institutions are directly linked through interbank deposits, loans and payment 
system clearings, and indirectly linked through their operation in the same (or similar) 
markets. 126 Due to the existence of these complex financial interrelationships, systemic risk 
is particularly prevalent within the financial services sector. Adverse shocks are typically 
transmitted more rapidly within the financial services industry than many others industry 
122 Op cit nlll. 
123 Systemic risk recognises that risk is not independent of market participants' own actions but rather, is 
determined by the collective behaviour of individual market players. See Crockett, A., 'Introductory 
Remarks' (Speech delivered at the Third Joint Central Bank Research Conference on Risk Measurement and 
Systemic Risk, Basel, 7 March 2002) 2. 
124 Bank for International Settlements, 64'• Annual Report (BIS, Switzerland, 1994) 177. 
125 Icard, A., 'Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk' (Speech delivered at the Fourth Joint Central Bank 
Research Conference on Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk, Frankfurt, 8 November 2005). 
126 Kaufman, G.G, and Scott, E.E., Does Bank Regulation Retard or Contribute to Systemic Risk? (Working 
Paper No. 211, Stanford Law School, California, 2000), 6. 
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sectors 127 and as a result, the impact of a major bank's indiscretions may cause a "rippling 
effect "128 that proves to be catastrophic for other institutions. 129 lf regulatory authorities were 
to freeze a large proportion of an institution's funds because they were connected to money 
laundering or terrorism financing, other institutions relying on those funds may be unable to 
honour their own debts 130 and/or facilitate their own operations/other transactions, as 
planned. 
An institution that suffers an adverse shock due to money laundering or terrorism financing 
activities may systemically impact other institutions and/or financial markets in two 
conflicting ways. 131 The affected financial institution may: 
• reduce the aggregate investment in the economy and create a recessionary spill over 
which decreases the profitability of other banks; 132 and/or 
• confer a strategic benefit on remaining banks by enabling them to increase the scope of 
their operations, build their customer base, and lower their operational costs by acquiring 
further lending facilities. 133 
Indeed, the strength and scope of the two aforementioned impacts will hinge upon the size 
and importance of the relevant institution adversely impacted by money laundering or 
terrorism financing. 134 Logically, the larger and more significant a financial institution is, the 
greater is its systemic importance and the power of any 'ripple effect' arising from its 
activities. Evidently, the failure of a global financial conglomerate would pose more 
systemic risk and have greater ramifications for the rest of the financial system than the 
failure of a small community bank. 1)5 
127 Opcitnl26,4. 
128 Baldwin, F.N., 'Exposure of Financial Institutions to Criminal Liability' (2006) 13(4) Journal of 
Financial Crime 387. 
129 Alexander, K., 'UK Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator's Role as 
Stakeholder' (2004) 33 Stetson Law Review 991. 
130 Ewing, M.A., Essays in Banking and Systemic Risk (Ph.D., Princeton University, 1998) 3. 
131 Eatwell, J., 'International Regulation, Risk Management and the Creation of Jnstability' (Speech delivered 
at the International Monetary Fund, Washington, I October 2004) 2. 
132 A recessionary spill over might occur due to a reduction ofthe aggregate supply of deposits. 
133 Acharya, V .V ., Essays in Regulation of Banks and Financial Institutions (Ph.D., New York University, 
2001) 4. 
134 Opcitnl27,6. 
135 Herring, R., International Financial Conglomerates: Implications for Bank Insolvency Regimes (Wharton 
School, Pennsylvania, 2003) 3. 
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Despite the clear impacts that an institution's failure may have upon other entities 
conducting similar activities or servicing the same markets, a number of institutions may not 
acknowledge the possible systemic implications arising from another entity's association 
with money laundering or terrorism financing. 136 Traditionally, some institutions have 
regarded systemic risk as a negative externality 137 that does not need to be priced into their 
speculative activities. 138 Although several international bodies have tried to counter this trend 
by addressing systemic risk through regulation, risk-based approaches to AMLICTF 
arguably reinforce such introspective views of risk. They seemingly encourage 
microeconomic approaches to risk and it is therefore somewhat paradoxical that regulators 
may seek to use them to inadvertently regulate systemic risk when systemic risk is, by 
definition, an externality that institutions cannot completely control. 139 
Given that systemic risk pervades financial markets and the banking industry, individual 
institutions cannot altogether control or eradicate it through an avoidance, acceptance or risk 
transfer strategy. However, they can seek to mitigate their systemic risk by instituting 
controls that minimise the possible effects that another bank's failure may have on it, and the 
possible effects that its own operations or ultimate failure may have on other banks. Even 
when operating in jurisdictions with risk-based approaches to AMLICTF, institutions should 
still assess whether the actions and policies that seem desirable for them individually, might 
I . d . II I4o resu t m a verse consequences system1ca y. 
One of the most pertinent examples of the systemic risk that may flow from a financial 
institution's facilitation of money laundering activities, is the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (DCCI). BCCI operated under a dual banking structure, through an 
impenetrable series of holding companies, affiliates, subsidiaries, insider dealings and 
136 Davis, H., 'A New Regulator for the New Millenium' (Speech delivered at the Proceedings of Financial 
Services Authority Conference: A Radical New Approach to Regulation, London, II December 2000). 
137 Externalities may be defined as those costs and benefits accruing to society which are external to the 
calculations of the individual investor, and not accounted for in the market place. See Eatwell, J., Op cit n 131. 
138 Eatwell, J. and Taylor, L., Global Finance at Risk: The Case for International Regulation (2000) 7-10. 
139 Opcitn131,5. 
140 Op cit n 123. 
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nominee relationships. 141 This complex and convoluted corporate structure not only 
increased the bank's risk of being exploited for money laundering purposes, but hindered the 
ability of regulatory authorities to identify if this was in fact occurring. This became apparent 
after regulatory and law enforcement officials identified that BCCJ had a history of: 
• evading legal restrictions on cross border movements of currency; 
• maintaining offshore accounts holding large and undetected sums of money; and 
• laundering millions of U.S. dollars for its customers, many of whom were high net-worth 
individuals seeking to hide the proceeds of their illegal enterprises-' 42 
Once BCCJ's money laundering activities were brought to light in 1991, the central banks of 
various countries blocked the institution's transactions and froze its accounts in order to limit 
the systemic risk stemming from its failure. However, this did not prevent substantial 
damage occurring to many smaller financial sectors where the bank operated, 143 or spare 
BCCI' s customers from having to deal with the disarray of international bankruptcy 
proceedings. BCCI's money laundering activities not only impacted its own customers, but 
also had broad consequences for other institutions without any direct, commercial ties to the 
bank. By way of example, following the BCCI scandal, a number of foreign institutions 
found it considerably more difficult to obtain approval to operate in the U.S. Those that were 
able to do so, faced more onerous legislative requirements and levels ofregulation. 144 
Evidently, in the financial services industry, where institutions are often interlinked and 
interconnected on a number of levels, the involvement of one large bank in a money 
laundering or terrorism financing scandal can have far-reaching and potentially unforeseen 
implications for consumers, institutions, financial markets and jurisdictions alike. 
141 The non-bank holding company, BCCJ Holdings SA, owned two separate banks that serviced two 
separate jurisdictions. Whilst one ofthe banks conducted business through 47 branches in 13 countries, the 
other operated 63 bank branches in 28 countries. 
142 Kerry, J., and Brown, H., The BCCJ Affair, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate, 102d Congress 2d Session Senate Print 102-140, 1992. 
143 Countries inc1uding Bangladesh, Bahrain and Cyprus all suffered significantly as a result ofBCCI's 
AMLICTF failures. Op cit n 135, I 7. See also International Monetary Fund, Qffshore Financial Centers: The 
Role of the IMF (2000) <http://www.imf.orglexternal/np/mae/oshore/2000/englrole.htm> at 13 May 2006. 
144 United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Information Technologies for Control of 
Money Laundering, OTA-!TC-630 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1995) 15. 
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2.6 Credit risk 
Credit risk is considered the oldest banking risk 145 and it concerns the possibility that 
borrowers may default on their loans. 146 Although generally overlooked in AMLICTF 
literature, there are three primary types of credit risk -consumer risk, company risk and 
country risk. 147 Interestingly, two of these appear to align neatly with the 'three bases' of risk 
commonly used by financial institutions to assess their MLITF risk. 
Though it may not otherwise be readily applicable to the advent of money laundering or 
terrorism financing, credit risk nevertheless bears some relevance to institutions trying to 
mitigate the risks represented by such crimes. The relevance of credit risk is perhaps most 
apparent where a financial institution has a number of accounts/transactions frozen under 
AMLICTF legislation because they relate to persons involved with, or involve funds 
traceable to, illicit activities. In such a scenario, the freezing of the relevant funds might have 
credit implications both for the institution at hand, and any other entity seeking to lay claim 
to those now irretrievable funds. 
An institution's credit risk in relation to money laundering and terrorism financing will 
clearly be heightened where it lacks adequate knowledge regarding its customers' identities, 
businesses, and relationships with other borrowers. A complex lending transaction, coupled 
with inadequate or poorly executed Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures, may lead to 
loan arrangements with undesirable or fictitious customers. Loan arrangements involving 
"related counterparties, connected borrowers, and a common source of income or assets for 
repayment"148 will not only increase an institution's credit risk, 149 but also its risk of 
145 Caruana, J., 'Contemporary Issues in Credit Risk', (Speech delivered at the Credit Risk Summit USA 
2003, New York, 27 October 2003). 
146 In this context, "default' means failing to fulfil contractual obligations in a timely manner, due to inability 
and/or unwillingness. See Lam, J., Enterprise Risk Management: From incentives to Controls (2003). 
147 World Bank, Analyzing and Managing Banking Risk: A Framework for Assessing Corporate Governance 
and Financial Risk (2"4 ed, 2003) 135. 
148 World Bank, Money Laundering Impacts Development 
<http://wwwl.worldbank.org/finance/html/amlCTF/docs/Ref Guide EN/v2/02-Ch02 EN v2.pdf> at I April 
2006. 
149 The greater the number of parties involved in any loan transaction, the more difficult it will potentially be 
for the lending institution to recoup its funds. ln the event that the primary borrower defaults, any related 
counterparties and/or connect borrowers may be given first priority in terms of their claim to the monies 
owed. 
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conducting business with money launderers and terrorism financiers. Identifying the ultimate 
or beneficial owners of certain accounts/transactions has occasionally proven to be a difficult 
exercise for financial institutions, particularly in relation to complex corporate structures. 
Thus, in order to mitigate their MLITF risk, as well as their exposure to customers engaged 
in activities such as fraud and tax evasion, it is necessary for institutions to conduct the 
necessary due diligence to identify these individuals. 
Whilst a number of the traditional techniques for credit risk minimisation are not applicable 
to the issues of AMLICTF (e.g. the taking of security facilities), financial institutions can 
still minimise their credit risk exposure through the use of a risk mitigation strategy. By 
establishing an effective due diligence regime aimed at understanding their customers' 
business interests and accurately identifying the beneficial owners of accounts, institutions 
can decrease their risk of engaging in loan arrangements with known criminals or terrorists. 
Further, they can minimise their credit risk by pinpointing the existing and potential risks 
inherent in their lending activities, 150 and addressing them through diversification and the 
d . . fl 151 un erwntmg o oans. 
Unlike the assessment ofMLITF risk, the measurement of credit risk has developed into a 
relatively precise science. Institutions now have access to significant amounts of statistical 
and historical data when calculating the credit risk associated with a particular borrower. By 
comparison, MLITF risk does not lend itself to such methodical assessment. Firstly, there are 
limited amounts of data available with respect to ML/TF risk so its measurement is far more 
subjective than credit risk. Whilst there are accepted methodologies for the assessment of 
credit risk, MLITF risk cannot be mathematically calculated. Even with the availability of 
money laundering typologies and a number of guidance notes from international bodies, 
there is no globally accepted standard with respect to accurately gauging MLITF risk. Unlike 
credit risk, the methods used to assess the ML/TF risk attached to a particular customer or 
jurisdiction are more imprecise- potentially varying widely and drawing on subjective 
assessments of risk. 
150 Opcitn147. 
151 Opcitn146. 
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2. 7 Operational risk 
According to the Basel Committee, 'operational risk' is the risk of directly or indirectly 
suffering loss as a consequence of inadequate internal processes, people and systems, or 
external events. 152 Since it rose to prominence in the early 1990s following a series of 
operational failures by several financial institutions (most notably, Barings Bank), the need 
for institutions to address their operational risk has steadily escalated. 153 This is largely due 
to the introduction of international capital adequacy regulations, 154 the growing diversity of 
financial products/services, and the increasingly automated environment in which such 
products/services are delivered. 155 
Unlike many other traditional types of risk, operational risk can itself give rise to the 
commission of money laundering or terrorism financing activities. Rather than the risk and 
damage that may result from an institution's alleged or actual involvement in a MLITF 
offence, it is concerned with the possibility that an institution's internal weaknesses may 
create an 'operational failure risk' or an 'operational strategic risk' that leads to an 
AMLICTF compliance failure and an array of other risks (e.g. reputational risk). Whilst an 
operational failure risk arises internally as a result of an institution's people, processes or 
technology, an operational strategic risk arises externally from environmental factors beyond 
an institution's control. 156 It should be noted however that an operational strategic risk linked 
to MLITF can inevitably translate into an operational failure risk. For example, whilst 
amendments to AMLICTF legislation will represent a strategic risk for an institution, any 
failure on the part of that institution to comply with the revised legislation will constitute an 
operational failure risk. 
iSl Suresha, R., and Karthik, K.V ., Mitigating Operational Risk- An Approach to Countering Money 
Laundering, I flex Consulting <http://www.itlexconsulting.com/Expertise/rnitigate.pdf> at 2 June 2006. 
153 Keenan, C., 'Overview: Will Risk Fixes Boost Competitive Edge?' (2003) 168(235)American Banker 12. 
154 Herbert, C., Five Ways to Manage Operational Risk in an Even Riskier World, IBM Australia 
<http://www-8.ibm.com/nzJmedia/downloads/IBMarticles/Operational risk.pdf> at 23 May 2006. 
155 Mantas Inc. and Celent Communications, White Paper: Using Behaviour Detection to Identify 
Operalional Risk (2003) 
<http://www.mantas.comiGiobaiAssets/PDF/WhitePapers/CelentOperationaiRisk.pdf> at I April 2006. 
156 Op cit n62. 
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As evidenced by a number of AMLICTF compliance failures, ML/TF risk may be closely 
related to operational risk. In several highly publicised cases, an institution's facilitation of 
money laundering activities has been attributed to its employees, technology or inadequate 
AMLICTF program. Given that no AMLICTF compliance program can be entirely 
technological, it is often the interaction between its technological and human components 
that carries the greatest operational risk. As later discussed in this thesis, some of the most 
notable penalties incurred by institutions under AMLICTF legislation have stemmed from 
the non-compliant activities of particular employees, and the inability of poorly implemented 
systems/compliance programs to prevent or detect their behaviour. 
Operational risk can arise in unpredictable circumstances and is, to differing degrees, 
inherent in all business activities. Thus, whilst institutions can never eradicate their 
operational risk, they can nevertheless mitigate such risk by implementing an AMLICTF 
program, conducting appropriate staff training, and periodically subjecting their AML/CTF 
systems and controls to independent reviews. Further, they can seek to minimise their 
exposure by attempting to periodically quantify the operational risk they face in relation to 
money laundering and terrorism financing. 
Financial institutions traditionally measured their operational risk using subjective self-
assessments. However, given that several large banks have suffered significant financial loss 
during the past decade as a result of inaccurate self-assessments, more sophisticated 
institutions are now attempting to develop more reliable methods of measuring their 
operational risk. 157 Nevertheless, the quantification of operational risk still remains 
inherently difficult because such risk is generally context dependent and its primary drivers-
institutional staff and institutions themselves- are unique and ever evolving. Only 'high 
probability/low impact' events with little context dependency will provide institutions with 
enough observable data to measure their operational risk level. 158 Such events may lend 
157 Opcitnl56. 
158 Op cit n I 09, 94. 
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themselves to statistical analysis and enable institutions to identify their prevalence by 
collecting data on their occurrence over an extended period. 159 
By comparison, statistical analysis cannot be usefully applied to 'low probability/high 
impact' loss events. 160 Large money laundering and terrorism financing scandals arguably 
fall within this category of events because they are so highly context dependent that 
institutions may only be capable of tracking the associated changes in their operational risk 
levels over time. In any event, it is unlikely that any institution could effectively gauge its 
own operational risk by simply monitoring the highly publicised AML/CTF scandals 
involving other institutions. Low probability/high impact loss events are hinged upon an 
institution's particular circumstances and the nature of the individuals involved. 
Consequently, the context dependency of operational risk means that such events do not 
generally provide reliable indicators of the risk that other institutions may face in the future. 
However, it is perhaps unimportant that institutions are largely incapable of quantifying their 
operational risk in relation to low probability/high impact money laundering events. Whilst it 
is important for institutions to identify their potential exposure to such events, it is not 
always necessary that they precisely calculate the operational risk they face as a result of 
such events. Indeed, risk-based approaches to AMLICTF only require institutions to create 
an internal control environment that is commensurate to the level of ML/TF risk that they 
might reasonably face. Requiring institutions to specifically tailor their AML programs to 
low probability/high impact loss events would likely be a costly and resource-intensive 
exercise- and potentially one that provides little benefit to regulatory authorities. 
It is clear that measuring the operational risk attached to money laundering and terrorism 
financing events will often prove to be difficult for institutions. Such crimes typically 
involve tangled webs of complex behaviours, 161 and the overriding risk level can only be 
assessed once an overall behaviour (or pattern of behaviour) is identified. Whilst many 
institutions are trying to assess their levels of operational and ML/TF risk by building 
159 Opcitnl55. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
52 
behavioural and transaction monitoring into their compliance programs, detection can still be 
problematic. The individual transactions used to facilitate money laundering or terrorism 
financing may occur over a period of time and be buried amongst millions of similar 
transactions. They might also be obscured by the ability of money launderers and terrorism 
financiers to continually alter their behaviour and evade older, outdated detection 
techniques. 162 Thus, although behavioural and transaction monitoring systems cannot 
eliminate the operational risk represented by money laundering and terrorism financing 
activities, such technologies can assist institutions to better understand their risk levels and 
mitigate them accordingly. 
2.8 Conclusion 
Over the past few decades, money laundering and terrorism financing have emerged as 
significant political and international issues. Whilst AML attracted a degree of attention 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the events of September II provided a graphic demonstration of 
the need for governmental AMLICTF efforts to be cohesive and coordinated. It is now 
widely accepted that any strategies aimed at addressing money laundering and terrorism 
financing must involve the cooperation of financial institutions, regulatory authorities and 
law enforcement officials if they are to be successful. Accordingly, financial institutions can 
no longer sit idly and expect national governments to combat money laundering and 
terrorism financing activities without private sector engagement. Indeed, many international 
bodies and national governments now recognise the integral role that financial institutions 
must play in safeguarding the international financial system, and assisting governments to 
identify (and combat) predicate offences. 
Since 200 I, a number of jurisdictions have enacted risk-based AMLICTF legislation 
requiring institutions to assess their individual levels ofMLITF risk. To fulfil their legislative 
AMLICTF obligations, many institutions are now framing their overall MLITF risk in terms 
"' Ibid. 
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of their customer risk, product/channel risk and jurisdiction risk. 163 It is believed that by 
using these 'three bases' of risk, institutions can identify, manage and mitigate their areas of 
greatest money laundering and terrorism financing exposure. 
However, whilst customer risk, product/channel risk and jurisdiction risk typically underpin 
risk-based approaches to AMLICTF, there appears to be some value in contextual ising 
MLITF risk in terms of older, more traditional types of risk. Though MLITF risk might not 
fit neatly within the confines of all such risk types, viewing it through the lens of traditional 
risks will enable institutions to better understand the broader consequence risk that money 
laundering and terrorism financing represent to their businesses. It will allow them to extend 
their analysis beyond the likelihood of money laundering and terrorism financing infiltrating 
their operations (which is inherently what the 'three bases' of risk seek to identify), to the 
possible ramifications attached to such an occurrence. By contextualising MLITF risk in 
terms of traditional risk types, institutions may also gain a better insight into the practical 
approaches and strategies that they may employ to manage their MLffF risk and/or mitigate 
the fallout stemming from any money laundering or terrorism financing event. 
A number of AMLICTF professionals, media commentators and regulatory authorities have 
emphasised the potential damage that an institution may sustain following the commission of 
a money laundering or terrorism financing offence and/or an AMLICTF compliance failure. 
Many have repeatedly held that an institution connected to money laundering or terrorism 
financing activities may incur significant financial damage and irreparable reputational 
damage. In today's increasingly diverse and regulated financial markets, it is clear that 
money laundering and terrorism financing pose an array of risks for financial institutions. 
However, due to the fiercely competitive nature of the financial services industry, the speed 
with which AMLICTF compliance failures can be broadcast to a global audience, and the 
lack of clarity regarding what some regulators will deem to be appropriate risk-based 
systems and controls, the extent of(and potential consequences attached to) an institution's 
MLITF risk remains largely unquantifiable. This is perhaps one of the primary reasons for 
163 It should be noted that in certain jurisdictions, AML/CTF legislative instruments actually require 
financial institutions to assess their MLITF in tenns ofthese separate types of risk. For instance, see 
Australia's Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules Instrument 2007 (No. /) (Cth). 
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the almost unquestioned acceptance of widely publicised claims that involvement in a money 
laundering or terrorism financing scandal may carry disastrous consequences and, in some 
cases, prove to be institutionally fatal. 
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Chapter3 
Looking at AML/CTF Legal Risk through the 
Lens of Criminal Law 
"He who profits by a crime, commits it"- Sir Walter Scott 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the events of September II, a number of significant changes have been made to the 
U.S. political and regulatory landscape. Expansive AMLICTF laws have been enacted, 
harsher criminal sanctions have accompanied AMLICTF compliance failures, and 
institutions have been confronted with a spate of new corporate responsibilities. According 
to some commentators, these changes have meant that financial institutions are now exposed 
to an increased risk of incurring criminal liability in relation to money laundering and 
terrorism financing offences, and/or breaches of AMLICTF legislation. 
Since the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001, financial institutions operating in the 
U.S. have been required to implement an effective AMLICTF compliance program, comply 
with additional reporting and KYC requirements, and employ a range of other AMLICTF 
controls. Whilst these extended obligations have certainly heightened the regulatory burden 
placed upon financial institutions, the AMLICTF legal risk faced by organisations has also 
increased, at least theoretically, as a result of the allegedly more aggressive enforcement of 
AMLICTF laws by U.S. regulatory authorities. 164 
In general terrns, an institution's AMLICTF legal risk is the chance of it facing litigation 
(including civil actions and criminal prosecution), adverse legal judgments, unenforceable 
contracts, fines and other legal penalties as a result of non-compliance with AMLICTF 
legislation. 165 As opposed to MLITF risk, which is solely concerned with the risk represented 
by money laundering and terrorism financing (i.e. in and of themselves), AMLICTF legal 
164 Vartanian, T.P., 'Money Laundering Dominates Bank Enforcement Actions' (2004) 169(185)American 
Banker 10. 
165 Op cit n 148. 
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risk is more outward-looking as it concerns the risk represented by non-compliance with 
municipal and/or extraterritorial AMLICTF laws. In the context of risk-based approaches to 
AMLICTF, such non-compliance is not limited to the deliberate facilitation of money 
laundering or terrorism financing, or even the inadvertent contravention of prescriptive 
legislative requirements. It can also arise as a consequence of an institution's failure to 
identify, mitigate and manage its ongoing MLITF risk. 
Whilst Chapter 4 of this thesis explores AML/CTF legal risk in the context of civil law, this 
Chapter focuses on an institution's risk in relation to the initiation of criminal enforcement 
proceedings and the imposition of criminal penalties. It provides an overview of the ways in 
which an institution and/or its employees may be held criminally liable for non-compliance 
with local or foreign AMLICTF laws. Further, it assesses the veracity of the oft-published 
claims that an institution linked to a money laundering or terrorism event is likely to face 
criminal charges, financial damage and a loss of market share. For the purposes of 
discussion, this Chapter is divided into several broad topic areas, including the: 
• principles underpinning the imputation of criminal liability to corporate entities; 
• criminal penalties that can accompany a money laundering or terrorism financing offence 
and/or a breach of AMLICTF legislation; 
• apparent frequency (or otherwise) with which criminal proceedings are invoked and 
criminal penalties are imposed upon a non-compliant institution; 
• extraterritorial laws and sanctions creating an additional layer of regulatory requirements 
for institutions; and 
• willingness of regulatory authorities and the courts to pursue criminal breaches of 
AML/CTF legislation. 
As discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the U.S. is predominantly used as a case study for 
AMLICTF regulation because it has some of the most visibly enforced AMLICTF laws, as 
well as some of the strongest legislative expressions of extraterritoriality. In recent years, the 
U.S. has hosted some of the most highly publicised criminal enforcement actions for 
breaches of AMLICTF laws. Further, it has seen some of the most damaging penalties given 
to institutions for such breaches. As opposed to a number of other jurisdictions such as 
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Australia, where no institution has yet been criminally prosecuted for breaches of the 
country's AMLICTF Act 2006 (Cth), there is a wealth of information available for the 
purposes of analysing the levels and types of risk faced by institutions operating under the 
U.S. AMLICTF regime. 
Given the nuances of U.S. AMLICTF laws and the U.S. enforcement environment, it is 
recognised that the analysis contained in this Chapter will not be equally relevant to 
determining the AMLICTF legal risk faced by institutions operating under different 
AMLICTF regimes. Similarly, where analysis is provided with respect to the AMLICTF legal 
risk faced by institutions in other countries, this will not necessarily be applicable to the 
experiences of those operating in the U.S. Nevertheless, whilst a number of nation states are 
still in the process of drafting, enacting and implementing their AMLICTF laws, and/or 
otherwise developing their enforcement environments, the U.S. experience provides an 
interesting case study for determining just how great the AMLICTF legal risk faced by 
institutions can actually be. This is particularly so, given that the country is often considered 
to be (whether rightly or wrongly) the international vanguard in terms of AMLICTF 
regulation and enforcement. 
3.2 The concept of corporate criminal liability 
Though once considered to be incapable of committing crimes in their own capacity, it is 
now well established that corporate entities are legal persons capable of holding property, 
suing and being sued, conducting transactions and, in certain jurisdictions, committing 
criminal offences and being punished for those offences. Whilst civil law obligations (e.g. 
contract, tort and restitution) have generally been applied to corporate entities with relative 
ease, the application of criminal law obligations to such entities has often proved to be more 
controversial. 166 This is primarily due to the inherent nature of corporate entities (i.e. the fact 
they are essentially collections of individuals bound together by complex webs of legal rights 
and duties) and the fact that criminal liability will often hinge upon the existence of 'fault', 
166 Wells, C., Criminal Responsibility of Legal Persons in Common Law Jurisdictions, Paper prepared for 
OECD Anti-Corruption Unit, Paris, 4 October 2000, 2. 
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generally in the fonn of intention, knowledge or subjective recklessness. Nevertheless, at 
common law there has been a gradual expansion of corporate criminal liability, both in terms 
of the range of offences that a corporation is capable of committing, and the way in which 
liability may be imputed to a corporation for such offences. 167 
Today, there are a number oflegal principles being used by different jurisdictions for the 
purposes of attributing criminal liability to corporate or legal persons. Firstly, the concept of 
vicarious liability (referred to in the U.S. as respondeat superior) is currently used in many 
countries to hold a corporation criminally liable for offences committed by its 
employees/agents in circumstances where: 
• such employees/agents had the requisite mens rea; 168 and 
• the relevant offences were within the scope of their employment and intended to benefit 
the corporation. 
Transplanted from civil law, the doctrine of vicarious liability is a derivative form of liability 
because it seeks to equate corporate culpability with that of an individua1. 169 
For the purposes of finding a corporation vicariously liable for the criminal acts of its 
employees, it will often be inconsequential whether the conduct of the relevant individual(s) 
violated corporate policy. In many jurisdictions, a corporation can be held criminally 
responsible for the activities of its employees even where it had a pristine corporate culture 
and its executive had taken reasonable steps to prevent their employees from violating the 
law no In other words, a corporation can be held strictly liable for the crimes of its 
employees. Although some jurisdictions (such as the U.S.) have endorsed the application of 
vicarious liability to both strict liability offences and those requiring subjective knowledge, 
167 Opcitnl66, 10. 
168 
"Mens rea" refers to the requisite mental state for a particular offence, e.g. intention or knowledge. 
169 Opcitnl66,4. 
170 Hasnas, J., Rethinking Vicarious Criminal Liability: Corporate Culpability for While-Collar Crime (2006) 
The Heritage Foundation <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Legallssues/wm 1195.cfm> at 30 December 
2008. 
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others (including England) have restricted the use of vicarious liability to a limited number of 
strict liability and/or regulatory offences. 171 
Secondly, to a theory more widely endorsed in Australian, English and Canadian law, a 
corporation may be held liable for the culpable transgressions of certain senior corporate 
officers, i.e. those senior managers regarded as the 'directing mind' of the corporation. 
Typically referred to as the 'alter ego' or 'identification' theory, this theory was developed 
by the U.K. courts in the 1940s to overcome the challenges associated with assigning 
criminal liability to corporate entities for serious offences requiring mens rea. Under it, 
certain key personnel are held to act as the company (rather than on its behalf, which is the 
case with vicarious liability). 
Indeed, the underlying premise of the identification theory is that a dichotomy exists with 
respect to those employees who act as the 'hands' of a corporation, and those who act as its 
'brains' .172 In the leading case of Tesco Supermarkets v. Nattrass [ 1972] AC 153, the U.K. 
House of Lords sought to clarify the types of personnel that may be considered to be at the 
centre of corporate power. It held that only those individuals who control or manage the 
affairs of a company will be regarded as embodying or acting as the company itself for the 
purposes of determining criminal liability. However, whilst this decision has been referred to 
and relied upon many times, it is uncertain how appropriate its anthropomorphic view of 
company decision-making and it conceptualisation of corporate 'command and control' now 
are in respect of the diverse, decentralised models of corporate organisation now being 
d db . . 173 a opte y many entities. 
Until recently, the only legally recognised ways of attributing criminal fault to a corporate 
entity were through the concepts of vicarious liability and identification. In the past few years 
however, a number of jurisdictions have introduced more modem liability rules. These rules 
171 The U.S. Supreme Court first accepted the constitutionality of using agency principles to impute criminal 
responsibility to corporations inN Y. Central and Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 509 
(1909). 
172 Opcitnl66,5. 
173 This issue, and the various questions it raises, falls outside the scope and purpose of this thesis. 
Accordingly, it will not be addressed in this paper and should instead fonn the subject of further research. 
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enable corporations in some countries to be imputed with criminal liability as a result of their 
internal procedures, operating systems or corporate culture. This 'corporate culture' theory 
differs significantly from the principles of vicarious liability and identification. Rather than 
equating the acts of certain individuals with those of a corporation, it exploits the distinction 
between natural and legal persons and focuses on a corporation's liability in its own right. 
The most significant aspect of Australia's corporate criminal liability regime is believed to be 
the statutory provisions providing for organisational liability in relation to federal offences, 
including on the basis of "corporate culture ". 174 Under Section 12.3 of the federal Criminal 
Code, a corporation may be deemed to have formed the necessary fault element for a 
Commonwealth offence if it has "expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the 
commission of the offence". This will be the case where the: 
• corporate culture directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance; or 
• relevant corporation failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that required 
compliance. 
For the purposes of the legislation, corporate culture is defined as "an attitude, policy. rule. 
course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate generally or in the part of 
the body corporate in which the relevant activities take place". 
Whilst the aforementioned methods of attributing criminal liability to a corporate entity are 
now cemented within the laws of many jurisdictions, it is important to note that corporate 
criminal liability is not a universal feature of modern legal systems. 175 This is particularly 
apparent in relation to many civil law countries, where the concept of holding corporations 
liable for criminal acts is historically unknown. Whilst one of the major impacts of 
international AMLICTF standards has been a greater acceptance by civil law countries of the 
need to introduce concepts of corporate criminal liability (for instance, in Switzerland), a 
number of countries have yet to legislatively provide for the notion of corporate criminal 
liability. Countries such as Brazil, Bulgaria and Luxembourg currently do not recognise any 
174 Aliens Arthur Robinson, 'Corporate Culture' as a Basis for the Criminal Liability of Corporations (2008) 
10 <http:/1198 .170.85.29/ Allens-Arthur-Robinson-Comorate-Cu1ture-paper-for-Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdl> at 2 
January 2009. 
175 Op cit n 174. 4. 
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form of corporate criminal liability, whilst others including Germany, Mexico and Sweden, 
only allow for administrative penalties to be imposed on corporations for the criminal acts of 
certain employees. 
3.3 The high price of non-compliance 
According to FATF Recommendation 29, effective AMLICTF regulation necessarily relies 
upon regulators having an appropriate range of supervisory tools available to them. 176 These 
tools should ensure that institutions in breach of their AMLICTF obligations are subject to 
"effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions ". 177 As 
global concern for money laundering and terrorism financing has increased sharply over the 
past decade, jurisdictions have sought to comply with FATF Recommendation 29 by 
providing tougher penalties for non-compliance with AMLICTF laws. 
Given that corporate entities are only 'persons' in a strict legal sense, the criminal penalties 
that may be imposed upon them are somewhat limited. A financial institution cannot be 
imprisoned, for instance. Traditionally, the penalties attached to non-compliance were 
relatively insignificant criminal fines. 178 Many institutions made little effort to meet their 
AMLICTF legislative obligations, 179 presumably because the seemingly minor consequences 
associated with non-compliance justified the risk of deviating from their requirements. 
However, this situation began to change in 1985 following the successful (and highly 
publicised) U.S. prosecution of the Bank of Boston for tax evasion and violations of federal 
money laundering regulations. The bank was fined USD$500,000 for failing to report 
USD$1,200 million in cash transactions with foreign banks. Whilst this financial penalty 
176 Op cit n 16, 18. 
177 Financial Action Task Force Secretariat, Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation II: Crimina/ising 
the Financing of Terrorism and Associated Money Laundering (2004) Asia-Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering 
<http://apgm l.org!issues/docs/14/F A TF%201ntemretative%20Note%20to%20Sp%20Rec%20IJ .doc> at 26 
July 2007. 
178 Alexander, R.C., Arlen, J., and Cohen, M.A., "Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal 
Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms' (1999) 42(1 ), Journal of Law & Economics 393, 395. 
179 Mercator Advisory Group, Anti-Money Laundering Technology (2005) 
<http://mercatoradvisorygroup.com/index.php?doc=news&action=view item&type=2&id=156> at 16 
October 2006. 
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may seem relatively immaterial when compared to the profits currently being generated by 
many financial institutions, it was significantly greater than the fines ordered under AML 
laws prior to that time. Essentially, the Bank of Boston case put other institutions on notice 
that non-compliance with AML regulations could result in criminal enforcement proceedings 
and large financial penalties. 
Today, many pieces of municipal and extraterritorial legislation provide criminal penalties 
for breaches of certain AMLICTF obligations. Institutions may face fines and other criminal 
repercussions for actively facilitating money laundering or terrorism financing activities 
and/or otherwise failing to comply with their AMLICTF obligations. Under some AML!CTF 
regulations, their officers and employees may also be exposed to fines or terms of 
imprisonment for wilful non-compliance with their obligations. 
During the past few years, a number of jurisdictions have started to impose criminal 
penalties for AML/CTF offences in the upper range of their sentencing guidelines180 This is 
particularly apparent in Europe, where a number of banking regulators have recently 
imposed the maximum fines possible upon several institutions for breaches of their 
AMLICTF requirements. 181 However, whilst this indicates that institutions and individuals 
may face considerable legal risk should they fall foul of applicable AMLICTF laws, it is still 
questionable how frequently these penalties are invoked. 
3.3.1 Show me the money: criminal fines for non-compliance 
Fines for institutions 
Fines have typically been imposed upon non-compliant institutions to admonish them for 
their offences, and demonstrate to other entities that AMLICTF compliance failures will not 
180 Op cit n 128, 388. 
181 For instance, in October 2008 Sweden's financial regulator, Finansinspektionen, imposed the maximum 
fine possible upon Forex (a bank operating in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland). The bank had a 
number of deficiencies in its AML/CTF procedures, and the fine was intended to reflect the graveness of 
those deficiencies. See Swedish Regulator Fines Forex AB Over $7 Million for AML Deficiencies (2008) 
Moneylaundering.com <http://www.moneylaundering.com/NewsBriefDisplay.aspx?id= 1794 at 16 March 
2009. 
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be tolerated. Regulatory authorities have seemingly been transparent and open about the dual 
purpose of such criminal penalties. When discussing the USD$25 million fine imposed upon 
Riggs Bank in May 2004 for its violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, former Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Director, William J. Fox, stated that FinCEN "wanted 
[the} penalty to hurt" Riggs Bank and send a strong warning to other banks that non-
compliance with AMLICTF laws may carry criminal and financial consequences. 182 
In the U.S., institutions convicted of certain types of federal money laundering offences are 
sentenced pursuant to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines contained in Chapter 8 of 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S. Sentencing Guidelines). 183 As outlined in 
Chapter 2, PartS(§ 2S) of the 2008 Federal Sentencing Guideline Manual, these Guidelines 
apply to the following types of money laundering offences: 
• under§ 2S1.1. of the Guidelines -laundering monetary instruments and/or engaging in 
monetary transactions in property derived from unlawful activity, in contravention of 18 
USC§§ 1956, 1957, 1960; and 
• under§ 2S1.3. of the Guidelines- structuring transactions to evade reporting 
requirements, failing to report cash or monetary transactions, failing to file currency and 
monetary instrument reports, knowingly filing false reports, bulk cash smuggling and/or 
establishing and maintaining prohibited accounts involving certain foreign jurisdictions, 
institutions or banks, in contravention of various statutory provisions. 184 
Whilst ruling in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) that the U.S Sentencing 
Guidelines are merely advisory, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that U.S. District Courts 
must nevertheless "consult [the Guidelines} and take them into account when 
sentencing". 185 Thus, as articulated in 18 USC§ 3553(a) and cases such as United States v. 
McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 474 (61h Cir. 2006), the U.S Sentencing Guidelines are simply one 
182 Cocheo, S., 'Dear Director: Watch Out For Tougher Moves When Examiners Review Anti-Money-
Laundering Effort' (2004) 24(4-8) ABA Bank Directors Briefing I, 3. 
183 These Guidelines are promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission. 
184 These provisions include, but are not limited to, the following: 18 U.S. C.§ 1960, 26 US. C.§§ 7203 
and 7206, and 31 U.S. C.§§ 5313,5314,5316,5318, 5318A(b}, 5322,5324,5326, 5331 and 5332. 
185 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) at 264. 
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of a number of factors that the courts must consider when sentencing an individual or an 
institution for criminal violations of federal AMLICTF laws. 
Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, institutions convicted of an offence 
contained in § 2S of the US. Sentencing Guidelines may be ordered to make restitution, 
adhere to a period of corporate probation for up to five years, 186 and/or pay a fine. Where a 
fine is imposed, the quantum of that fine will rest upon the perceived severity of the 
offence(s) and culpability of the defendant institution. In relation to those money laundering 
and reporting offences covered by§§ 2Sl.l. and 2Sl.3. of the US. Sentencing Guidelines, 
the severity of an offence will be greater where a defendant: 
• committed the underlying predicate offence(s); 
• knew or believed that the laundered funds were the proceeds of crime, or otherwise 
. d d I f I . . 187 mten e to promote un aw u acttvtty; 
• engaged in the business of laundering funds; 188 and/or 
• conducted "sophisticated laundering··. 189 
Determining the culpability of a defendant is a separate process from determining the 
severity of an offence. Whilst the severity of an offence is determined by reference to the 
relevant portions of Chapter 2 of the US. Sentencing Guidelines, the culpability of a 
defendant institution is assessed under Chapter 8 of the Guidelines. In accordance with 
§ 8C2.5., an institution's culpability is assessed by weighing up a number of different 
factors. These factors relate not only to the behaviour of (and the controls/programs 
implemented by) a defendant institution prior to its criminal activity, but to the steps taken 
186 A period of corporate probation may be required where the court wants to secure the payment of 
restitution/a monetary penalty, improve external monitoring and oversight of an institution's activities, and/or 
ensure that an institution implements appropriate corrective measures. See§ BDl. I. of the US Sentencing 
Guidelines. 
187 Under§ 2Sl. I. specifically, the 'severity' of a money laundering offence will be greater where a 
defendant knew or believed that any of the laundered funds were the proceeds of, or were intended to 
promote (i) an offence involving the manufacture, importation or distribution of a controlled substance or a 
listed chemical; (ii) a crime of violence; or (iii) an offence involving firearms, explosives, national security, 
or the sexual exploitation of a minor. 
188 In determining whether a defendant institution was in the 'business' of laundering funds, the court may 
consider a range of factors, including whether the institution regularly laundered funds, laundered funds over 
an extended period of time, and/or generated revenues in return for laundering funds. 
189 Sophisticated laundering typically involves the creation/use of fictitious entities, shell banks, offshore 
financial accounts, and/or layers of transactions. 
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by that institution following the commission/identification of such activity. Whilst different 
factors have the ability to increase or decrease a defendant's culpability, an institution's 
culpability will be greater where: 
• high level personnel were involved in, or wilfully blind to, the criminal conduct 
(§ 8C2.5(b));l9o 
• there is a recent history of similar misconduct(§ 8C2.5(c)); 
• the offence constitutes a violation of a previous court order or a period of corporate 
probation(§ 8C2.5(d)); and/or 
• there has been wilful obstruction or a deliberate attempt to obstruct justice during any 
investigation, prosecution or sentencing of the alleged offence(s) (§ 8C2.5(e)). 
In 2002, Broadway National Bank became the first U.S. financial institution following the 
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act to be criminally prosecuted for breaching federal 
AMLICTF laws. The bank pleaded guilty to a three-count felony Information that charged it 
with failing to maintain an AMLICTF program, failing to report USD$123 million in 
suspicious cash deposits, and structuring USD$76 million in transactions to evade currency 
reporting requirements. 191 After considering the institution's modest revenues, the 
seriousness of its conduct and its attempts at reform, a U.S. District Court fined Broadway 
National Bank USD$4 million; making it also the first institution to incur a criminal fine for 
an AMLICTF compliance failure post-September II. 
Whilst the USD$4 million fine imposed might appear meagre when compared to the 
USD$199 million involved in Broadway National Bank's offences, the fine was simply the 
'tip of the iceberg' in terms of the penalties that U.S. regulatory and judicial officials would 
subsequently impose upon institutions for AMLICTF compliance failures. More recent 
regulatory actions have seen some institutions incur fines more than 20 times that imposed 
upon Broadway National Bank just several years ago. For instance, on 20 December 2005, a 
190 See also VanCleef, C.R., Silets, H.M., and Motz, P., 'Does the Punishment Fit the Crime?' (2004) 12(1) 
Journal of Financial Crime 56, 57. 
191 United States Customs and Border Protection, Manhattan Bank Pleads Guilty to US Criminal Charges 
for Failure to Report $123 Million in Suspicious Cash Deposits (2002) 
<http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news releases/archives/legacy/2002/112002/11272002.xml> at 25 
July 2007. 
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U.S. court ordered ABN Amro N.Y. to pay USD$80 million in fines and penalties for failing 
to prevent money laundering, failing to report suspicious activity, violating U.S. Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions and inadequately training staff in relation to their 
AMLICTF obligations. 192 
Though it tends to undercut much of the rhetoric about the aggressive regulatory pursuit of 
AMLICFT compliance, the sizeable criminal fines imposed upon institutions such as ABN 
Amro N.Y. appear to be the exception rather than the rule as far as AMLICTF enforcement is 
concerned. Whilst the size of the penalties imposed upon Riggs Bank, the Bank of New York 
and ABN Amro might suggest that all institutions operating in the U.S. face relatively high 
levels of AMLICTF legal risk, U.S. sentencing statistics do not readily support this view. 
Official reports released by the U.S.S.C. indicate that whilst the risk of incurring a large 
criminal fine for money laundering offences is rising for institutions in the U.S., a successful 
prosecution will not necessarily result in the payment of a large monetary penalty. 
According to Table 51 193 in the U.S. Sentencing Commission's 2006 Sourcebook of Federal 
Sentencing Statistics (U.S.S.C. 2006 Sourcebook), during the 2006 fiscal year194 there were 
ten corporate defendants sentenced under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines where 
money laundering was their sole, or primary, criminal offence. 195 Of these defendants, only 
one was ordered to pay a monetary fine (the quantum of which is not outlined in the USSC. 
2006 Sourcebook) and only one was required to make restitution. The remaining eight were 
neither ordered to pay a fine, nor ordered to make any restitution for their criminal conduct. 
However, whilst these figures imply that the risk of an institution being fined and/or ordered 
to make restitution for a money laundering offence is negligible in the U.S., the U. S. 
192 Simpson, G.R., • ABN Amro to Pay $80 Million Fine Over Iran, Libya', The Wall Street Journal (New 
York), 20 December 2005, AJ. 
193 This table is formally titled ''Organizations Receiving Fines or Restitution by Primary Offense Category 
and Applicability of Chapter 8 Fine Guidelines". 
194 The 2006 fiscal year ran from 1 October 2005 to 30 September 2006 inclusive. 
195 These ten cases constituted 4.6% of the total cases sentenced in accordance with Chapter 8 of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines that year. See United States Sentencing Commission, Sourcebook of Federal 
Sentencing Statistics (2006) Table 51 <http://www.ussc.gov/ ANNRPT/2006/SBTOC06.htm> at I 0 October 
2007. 
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Sentencing Commission's 2008 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics (U.S.S.C. 2008 
Sourcebook) indicates that this risk has risen during the past few years. According to Table 
51 in that document, during the 2008 fiscal year196 there were sixteen corporate defendants 
sentenced under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines where money laundering was 
their sole, or primary, criminal offence. 197 Of these defendants, which collectively accounted 
for 8.1% of all corporations sentenced under the US. Sentencing Guidelines that year (an 
increase of 3.5% since 2006), eight were ordered to pay a monetary fine and six were 
required to make restitution. The remaining two were neither ordered to pay a fine, nor 
ordered to make any restitution for their criminal conduct. 
Whilst the figures in the US. S.C. 2008 Sourcebook certainly demonstrate that between the 
2006 and 2008 fiscal years, the probability of an organisation being ordered to pay a fine or 
make restitution for a money laundering offence increased, the actual risk now faced by 
institutions should not be overstated. Indeed, for those eight organisations ordered to pay a 
fine during the 2008 fiscal year, the average fine imposed upon them was a mere 
USD$35,663. Further, for those six organisations ordered to make restitution, the average 
cost of their efforts was only USD$89,325. Thus, whilst an institution convicted of a money 
laundering offence and/or an AMLICTF compliance failure may technically be exposed to 
significant criminal fines, the likelihood of it actually incurring such a fine appears to be 
minimal judging by the most recent sentencing statistics. 
Fines for individuals 
Whilst defendant institutions in the U.S. are to be sentenced in accordance with the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, their officers and employees may be sentenced under 
the remaining Chapters of the US. Sentencing Guidelines. As previously noted, the decision 
in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) requires District Courts to consider the US. 
Sentencing Guidelines when sentencing an individual with respect to a money laundering 
offence under§ 2S. In addition to these Guidelines however, they must have regard to a 
number of other factors outlined in 18 US. C.§ 3553(a). These factors include the: 
196 The 2008 fiscal year ran from I October 2007 to 30 September 2008 inclusive. 
197 See United States Sentencing Commission, Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics (2008) Table 51 
<http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/SBTOC08.htm> at 3 October 2009. 
68 
• nature and circumstance of the offence, and the history and characteristics of the 
individual defendant; and 
• need for the individual's sentence to: 
(i) reflect the seriousness of the offence and provide just punishment for its 
commission; 
(ii) deter criminal conduct; 
(iii) protect the public from further crimes committed by the defendant; and 
(iv) provide the defendant with any necessary correctional treatment. 
According to the U.S. S.C. 2008 Sourcebook, during the 2008 fiscal year there were 893 
individuals sentenced under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines where money laundering was 
their primary criminal offence.I 98 Whilst there are no figures available with respect to how 
many of these individuals committed their offence(s) whilst employed by an institution 
covered by U.S. AMLICTF laws, the nature and type of money laundering offences covered 
in§ 2S of the Guidelines (particularly those contained in§ 2SJ.3.), suggest that a 
considerable number might have. 
As outlined in Table 15 of the U.S.S.C. 2008 Sourcebook, of the 893 individuals sentenced 
for a money laundering offence during the 2008 fiscal year, 573 (64.2 per cent) were not 
ordered to pay a fine or make any restitution. Of those remaining, only 152 (17.0 per cent) 
were ordered to pay a criminal fine, and only 19 (2.1 per cent) were ordered to both pay a 
fine and make restitution.I 99 
For those individuals who were ordered during the 2008 fiscal year to pay a fine or make 
restitution for a money laundering offence, they were required to pay an average of 
198 This number is relatively consistent with the 901 individuals sentenced for a money laundering offence 
under the U.S Sentencing Guidelines during the 2006 fiscal year. 
199 Again, these figures are relatively consistent with the statistics for the 2006 fiscal year, during which 562 
defendants (62.4 per cent) were not ordered to pay a fine or make any restitution, 182 defendants (20.2 per 
cent) were ordered to pay a criminal fine, and 12 defendants (1.3 per cent) were ordered to both pay a fine 
and make restitution. See United States Sentencing Commission, Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 
(2006) Table 15 <http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/SBTOC06.htm> at 10 October 2007. 
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USD$3,286,380?00 This amount is more than 5.8 times greater than the average payment 
ordered for other types of offences that year. 201 Further, it is more than USD$1, 730,000 
greater than the average payment ordered in the next highest payment category (i.e. the 
average payment for fraud offences).202 These figures demonstrate that whilst individuals 
sentenced for a money laundering offence under the US Sentencing Guidelines may face a 
comparable risk to institutions of incurring a criminal fine or being ordered to make 
restitution, they face a significantly higher risk of paying dearly for their misdeeds. 
3.3.2 The imposition of imprisonment 
Given the global importance that AMLICTF issues have assumed in recent years, a 
number of related offences now carry a period of imprisonment instead of, or in addition 
to, other penalties. In risk-based AMLICTF regimes, criminal liability is generally far 
more likely to attach itself to breaches of the minimum, prescriptive requirements 
contained in AMLICTF legislation. For instance, it often applies to statutory tipping off 
provisions, and any failure to properly report suspicious or significant cash transactions 
(otherwise referred to in Australia as 'Suspicious Matters' and 'Threshold Transactions' 
respectively). In certain regimes, criminal liability and terms of imprisonment might also 
extend to circumstances where an individual deliberately seeks to avoid or circumvent 
their AML/CTF obligations. In the U.S. for instance, any individual who structures a 
transaction to avoid federal reporting requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act may be 
imprisoned for up to five years and fined up to USD$250,000.203 
200 In total, individuals were collectively sentenced to pay a total of USD$1 ,012,205,051 during the 2008 
fiscal year. This is markedly more than the USD$454,523,087 that individuals sentenced for similar offences 
were ordered to pay during the 2006 fiscal year. See United States Sentencing Commission, Sourcebook of 
Federal Sentencing Statistics (2006) Table 15 <http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/SBTOC06.htm> at I 0 
October 2007. 
201 The average payment ordered in cases sentenced under the Guidelines during the 2008 fiscal year was 
USD$557,367. See United States Sentencing Commission, Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 
(2008) Table 15 <http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/SBTOC08.htm> at 3 October 2009. 
202 After money laundering cases, fraud cases and arson cases had the next highest average payments (i.e. 
USD$1 ,555,627 and USD$570,516 respectively). 
203 Other more egregious criminal offences under the Act may carry a tenn of imprisonment up to ten years 
and/or a fine up to USD$500,000, depending upon the particular AMLICTF provisions that have been 
violated. 
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The length of imprisonment imposed upon an individual for a money laundering offence will 
vary between different jurisdictions and AMLICTF statutes. Research conducted by Michael 
Levi and Peter Reuter suggests that during the 2000 fiscal year, the average term of 
imprisonment imposed upon the 590 individuals sentenced in the U.S. for a money 
laundering offence was 36 months?04 However, individuals that played leadership roles in 
money laundering activities typically received lengthier sentences. The average sentence for 
cash or monetary instrument smuggling was 19.6 months, compared with 13.4 months for 
structuring transactions and 8.5 months for failing to properly file a transaction report.205 
Whilst these sentences may appear to be relatively minimal, it should be noted that they 
relate only to standalone money laundering offences, and not money laundering offences 
coupled with some kind of underlying predicate offence. Further, they were imposed prior to 
the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act and the bolstering of the country's AMLICTF 
legislative framework. 
Despite the potential sentences attached to money laundering offences and/or breaches of 
AMLICTF legislation, the risk of an individual actually being imprisoned appears to be 
higher in some jurisdictions than others. For instance, individuals in the U.S. arguably face 
greater AMLICTF legal risk than many of their foreign counterparts due to the belief of the 
country's regulatory and law enforcement authorities that the pursuit of "guilty individuals 
should always take precedence over the prosecution of entities". 206 They may also face a 
greater risk of imprisonment, given that U.S. federal prosecutors can now consider the 
adequacy of prosecuting culpable employees when determining whether to pursue a 
corporation for malfeasance. 
In a memorandum released by Larry D. Thompson in January 2003 (the Thompson Memo), 
the U.S. Department of Justice detailed a set of guidelines (entitled the Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations) for federal prosecutors to follow when determining 
204 Levi, M., and Reuter, P., Money Laundering (2006) The University of Chicago 338 
<http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/faculty/reuter/Working%20Papers/Levi and Reuter.pdf> at 16 October 
2008. 
205 Ibid. 
206 See Thompson, L.D., (Untitled speech delivered at the Corporate Fraud Task Force Conference, 
Washington D.C., 26 September 2002). 
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whether to indict a U.S. company for criminal misconduct. The guidelines stressed the 
importance of prosecuting individuals for business crimes, and stipulated that because the 
imposition of individual criminal liability "may provide the strongest deterrent against 
future corporate wrongdoing", it should be pursued "even in the face of offers of corporate 
guilty pleas". 207 They essentially enabled U.S. federal prosecutors to consider the 
satisfactoriness of prosecuting culpable employees, when determining whether to lay 
criminal charges against a corporation for malfeasance. Where the prosecution of such 
individuals satisfies the need to provide retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and restitution, 
the prosecution of the relevant corporation may be deemed to be unnecessary. 208 
The result of this has been that several institutions accused of committing money laundering 
offences have sought to limit their own criminal culpability and AMLICTF legal risk by 
providing U.S. prosecutors with evidence against their employees. One of the more striking 
examples of this is provided by global accounting firrn KPMG, which faced regulatory 
scrutiny in 2005 after it was found to have laundered funds and created fraudulent tax 
shelters for the purposes of assisting its wealthy clients to evade USD$2.5 billion in taxes. In 
what became the largest criminal tax case ever filed in the U.S., federal prosecutors indicted 
eight former KPMG executives with conspiracy (an offence punishable by imprisonment), 
and filed a criminal Information against KPMG charging it with conspiracy and other 
crimes?09 
Unlike its eight forrner executives, KPMG ultimately managed to avoid being prosecuted for 
its offences. In part, this is due to the fact that the company's indictment may have put it out 
of business and left only three international audit firrns remaining (a highly undesirable 
result given the previous collapse of Arthur Andersen). However, it is also attributable to the 
various representations KPMG made to U.S. prosecutors in order to avoid formal indictment. 
The company not only agreed to pay USD$456 million in penalties, but also to submit to an 
207 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Department Components 
and United States Attorneys, 20 January 2003 <http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/cornorate guidelines.htm> at 1 
August 2008. 
208 Wray, C.A., and Hur, R.K., 'Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson 
Memo in Theory and Practice' (2006) 43(3)American Criminal Law Review 1095, 1106. 
209 
'KPMG Pays $456 million US Fine, 8 Former Execs Charged with Conspiracy', CBC News, 29 August 
2005 <http://www.cbc.calmoney/story/2005/08/29/KPMG fined20050829.htm I> at 15 May 2008. 
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independent monitor and assist authorities with their investigations into the activities of the 
eight indicted employees. Further, in an undertaking that attracted the ire of many legal 
practitioners and industry participants, KPMG essentially agreed to "[throw] its former 
partners overboard while giving the government evidence to use against/hem "210 
However, it is debatable whether KPMG had much choice with respect to avoiding its own 
prosecution by legally abandoning its employees. According to the Honorable Lewis A. 
Kaplan, a U.S. District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York, the past decade 
has seen the U.S. move from a system in which ''prosecutors prosecuted and courts and 
juries decided guilt or innocence" to one where prosecutors "threaten business entities with 
unbearable extrajudicial consequences and thus exact acquiescence in the government's 
demands". 211 Such acquiescence may involve the payment of large fines, firing of culpable 
employees, and implementation of additional internal controls. 
If Judge Kaplan's commentary is to be accepted, it may be that under the current 
enforcement environment in the U.S., an institution that finds one of its employees 
accused of criminal wrongdoing must choose between "betting the company'sfuture that 
the employee will be exonerated" or doing whatever the U.S. Department of Justice 
demands to avoid indictment.212 This certainly appears to have been the case in relation 
to KPMG; with claims that U.S. government officials held a ''proverbial gun"213 to the 
company's head by making the availability of a deferred prosecution agreement 
contingent on its agreement not to pay its former employees' legal fees in any related 
criminal proceedings.214 Evidently, the KPMG case demonstrates that even where an 
institution condones or encourages the commission of a money laundering offence by one 
or more of its employees, those employees may find themselves abandoned by the 
institution in the face of subsequent criminal proceedings. 
210 Gleckman, H., Borrus, A., and McNamee, M., 'Inside the KPMG Mess', Business Week, 12 September 
2005, 46. 
211 Kaplan, L.A., Some Reflections on Corporate Criminal Responsibility (2007) The Antitrust Source 1 
<http://www .abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/1 O/Oct07-Kaplan I 0-18f.pdl> at 31 December 2008. 
212 Opcitnl70. 
213 Khoury, P.F., DOJ's "Thompson Memo" Is Unconstitutional (2006) Wiley Rein LLP 
<http://www.wileyrein.com/publication.cfm?publication id=12690> at 3 August 2008. 
214 The use of deferred prosecution agreements is further discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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In addition to the strategies employed by federal prosecutors, an individual's risk of incurring 
a term of imprisonment may be influenced by their organisational position. In jurisdictions 
such as the U.S., the U.K. and Australia, municipal AMLICTF laws require institutions to 
appoint a nominated officer to oversee AMLICTF compliance and file, as appropriate, 
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs).215 This individual will generally- with the exception of 
deliberately non-compliant employees- face the greatest AMLICTF legal risk in relation to 
their institution's breaches of AMLICTF legislation. 
In the U.K., responsible officers are referred to as Money Laundering Reporting Officers 
(MLROs). Whilst all employees can be held criminally liable for the deliberate commission 
of certain money laundering offences, MLROs may be held liable and imprisoned for their 
institution's failure to report suspicious activities and/or implement appropriate AMLICTF 
controls.216 For instance, under Section 330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (U.K.) 
(POCA), a MLRO convicted of failing to file a SAR may be imprisoned for up to five years. 
The practical effect of this and similar provisions is that MLROs may personally assume 
some of the AMLICTF legal risk that would otherwise fall squarely on the shoulders of their 
institutions. 
As with the legislative position in the U.K., a failure to properly report suspicious activities 
may carry a term of imprisonment in Australia. However, the full extent of the AMLICTF 
legal risk attached to this offence will not be known until such time as the AMLICTF Act 
2006 (Cth) is fully implemented. Once the staggered implementation of the Act is complete, 
the risk attached to reporting failures may appear to be slightly different to that in the U.K. 
Whilst the U.K. test for reporting is whether an individual had "reasonable grounds to 
suspect" that another was involved in money laundering, the Australian test is whether a 
person "suspected on reasonable grounds" that another was involved in such activities. 
Given that this distinction will likely result in Australia relying on a somewhat subjective test 
215 The name given to such reports may vary between different jurisdictions. For instance, Australian 
AML/CTF legislation has recently renamed such reports (which were previously referred to as Suspicious 
Transaction Reports) Suspicious Matter Reports, 
216 Fagg, S., Laundering Causing Recruiting Woes (2006) Human Resources Magazine 
<http://www.humanresourcesmagazine.com.au/articles/aO/Oc043faO.asp> at 20 September 2006. 
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of knowledge, as opposed to the purely objective test adopted in the U.K.,217 the AML/CTF 
legal risk attached to a reporting failure may prove to be lower in Australia than it is in the 
U.K. However, further exploration of this issue should take place once the transaction 
reporting requirements under the Act come into force, and AUSTRAC begins to actively 
monitor and enforce compliance with them. 
Evidently, the extent of an individual's AMLICTF legal risk (and, more specifically, their 
risk of imprisonment) may be somewhat dependent upon their organisational position and the 
role they are expected to play regarding their institution's AMLICTF compliance. However, 
it may also be linked to their profession or industry, as the past few years have seen certain 
jurisdictions take a more hard-lined stance with regards to particular individuals considered 
to represent a greater MLITF risk and/or have an increased AMLICTF compliance burden. 
This is perhaps most evident with regards to members of the legal profession; a number of 
whom have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment in the U.K. for deliberately facilitating, 
being wilfully blind to, and/or failing to report their clients' money laundering activities. 
In the U.K., the POCA and the country's Money Laundering Regulations have significantly 
extended the obligations imposed upon professional advisers to report suspicions of money 
laundering and other illegal activities.218 They have also heightened the penalties for failing 
to report such suspicions, with professionals facing up to 14 years imprisonment for violating 
legislative reporting requirements. In R v Duff[2002] EWCA Crim 2117 for instance, U.K. 
solicitor Jonathan Duff (Mr Duff) was expelled from the U.K. Law Society and sentenced to 
six months imprisonment for failing to disclose knowledge or suspicions of money 
laundering. 
After a wealthy, long-standing client of his was gaoled for drug trafficking and possession, 
Mr Duff became suspicious of two transactions that he had previously conducted on their 
behalf. However, in accordance with legal advice he received from the U.K. Law Society 
217 Oliver, P., Reputation and Risk on the Line (2006) Lawyers Weekly 
<http://www .lawyersweekl y .com .au/ a11icles/ 50/0C04 565 O.asp?Type= 5 5&Category= 13 25> at 3 November 
2006. 
218 Quick, C., 'Money Laundering- Get it Wrong. Go to Jail' (2004) 133( 1325) Accountancy 46. 
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and another law firm, Mr Duff did not report the transactions because he believed that the 
U.K.'s new AMLICTF laws did not apply retrospectively to past transactions.219 At trial, Mr 
Duff pleaded guilty to two counts of failing to disclose suspicions of money laundering, and 
became the first U.K. solicitor to be convicted of, and imprisoned for, failing to disclose 
suspicions of money laundering. When refusing leave to appeal against his sentence, the 
Court of Appeal held that this was "a case where a solicitor received £70,000 in cash ... the 
money had been put in part into fictitious names [so thatJ.for six months ... he was courting a 
risk that his suspicions were reportable". Undoubtedly, this ruling "stripped away the last 
vestiges ofcomplacency over money laundering in the [legal] profession". 220 Perhaps for the 
first time, it made U.K. legal professionals acutely aware of the fact that their AMLICTF 
legal risk was not confined to the deliberate laundering of criminal funds- it also extended 
to genuine misunderstandings regarding the timing and scope of their legislative AMLICTF 
obligations. 
Nevertheless, more recent cases such as R v. Dougan (unreported, 2006)221 and R v Griffiths 
and Pattison [2006] EWCA Crim 2155,222 demonstrate that even after the U.K. AMLICTF 
legislative regime has been operational for several years, some solicitors are still turning a 
blind eye to (or are simply ignorant of) their ongoing reporting obligations. 223 Further, they 
suggest that the AMLICTF legal risk faced by legal practitioners may continue to be greater 
than that faced by ordinary corporate officers for some time. In accordance with the 
statements of Kerr LCJ of the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in R v. McCartan [2004] 
219 Opcitn217. 
220 Myint, R., 'Solicitors Beware: Money Laundering after R v Duff (2003) 2(10)Journal of International 
Trust and Corporate Planning 65. 
221 In R v. Dougan (unreported, 2006}, Mr Dougan allowed £66,000 (AUD$167,062) in illegal tax scam 
earnings to pass through his client account. Although he did not initially realise that the funds were the 
proceeds of crime, Mr Dougan continued to act for the client after he became suspicious. When sentencing 
Mr Dougan to three months imprisonment, the presiding judge accepted that Mr Dougan was "a narve victim 
of a sophisticated criminal" but held that solicitors had to "take the greatest care" to stop others using their 
respectability to launder cash. 
222 Jn R v. Griffiths and Pattison [2006] EWCA Crim 2155, Mr Griffiths acted on behalf of clients who were 
selling a property for less than one-third of its market value in an attempt to prevent the property being 
considered an asset in any proceeds of crime confiscation hearing. The property was being sold by drug 
traffickers to an estate agent for the amount of the outstanding mortgage. Mr Griffiths argued that he had 
relied on the explanation of the estate agent, whom he had trusted for years, for the reason behind the 
transaction. However, in sentencing Mr Griffiths to 15 months' imprisonment, the presiding Judge stated that 
Mr Griffiths had "clearly closed his eyes to the obvious". 
223 Op cit n217. 
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NICA 43, "a custodial sentence will almost invariably be required" where a lawyer violates 
their AMLICTF reporting requirements because it is important for the courts "to make clear 
the importance of [their] scrupulous adherence to the requirements of .. legislation". 
3.4 The long-arm of the law: Extraterritorial AML/CTF legislation 
Traditionally, criminal law was confined to conservative territorial terms. Bound and 
restricted by the principles of domestic jurisdiction or 'sovereignty', 224 a nation state was 
only able to exercise jurisdiction in relation to a criminal matter in circumstances where that 
matter arose within its own geographical boundaries. However, as recognition of the 
potential intemationalisation of criminal activities grew, so too did the jurisdictional rules 
governing what nation states could legislatively provide for. The rigid common law 
'territorial paradigm' started to lose favour and a number of jurisdictions started to 
legislatively assert authority over criminal activities occurring outside their own borders. 
Whilst a state's jurisdiction may still be fundamentally tied to a particular geographic 
territory, it is now well established that nation states have the authority to enact 
extraterritorial legislation under specific international agreements (e.g. the Vienna 
Convention) and certain principles of intemationallaw.225 Whilst international law might be 
thought to place a number of constraints on the extraterritorial reach of nation states, some 
academics believe that it has actually expanded the legislative power of countries over 
persons and acts committed abroad.226 In the U.S. for instance, any constitutional obstacles to 
the extraterritorial application of domestic legislation to the perpetrators of 'universal' crimes 
(for instance, financiers of terrorism), may be overcome as a result of the interaction between 
224 Under the well established principles of sovereignty, a nation state has authority to "prescribe, adjudicate, 
and enforce its laws within its own borders". See Colangelo, A.J., "Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law' (2007) 48(1) Harvard 
International Law Journal 121, 127. 
225 For instance, under the "protective principle" in international law, countries may seek to enact legislation 
enabling them to assert jurisdiction over conduct which occurs outside their geographic borders, but which 
bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of their country. See, by way of example, the U.S. Model 
Penal Code. 
226 See Colangelo, A.J., 'Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection 
of National and International Law' (2007) 48(1) Harvard International Law Journal121. 
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the international legal doctrine of universal jurisdiction and congressional lawmaking 
authority. 
Accordingly, whilst AMLICTF legal risk might arise by virtue of municipal AML/CTF 
legislation, it might also arise as a product of the criminal offences and penalties provided for 
under foreign AMLICTF laws with extraterritorial or "long-arm·· jurisdiction.227 These laws 
essentially enable national governments to impose binding, enforceable obligations on 
individuals and institutions operating beyond their own geographic boundaries. Given the 
transboundary nature of many money laundering and terrorism financing activities, the 
increasing globalisation of the financial services industry, and the number of international 
bodies currently working to address AMLICTF issues, recent years have seen a number of 
jurisdictions enact extraterritorial AMLICTF laws. 
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government imposed a suite 
of extraterritorial controls upon foreign financial institutions. These controls, which have 
significantly changed the way that foreign institutions conduct business in the U.S. and with 
U.S. institutions, are enshrined in several extraterritorial legislative instruments, including 
Executive Order 13224- Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons who 
Commit, or Threaten to Commit. or Support Terrorism (Executive Order 13224) and the 
USA PATRIOT Act. Whilst the legality of such sweeping legislation has often been 
questioned, the U.S. government has continually justified the extraterritorial reach of its laws 
by reference to the 'effects doctrine'. Under this doctrine, U.S. courts are instructed to 
presume that Congress intended to regulate extraterritorially whenever foreign conduct is 
deemed to have a 'substantial effect' within the U.S.228 
Whilst a number of nation states have enacted extraterritorial AMLICTF laws, these laws are 
arguably far narrower than the broad provisions and expansive scope of U.S. extraterritorial 
227 Extraterritorial laws enable countries to exercise jurisdiction beyond their own geographic borders. They 
operate such that persons existing beyond the limits of the enacting state or nation are still amenable to its 
legislative provisions. 
228 Mitchell, S.L., 'The Implications of the USA Patriot Act on Foreign Banking Institutions' (Speech 
delivered at the National Anti-Money Laundering Training Seminar, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 24 May 
2002) I. 
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legislation. For instance, the U.K. has previously enacted the Terrorism Act 2000 (U.K.) to 
empower U.K. courts to oversee cases concerning the planning and orchestration of terrorist 
acts, regardless of where in the world such acts are carried out229 1n comparison to U.S. 
AMLICTF legislation however, the extraterritorial implications of this Act are somewhat 
limited by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Amendments to the Terrorism Act 2000 
(U.K.), which stipulates that freeze orders do not have extraterritorial effect in relation to the 
foreign branches of U.K. companies or financial institutions. As such, it is unlikely that other 
third parties acting outside U.K. territory, either directly or indirectly in support of terrorism, 
will be covered by the Terrorism Act 2000 (U.K.). 
3.4.1 Widening the posts: The Money Laundering Control Act 
One of the first pieces of extraterritorial AMLICTF legislation to be enacted in the U.S. was 
the MLCA. Codified as 18 USC.§§ 1956 and 1957, this Act criminalises domestic and 
international money laundering, and carries large fines and potential prison terms for their 
commission. Unlike earlier, relatively unsuccessful legislative attempts to curb the movement 
of illegal income, the MLCA was not solely created to impose currency reporting 
requirements upon financial institutions. Rather, it was enacted to more widely undermine 
the use of financial institutions to convert illegally derived funds into usable and 
inconspicuous funds 230 Under the Act, the term ''financial institution" is defined broadly; 
encompassing not only U.S. institutions but also foreign banks and other foreign financial 
institutions?31 
In addition to its expansive definition of ''financial institution", the extraterritorial scope of 
the MLC'A is cemented by provisions criminal ising the international transportation, 
transmission or transfer of illicit proceeds to or from the U.S. It is also strengthened by 
expansively drafted provisions which render it a criminal offence for any institution to 
engage in financial transactions using money or property known to have been derived from 
229 Alexander, K., 'Extraterritorial US Banking Regulation and lntemational Terrorism: The Patriot Act and 
the International Response' (2002) 3(4) Journal of International Banking Regulation 307, 312. 
230 Tucker Mann, T., 'Money Laundering' (2007) 44(2) American Criminal Law Review 769. 
231 Under the Act, the tenn "financial institution" includes any financial institution as defined in 31 US. C. § 
53I2(a}(2), and any foreign bank as defined in Section I of the International Banking Act~( 1978 (12 USC 
§ 3101(7)). 
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unlawful activity. This includes transactions designed to avoid a federal or state transaction 
reporting requirement, and those intended to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, 
ownership or control of illegally obtained funds. 
However, whilst the MLCA extends the compliance obligations of, and the AMLICTF legal 
risk faced by, various U.S. and non-U.S. institutions, there are certainly limitations on the 
extraterritorial reach of the Act. It has been established that for the purposes of adjudicating 
an action or enforcing a penalty under the MLCA, U.S. District Courts have jurisdiction over 
any foreign person (including any foreign financial institution) against whom such an action 
is brought. That being the case, 18 USC.§ 1956(j) stipulates that the courts can only 
exercise their extraterritorial jurisdiction under the MLCA where one of the following 
conditions is met: 
• a foreign person has committed an offence under the Act in relation to a financial 
transaction that has occurred wholly or partly in the U.S.; 
• a foreign person has converted, for their own use, property in which the U.S. has an 
ownership interest in by virtue of the entry of an order of forfeiture by a U.S. court; or 
• an offence under the Act has been committed by a foreign financial institution that 
maintains a correspondent or interbank account with a U.S. financial institution. 
Although 18 USC.§ 1956(a) explicitly states that "unlawful activity" under the MLCA 
encompasses tax fraud and tax evasion,232 18 USC.§§ 1956(j) and 1957(d)(2) prevent the 
U.S. government from exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction with respect to both these 
crimes.233 Regardless of this restriction however, extraterritorial jurisdiction may still be 
exercised in respect of wire and mail fraud by virtue of 18 USC.§ 1956(c)(4)(A) and (5), 
and 18 USC.§ 1957(j)(l). Consequently, where an institution covered by the Act mails or 
wires funds to a foreign jurisdiction for a customer seeking to avoid the proper payment of 
taxes, any failure by that institution to report the transaction could constitute concealment of 
232 See 18 USC.§ /956(a)(J)(A)(ii), and I.R.C. §§ 7201 and 7206. 
233 Whilst 18 USC§ 1956(/) relates to conduct concerning a transaction or series of related transactions 
involving ''funds or monetary instruments" of a value exceeding USD$10,000, /8 USC.§ 1956(a)(2) deals 
with funds or monetary instruments but does not include tax fraud or tax evasion. As 18 USC§ 1957 does 
not refer to tax fraud or tax evasion, extraterritorial jurisdiction is not granted to the U.S. government with 
respect to these crimes. 
80 
tax fraud or tax evasion. If this were to occur, the transaction would constitute a specified 
unlawful activity under 18 U.S. C.§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii), and the U.S. government could 
exercise its extraterritorial jurisdiction. Whilst the involvement of tax fraud or tax evasion 
does not grant extraterritorial jurisdiction in and of itself, in such circumstances the mail and 
wire fraud act as the predicate offences that give rise to the extraterritorial jurisdiction?34 
Given its extraterritorial reach, the MLCA carries a certain level of AMLICTF legal risk for 
financial institutions operating outside the U.S. Particular offences under the Act carry 
criminal penalties including imprisonment up to 20 years, and fines up to USD$500,000 or 
twice the value of the monetary instruments or funds laundered (whichever is greater).235 
Where an institution commits one of these criminal offences, the quantum of their penalty 
will depend upon a range of factors, including the purpose of their intended punishment, the 
nature of their offence, and their compliance history. 
3.4.2 A new regulatory era: The USA PATRIOT Act 
Considered "the strongest expression of extraterritorial powers over the international dollar 
payments system",236 Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act is formally known as the 
International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001 (P.L. 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272). Enacted in the U.S. in the immediate aftermath of September 11, the 
Act applies to both U.S. and non-U.S. financial institutions, and is responsible for extending 
the country's extraterritorial AMLICTF enforcement powers237 
The legislation, which amends certain provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act and the MLCA, 
was drafted on the premise that weaknesses in financial transparency are critical to the 
financing of terrorism. It has considerable extraterritorial implications for financial 
institutions (and the AMLICTF legal risk they face) because it has vastly: 
234 Duke, J.R., "Penalties Relating to Foreign Trusts for Failure to Report' (Speech delivered at Ashford 
Suites, High Point, North Carolina, 27 January 2006) 5. 
235 Op cit n230, 789. 
236 Op cit n228, 2. 
237 Preston, E., 'The US Patriot Act: New Adventures in American Extraterritoriality' (2002) 1 0(2) Journal 
of Financial Crime 104. 
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• widened the predicate offence of money laundering to encompass policies related to the 
interdiction of terrorism financing; 
• expanded U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to the activities of foreign third 
parties (including banks and professional advisers) deemed to be supporting terrorists or 
terrorist groups; and 
• increased U.S. supervisory control over the global activities of foreign banks that 
maintain a correspondent or payable through account with a U.S. institution.238 
Five sections of the USA PATRIOT Act have notable implications for non-U.S. financial 
institutions. Three of these sections (Sections 3II, 3I2 and 3I3) indirectly regulate foreign 
entities by imposing restrictions on their activities with domestic financial institutions239 
The remaining two sections (Sections 317 and 3I9) directly regulate the activities of 
institutions beyond U.S. borders. As these latter sections explicitly relate to the potential 
initiation of civil proceedings and civil forfeiture actions against non-U.S. institutions, they 
are addressed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
Some of the most notorious U.S. extraterritorial provisions contained in the USA 
PATRIOT Act are enshrined in Section 311. That section carries significant AMLICTF 
legal risk for foreign institutions dealing with the U.S. financial system, because it 
empowers the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury to invoke one or more targeted "special 
measures" in relation to those nations, institutions, transactions and accounts deemed to 
be of "primary money laundering concern". 240 In order of ascending severity, these 
special measures include: 
(i) additional record keeping or reporting requirements for particular transactions; 
(ii) requirements around the identification of the foreign beneficial owners of certain 
accounts held at a U.S. financial institution; 
238 Op cit n229, 307. 
239 As outlined in 31 U.S. C.§ 5312(a) and (c), domestic financial institutions are defined broadly under U.S. 
law to encompass a range of varied entities. Examples of those covered by the definition include banks, trust 
companies, credit unions, thrift institutions, securities brokers and dealers, currency exchanges, insurance 
companies, pawnbrokers and travel agencies. 
24° Fleming, T., 'OF AC and 311 Exposure Issues' (Paper presented at the 2006 ABA/ABA Money 
Laundering Enforcement Conference, Washington DC, 9 October 2006) 9. 
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(iii) requirements around the identification of foreign bank customers who use an interbank 
payable-through account opened by that foreign institution at a U.S. bank; 
(iv) requirements around the identification of foreign bank customers who use an interbank 
correspondent account opened by that foreign institution at a U.S. bank; and 
(v) restrictions or prohibitions on the opening/holding of certain interbank correspondent 
or payable-through accounts. 
Once a foreign institution is deemed to represent a "primary money laundering risk" under 
Section 311, FinCEN will issue a notice of proposed rulemaking. Depending on the steps and 
corrective actions (if any) subsequently taken by the relevant institution to address the U.S. 
government's concerns, this proposed rulemaking may be withdrawn or finalised. To 
illustrate, following its initial designation as a "primary money laundering concern" on 
26 April 2005, Latvian institution Multibanka revised its AMLICTF policies, procedures and 
internal controls so significantl/41 that FinCEN withdrew its proposed rulemaking on 
13 July 2006 and no special measures were ever invoked?42 By comparison, a proposed 
rulemaking issued with respect to the Commercial Bank of Syria in May 2004, was finalised 
on 9 March 2006 after the bank allegedly continued to provide political and material support 
to Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups. Using the justification that the bank 
had repeatedly "been used by terrorists to move funds and ... acted as a conduit for the 
laundering of proceeds generated from the illicit sale of Iraqi oil", 243 the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury (U.S. Treasury Department) ordered all U.S. banks to terminate any 
correspondent account they maintained for the institution. The effect of this on the 
Commercial Bank of Syria was significant, as too were the ramifications for Banco Delta 
Asia (addressed in Chapter 7 of this thesis) when the U.S. Treasury Department deemed it 
to be of "primary money laundering concern". 
241 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN Withdraws Finding on Latvia's Multibanka and Issues 
Final Rule against Latvia's VEF Banka (2006) <http://www.fincen.gov/Jatvia 311 withdraw.html> at 5 
December 2006. 
242 United States Government,_ U.S. Federal Register- Proposed Rules, Vol. 71, No. 134, 13 July 2006, 
39606. 
243 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Treasury issues Final Rule against Commercial Bank of Syria 
U.S Financial Institutions Must Terminate Correspondent Accounts (2006) U.D. Department of the Treasury 
<http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js41 05.htm> at 5 December 2006. 
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In addition to the expansive powers provided by Section 311, Section 312 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act enables the U.S. government to indirectly regulate the activities of foreign 
financial institutions. It stipulates that all U.S. banks that maintain correspondent accounts 
for certain types of foreign banks, must identify the beneficial ownership of those banks. 
Further, they must determine whether such banks provide correspondent accounts to other 
foreign banks, and conduct enhanced due diligence on their correspondent accounts to 
assess their MLITF risk.Z44 
Section 313 of the Act also has extraterritorial implications for foreign institutions as it 
strictly prohibits U.S. institutions from directly establishing, maintaining, administering or 
managing correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks, or any foreign bank that conducts 
business with a foreign shell bank.245 It is not sufficient for U.S. institutions to simply ensure 
that they are not directly maintaining a correspondent account on behalf of a shell bank; they 
must also take "reasonable steps" to safeguard the indirect abuse of their correspondent 
accounts by foreign institutions conducting banking activities for a shell bank. 
For foreign financial institutions, the AMLICTF legal risk represented by the 
extraterritoriality of the USA PATRIOT Act is particularly pronounced because the powers 
granted to U.S. authorities under the Act are so significant. Under its provisions, any foreign 
institution seeking to access the U.S. banking system must implement AMLICTF controls 
that conform to the high standards of due diligence and transparenc/46 required of U.S. 
institutions. !fits controls do not meet the standards required by the U.S. government under 
the USA PATRIOT Act, a foreign institution may have its U.S. correspondent account(s) 
terminated and find itself barred from conducting business with U.S. institutions and 
accessing the U.S. banking system thereafter. 
244 See 31 USC§ 55318(i)(2}(B) (2002) and 31 USC§ 5318(i)(3) (2002). 
245 For the purposes of the Act, a "correspondent account" is defined as an account established to receive 
deposits from, make payments on behalf of, or handle other financial transactions related to, a foreign 
financial institution. A "shell bank" is a bank that does not have a physical presence (for instance, a place of 
business that is located at a fixed address) in any country. 
246 Op cit n229, 312. 
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Whilst the U.S. government might contend that the far-reaching extraterritorial provisions 
contained in the USA PATRIOT Act are necessary to protect the U.S. financial system, it may 
be argued that there is a certain degree of 'legislative arrogance' inherent in their enactment. 
Embedded in the drafting of many of the Act's provisions appears to be an assumption on the 
part of U.S. legislators that, regardless of the additional costs that U.S. laws may impose 
upon foreign financial institutions, such institutions will endeavour to meet them. 
Presumably, this assumption is largely hinged upon the status ofNew York City as one of the 
world's most important international financial centres, and the dominance of the U.S. in the 
international banking system. Nevertheless, despite what it may be attributable to, the view 
that foreign institutions will typically fall into line with U.S. compliance standards, has 
largely proven to be correct. 
Although some commentators have argued that the expansive extraterritoriality of the Act 
could cause a backlash and "threaten America's primacy in the international financial 
system", 247 this does not appear to have been the case. In order to ensure their continued 
survival and ongoing access to the U.S. banking system, vast numbers of foreign financial 
institutions have voluntarily assumed compliance with the Act and adopted additional 
AMLICTF controls in order to avoid being cut off from U.S. business. In the current 
commercial environment, where the U.S. is one of the largest and most influential players in 
international commerce, exclusion from the U.S. financial system is seemingly far too high a 
price to pay for falling foul of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
That said, it must be noted that in some countries there has certainly been a shift or, at the 
very least, speculation of a shift towards an increasing use of the Euro as an alternative to 
U.S. dollars. The international role of the Euro has changed markedly in recent years 248In 
the Asia-Pacific region, countries including Indonesia and Malaysia have already shifted 
some of their central banks' reserves from U.S. dollars to Euros. Further, China and a number 
of other Asian nations have increased the share of the Euro in their foreign exchange 
247 Op cit n237. 
248 Kuroda, H., 'The Importance of the Euro in a Rapidly Changing Environment: An Asian Perspective' 
(Speech delivered at the Brussels Economic Forum 2008: Economic and Monetary Union in Europe: 10 
Years On, Brussels, 15 May 2008). 
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reserves.249 As a result, it may be contended that the dominance and influence of U.S. 
currency has waned slightly, and the scope and relevance of U.S. extraterritorial AMLICTF 
legislation has been reduced. As foreign nations and institutions rely more heavily upon the 
Euro as a means of conducting business, their exposure under- and their need to strictly 
comply with- U.S. AMLICTF legislation may be somewhat limited. 
3.4.3 Beyond AMVCTF compliance: Economic and trade sanctions 
The term "economic and trade sanctions" refers to the deliberate government withdrawal, or 
threat of withdrawal, of trade or financial relations. The use of sanctions has a lengthy 
history; traceable back to 432 B.C. when Athens officials denied certain traders from 
accessing the city's harbour and marketplace250 However, whilst economic and trade 
sanctions may not be entirely new legal tools, it was not until the 1990s that their use became 
more commonplace on the global stage. At that time, the United Nations started to play a 
greater role in international affairs and the United Nations Security Council became more 
willing to endorse mandatory sanctions against nation states involved in civil strife, regional 
. d/ . I . f h . h 251 aggression, an or gross v1o atwns o uman ng ts. 
Economic and trade sanctions have generally been invoked to achieve the same purposes as 
criminal penalties; namely, deterrence, punishment and rehabilitation. More specifically 
however, they have been used to foster or exacerbate political or economic instability in a 
certain country by limiting its exports/restricting its imports, or interrupting its commercial 
finance (i.e. by reducing its aid and/or cutting any loans made to its government)?52 
249 Suparno, R., 'The Euro: A Viable Alternative to the U.S. Dollar'. The Jakarta Post (Jakarta), 18 July 
2005 <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/07/18/euro-viable-alternative-us-dollar.html> at 24 January 
2009. 
250 Paulson, M., 'History of U.S. Sanctions Shows Most Haven't Worked', Seattle Post-Jnte/ligencer, 11 May 
1999 <http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/iraq/sanction.shtml> at 30 December 2008. 
251 Hufbauer, G.C., Schott, J.J., Elliott, K.A., and Oegg, B., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3'' ed, 2007) 
132. 
252 Elliott, K.A., Hufbauer, G.C., and Oegg, B., The Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics (2"d ed, undated) 
<http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Sanctions.html> at 30 December 2008. 
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In recent times, countries such as the U.S. have aggressively used economic and trade 
sanctions to pursue their own foreign policy and national security interests.253 Following 
September II, targeted financial sanctions have been used to isolate supporters of terrorism 
and prevent the facilitation of suspect money tlows.254 However, whilst a number of 
sanctions have been invoked in relation to terrorism, terrorism financing and money 
laundering activities, many sanctions programs have involved political objectives far beyond 
those associated with AML/CTF. Unlike AMLICTF countermeasures, economic and trade 
sanctions can be used to address a far broader spectrum of issues considered to threaten 
international order and stability. 255 This is evidenced by the fact that sanctions have 
previously been used to force the apartheid government of South Africa to allow democratic 
elections, block the Russian transfer of sophisticated cryogenic rocket engines to India, and 
prevent China from continuing to export sensitive military equipment.256 
Whilst there are many economic and trade sanctions programs currently being administered 
around the world, the discussion herein is limited to OFAC sanctions as they are often 
considered to be some of the most important and influential sanctions programs post-
September II. Using its authority under Presidential wartime and national emergency 
powers,257 as well as under specific legislation, OFAC currently administers a number of 
sanctions to regulate transactions and freeze foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction. It 
maintains country-based sanctions programs (which may be limited, comprehensive or 
regime-based in nature), as well as list-based programs targeted towards foreign narcotics 
traffickers, foreign terrorists, weapons proliferators, and persons undermining the 
sovereignty of specific nation states. 
253 Op cit n229, 308. 
254 Zarate, J.C., Financial Power and International Security: Reflections on the Evolution of the Global Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Regime since 9/11, UBS Money Laundering Prevention 
Newsleller, Spring 2009, 15, 16. 
255 For instance, economic and trade sanctions may be invoked in circumstances where a particular country is 
believed to be proliferating weapons of mass destruction, violating fundamental human rights, or trafficking 
in narcotics. 
256 Op cit n250. 
257 These powers are largely enshrined in the Trading with the Enemy Act of I 9 I 7 (P.L. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411) 
and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626). 
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Depending on whether a sanctions program is country-based, regime-based or list-based, the 
obligations placed upon institutions may include: 
• blocking the accounts, assets and other propertl58 of specified individuals and entities; 
• blocking transactions that are-
(i) conducted by or on behalf of a blocked individual or entity; 
(ii) directed to, or planned to go through, a blocked entity; or 
(iii) otherwise connected with a transaction in which a blocked individual or entity has 
an interest; and 
• rejecting unlicensed trade and financial transactions with specified individuals and 
entities.259 
A review of OFAC's sanctions programs reveals how greatly the obligations under each may 
vary. For instance, the list-based sanctions programs prohibit institutions from dealing with, 
and oblige them to freeze the property of, any person/entity appearing on a specified list. By 
comparison, country-based sanctions programs typically impose trade prohibitions on 
institutions, and require them to block any assets of a specified government. Some sanctions 
regulations go even further than these requirements, with the Cuban sanctions program 
prohibiting institutions from exporting goods to or importing goods from Cuba, travelling to 
Cuba without a specific licence, and dealing with any property in which Cuba or a Cuban 
. I h . 260 natwna as an mterest. 
In addition to the aforementioned sanctions programs, OFAC also maintains a list of 
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDNs list). Created under Executive 
Order 13224, this list contains more than 3,500 'foreign adversaries" (including 
individuals, entities and vessels) based in more than 110 countries. Under OFAC regulations, 
"all U.S. persons" are strictly prohibited from engaging in any form of financial transaction 
with anyone listed on the SONs list. 
258 The definition of "assets and property" is particularly broad and includes anything of direct, indirect, 
present, future or contingent value (including all types of bank transactions). 
259 Federal Financiallnstitutions Examination Council, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering 
Examination Manual (2006) 136. 
260 Office of Foreign Assets Control, Cuba: What You Need to Know about the U.S Embargo (2004) 
<http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcementlofac/programs/cuba/cuba.pdf> at 19 October 2007. 
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For the purposes ofOFAC's SONs list, the term "all U.S. persons" is defined to include all 
U.S. citizens and permanent residents wherever they are located, all people and organisations 
within the U.S., and all U.S. incorporated entities and their foreign branches throughout the 
world. The expansiveness of this definition means that OFAC's sanctions programs have a 
far broader scope- and potentially carry a higher level of AML/CTF legal risk- than many 
AMLICTF laws. Unlike the Bank Secrecy Act for instance, OFAC's regulations are not only 
binding upon U.S. banks and their domestic branches, agencies and international banking 
facilities, but also upon the foreign branches of U.S. institutions (including their foreign 
offices and subsidiaries) and a host of other industries not typically caught by U.S. municipal 
AML/CTF legislation (for instance, travel agencies and publishers).261 
Whilst some OFAC regulations are explicitly extraterritorial in nature, the vast majority are 
only directly applicable to U.S. persons. However, this has not prevented a significant 
number of foreign institutions from nevertheless observing those regulations and bestowing 
upon them a legal status akin to de facto internationallaw.262 Presumably, many entities have 
sought to comply with all of OFAC's sanctions programs in order to avoid the potential: 
o extraterritorial third party liability they may incur as a result of assisting, facilitating or 
conducting transactions for designated terrorist organisations; 263 and 
o reputation a! and financial damage they may sustain as a result of dealing with a restricted 
entity and being placed on the SONs list themselves.264 
Since the events of September II, the legal risk represented by non-compliance with OFAC 
regulations has become more pronounced as the U.S. Treasury Department has paid 
261 A select number of OF AC sanctions regulations (including those relating to Cuba and North Korea) 
extend beyond the definition of "all U.S. persons", to encompass all foreign subsidiaries owned or controlled 
by U.S. companies. 
262 Given that so many foreign institutions abide by OFAC sanctions programs in order to protect their own 
reputations and their ability to conduct business in (and with) the U.S., OFAC sanctions have assumed a 
status comparable to international law. Their coverage is arguably akin to international law now, despite the 
fact that they are created, enforced and monitored by a single jurisdiction. 
263 Op cit n229, 312. 
264 Under various pieces of legislation, the U.S. government maintains broad powers with respect to those 
individuals and entities seen to be supporting terrorist activities. For instance, under Section I (d) of Executive 
Order /3224, the U.S. government is empowered to block the property of foreign persons who "assist in, 
sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in 
support of" acts of terrorism and/or those individuals/entities otherwise designated by the U.S. Secretary of 
the Treasury. 
89 
increased attention to institutions' compliance with economic and trade sanctions.265 
Currently, a single violation of an OFAC sanctions program may result in one of more of the 
following penalties: 
• criminal fines up to USD$10 million dollars for corporations and USD$5 million dollars 
for individuals; 
• terms of imprisonment ranging from 10 to 30 years for wilful violations; 
• civil penalties ranging from USD$11 ,000 to USD$ I million; and 
• forfeiture of the funds/property involved in the violation. 
Since February 2003, hundreds of institutions have been penalised for breaching U.S. federal 
sanctions regulations.266 However, perhaps the most notable penalty imposed upon an 
institution for OFAC sanctions violations is that incurred by Swiss banking giant UBS in 
May 2004. The bank received a USD$100 million monetary penalty for engaging in USD 
banknote transactions with sanctioned countries, and deliberately attempting to conceal those 
transactions from the U.S. Federal Reserve. Given that this penalty was approximately 
twenty times the amount of net profit that UBS made as a result of breaching OFAC 
sanctions,267 it was seemingly intended to damage the institution's financial standing and 
send a clear message to other institutions that non-compliance with OFAC sanctions can 
carry heavy penalties. Interestingly however, it is probable that the penalty levied against the 
institution would have been even higher had it not cooperated with investigators and reduced 
its future risk by instituting corrective actions internally, disciplining responsible staff, and 
agreeing to withdraw from the international banknote trading business268 
Whilst institutions are not required to design and implement a sanctions compliance 
program, the Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines published in the U.S. Federal 
265 Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC Compliance Mandatory; Penalties for Non-Compliance 
Staggering <http:/1216.70.94.1 0/leeupdates/officeofforeignassetscontrol.pdf> at 18 November 2006. 
266 Op cit n 180. 400. 
267 Baxter. T.C., 'Risk Management and Regulatory Failures at Riggs Bank and UBS: Lessons Learned' 
(Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. 
House of Representatives, 2 June 2004). 
268 UBS, UBS Statement on Regulatory Actions by the US. Federal Reserve and the Swiss Federal Banking 
Commission (2004) 
<http://www.ubs.com/1/e/media overview/media global/search )/search I O?newsld=59058> at 24 January 
2009. 
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Register on 8 September 2008, enable OFAC to consider a range of general factors when 
determining the appropriate enforcement response to an apparent violation of sanctions 
regulations.269 These factors include the history of an institution's sanctions compliance, the 
strength and scope of its sanctions compliance program, any voluntary disclosure of its 
violations, and any actions subsequently taken to secure its future compliance with OFAC 
• 270 
sanct10ns programs. 
Whilst there is a degree of overlap between the customer screening requirements contained 
in U.S. AMLICTF legislation271 and the sanctions list-checking requirements overseen by 
OFAC, OFAC sanctions generally extend beyond known money launderers and terrorism 
financiers to include known terrorists, narcotics traffickers, weapons proliferators and other 
designated foreign persons. Accordingly, OF AC sanctions may be considered to carry 
greater legal risk for financial institutions than the Bank Secrecy Act's customer 
identification requirements because there is a broader, ongoing risk of contravention272 
3.5 Enforcement and AML/CTF legal risk 
An institution's AMLICTF legal risk is not simply hinged upon the number and scope of 
applicable AMLICTF laws, offences and penalties in a particular jurisdiction. It is also a 
product of the way in which such laws, offences and penalties are interpreted, pursued and 
applied. Whilst the overriding enforcement environment will affect institutions' AMLICTF 
legal risk in relation to their potential liability at both civil and criminal law, for ease of 
reference the issue of enforcement is addressed in this Chapter. 
Unless AMLICTF legislation is strongly enforced by regulatory authorities and the courts, it 
is unlikely to have any impact on the way institutions identify, mitigate and manage their 
269 See United States Government, US Federal Register. Vol. 73, No. 174,8 September2008, 51933-51941. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Under current U.S. AML/CTF laws, U.S. financial institutions are required to compare new accounts 
against government lists of known or suspected terrorists/terrorist organisations within a reasonable time after 
opening the account. 
272 Institutions are not only required to screen their new customers against the OF AC lists when opening an 
account, but also screen their existing customer base regularly to ensure that they are not unintentionally 
holding an account for an individual/entity that has been subsequently added to the lists. In addition, 
institutions are required to filter their payments for transactions to or from sanctioned individuals or entities. 
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MLITF risk. Where institutions believe that non-compliance with such legislation is unlikely 
to carry a high degree of AMLICTF legal risk, there will be little incentive for them to spend 
copious amounts of money trying to fulfil their legislative obligations. 
Whilst the two primary deterrents for individuals engaged in money laundering are 
considered to be the risk of getting caught for their crimes and the severity of their likely 
punishment,273 the same can arguably be said with respect to institutions covered by 
domestic and/or extraterritorial AMLICTF legislation. Indeed, an institution's AMLICTF 
legal risk is likely to be directly proportionate to the aggressiveness with which AMLICTF 
compliance is enforced, and legislative breaches are punished. Even in a jurisdiction where 
AMLICTF laws provide for a number of offences and harsh criminal penalties, the 
AMLICTF legal risk faced by institutions will still be minimal unless accompanying 
enforcement efforts are coordinated and concerted. 
In some jurisdictions, institutions may try to assess their potential AML/CTF legal risk by 
reference to the number of successful criminal prosecutions for breaches of domestic 
AM L/CTF laws. This is perhaps underpinned by the fact that many regulatory bodies have 
traditionally used public enforcement actions and harsh criminal penalties to demonstrate that 
non-compliance with AMLICTF laws may be sternly punished. However, by assessing their 
AMLICTF legal risk solely on the basis of how many successful prosecutions have taken 
place in a certain jurisdiction, institutions may understate (and therefore underestimate) the 
level of risk they face. Whilst criminal penalties are often the most newsworthy hallmarks of 
a strong enforcement environment, they are not the only hallmarks. As is further discussed in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis, civil enforcement actions are frequently used to address AMLICTF 
compliance failures and contraventions of AMLICTF legislation. In fact, many domestic 
regulatory bodies have demonstrated a preference for pursuing non-compliance through the 
use of civil actions, which enable them to appease politicians and the public by dispensing 
with the more arduous criminal standard of proof and notching up some 'quick wins' on the 
regulatory scoreboard. 
273 Yeandle, M., Mainelli, M., Berendt, A., and Healy, B., Anti-Money Laundering Requirements: Costs 
Benefits and Perceptions (2005). 
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Thus, whilst the number of successful criminal prosecutions may be an indicator of the 
effectiveness of a country's AMLICTF laws, the strength and/or reliability of that indicia 
may be questionable if viewed in isolation. There might be a range of reasons why a country 
has had very few prosecutions in relation to a specific crime. For instance, at the most basic 
level, it may simply be that there are low levels of that crime. Quantifying AMLICTF legal 
risk solely on the basis of prosecutions may lead to inaccurate assessments of risk given that 
a sizeable proportion of money laundering and terrorism financing offences are never 
identified. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, there are no accurate statistics with 
respect to the prevalence of such activities so, at best, the published statistics are simply 
informed estimates. Accordingly, it is difficult to analyse the appropriateness of the number 
of criminal prosecutions in any jurisdiction without having sound crime statistics to compare 
them to. 
Another significant problem with basing assessments of AMLICTF legal risk wholly upon 
the number of prosecutions is that in many jurisdictions a significant number of enforcement 
proceedings never advance to that stage. Many are settled out of court via cooperative (and 
sometimes confidential) agreements with regulatory authorities. Thus, the number of visible 
prosecutions in a particular nation state may not reflect the totality of regulatory and 
enforcement efforts in respect of AMLICTF. 
From a legal risk perspective, what is perhaps more important than the number of criminal 
prosecutions in a certain country, is any criticism levied against authorities there for their 
refusal or unexplained reluctance to initiate criminal proceedings in circumstances where 
they are deemed to be warranted. This may involve criticism provided by other nation states 
or even international bodies concerned with the effective enforcement of AMLICTF 
legislation. For instance, in the FA TF's 2005 Mutual Evaluation Report on Australia, the 
FA TF expressed concern about the "dearth of money laundering prosecutions and 
convictions" at both the federal and state levels274 
274 Financial Action Task Force, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism- Australia (2005) Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 28 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/35528955.pdt> at 3 May 2008. 
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In reviewing the country's apparently low levels of money laundering prosecutions, FA TF 
officials held that Australian authorities did not appear to be treating money laundering as a 
separate and serious offence. Rather, they seemingly considered money laundering offences 
to be ancillary to predicate offences; a viewpoint only strengthened by the fact that 
Australian judges have generally sentenced predicate crimes and money laundering offences 
concurrently. The effect of this Mutual Evaluation report was that the Australian government 
set about drafting and enacting the AMLICTF Act 2006 (Cth) to bolster both its AML/CTF 
regime, and the FA TF' s opinion of the seriousness with which it regarded global AMLICTF 
efforts. Whilst the AMLICTF Act 2006 (Cth) is currently still being implemented across 
regulated sectors, 2008 saw a number of money laundering prosecutions launched against 
individuals alleged to have breached the money laundering provisions of the Criminal Code 
Act 1995 (Cth). This is seemingly demonstrative of a desire oflaw enforcement officials to 
more actively pursue money laundering prosecutions. Indeed, during 1997 and 2005 
inclusive, there were only 5 successful prosecutions for money laundering in Australia.275 
3.5.1 The stakes are raised: Increased enforcement 
Historically, the levels of visible, criminal enforcement of AMLICTF laws have tended to be 
"extremely modest'". 276 Whilst there were laws in some countries relating to AML and, to a 
lesser extent, CTF, the offences enshrined in those laws- and the legal courses of action they 
gave rise to- generally focussed upon the crime of money laundering as committed by drug 
traffickers. Where an individual was charged with committing any criminal offence from 
which they derived a profit, money laundering was simply an additional charge used by 
prosecutors to bolster their case against the defendant and increase any penalties they 
ultimately received. 
However, during the past decade many jurisdictions have expanded their AMLICTF laws 
and focussed their regulatory efforts on the broader processes of money laundering and 
terrorism financing. Money laundering is now widely recognised as a criminal offence in its 
275 Op cit n274, 31. 
276 Levi, M., Money Laundering and Its Regulation (2002) 582 ANNALS American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 181. 
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own right, and AMLICTF laws often provide for a range of related offences that do not 
necessarily require the active laundering of dirty funds or the financing of terrorist acts. For 
instance, under Australia's AMLICTF Act 2006 (Cth), individuals and institutions may be 
held criminally liable for a range of criminal acts, including tipping off (Section 123), giving 
false or misleading information to regulatory/law enforcement authorities (Section 136), and 
providing a designated service (i.e. a financial service covered by the Act) using a false 
customer name (Section 139). 
Whilst most high profile AMLICTF enforcement actions have occurred in the U.S., the past 
few years have seen a number of other foreign regulators start to more actively enforce 
compliance with their domestic AMLICTF laws. This is particularly apparent in the Asia-
Pacific region, where many countries have enacted AMLICTF legislation and increased their 
enforcement efforts in an effort to gain membership to the FATF. For example, from the 
time it became an FA TF Observer in January 2005 until the time it was accepted as a fully-
fledged member in June 2007, China took considerable steps to strengthen its AMLICTF 
regime?" Its government passed more stringent AMLICTF laws and during 2005 alone, the 
People's Bank of China fined more than 600 financial institutions a total ofCNY56.29 
million (AUD$5.3 million) for breaching the country's AML regulations. 278 
Whilst there has been an apparent increase in the enforcement efforts of Asia-Pacific nations 
seeking FATF membership, the past few years have also seen an amplification of the 
enforcement activities undertaken by some countries that are already members of the 
international body. Amongst these countries is Japan, where regulatory authorities have 
made a focussed attempt to reprimand institutions in breach of their AMLICTF obligations. 
Most notably, after finding in October 2004 that Citibank's internal AMLICTF controls were 
inadequate, the Japanese Financial Services Agency barred the institution from Japanese 
277 People's Bank of China, China Became a Full Member of Financial Action Task Force on Anti-Money 
Laundering (2007) <http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?coi~6400&ID~872> at 17 July 2007. 
278 
"PBC Fines BTMU CNY1.2mn for Violation of Anti-Money Laundering', SinoCast China Business Daily 
News (Beijing), 5 April 2006, I. 
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Government bond auctions,279 revoked a number of its banking licences, and ordered the 
closure of all accounts at its four private banking branches in Japan. 
Whilst the U.S. is typically hailed as setting the benchmark for AMLICTF regulation and 
enforcement, the action taken by Japanese regulatory authorities against Citibank is 
seemingly far more aggressive and more damaging than most of the enforcement actions 
waged against institutions in the U.S. Rather than simply imposing a large fine or monetary 
penalty upon the bank, which has often been the preference of U.S. regulators, the Japanese 
Financial Services Agency caused Citibank considerable reputational and financial damage 
by forcing it to shut down a lucrative component of its business. 
3.5.2 Tighter crime-fighting networks 
In recent years, a number of jurisdictions have enacted legislation to facilitate greater 
cooperation and information sharing between the organisations responsible for overseeing 
AMLICTF compliance and enforcement. In fact, one of the greatest drivers behind the 
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act was the need to create tighter crime-fighting networks 
and remove several legal barriers impeding the sharing of information between: 
• law enforcement bodies and intelligence agencies; and 
• regulatory authorities and industry groups. 
Whilst U.S. federal law enforcement agencies have long been able to access data relating to 
institutions' compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act, it was not until the USA PATRIOT Act 
came into force that the country's intelligence agencies were able to access the Currency 
Banking and Retrieval System (CBRS) database. Maintained by the Internal Revenue 
Service, this database is used to electronically warehouse all Bank Secrecy Act documents, 
including Foreign Bank & Financial Account Reports, Currency Transaction Reports, 
Suspicious Activity Reports, and Reports of Cash Payments over USD$10,000 Received in a 
279 
'Japan Closes Citibank Branches', BBC News, 17 September 2004 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk! l/hi/business/3666828.stm> at 30 April 2006. 
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Trade or Business.280 Given the type and breadth of information it stores, the ability of the 
wider intelligence community to access the CBRS database has facilitated a more open 
dialogue amongst law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and aided in the investigation 
and prosecution of AMLICTF compliance failures. In doing so, it has potentially also 
heightened the AMLICTF legal risk faced by U.S. institutions. 
Compliance failures that could once have slipped under the regulatory radar or fallen 
between bureaucratic cracks can now be more easily identified and prosecuted by a number 
of regulatory authorities. Historically, the utility ofFinCEN data had been hampered by the 
overdependence of regulators and institutions on paper reporting. However, the advent of 
electronic reporting and the ability of intelligence agencies to now access the CBRS 
database, has theoretically strengthened the ability of government bodies to identify and 
investigate money laundering activities and breaches of AMLICTF legislation. This contrasts 
with the situation in Australia, where AUSTRAC has primarily relied on electronic reporting 
and has for many years granted a range of intelligence and law enforcement bodies access to 
its intelligence (both in relation to institutions, and the reports submitted by them).281 
In addition to the enhanced collaboration between law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies, the past few years have also ushered in a period of heightened cooperation between 
financial services regulators and industry bodies. FinCEN in particular has made a concerted 
effort in recent times to work with industry bodies to ensure that U.S. institutions are 
meeting their AM LICTF obligations. According to some commentators, this public and 
private sector collaboration has effectively created an additional layer ofregulatory 
oversight282 and heightened the AMLICTF legal risk faced by institutions. 
280 Brown, K., (Written Statement before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United 
States Senate, 28 September 2004). 
281 Following the enactment of Australia's AMLICTF Act 2006 (Cth), AUSTRAC entered into 
Memorandums of Understanding (which enable partner agencies to access AUSTRAC infonnation) with 
organisations including the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity and the Australian Secret 
Intelligence Service. During 2007-2008, the greatest users of AUSTRAC information included the Australian 
Taxation Office, Australian Federal Police, Australian Customs Service, and Australian Crime Commission. 
See Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, A USTRAC Annual Report 2007-08 (AUSTRAC, 
Sydney, 2008) 51-59. 
282 Alexander, R., and Allen, C., 'Big Price for Lax Anti-Laundering' (2004) 169(204) American Banker II. 
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Arguably however, in several jurisdictions the increased dialogue between regulatory 
agencies and industry bodies has in fact diminished the AMLICTF legal risk faced by 
institutions. Indeed, it may have fostered a more cooperative approach to enforcement, where 
regulators are more inclined to work with industry participants to achieve AMLICTF 
compliance, rather than immediately launching enforcement actions against those in breach 
of their requirements. As stated in the U.K. FSA's Enforcement Handbook, the "open and 
cooperative relationship between firms and their supervisors, will, in some cases where a 
contravention has taken place, lead the [U.K. FSA] to decide against taking formal 
disciplinary action ". 283 
As previously discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, regulatory authorities and industry 
participants operating in risk-based regimes may have different understandings regarding the 
way in which MLITF risks should be assessed and prioritised. Clearly, better communication 
and cooperation between the public and private sector may ensure that there are common 
understandings ofMLITF risk, and help to alleviate some of the AML/CTF legal risk 
otherwise faced by institutions. Indeed, as Australia continues to implement its AMLICTF 
legislation, most major financial institutions and industry bodies (including the Australian 
Bankers' Association, Investment and Financial Services Association, and Australian 
Financial Markets Association), are seeking to limit their potential regulatory exposure 
(and/or the exposure of their members) by engaging in an open, ongoing dialogue with 
AUSTRAC. 
As previously noted, this dialogue may limit the AMLICTF legal risk of Australian 
institutions by impacting the ability of regulatory authorities (in this case, AUSTRAC) to 
regulate and enforce compliance with AMLICTF legislation. Were the discussions between 
regulatory officials and regulated institutions (and/or the industry bodies representing them) 
to provide regulated institutions with an excessive ability to influence AMLICTF policy and 
283 United Kingdom Financial Services Authority, Enforcement Handbook 4 
<http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/extra/4755.pdt> at 12 July 2008. 
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its implementation, "regulatory capture" may occur.284 In such a case, the independence of 
regulatory officials may be compromised285 and the commercial interests of institutions may 
be prioritised above the public interest attached to the effective regulation of AMLICTF 
compliance. Regulated institutions may be able to push the boundaries of AMLICTF 
regulation (primarily by diluting their requirements- if not at the policy level, then certainly 
with respect to the compliance/enforcement approach of regulatory officials) and, by 
extension, limit their exposure to instances of non-compliance and/or undesirable regulatory 
. . f ,. 286 
actiOns m respect o non-comp tance. 
3.5.3 The politics of enforcement 
In some jurisdictions, the regulation and enforcement of AMLICTF legislation is largely 
attributable to the political environment and the attention being paid to AML/CTF issues by 
government officials. At times, the level of AMLICTF enforcement in a particular country 
has appeared to be directly proportionate to the level of support or criticism received by the 
presiding national government. As a general rule, the more acutely aware a government is of 
the importance of combating money laundering and terrorism financing, the greater is the 
pressure placed upon regulatory officials to instigate enforcement actions, and the higher is 
the degree of AMLICTF legal risk faced by institutions. 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, U.S. prosecutors displayed a great willingness to 
prosecute corporations for their wrongdoing. However, they seemingly broke with tradition 
in 1991, following the promulgation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Rather than seeking 
to criminally pursue most cases of corporate malfeasance, U.S. prosecutors agreed to forgo 
the criminal prosecution of several large companies for securities fraud violations, in 
284 According to public choice theorists, regulatory capture occurs when individuals/corporations with a key 
interest in the outcome of policy or regulatory decisions are able to focus their resources and ''capture" the 
influence of regulatory officials in order to secure desirable policy outcomes. 
285 Jopson, B., 'Is the Gamekeeper Tied Down by the Big Four?', Financial Times (London), 14 September 
2006, 8. 
286 It should be noted however that in certain jurisdictions, the fruition of regulatory capture may be 
hampered by the nature of the regulator and the review mechanisms/functions of international AMLICTF 
bodies. For instance, in Australia, regulatory capture may be impeded by the fact that AUSTRAC is an 
independent regulatory agency and, together with Australian AMLICTF laws and frameworks, it is subject 
to peer review by international organisations such as the FA TF. 
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exchange for their payment of financial penalties, execution of certain remedial actions, and 
ongoing cooperation with regulatory and Jaw enforcement authorities 287 
However, the U.S. regulatory and enforcement environment again changed during the early 
2000s after a number of significant corporate frauds highlighted the public policy need for 
corporations to be held accountable for their malfeasance?88 The government once again 
displayed a willingness to criminally prosecute companies such as Enron, WorldCom and 
Arthur Andersen for their wrongdoing. However, the severe consequences attached to the 
indictment of such organisations soon caused U.S. government officials, regulatory 
authorities and prosecutors to reconsider their approach to AMLICTF enforcement. 
In March 2002, following its failure to cooperate with U.S. prosecutorial and regulatory 
officials, international accounting firm Arthur Andersen was indicted for its role in the 
En ron scandal. By the time the company was convicted several months later, it had 
collapsed and "an unmitigated disaster" was set in motion;289 a disaster that was only 
made worse by the legal proceedings that had been waged against it. The collateral damage 
caused- or in some cases, compounded- by Arthur Andersen's indictment was 
undeniable. The long-standing company went bankrupt, tens of thousands of employees 
were retrenched, shareholders lost their investments, and the 'Big 5' accounting firms 
essentially became the 'Big 4.' 290 Indeed, the corporation's prosecution only made its 
demise that much more notable. 
There are a number of complexities inherent in prosecuting certain types of legal persons. 
Indeed, the indictment or criminal prosecution of public companies is particularly 
problematic because any conviction is likely to punish innocent employees, shareholders and 
corporate constituents. Given that the defining characteristic of publicly traded companies is 
287 Spivack, P ., and Raman, S., 'Regulating the 'New Regulators': Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements' (2008) 45(2) American Criminal Law Review 159, 160. 
288 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Op cit n207, Part l(B). 
289 See Ainslie, E.K., Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution (2004) 
American College of Trial Lawyers 
<http://www .actl.com/ AM/T emplate.cfm ?Section= All Publications& T empl ate=/CM/ContentDisplay .cfm& C 
ontentFileJD~5I> at 4 August 2008. 
290 Op cit n208, I 097. 
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their separation of ownership and control, the shareholders who essentially own the 
corporation do not control the actions of those working for it.291 However, by imposing 
criminal penalties upon a corporation for the actions of its employees (rather than, for 
instance, punishing the employees themselves), it is arguably the shareholders who are 
punished. This is further discussed in the Riggs Bank case study contained in Chapter 6 of 
this thesis. 
Since the closure of Arthur Andersen, there has once again been a fundamental shift in the 
AML/CTF regulation of large U.S. corporations. Whilst some commentators claim that U.S. 
regulatory and law enforcement authorities have continued to "shoot first and ask questions 
later" 292 when pursuing corporate crime, this does not appear to be the case with respect to 
money laundering offences and criminal AMLICTF compliance failures. On the contrary, it 
appears that U.S. federal prosecutors have generally sought to find ways of tightly regulating 
AML/CTF compliance without unnecessarily prosecuting financial institutions. They have 
placed increased reliance on deferred and non-prosecution agreements and today, will 
generally only lay criminal charges against a U.S. corporation in the rarest and most extreme 
circumstances.293 As further discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis, the case of foreign 
financial institutions appears to be somewhat different, with regulatory officials and 
prosecutors seemingly more willing to take formal legal action against these entities in 
circumstances where their prosecution will have little impact on U.S. interests. 
According to former U.S. Attorney-General Alberto R. Gonzales, whilst U.S. government 
authorities are not afraid to target corporate misbehavior, prosecutors certainly need to 
consider any potential "collateral consequences" when determining whether to prosecute an 
institution?94 These comments certainly suggest a degree of reluctance to pursue criminal 
proceedings in circumstances where other less intrusive, less disruptive and less damaging 
enforcement options are available. However, whilst this less aggressive and perhaps more 
strategic approach to AMLICTF enforcement of AML/CTF may be preferable from the 
291 Op cit n 170. 
292 Isaac, W.M., 'Harsh Approach to Regulation is Backfiring' (2005) 170( 191) American Banker I. 
293 Op cit n208, I 098. 
294 Hamilton, W., 'KPMG Avoids Potential Collapse', Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles), 30 August 2005 
<http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/30/business/fi-kpmg30> at 21 January 2009. 
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standpoint of most financial institutions, it has not been without criticism. As detailed in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis, cases such as Riggs Bank have at times raised questions about 
whether the enforcement of AMLICTF legislation is occasionally still too lax. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Just as money laundering and terrorism financing can seamlessly transcend geographic 
boundaries, so too can the AMLICTF legal risk faced by many institutions. Over the past few 
years, a number of countries have enacted municipal and extraterritorial legislation. Such 
legislation has expanded the AMLICTF obligations placed upon financial institutions, 
attached criminal liability to a number of AMLICTF offences, and created an additional layer 
of regulatory oversight with respect to institutions' AMLICTF compliance. Theoretically, it 
has heightened institutions' AMLICTF legal risk. 
An institution's AMLICTF legal risk will always be somewhat proportionate to the scope of 
applicable AMLICTF laws, and the severity of the possible criminal penalties attached to 
non-compliance with such laws. An institution subject to an elaborate array of national and 
extraterritorial AMLICTF laws will likely face far greater risk than a comparable entity 
operating in a jurisdiction with relatively skeletal AML/CTF legislation. That said, even in 
those jurisdictions where municipal AMLICTF legislation creates a copious number of 
AMLICTF obligations and offences, the AMLICTF legal risk faced by covered institutions 
will still fundamentally hinge upon the aggressiveness with which AMLICTF compliance is 
enforced. 
Where regulatory, law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities take an uncompromising 
stance with respect to the enforcement of AML/CTF compliance, institutions will generally 
face a higher level of AMLICTF legal risk. As a general rule, the more attention government 
officials pay to money laundering offences and AMLICTF compliance failures, the greater is 
the tenacity with which local regulators will pursue AMLICTF compliance, and the 
willingness with which local prosecutors will launch criminal enforcement proceedings 
against those institutions in breach of their AMLICTF requirements. This is not to simplify 
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the factors that may sculpt a jurisdiction's enforcement environment with respect to 
AMLICTF. Of course, the aggressiveness of enforcement efforts in a particular nation state 
may of course be heavily impacted by additional factors, including whether the relevant 
jurisdiction is a member of international bodies such as the FA TF. 
Clearly, an institution's exposure to criminal culpability for an AMLICTF compliance failure 
is not only attributable to the number of relevant offences and penalties in a particular 
jurisdiction, but to the overriding enforcement environment there. That said, even in the U.S. 
(which is often held to have the most aggressive AMLICTF enforcement regime in the 
world), there have been documented instances where prosecutors and regulatory authorities 
have been reluctant to wage formal criminal proceedings against a non-compliant institution. 
As the evolving enforcement environment in the U.S. has shown, the consequences of 
imposing harsh criminal penalties upon an institution may in fact limit the AMLICTF legal 
risk faced by entities operating there. 
Following the collapse and prosecution of corporations such as Enron and Arthur Andersen, 
U.S. authorities have seemingly taken the view that criminal enforcement actions might not 
be the most effective way of addressing instances of corporate crime and legislative non-
compliance. The collateral damage that can accompany a company's indictment appears to 
have dissuaded U.S. regulatory officials and federal prosecutors from pursuing criminal 
enforcement actions in a number of cases. In the past few years there have undoubtedly been 
many instances where potential criminal proceedings against an institution have been set 
aside in favour of prosecuting culpable employees, pursuing a civil action and/or securing 
institutional change via one of the cooperative agreements outlined in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis. 
Thus, whilst an institution's AMLICTF legal risk is likely to be far higher in the U.S. than 
other jurisdictions, it seems that the overall risk that institutions face there is overstated -
least of all by regulatory authorities and institutions themselves. Whilst AMLICTF 
legislation provides authorities with an arsenal of enforcement tools, it appears that formal 
enforcement actions and criminal penalties are now only invoked in the rarest of 
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circumstances. This will potentially be the case where an institution has committed 
significant, ongoing breaches of its AMLICTF obligations, and/or has otherwise been 
recalcitrant or unresponsive to regulatory efforts to rectify its behaviour/control failures. 
Statistics contained in the U.S.S. C. 2008 Sourcebook indicate just how few institutions are 
criminally prosecuted in the U.S. for money laundering offences and/or criminal breaches of 
AMLICTF legislation. They suggest that many non-compliant institutions manage to avoid 
even the imposition of a criminal fine for their compliance failures. Although this may 
largely be due to the reluctance of U.S. authorities to instigate criminal enforcement actions 
against institutions, it may also be attributable to the heightened cooperation between 
regulatory bodies and the financial services industry. 
Increased dialogue between the public and private sectors in relation to AMLICTF 
compliance may have effectively limited institutions' AMLICTF legal risk in recent times. 
By fostering an environment that focuses on prevention, communication and collaboration, 
many U.S. regulatory authorities are now working more cooperatively with institutions to 
correct their compliance deficiencies before any criminal enforcement action is even 
considered. As reflected in U.S. sentencing statistics and the relatively small number of 
corporate prosecutions for breaches of AMLICTF legislation, this heightened communication 
between the public and private sectors has seemingly diminished the need for (or at least, 
discouraged) regulatory authorities from taking decisive enforcement action against financial 
institutions. 
Greater cooperation between regulatory authorities and the 'regulated' sectors is likely to 
have played some role in lowering the apparent risk of institutions being criminally pursued 
for their AMLICTF non-compliance. From the perspective of institutions, the increased 
dialogue may have enabled them to build better relationships with regulatory authorities and 
gain a better understanding of how such authorities will assess their MLITF risks and the 
effectiveness of their risk controls. From the standpoint of regulatory authorities however, 
the enhanced cooperation with financial institutions might have given them a greater ability 
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to identify and address any 'compliance gaps' earlier without the need for criminal 
enforcement proceedings. 
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Chapter4 
Looking at AML/CTF Legal Risk through the 
Lens of Civil Law 
"We don't give our criminals much punishment, but we sure give 'em plenty of publicity"-
Will Rogers 
4.1 Introduction to civil liability and AMUCTF legal risk 
Criminal penalties are simply one aspect of an effective regulatory framework. In accordance 
with the 'strategic regulation theory', successful corporate regulation requires the availability 
of a number of approaches and outcomes; both civil and criminal, as well as individual and 
295 Wh'l . . I . " h f I 'd 296 corporate. 1 st cnmma sanctiOns may 10rrn t e apex o any regu atory pyram1 , 
there should be layers of other enforcement tools and regulatory options supporting them. 
This Chapter seeks to address an institution's potential AMLICTF legal risk under civil law. 
As previously noted in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the term "civil" is used throughout this 
Chapter in an inclusionary fashion to encompass every legal course of action, type of legal 
proceeding or penalty that is not strictly "criminal" in nature. Unless expressly stated, the 
definition of civil law used throughout this thesis necessarily includes those areas of the law 
that might otherwise technically fall under the umbrella of equity. 
Whilst many governments have enacted municipal laws attaching criminal liability to 
certain breaches of AMLICTF requirements, AML/CTF compliance failures have typically 
been addressed through the use of civil, rather than criminal, proceedings. Since the 
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act and similar pieces of AMLICTF legislation, a number 
of institutions have incurred sizeable civil penalties for failing to fulfil their AMLICTF 
obligations. Whilst there has seemingly been enough evidence in at least some of these 
cases to successfully prosecute the relevant institution, the preference of many regulatory 
295 Clough, J., and Mulhern, C., The Prosecution of Corporations (2002) 239. 
296 Fisse, B., and Braithwaite, J ., Corporations, Crime and Accountability (1993) 140-142. 
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authorities has been to address corporate AML/CTF compliance failures at civil law. As 
previously discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, this is partly attributable to their desire to 
avoid the commercial consequences (as well as the potential delays and uncertainty)297 
associated with the criminal prosecution of corporate entities. 
In recent years, institutions operating in particular jurisdictions have seemingly faced 
heightened levels of AMLICTF legal risk in relation to their civil law obligations. This is not 
only due to the enforcement preferences of regulatory authorities, but also the disconnect that 
has at times arisen with respect to institutions' obligations at criminal and civil law. Whilst 
civil and criminal law are capable of operating concurrently, some institutions have identified 
a potential conflict between their rights and responsibilities under statute, contract law, and 
equitable constructive trust principles. This has been particularly apparent in the U.K., where 
several entities have complied with their AML/CTF obligations at criminal law, only to find 
themselves exposed to liability at civil law. 
Given the various AML/CTF obligations commonly imposed upon financial institutions, and 
the types of civil penalties that can accompany a contravention of those obligations, 
consideration of an institution's AML/CTF legal risk at civil law falls into several parts. This 
Chapter seeks to: 
• address the types of civil actions and civil penalties that contraventions of municipal 
and/or extraterritorial AML/CTF legislation may attract; 
• detail the principles of constructive trusts and outline the circumstances that may see an 
institution face liability as a constructive trustee in relation to certain money laundering 
activities; 
• highlight the way in which an institution's AML/CTF legal risk may be increased by any 
misalignment between their obligations at civil and criminal law; and 
• examine the ways that an institution may best seek to balance its various AML/CTF 
obligations, and mitigate and manage its risk at civil law. 
297 Bugg, D., 'Compliance through Prosecution (or Haunted by Kable)' (Speech delivered at the Australasian 
Law Teachers' Association Conference, Canberra, 3 July 2000). 
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As with Chapter 3 of this thesis, the U.S. and the U.K. are the focal points of discussion 
around civil AMLICTF legal risk. In both these jurisdictions, there has been a number of 
significant civil actions involving- and a number of notable civil penalties given to-
individuals/institutions in breach oflocal AMLICTF Jaws. Further, with respect to the U.K. 
experience, there has been a number of interesting case law developments in relation to the 
potential conflict between institutions' obligations under statute, contract Jaw, and in equity. 
Whilst Australia is yet to see any institution face civil proceedings for contravening the 
country's AMLICTF Act 2006 (Cth), the U.S. and the U.K. provide interesting case studies 
for analysing the levels of risk faced by institutions operating under risk-based AMLICTF 
regimes. As noted previously however, differences between countries' enforcement and legal 
environments mean that not all of the analysis contained in this Chapter will be entirely 
relevant to determining the civil AMLICTF legal risk faced by institutions operating outside 
the U.S. and the U.K. For instance, whilst the U.S. and Australian enforcement experiences 
may be similar insofar as the courts in both countries may impose civil penalties upon non-
compliant individuals/institutions, the U.S. civil penalty regime is broader than the Australian 
regime because it also gives regulators broad authority to impose such penalties directly. 
Thus, there is seemingly greater executive power and leverage in the U.S., and this must 
necessarily be taken into account when determining the likely enforcement environment, and 
civil AMLICTF legal risk faced by institutions, in Australia. 
4.2 Civil liability & its associated penalties 
In contrast to criminal penalties, which typically seek to punish illegal conduct, civil 
penalties aim to right a legal wrong, enforce an agreement, settle a dispute or rectify a 
compliance failure. With the exception of one or two specific penalties (including civil 
forfeiture, which seeks to both recoup improperly gotten gains and punish a wrongdoer), civil 
penalties are primarily concerned with compensation and fairness, rather than deterrence or 
retribution. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that where an institution has inadvertently or 
unintentionally engaged in an AMLICTF compliance failure, civil penalties have often been 
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invoked to secure institutional change and ensure that similar control failures do not arise 
again in the future. 
In order to succeed with a case at civil law and justify the imposition of any civil penalty, a 
claimant must prove the alleged conduct alleged on the "balance of probabilities". As this 
is considerably less onerous than the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of proof 
required in criminal proceedings, an institution that successfully avoids criminal 
prosecution in relation to its AMLICTF compliance failures may nevertheless face civil 
enforcement proceedings. In contrast to criminal offences and enforcement actions, civil 
proceedings do not generally require regulatory authorities to establish any fault element 
(e.g. knowledge or recklessness) on the part of a respondent institution. 
Where an institution has fallen foul of its AMLICTF legislative requirements, its resulting 
legal risk and exposure to civil penalties will rest upon a number of factors. These include 
the specific requirements it has contravened, the jurisdiction(s) within which such 
contraventions took place, the apparent enforcement environment, and the number and type 
of matters that the relevant regulatory authority/court can consider when determining the 
most appropriate civil penalties. Under municipal laws, the matters to be taken into account 
for the purposes of imposing a civil penalty may be discretionary or prescriptive. For 
instance, when determining the appropriate quantum of a civil monetary penalty for a 
contravention of AMLICTF legislative requirements, Section 1 75(3) of the AMLICTF Act 
2006 (Cth) stipulates that Australian courts must consider all relevant criteria, including: 
• the nature and extent of the relevant AMLICTF contravention; 
• the nature and extent of any loss suffered as a result of the AMLICTF contravention; 
• the circumstances surrounding the AMLICTF contravention; and 
• whether the relevant institution has previously engaged in similar conduct. 
Depending on the jurisdiction(s) within which an institution has contravened its AMLICTF 
obligations, any civil penalties imposed upon it may be supplemented by formal orders 
requiring that certain corrective actions be taken. The purpose of such orders is generally to 
ensure that an institution's AMLICTF controls and AMLICTF program are robust enough 
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to meet legislative compliance and prevent similar legislative contraventions from arising 
in future. In the U.S., these types of formal orders have accompanied most of the 
significant civil monetary penalties imposed upon non-compliant institutions in the past 
few years. 
4,2,1 Civil monetary penalties 
As demonstrated by a number of recent enforcement actions, civil monetary penalties have 
often been used to address contraventions of AMLICTF legislation. This is certainly in 
accordance with the way that many municipal AMLICTF laws have been framed. Indeed, 
certain pieces of AMLICTF legislation have been drafted in way that explicitly endorses 
the use of civil penalties in preference to criminal penalties such as fines and imprisonment. 
When Australia's Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Bil/2005 
(Cth) was initially drafted, it primarily sought to address AMLICTF compliance failures 
through the use of criminal penalties. However, prior to its enactment as the AML/CTF Act 
2006 (Cth), the focus of the Bill shifted significantly. Many references to criminal offences 
and criminal liability were removed and replaced with civil penalty provisions.298 Whilst 
the Act still provides criminal penalties for breaches of specific prescriptive requirements, 
the Australian Government seemingly believed that a civil penalty regime was more 
appropriate to address contraventions of the Act's risk-based requirements 299 
In the U.S., contraventions of certain AMLICTF requirements carry civil monetary 
penalties ranging from USD$3,000 to I per cent of their assets or USD$1 million 
(whichever is greater). Pursuant to an interagency policy statement adopted by U.S. federal 
banking agencies, the size of any civil monetary penalty imposed upon an institution will 
generally depend upon the duration of its AMLICTF compliance failure(s), any refusal to 
cooperate with regulatory authorities, and the presence (or otherwise) of a compliance 
program. As stated in the U.S. Treasury Department's "Interagency Policy Regarding the 
298 Civil penalty provisions now apply to a range of offences under the Act, including the failure to conduct 
customer due diligence before providing a service designated by the Act, failure to report suspicious matters, 
failure to adopt a risk-based AMLICTF program, and failure to retain relevant AML/CTF records. 
299 Allens Arthur Robinson, Civil Penalty Provisions in Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing Act 2006 (2006) <http://www.aar.eom.au/pubs/fmres/foamldec06.htm> at 24 August 2007. 
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Assessment of Civil Money Penalties by the Federal Financial Institutions Regulatory 
Agencies", the quantum of such a penalty may also be determined by reference to the 
following five factors: 
• the size of the institution's financial resources; 
• any apparent good faith of the part of the institution; 
• the gravity of the legislative contravention(s); 
• any history of similar contraventions; and 
• any other factors that justice may require.300 
Many commentators and banking professionals have held that more serious contraventions 
of AML/CTF legislation may lead to the imposition of monetary penalties that are so steep, 
they are financially crippling for an institution.301 However, whilst this may be true in a 
theoretical or academic sense, there does not appear to be any documented cases of an 
institution being forced to close as a direct result of the civil monetary penalties imposed 
upon it for non-compliance with AMLICTF or economic and trade sanctions legislation. 
Even though institutions such as UBS302 and ABN Amro303 have incurred civil monetary 
penalties totalling USD$100 million and USD$80 million (respectively), the size and 
financial resources maintained by both these institutions makes it highly unlikely that such 
penalties caused any kind of financial strain upon them. Evidently, some global banking 
institutions are so profitable that the amount of funds they launder or use to facilitate 
transactions in breach of AMLICTF legislation, may pale in comparison to the possible 
monetary penalties their non-compliance might attract. 
300 Office of the Comptro1ler of the Currency, Interagency Statement of Civil Monetary Penalties (1998) 
OCC 98-32 <http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/98-32.txt> at 23 August 2008. 
301 See De Koker, L., 'Some Thoughts on the Impact of Customer Due Diligence Measures on Financial 
Exclusion' (2006) 13(1) Journal of Financial Crime 26. 
302 On 10 May 2004, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board of Governors assessed a civil monetary penalty of 
USD$100 million against UBS for repeatedly conducting U.S. banknote transactions for, and illegally 
transferring funds to, countries the subject of U.S. sanctions regulations. See Mojuye, B., 'What Banks Need 
to Know about the Patriot Act' (2007) 124(3) Banking Law Journal 25 8. 
303 On 19 December 2005, FinCEN, OF AC and a number of state banking regulators concurrently assessed a 
civil monetary penalty of USD$80 million against ABN Amro for failing to identify, analyse and report 
suspicious activities, and facilitating transactions in violation ofOFAC sanctions regulations. See Byrne, J.J., 
and Kelsey, M.D., 'AML Enforcement Actions: What Can We Learn?' (2006) 27(3) ABA Bank Compliance 
II. 
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The imposition of a USD$80 million or USD$1 00 million civil monetary penalty upon a 
smaller or community-based institution would clearly have the potential to significantly 
impact its ability to continue operating. Indeed, many such institutions would be financially 
drained if they were ever to incur the quantum of civil monetary penalties imposed upon 
international banking giants such as UBS and ABN Amro. However, unless the most 
brazen contraventions of AML/CTF legislation were committed over a period of time, it is 
highly unlikely that a smaller institution would ever incur penalties in the same vicinity as 
these institutions. As previously noted, the size of an institution's financial resources may 
be taken into account for the purposes of determining an appropriate penalty. Were a small 
community bank to generate annual profits ofUSD$2 million, it is improbable that a court 
would seek to address its AMLICTF compliance failures through a civil monetary penalty 
totalling far more than that amount. As previously stated, the fundamental purpose of civil 
penalties is not to punish a wrongdoer but rather, to encourage future compliance and 
compensate any readily identifiable 'victims' 304 
Just as criminal fines can be imposed upon individuals and institutions alike, so too can 
civil monetary penalties. Although such penalties appear to be overwhelmingly imposed 
upon corporate entities, in recent years some regulators have demonstrated a willingness to 
also impose them upon individuals. For instance, in November 2005 the U.K. FSA imposed 
its first civil monetary penalty upon an individual following September II and the 
subsequent London bombings. That individual, the Managing Director of Investment 
Services U.K. (Ltd), was ordered to pay £30,000 (A UD$72,000) in relation to his 
company's contraventions of municipal AMLICTF regulations305 Whilst this penalty may 
seem relatively small when compared with those imposed upon a number of other 
institutions, its imposition is significant because it marked a potential increase in the 
AMLICTF legal risk faced by organisations' senior management teams. 
304 It should be noted however that unlike other types of financial crime (e.g. fraud), there is usually a lack of 
identifiable victims with money laundering activities. 
305 McNeil, C., Laundering Lessons from the UK (2006) Risk Management Magazine 
<http://www .riskmanagement11J_flgazine.com.au/articles/1 D/OC04 7E I D.asp?Tvpe= I 25&Category= 1241 > at 
29 July 2007. 
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4.2.2 Orders and agreements 
In addition to civil monetary penalties, an institution in contravention of its AMLICTF 
legislative obligations may be subject to binding orders issued by regulatory authorities or 
the courts. Typically used to secure an institution's ongoing AMLICTF compliance, these 
Orders are individually stylised to an institution's compliance failures. For example, in 2004 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) ordered the New York National Bank 
to prevent its Chief Operating Officer from overseeing the organisation's Bank Secrecy Act 
and AMLICTF functions, and ensure that its new Compliance Officer reported directly to the 
Board audit committee.306 Whilst these requirements may appear unusually narrow, they 
were specifically designed to remedy the bank's previous legislative contraventions, which 
had arisen largely because of failures on the part of the institution's Chief Operating Officer, 
and a lack of transparency around the oversight of the bank's AML/CTF compliance. 
By virtue of§ 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873), 
U.S. federal banking regulators have a palette of administrative powers at their disposal to 
address violations of the AMLICTF requirements contained in the Bank Secrecy Act. These 
powers include the ability to issue orders that: 
• require an institution to cease and desist unlawful, unsafe or unsound practices; 
• require an institution to undertake specified affirmative actions; 
• remove or prohibit affiliate parties from participating in the affairs of an institution; and 
• terminate the insurance of an institution that violates any applicable law.307 
This last power is arguably one of the most powerful sanctions available to banking 
regulators, and it may partly explain their apparent reluctance to initiate formal enforcement 
proceedings against institutions that have fallen foul of their AMLICTF obligations. Were an 
institution to lose its deposit insurance as a result of its indictment for a money laundering or 
terrorism financing offence and/or a contravention of AMLICTF legislation, this could create 
an extensive run on its deposits and, in severe cases, lead to its closure. 
306 Opcitnl64. 
307 Opcitnl90,59. 
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Whilst many U.S. banking regulators have the power to unilaterally impose a cease and 
desist order upon an organisation, they will frequently seek an institution's consent to any 
order requiring it to discontinue certain activities or undertake specific remedial actions. 
Rather than overtly penal ising an institution for its AMLICTF compliance failures, these 
consensual orders are intended to redress an organisations' lax internal controls and the 
environment that gave rise to its compliance issues. Non-compliant institutions that fully 
cooperate with the relevant regulatory authorities and agree to the imposition of a cease and 
desist order, may therefore be able to minimise their AMLICTF legal risk. This is in 
comparison to non-compliant institutions that actively resist or obstruct the imposition of 
such an order, which may place themselves at greater risk of facing more severe penalties. 
4.2.3 Civilforfeiture 
In addition to civil monetary penalties, institutions that contravene their AMLICTF 
legislative obligations by facilitating (actively or otherwise) money laundering activities, 
may face a civil forfeiture action initiated by government authorities. In contrast to 
criminal forfeiture (or asset confiscation), civil forfeiture enables governments to recover 
the proceeds of crime even in the absence of criminal charges or a criminal conviction. 
Thus, it may be used effectively in circumstances where a criminal trial is likely to be 
lengthy, expensive and/or unsuccessful due to a defendant's vigorous denial of all (or at 
I h ')''lh . h308 east t e most senous cnmma c arges agamst t em. 
Although the objectives of criminal and civil forfeiture are fundamentally the same (i.e. 
to recover the proceeds of crime and ensure that those who illegally obtained such funds 
are denied the opportunity to use them), the procedures attached to each are often very 
different. Whilst criminal forfeiture involves waging an action against a person (in 
personam) as part of a criminal case, civil forfeiture involves bringing an action 
specifically against certain property (in rem). As a result, civil forfeiture may prove to be 
successful in circumstances where a criminal forfeiture action would otherwise have been 
308 Cassella, S.D., 'The Case for Civil Forfeiture: Why In Rem Proceedings are an Essential Tool for 
Recovering the Proceeds of Crime' (Paper presented at the 25th Cambridge International Symposium on 
Economic Crime, Cambridge, 7 September 2007) 7. 
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defeated (for instance, in circumstances where the relevant defendant is deceased, 
unidentifiable, or unable to be extradited from a foreign jurisdiction). 
In civil forfeiture cases, the relevant government is the plaintiff, the property is the 
defendant, and any persons objecting to the forfeiture and claiming an interest in the 
property are claimants.309 Ifthe court overseeing a civil forfeiture action determines on the 
balance of probabilities or the preponderance of the evidence that the disputed property 
represents the proceeds of unlawful activity, it may order its forfeiture to the state.310 In the 
U.S. for example, funds sufficiently involved with money laundering activities may be 
forfeited to the U.S. federal government pursuant to 18 USC§ 981. Given that the test of 
"involvement" is relatively broad, even legitimate funds can be the subject of a civil 
forfeiture action if they have been used to facilitate the money laundering process and/or 
make it easier311 Thus, an institution that enables a wealthy customer to launder a small 
amount of dirty funds through their bank accounts, may find that the entire contents of 
those accounts are forfeited if the large balances contained therein aided the concealment of 
the laundered funds. 
In many jurisdictions, any institution or individual against whom a civil forfeiture order is 
made will have a formal right to contest that order and convince the court that the forfeited 
property should be returned to them. For instance, any person claiming an interest in funds 
seized by the U.S. federal government in a civil forfeiture action can file a claim asserting 
their interest in those funds. 312 As stipulated by 18 USC.§ 983(a)(3), the government 
must file a complaint for forfeiture within 90 days of receiving that claim, or return the 
funds to the claimant. If it files a complaint and alleges that the relevant funds were 
309 Op cit n308, 3. 
310 Simser, J., 'The Significance of Money Laundering: The Example of the Philippines' (2006) 9(3) Journal 
of Money Laundering Contro1293, 297. 
311 See United States v. $557,933.89, More or Less, in United States Funds, 287 F.3D 66 (2d Cir. 2002). See 
also United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) In Account No. 90-3617-3, 754 F. Supp. 1467, 1473 (D Haw. 
1991), and United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955, 970 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2000) and United States v. McGauley, 279 
F.3d 62, 76 n. 14 (1st Cir. 2002). 
312 See 18 USC§ 983(a)(2). 
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involved in or used to facilitate a criminal offence, it must establish that there was "a 
substantial connection" between those funds and the alleged offence. 313 
In the past few years, the U.S. Department of Justice has used civil forfeiture to confiscate 
the proceeds of crime in many money laundering cases. During 2006, it recovered 
USD$1.2 billion in forfeited assets; USD$804 million (or 67 per cent) of which was seized 
via contested or uncontested civil forfeiture claims.314 This statistic clearly highlights the 
practicality of, and potential success rates attached to, the use of civil forfeiture actions 
rather than criminal asset confiscation. However, given that hundreds of billions of dollars 
is believed to be laundered each year, it also demonstrates the minimal level of AMLICTF 
legal risk that institutions may practically face at civil law with respect to any funds 
sufficiently connected to money laundering activities. 
In addition to the U.S., there are civil forfeiture regimes in a number of other jurisdictions 
including Australia, South Africa, the Republic of Ireland, the Philippines and the U.K. 315 
As opposed to fines and civil monetary penalties, which might only directly impact the 
institutions upon which they are imposed, it is interesting to note that the civil forfeiture 
laws in these countries may have an indirect deterrent effect on money launderers. 
Indeed, the underlying purpose of money laundering is to obscure and protect the 
proceeds of crime, and civil forfeiture is capable of removing such funds from the 
individuals seeking to legitimise them. 
4.2.4 Shareholder derivative suits 
Whilst an institution's AMLICTF legal risk will largely be determined by available civil 
penalties and the propensity of regulatory authorities/the courts to invoke them, it may also 
rest upon the types of civil lawsuits available to other interested parties. These lawsuits 
may arise outside the confines of applicable AMLICTF laws, and vary amongst different 
jurisdictions. In the U.S. for instance, institutions that fail to meet their AMLICTF 
313 See 18 U.S.C § 983(c). 
314 Op cit n308, 5. 
315 Op cit n308, 2. 
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compliance obligations may find themselves facing one or more shareholder derivative 
suits.3 16 
The last few years have seen a marked increase in the number of shareholder derivative 
suits waged against the directors of institutions in breach of U.S. municipallaws.317 These 
suits are filed by shareholders (on behalf of their corporation) in circumstances where 
organisational officers or directors have violated one or more of the fiduciary duties they 
owe to the corporation.318 They are separate and distinct from 'direct shareholder actions', 
which necessarily hinge upon the infringement of individual shareholder rights. 319 Whilst 
these types of lawsuits relatively unique to the U.S., they historically emerged in equity as 
a means for shareholders to enforce a corporate right or remedy a legal wrong in 
circumstances where the relevant directors failed to do so. 320 
With respect to contraventions of AMLICTF legislation, the directors of U.S. institutions 
such as Riggs Bank and the Bank of New York have previously faced shareholder derivative 
suits alleging that their institutions' AMLICTF compliance failures were attributable to their 
personal ''>ystematic wrongdoing",321 "reckless mismanagement"322 and breaches of 
fiduciary duties. Given the media coverage and regulatory attention devoted to the 
AMLICTF failings of both institutions, they are perhaps representative of many AMLICTF-
related actions. Indeed, shareholder derivative suits have typically been initiated against the 
directors of institutions that have: 
316 These suits provide a device to deal with an essential problem of enforcement in company law. The 
challenge of AML is underlined by problems of enforcement in corporate and securities regulation where 
financial institutions use the corporate form as their principal structure to conduct business. 
317 Robinson, T.L., 'A New Interpretation of the Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement in Shareholder 
Derivative Suits: In re Bank of New York Derivative Litigation and the Elimination of the Continuing Wrong 
Doctrine' (2005) I Brigham Young University Law Review 229. 
318 Jones Day, Shareholder Derivative Actions- Overview 
<http://www.jonesday.com/shareholder derivative actions/> at 24 June 2007. 
319 Li, X., A Comparative Study of Shareholders' Derivative Actions: England, the United States, Germany 
and China (Ph.D., Kluwer Law International, 2007) 3. 
320 See /9 A. Jur. 2D Corporations§ 2250 (2003). 
321 
'Bank of New York Wins the Dismissal of Shareholder Suit', The Wall Street Journal (New York) 29 
November2001, Bl4. 
322 
'Some Shareholders Sue Bank of New York', The New York Times (New York), 25 September 1999 
<http://guerv.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res~9E06E4D7133FF936A 1575ACOA96F958260> at 3 
November 2007. 
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• incurred significant civil monetary penalties and/or criminal fines for their non-
compliance with AMLICTF legislation; and 
• experienced one or a combination of the following: 
(i) negative findings arising from regulatory reviews of, or investigations into, their 
AMLICTF compliance failures; 
(ii) criminal charges being laid against one or more employees/officers in relation to 
their contraventions of AMLICTF laws; and/or 
(iii) reputationalloss stemming from their poor AMLICTF compliance record. 
Thus, an institution's AMLICTF legal risk is not strictly limited to the imposition of civil 
penalties. It may also extend to civil lawsuits waged in the aftermath of any formal 
enforcement proceedings. 
Although most shareholder derivative suits have generally been filed after the initiation of 
formal enforcement proceedings and the imposition of related penalties, one of the greatest 
impediments to the success of these claims has been, perhaps surprisingly, a lack of 
evidence. 323 Further, this situation is unlikely to change in the near future due to the decision 
of the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (Stone v. 
Ritter). This case involved a shareholder derivative suit which alleged that 15 current and 
former directors of Am South Bancorp breached their fiduciary duty of good faith and, in 
doing so, gave rise to repeated violations of federal AMLICTF regulations and over USD$50 
million in fines, civil monetary penalties and legal costs324 The lawsuit arose shortly after 
FinCEN released a damning investigatory report in relation to Am South Bancorp's 
compliance failures and inadequate AMLICTF controls. The fact that the case was heard and 
decided in Delaware is significant from a precedent perspective, given that most U.S. 
multinational financial institutions are registered in that state and will therefore be subject to 
its company laws. 
323 A lack of evidence has not been the only impediment to the success of shareholder derivative suits. Whilst 
such analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis, it might be argued that these lawsuits are particularly difficult 
for claimants because the standards of common law duties imposed on directors vis a vis the company and 
shareholders, are not apposite (and/or not otherwise easily adaptable) to the duties owed to the State under 
AMLICTF legislation. 
324 David, P., 'Ruling in Am South Case Offers Boards a Reprieve' (2006) 171(46)American Banker 2. 
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The shareholder derivative suit in Stone v. Ritter was ultimately dismissed because the 
claimant shareholders failed to demonstrate that Am South Bancorp's directors consciously 
ignored "redjlags"325 that their institution's AMLICTF compliance mechanisms and 
reporting structures were inadequate326 According to the court, it was not sufficient for the 
shareholders to base their action entirely on the findings of the previously released FinCEN 
report and/or the penalties paid by the institution in relation to its AMLICTF compliance 
failures 327 To be successful, the claimants needed to do more than just "equate a bad 
outcome with bad faith". They had to allege ''particularised facts that created reason to 
doubt whether the directors had acted in good faith in exercising their oversight 
.b .1. . , 32R respons1 1 111es . 
In accordance with the court's ruling in Stone v. Ritter, an AMLICTF-related shareholder 
derivative suit based upon an alleged breach of the duty of good faith, will not be successful 
unless there is proof that the relevant directors knew that they were not discharging their 
fiduciary obligations. This standard of proof may be highly problematic for shareholders as 
the obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that 
assumes the same importance as the duties of care and loyalty. Whilst breaches of the latter 
fiduciary duties may create liability directly, a failure to act in good faith can only establish 
liability indirectly. 329 Accordingly, an alleged breach of the fiduciary duty of good faith is 
''possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to 
. . d " 330 wm;u gment . 
As the ruling in Stone v. Ritter clearly highlights the difficulties inherent in proving an 
alleged breach of good faith, it has the potential to diminish directors' AMLICTF legal risk 
325 Stone v Ritter upheld the notion that a director's duty to act is most easily triggered when there are ''red 
flags" indicating that something is wrong with the way their entity is being operated. See MorrisJames, 
Supreme Court Interprets the "Duty" to Act in Good Faith (2006) Delaware Business Litigation Report 
<http://www.delawarebusinesslitigation.com/archives/case-summaries-supreme-court-interorets-the-duty-to-
act-in-good-faith.html> at 19 November 2007. 
326 American Bar Association, Director Oversight Duties after Care mark (200 1) 
<http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL996000pub/newsletter/200703/> at 24 November 2007. 
327 Op cit n324. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Op cit n326. 
330 Ibid. 
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by deterring other shareholders from initiating similar suits. Undoubtedly, the case 
demonstrates that shareholders must have specific facts to support their claims. Even the 
most scathing regulatory review will not guarantee a successful outcome for claimant 
shareholders because a court "isn't going to allow people to simply throw an allegation by 
FinCEN on the court to create a case··. 331 Gathering the evidence required for shareholder 
derivative suits may prove difficult for many claimants, who may be so removed from their 
institution's day-to-day operations that they are unable to identify any evidence of 
wrongdoing beyond that already noted in regulatory reviews and/or formal enforcement 
proceedings. 
4.2.5 International civil lawsuits 
A civil lawsuit waged against the Bank of New York in May 2007 demonstrates that an 
institution's non-compliance with municipal AMLICTF legislation may give rise to 
previously unforeseen litigation in a foreign jurisdiction. Initiated by the Russian government 
in the Moscow Arbitration Court, the lawsuit marks the first time that a civil case involving 
the U.S. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (18 U.S.C. § 1961, et 
seq.) (RICO Act) has been tiled in a foreign court. Although the Act was originally enacted 
to address organised crime, it contains a number of civil provisions. These provisions are 
frequently used in cases involving large corporations because they entitle a plaintiff to 
recover up to three times as much as their actual damages. 
Apart from the interesting jurisdictional issues it raises, the case against the Bank of New 
York is like no other AMLICTF -related action ever launched against an institution. Indeed, it 
appears to prove that money laundering activities and AML/CTF compliance failures- even 
if they arose over a decade ago- may resurface to cause an institution significant legal, 
reputational and financial risk. 
331 Op cit n324. 
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In these proceedings, the Russian government is seeking 579.096 billion roubles 
(USD$22.5 billion)332 in damages from the Bank ofNew York for its role in a 1990s money 
laundering scheme that enabled approximately USD$7 billion to be siphoned out of Russia 
and placed into offshore accounts.333 It alleges that from 1996 to 1999 inclusive, the Bank of 
New York created a "system through which conditions were made for companies and 
Russian banks to not make the proper payments, thus inflicting a loss against the Russian 
Federation··. 334 According to the claimant, the result of this was that the Russian Federal 
Customs Service was deprived of billions of dollars in tax revenue at a time when Russian 
government was suffering such financial hardship that it was forced to default on USD$40 
billion in domestic debt and seek emergency loans from the International Monetary Fund. 
In evidentiary terms, the Russian government's action is hinged upon materials previously 
created/used by U.S. authorities to mount an enforcement action against the Bank of New 
York, and prosecute one of its staffmembers. 335 More specifically, it is largely based upon: 
• a non-prosecution agreement entered into by the Bank of New York, in which the 
institution acknowledges certain misconduct and agreed to pay USD$38 million to 
settle charges relating to "very serious violations" of federal AMLICTF regulations;336 
and 
• an accompanying press release published by the U.S. Department of Justice on 
8 November 2005. 
Both these documents are critical to the Russian government's civil litigation because they 
go towards establishing whether the Bank of New York ever admitted criminal liability for 
332 Butrin, D. et a!, 'The Case of the Long Gone Cash', Kommersant (Moscow), 18 May 2007 
<http://commersant.com/p766368/r 1/money laundering/> at 28 January 2008. 
m Cullison, A., 'Russia Sues Bank of New York Over 1990s Scandal'. The Wall Street Journal (New York), 
18 May 2007, A.3. 
m Ustinova, T., and Stempel, J., 'Russia Sues Bank of New York for $22.5 Billion', Reuters, 17 May 2007 
<h.!!Q:IIwww.reuters.com/articlelbusinessNews/idUSLI756117200705!7?pageNumbeP2&sp~true> at 20 
September 2007. See also Medetsky, A., and Elder, M., 'Bank of New York Sued by Russian Customs for 
$22Bin for Money Laundering', The Moscow Times (Moscow), 18 May 2007,2. 
335 In February 2000, fanner bank employee Lucy Edwards and her husband, Peter Berlin, were convicted of 
conspiracy and opening an unlicensed branch of a foreign bank. Whilst neither of these crimes can provide a 
basis for a claim under the RICO Act, it is claimed that one of the objectives of the conspiracy was to launder 
money in order to promote a "wire-fraud scheme" (an activity that may give rise to a cause of action under 
the RICO Act). 
336 Gardner, H., and Levitov, M., "Russia Sues Bank of New York for $22.5 Billion', Bloomberg, 17 May 
2007 <http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news0pid~20601 087&sid~aiVrh6bgUcwk&refer~home> at 19 
September 2007. 
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its involvement in money laundering activities. Such an admission of guilt is particularly 
important to the Russian government's case for a number of reasons. Not only is it pivotal to 
the government's claims that the statute oflimitations clock has been reset, but it is also 
required to surmount the jurisdictional hurdle posed by the fact that Russian commercial 
courts are not supposed to become involved in the interpretation of criminal laws (whether 
they are local or foreign laws).337 
Although the Bank of New York entered into a non-prosecution agreement to avoid being 
criminally prosecuted for its actions, it is contentious whether that agreement actually 
contains admissions of criminal wrongdoing. According to the bank, the agreement contains 
no more than a few acknowledgments of its incompetence. However, regardless of whether 
the Moscow Arbitration Court finds that the non-prosecution agreement does in fact contain 
admissions of intentional misconduct, fierce argument is still likely to surround the 
accompanying press release published in November 2005 by the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Although the press release explicitly states that the Bank ofNew York "admitted its criminal 
conduct", the Bank of New York claims that this statement does not refer to its acceptance of 
liability relating to its alleged money laundering offences. Rather, it concerns a number of 
fraudulent loan applications processed by one of its branches. 338 
In August 2008, the U.S. Attorney's offices for both the Eastern and Southern Districts of 
New York belatedly amended the press release that had accompanied the Bank of New 
York's non-prosecution agreement in 2005. The revised document clarifies that the bank 
never admitted criminal liability in relation to its alleged money laundering activities; it only 
assumed responsibility in respect of the fraudulent loan applications. Despite the 
amendments made to the press release however, the Russian government continues to argue 
that because the institution accepted "responsibility" for the matters contained in its non-
prosecution agreement (i.e. a document stemming from a criminal investigation into the 
337 Parloff, R., 'Bank of New York's $22.5 Billion Headache', Fortune, 24 September 2008 
<http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/23/news/companies/parloff bank new york.fortune/index.htm> at 14 
January 2008. 
338 Ibid. 
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institution's activities), it unambiguously admitted criminal responsibility for its money 
laundering activities. 
According to some business analysts, the ongoing lawsuit poses no real risk to the Bank of 
New York Mellon beyond minimal share price turbulencen9 Nevertheless, it remains 
unclear what the longer-term impacts of the case might be if the court ultimately finds in 
favour of the Russian government. Even if damages are awarded, it is uncertain whether any 
order of the Russian court could be enforced in the absence of a ruling by an international or 
U.S. court. The enforceability of such an order would be questionable, especially in light of 
the fact that Russia's legal system is generally perceived to be inexperienced with respect to 
complex financial cases, and 'fraught with Soviet-era practices and allegations of corruption 
and political influence". 340 
Nevertheless, although any judgment of the Moscow Arbitration Court is unlikely to be 
enforceable in the U.S., the Bank of New York Mellon may still suffer reputational and 
financial ramifications as a result of the case. The institution currently conducts business in 
more than I 00 countries and the judgment is likely to be enforceable in at least a few of 
them. Furthermore, after conducting business in Russia- a country that is currently the 
world's sixth-largest economy and the second-largest producer of oil- for more than 80 
years, the bank would certainly suffer a degree of financial damage if it was required to cease 
operating there.341 Beyond the implications that the case may have for the Bank of New York 
Mellon, it may set a precedent for the international application of civil RICO Act provisions 
to money laundering activities undertaken by global financial institutions. 
4.3 Civil liability and extraterritorial AMUCTF laws 
As is the case with criminal liability, civil liability for AMLICTF compliance failures may be 
applied in extraterritorial laws and pursued across national borders. This is most apparent 
339 Following the Bank of New York's alleged breaches of AMLICTF legislation, the institution and Mellon 
Financial Corp. agreed to merge in a USD$16.5 billion deal that has seen the newly formed 'Bank of New 
York Mellon' become the world's largest custody bank and one of its largest asset managers. 
340 Op cit n333. 
341 Op cit n337. 
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from U.S. AMLICTF legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act, which contains a number of 
important extraterritorial provisions that relate to the initiation of civil actions against non-
U.S. persons. 
In contrast to Sections 311,312 and 313 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which were discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis, Sections 317 and 319 regulate foreign financial institutions through 
the use of civil sanctions. Firstly, Section 317 creates a civil cause of action against 'foreign 
persons" (including foreign financial institutions) with respect to contraventions of 18 U.S. C. 
§ 1956 and 18 U.S. C.§ 1957. It authorises U.S. courts to: 
• exercise jurisdiction over a civil action instituted by the U.S. government against a 
foreign person for the purposes of enforcing a forfeiture judgment based upon a violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §1956; and 
• seize any assets involved in such an action, and appoint a federal receiver to take custody 
of all assets needed to satisfy any civil judgment, forfeiture order or criminal sentence 
made under 18 U.S. C.§ 1956 or 18 U.S. C.§ 1957.342 
Clearly, the civil cause of action enshrined in Section 317 may provide a suitable alternative 
to criminal proceedings where the relevant offender is a foreign corporation, and a successful 
prosecution is less importane43 (or perhaps far more difficult to attain) than a finding of civil 
liability and the imposition of a civil monetary penalty. Whilst it potentially lowers the 
likelihood of foreign institutions being indicted for their contraventions of U.S. AMLICTF 
laws, the Section may nevertheless heighten their AMLICTF legal risk in relation to 
incurring civil liability for their compliance failures. 
In addition to Section 317, Section 319 outlines civil sanctions that may be imposed upon a 
foreign entity. Labelled "the most troubling aspect" of the USA PATRIOT Act/44 this 
Section embodies perhaps the most extreme application of U.S. extraterritoriality under 
AMLICTF legislation. Codified as 18 U.S. C.§ 981(k)(1), Section 319 provides for the civil 
"' Op cit n237, 107. 
343 United States Department of Justice, Field Guidance on New Authorities (Redacted) Enacted in the 2001 
Anti-Terrorism Legislation (2001) <http://usacm.acm.org/usacm/DOJ Terrorism Law.htm> at I November 
2007. 
344 Op cit n342. 
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forfeiture of funds contained in a foreign financial institution's U.S. correspondent or 
interbank account. It states that where funds derived from criminal activity are deposited into 
an account in a foreign bank, and that bank maintains a correspondent account in the U.S., 
the funds "shall be deemed to have been deposited into the correspondent account" in the 
U.S. Accordingly, it gives the U.S. government jurisdiction to seize or restrain funds in the 
foreign bank's U.S. correspondent account "up to the value of the funds deposited". 
Section 319 was enacted to prevent foreign depositors (including money launderers and 
supporters of terrorism) from committing criminal offences in the U.S. and using foreign 
accounts to place their proceeds of crime beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement 
authorities. Whilst such individuals could historically obscure the ownership and source of 
their funds by hiding behind a foreign bank's use of the 'innocent owner' defence,345 
Section 319 prevents foreign depositors from exploiting certain nuances of forfeiture law. 
Given that foreign institutions can no longer directly contest a civil forfeiture action by using 
the 'innocent owner' defence otherwise available to them under 18 U.S. C.§ 983(d)/46 foreign 
depositors wanting to contest a forfeiture action in the U.S. federal courts are now required to 
mount an action on their own behalf. 
Many of the hallmarks of Section 319 were recently challenged by a foreign financial 
institution in United States v. Union Bank for Savings and Investment (Jordan), 487 F.3d 8 
(1st Cir. 2007). Considered to be "thejirst real test of Section 98J(k)",347 this case concerned 
two individuals in Canada who obtained approximately USD$7 million via a telemarketing 
fraud scheme; more than USD$2.8 million of which was traceable to an account held by a 
money exchanger at the Union Bank for Savings and Investment (Union Bank) in the West 
Bank of Israel. During 2002 and 2003, the U.S. government successfully mounted a civil 
345 Cassella, S.D., Recovering the Proceeds of Crime from the Correspondent Account of a Foreign Bank 
(2005).6 <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articJe~ J015&context~stefan cassella> at 22 May 
2008. 
346 See Section 98J(k)(3) and (4). The "innocent owner' defence can ordinarily be used by an institution to 
defeat a forfeiture action in circumstances where (i) it was unaware that the relevant funds were derived from 
unlawful activities; and (ii) upon learning of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, it did all that could 
reasonably be expected to terminate the use of such funds. 
347 Op cit n345, 10. 
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forfeiture action under Section 981(k) and seized USD$2.8 million from Union Bank's U.S. 
correspondent account at the Bank ofNew York.348 
Although any claim for the return of the funds should have been filed by the money 
exchanger, it was Union Bank that sought to contest the application of Section 981 (k) and the 
forfeiture of the funds. Whilst the bank acknowledged that it may have held funds that 
represented the proceeds of crime, it contested the civil forfeiture of those funds on a number 
of constitutional and other grounds. Fundamentally, Union Bank argued that: 
o the funds seized from its U.S. correspondent account were not directly traceable to the 
fraud proceeds allegedly deposited in the account at its West Bank operations; 
o as the owner of the funds in its correspondent account, it had legal standing to contest the 
forfeiture by virtue of the 'innocent owner' defence; and 
o the forfeiture of the funds in its correspondent account violated the Eighth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution because it represented "excessive punishment"349 
Each of Union Bank's arguments failed and it was unsuccessful in its claim to have the 
USD$2.8 million in forfeited funds returned. Firstly, the court held that the U.S. government 
was under no obligation to trace the forfeited funds to the Canadian fraud scheme because 
Section 981 (k) "allows for the forfeiture of funds in an interbank account without proof that 
the funds are directly traceable to forfeitablefunds that were originally deposited with the 
foreign bank"350 Secondly, on the issue of the institution's ability to assert a claim using the 
'innocent owner' defence, the court confirmed that such a defence was not available to Union 
Bank because only the foreign account holder (as opposed to the foreign bank) had standing 
to contest the forfeiture of funds seized from a correspondent account under Section 981(k). 
Finally, with respect to the Eighth Amendment constitutional challenge, the court held that 
the forfeiture could never amount to "cruel and unusual punishment" or the imposition of an 
348 Hogan & Hartson, The Long Arm (and Tight Grip) of Deposit Forfeiture Under the USA PATRIOT Act 
(2007) <http://www .hoganandhartson.comlfi les/Publ icationl dd5bbfdc-e2a2-466e-a9e3-
f3609bb82b63/Presentation/PublicationA ttachment/b608bc68-2e 17-4 fd8-ab 7b-
ffab2baca6ca/FinSvcRegUpdate.pdJ> at 22 May 2008. 
349 Op cit n345, 12-15. 
350 See United States v. Funds on Deposit in Account No. 890-005 7 I 7 3 maintained at the Bank of New York 
by the Union Bank for Savings and Investments Jordan, No. 02-472-B, (D. N.H. Jan. 6, 2005). 
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"excessiveftne" because forfeiture merely restores the status quo ante and therefore can 
never be punitive or construed as a punishment in a strict constitutional sense. 
Evidently, the Union Bank case illustrates the potential civil law ramifications and 
AMLICTF legal risk that an institution may face under Section 319 of the USA PATRIOT 
Act. That Section effectively "exports the riskofforfeiture"351 to foreign financial 
institutions and gives the U.S. government considerable leverage over their activities. It 
places them in a particularly vulnerable legal position and leaves them open to incurring 
strict liability for the criminal acts of their customers. Even where a foreign financial 
institution has implemented an effective AMLICTF program and a host of other internal 
controls, it may still face the risk of accepting tainted funds and having those funds seized via 
a virtually incontestable civil forfeiture order granted by the U.S. courts. Thus, such an 
institution may always have a degree of exposure to the civil law consequences and 
extraterritorial reach of Section 319. 
4.4 When you can't even trust your own bank- financial institutions 
and constructive trusts 
The primary aim of risk-based AMLICTF legislation is to thwart opportunities for money 
laundering and terrorism financing by ensuring that institutions implement appropriate 
AMLICTF controls tailored to their MLITF risk. Although such legislation has typically 
been concerned with identifying, reporting and confiscating the proceeds of crime, rather 
than recompensing the victims of crime, identifiable victims of fraud and money 
laundering352 may nevertheless seek to recover their losses in certain jurisdictions. In 
countries such as the U.K., individuals may file a civil claim against an institution involved 
in the laundering of their funds. 353 Pursuing such a claim is likely to be particularly 
351 Op cit n342, 108. 
352 Whilst a large proportion oflaundered funds will not have been derived from readily identifiable victims 
(this may be the case if the suspect funds are the product of drug trafficking, for instance), funds derived from 
crimes such as fraud, false accounting and forgery, may lend themselves to the identification of obvious 
victims who have suffered financial loss. 
353 Wessing, T., Money Laundering: Changes to the UK's Money Laundering Regime (2005) 
<http://www.taylorwessing.com/website/generator/taylorwessing/content/publications/items/UK/MondeyLau 
ndering TWUK english.de.property~tile.pdt> at 20 October 2006. 
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attractive where a victim of fraud/money laundering is seeking a 'deep pocket' from which 
to recover their lost funds, and the wrongdoer cannot be located or is unable to recompense 
them.354 
Legally recognised in jurisdictions such as Australia and the U.K., a trust is a relationship 
in respect of property "under which one person. known as a trustee, is obliged to deal with 
the property vested in him or her for the benefit of another person, known as a 
beneficiary". 355 Whilst there tends to be "no clear and all-embracing definition "356 of a 
constructive trust, such a trust will arise by operation oflaw where an individual or 
institution that has not been appointed as a trustee, nevertheless invokes the liabilities of 
trusteeship by conducting themselves as trustees in relation to certain property. As opposed 
to other types of civil actions that might be brought against an institution in relation to 
money laundering activities, constructive trust claims will generally concern customers 
who are the perpetrators- rather than the victims- of crime.357 
As constructive trusts arise subsequent to a breach of trust or fiduciary duty (often due to 
fraud), 358 they are not particularly relevant in the context of terrorism financing. As 
previously discussed, the funds involved in such activity may be 'clean' before they are 
received by, and even after they are processed by, a financial institution. However, despite 
the inapplicability of constructive trust principles to funds that are 'clean' and legitimate, a 
number of constructive trust cases concerning fraud and money laundering have arisen in 
the U.K. in recent years. Whilst there are no civil causes of action in the U.K. that directly 
equate to the criminal offences of theft and/or the handling of stolen property, it is well 
354 Law Society of England and Wales, Guide Online 
<http://www .lawsociety .org. uk/professional/ conduct/ guideon line/vi ew=page .law?PO LI CY I 0=22 507 4> at 12 
November 2006. 
355 Tagoe, L., 'An Analysis of Banks' Liability for the Deposits of Proceeds of Criminal Activities in the 
U.K.' (2003) 4(4) Journal of International Banking Regulation 352. 354. 
356 See the comments of Edmund-Davies LJ in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith & Co [1969] 2 Ch 276, at 
pp. 300. 
357 Brindle, M., 'The Liabilities of Financial Intennediaries and their Advisers for Handling the Proceeds of 
Crime' (2002) 9(3) Journal of Financial Crime 227. 
358 Binnington, A., Constructive Trusts And All Crimes Money Laundering Legislation: Is There a Problem? 
( 1998) Jersey Legal Information Board 
<http://www .jerseylegalinfo.je/publications/jerseylawreview/Oct98/constructive trusts.aspx> at I 0 October 
2006. 
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settled that a banker or financial institution may be held liable as a constructive trustee in 
respect of their dealings with the proceeds of crime paid into an account359 
Due to the existence of supporting U.K. case law, and the fact that the AMLICTF 
experience in the U.K. has often been cited in debates about how AMLICTF issues should 
and will be addressed in other jurisdictions (such as Australia), the analysis of constructive 
trusts contained in this Chapter primarily focuses on U.K. legal authorities. 
4.4.1 The twin branches of constructive trust liability 
As articulated in U.K. authorities such as Barnes v. Addy (1874) L R 9 ChApp 244, 
liability as a constructive trustee may arise in circumstances where there has been: 
• "knowing assistance·· (i.e. evidence of a person knowingly assisting in a fraudulent and 
dishonest design on the part of a trustee); or 
• ''knowing receipt" (i.e. evidence of a person receiving and becoming chargeable with 
trust property). 360 
The specific elements required to succeed with a claim under each of these heads of 
liability, are outlined on the following page in Table 2. 
359 Cases such as Foley v. Hill [1848]2 HL Cas 28 established early on that a banker who is not expressly 
declared as a trustee may nevertheless be treated as a constructive trustee on account of their dealing(s) with 
trust affairs. 
360 Whilst a constructive trust can also arise in circumstances where there have been inconsistent dealings 
with trust funds, only cases of 'knowing assistance' and ·knowing receipt' are relevant with respect to 
instances of money laundering. 
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Knowing Assistance vs. Knowing Receipt 
(i) Existence of a trust or other fiduciary (i) Existence of a trust or other fiduciary 
relationship relationship 
(ii) The trust or fiduciary duty was (ii) The Plaintiff's assets were disposed of in 
breached by someone other than the breach of the relevant trust or fiduciary duty 
Respondent 
(iii) The Respondent assisted in the (iii) The Respondent beneficially received (and 
relevant breach of trust/fiduciary duty became chargeable with) assets traceable as 
and in doing so, acted dishonestly those of the claimant 
(iv) The Respondent's actions resulted in (iv) The Respondent had knowledge361 that the 
loss for the claimant. assets they received were traceable to a 
breach of fiduciary duty which made it 
unconscionable to retain them. 
Example- See the statements of Hoffman Example- See the statements of Lord Selbome in 
L.J. in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings pic Barnes v Addy (1874) L R 9 ChApp 244 
[ 1994] 2 All ER 685 
4.4.2 Knowing assistance 
As outlined in Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan [ 1995) 2 AC 378 (PC), liability for 'knowing 
assistance' will arise where a primary wrongdoer acts in breach of a trust or fiduciary duty, 
and another- acting dishonestly- assists them to do this. Accordingly, an institution can 
incur liability as a constructive trustee where it receives certain trust funds and, despite 
having information that they may be derived from breach of a trust or fiduciary duty, 
subsequently pays the funds away at another's request. For instance, if an institution 
knowingly facilitates a transaction on behalf of a customer using funds that the customer 
attained by defrauding their employer, the employer can launch a civil action for 'knowing 
assistance' against the institution. Indeed, it will be open to them to argue that the institution 
should be held liable as a constructive trustee because it knowingly assisted a breach of 
fiduciary duty by paying away the funds in the manner directed by the fraudulent 
employee/customer. 
361 For the purpose of this test, the concept of "knowledge' extends beyond actual knowledge to include (a) 
'Nelsonian knowledge', which involves the deliberate shutting of the eyes to what would otherwise be 
obvious, and (b) knowledge in circumstances where an honest and reasonable man would have been 
SUSpiCIOUS. 
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Dishonesty is the touchstone of liability in 'knowing assistance' cases.362 As stated by 
Lord Selborne in Barnes v. Addy (1874) L R 9 ChApp 244, an institution will only be held 
liable for 'knowing assistance' where it has assisted "with knowledge in a dishonest and 
fraudulent design on the part of the [relevant} trustees". With respect to constructive trust 
cases, U.K. case law suggests that the necessary standard of knowledge is particularly broad 
and may be satisfied by the following: 
• actual knowledge; 
• wilfully shutting one's eyes to the obvious; 
• wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable man 
would make; 
• knowledge of circumstances that would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable 
man; or 
• knowledge of circumstances that would put an honest and reasonable man on 
inquiry363 
With respect to the aforementioned categories of knowledge, Australian case law has 
demonstrated that not all five categories will be sufficient for the purposes of substantiating 
the requisite 'knowledge' requirements needed to succeed with a 'knowing assistance' claim 
in Australia. Whilst the High Court of Australia held in Farah Constructions v. Say-Dee Pty 
Ltd [2007) 230 CLR 89 that the first four categories of cognisance would meet the relevant 
knowledge requirement, it stated that the fifth category (i.e. knowledge of circumstances that 
would put an honest and reasonable man on inquiry) would not suffice under Australian law. 
Thus, whilst the knowledge requirements for 'knowing assistance' claims are substantially 
similar in the U.K. and Australia, institutions operating in the U.K. may face a slightly higher 
level of legal risk than their Australian counterparts because their acceptable standard of 
knowledge is broader than that allowed for in Australia. 
Given that knowledge is pivotal to the success of any 'knowing assistance' claim, an 
institution facing such a claim could attempt to minimise its risk by disputing claims that it 
362 Op cit n355, 375. 
363 See the comments of Gibson J in Baden v. Societe Generate [1993] I WLR 509, at 575-576. 
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had the necessary standard of knowledge to attract liability as a constructive trustee. Even if 
it clearly paid away funds related to a breach of trust or fiduciary duty, an institution could 
still avoid liability by establishing that it only had vague suspicions (rather than actual or 
constructive knowledge) regarding the source of the funds. As enunciated in The Bank v. A 
Ltd [2000] All ER 864, institutions cannot be held liable as a constructive trustee "merely 
because they entertain suspicions as to the provenance of money deposited with them". 364 
Additionally, an institution facing a 'knowing assistance' claim may try to limit its legal 
exposure by contending that in light of subjective considerations (such as its previous 
experience with the customer involved) its conduct was not objectively dishonest by the 
ordinary standards of honest and reasonable people365 However, substantiating this claim 
may prove particularly difficult for some institutions, given that the increased global 
attention paid to AMLICTF issues during the past decade has ushered in an expectation of 
tighter K YC controls and customer/account screening. In the aftermath of September II, the 
enactment of extensive risk-based AMLICTF legislation and the imposition of various 
AMLICTF obligations upon institutions means that "honest and reasonable" bankers are 
now arguably expected to act with a far greater level of diligence than ever before. 
4.4.3 Knowing receipt 
In comparison to 'knowing assistance', the cause of action for 'knowing receipt' is 
restitutionary and only available where a Respondent has received or applied funds in breach 
of a trust or fiduciary duty for their own use and benefit.366 The most significant and perhaps 
the most strictly applied requirement of 'knowing receipt' cases is the beneficial receipt of 
tainted funds. 367 An institution that receives funds into a customer's account will not 
generally be treated as the recipient of those funds. This is fundamentally because it will be 
364 This statement accords with the finding in The Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland v. A 
Limited [2000] AllER 864 that a bank's suspicions about its customer were not sufficient to give rise to 
constructive trust liability- even though a report to the relevant investigatory agency was made. 
365 See the test for dishonesty outlined by the U.K. Privy Council in Barlow Clowes v. Eurotrust 
International Ltd [2006]1 AllER 333. 
366 It is important to note that in cases of knowing receipt, a bank will only be liable for the amount that it has 
received. This contrasts with cases of knowing assistance, where an institution is potentially liable for the 
whole of the amount lost as a result of a fraud or other illicit activity. 
367 Op cit n357, 230. 
132 
receiving those funds as an agent of its customer, and bound to account to its customer for 
any interest earned on them. 
Importantly however, there are still circumstances where an institution will be deemed to 
have beneficially received customer funds. Under U.K. case law, an institution that receives 
funds into a customer's account and subsequently uses them to discharge/reduce the 
customer's overdraft or mortgage, will be deemed to have received those funds 
beneficially.368 As such, where an institution receives funds in this way, it may be held liable 
for 'knowing receipt' if it applied the funds for its own benefit and did so knowing that they 
were being misapplied in breach of a trust or fiduciary duty369 
Given the limited circumstances in which an entity will be deemed to have received funds for 
their own use and benefit, an institution's AMLICTF legal risk is far greater with respect to 
'knowing assistance' claims than 'knowing receipt' claims. This is clear when considering 
that 'knowing assistance' claims involve both the receipt and paying away of funds; a type of 
transactional behaviour that is integral to the placement and layering stages of money 
laundering. Nevertheless, a 'knowing receipt' claim may still be successfully waged against 
an institution in circumstances where it received tainted funds and, knowing that they were 
paid in breach of a trust or fiduciary duty, applied them for its own benefit.370 
Although 'knowing receipt' claims do not require evidence of dishonesty, proof of 
knowledge is pivotal to their success.371 Thus, as with 'knowing assistance' cases, an 
institution may seek to limit its AMLICTF legal risk and deflect its culpability in a 'knowing 
receipt' case by arguing that it did not have the necessary degree of knowledge to attract 
liability as a constructive trustee. However, given that an institution does not need to have 
actual knowledge of the fact that the funds they beneficially received were traceable to a 
breach of fiduciary duty, substantiating such a claim could be problematic. In the context of 
368 Herbert-Smith, The Effect of the Risk Based Approach on Civil Liability (2006) 
<http://www .herbertsm ith .com IN Rlrdon lyres/F9 A C5 EB 7- SA 64-4 3C2-A A 40-
650B320155F4/2275/TheeffectoftiskbasedapproachJune2806.html> at 2 November 2006. 
369 See Polly Peck International v. Nadir [1992) 4 All ER 769. 
370 See Houghton v. Foyers [2000)1 BCLC 511 at 516. 
371 See Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts [1987] Ch 264. 
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'knowing receipt' claims for instance, an institution may be "disentitled to rely on lack of 
actual knowledge "372 and affixed with constructive knowledge where it has failed to collect 
and verify additional KYC information in circumstances where it could have been expected 
to do so373 
4.5 The potential tension between an institution's AML/CTF 
obligations at criminal and civil law 
The extent of an institution's potential liability under constructive trust principles is not 
solely determined by its exposure to 'knowing assistance' and 'knowing receipt' claims. 
Indeed, its AMLICTF legal risk in relation to such principles may be heightened in 
circumstances where there is an apparent tension between its: 
• obligations to third parties under equitable constructive trust principles; 
• contractual requirements to follow customers' instructions; 
• statutory obligations in relation to 'tipping off; and 
• statutory requirements to report suspicious transactions and/or activities. 
In jurisdictions such as the U.K., the interplay between the abovementioned obligations has 
occasionally created significant challenges for institutions trying to achieve AMLICTF 
compliance and balance their competing responsibilities. In recent years, a number of U.K. 
authorities have dealt with the apparent tension between institutions' various AMLICTF 
obligations and exposures. Whilst some commentators have held that these cases have 
provided guidance that is unclear and unsatisfactory at best, this Chapter draws on such 
authorities in order to highlight the way in which institutions may face heightened 
AMLICTF legal risk as a result of their competing obligations. Further, it seeks to analyse 
the steps that institutions should take in order to best meet their compliance obligations and 
minimise their potential liability. 
372 See statements of Buckley LJ in Belmont Finance Corporal ion Ltd v. Williams Furniture Ltd [1979] Ch 
250, at 267. 
m Op cit n355. 360. 
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4.5.1 Institutions' various contractual and legislative obligations 
Contractual obligations to customers 
As financial institutions typically hold money for their customers on the basis of a 
contractual banker/customer relationship, 374 they are generally bound to follow their 
customers' instructions within the boundaries of the law, Accordingly, any institution that 
deals with a customer's funds in a manner inconsistent with an express or implied term of 
their contract with that customer, may face a civil lawsuit for breach of contract. 
Civil liability might not only attach to an institution where it has failed to honour a 
customer's instructions, but also where it has blindly complied with such instructions. To 
demonstrate, if a bank held an account on behalf of a company and that account authorised 
each company director to sign cheques/give payment instructions in relation to the account, 
the bank could be held liable for breaching its contract with the company if it enabled one 
of the directors to fraudulently misapply funds from the account. In accordance with the 
decision in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale [ 1989]4 AllER 409, the company could argue that 
under an implied term of its contract, the bank was prevented from honouring payment or 
transactional instructions from a director in circumstances where an honest and reasonable 
person would have considered there to be a serious or real possibility that the director was 
acting fraudulently. In order to successfully establish a breach of contract, the company 
would not need to prove any fraud or dishonesty on the part of the bank. It would simply 
need to demonstrate that the institution was negligent in carrying out financial activities on 
its behalf.375 
If the aforementioned scenario were to materialise, the bank could be held liable to account 
for the funds misapplied by the fraudulent director, and ordered to pay damages to the 
company. Evidently, this would be a highly undesirable outcome for an institution given its 
potential reputational impacts, and the fact that the misappropriation of funds might have 
been prevented through the use of enhanced due diligence and transaction monitoring. By 
properly identifying the nature of company's business and understanding what constituted 
374 Op cit n357, 227. 
375 Ibid. 
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'normal' transactional behaviour on its account(s), the institution could possibly have 
identified that the director's payment instructions were atypical for the company. 
Statutory obligations to report suspicious activities and freeze accounts 
Financial institutions may become suspicious of certain customers or accounts for a 
number of reasons. They may doubt the legitimacy of a customer's alleged identity, the 
validity of their transactions, and/or the legality of their activities. The reporting of such 
suspicions generally plays an integral role in most AMLICTF regimes. Given its ability to 
provide crucial intelligence on financial dealings related to criminal conduct, such 
reporting can provide regulatory and law enforcement authorities with the lynchpin they 
need to not only trigger an investigation into money laundering, but also the predicate 
offences underlying it. Accordingly, in many jurisdictions the threshold for suspicious 
activity reporting is generally quite low for institutions- covering both objective money 
laundering/terrorism financing 'red flags', and subjective suspicions held by employees and 
AMLICTF staff. 
It should be noted however that the requisite legislative standard for reporting may vary 
amongst jurisdictions, with some AMLICTF regimes requiring only objective or subjective 
suspicions to be reported. Often, the distinction between an institution's obligation to report 
objective or subjective suspicions may be solely attributable to the legislative drafting of a 
few select words. For instance, whilst institutions operating in the U.K. are required to 
report those instances where they have "reasonable grounds to know or suspect" money 
laundering, institutions operating in Australia are required by Section 41 of the AMLICTF 
Act 2006 (Cth) to report those instances where they "suspect [money laundering] on 
reasonable grounds". Whilst their drafting is similar, the reporting obligations under U.K. 
and Australian AMLICTF laws are in fact very different. Whilst institutions operating in 
Australia are required to report subjective assessments of suspicion, institutions operating 
in the U.K. have a broader reporting requirement as they are bound to report objective 
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assessments of suspicion (i.e. those circumstances where they ought to have had reasonable 
cause to suspect, or where an objective test of suspicion arises). 376 
Whether based upon objective or subjective suspicions, it is clear that suspicious activity 
reporting requirements typically carry a higher degree of AMLICTF legal risk than many 
other AMLICTF obligations. Due to its ability to deter illegal behaviour, and support the 
identification, investigation and prosecution of criminal activities/77 suspicious activity 
reporting has generally been one of the most strictly enforced aspects of risk-based 
AMLICTF regimes. In a significant number of jurisdictions, failure to report a suspicion of 
money laundering or terrorism financing is regarded as a standalone criminal offence, 
capable of attracting hefty penalties. In recent years, many of the largest, formal 
enforcement actions have involved breaches of suspicious activity reporting regulations. 
In certain jurisdictions, municipal AMLICTF legislation requires institutions to freeze a 
suspect account and/or block the provision of further banking services to a suspect 
customer immediately upon filing a SAR with the relevant Financial Intelligence Unit 
(FlU). For instance, in Switzerland, local AMLICTF laws compel institutions to freeze (for 
a minimum of five days) funds suspected of being connected with money laundering or a 
predicate offence. 378 Whilst these freezing requirements may sound drastic when compared 
to the approaches taken in other countries, institutions operating in Switzerland do not 
generally report their suspicions or file a report until they have conducted an extensive 
internal investigation into the suspect customer/funds/transactional behaviour.379 
Evidently, Swiss legislative obligations in relation to the reporting of suspicious activity 
and the freezing of suspect funds are vastly different to those enacted in the majority of 
AMLICTF regimes. The reporting requirements enshrined in the country's AMLICTF laws 
376 Bosworth-Davies, R., How Do I Know When I am Suspicious? (2004) SAS 
<http://www.sas.com/news/feature/fsi/dec04aml.html> at I June 2008. 
317 Romaniuk, P., Haber, J., and Murray, G., 'Suspicious Activity Reporting: Regulatory Change and the 
Role of Accountants' (2007) The CPA Journa/70. 
378 Financial Action Task Force, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism -Summary: Switzerland (2005) 4 <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/60/30/35529139.pdt> at 19 November 2007. 
379 Geary. J., Instant Freezing is a Tip-Offlike No Other (2006) 9 Money Laundering Intelligence J. 
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are so narrowly drafted that institutions only report 'actionable intelligence', i.e. those 
customers/transactions that warrant further investigation by regulatory and law 
enforcement authorities. This is in contrast to the position in most other jurisdictions, where 
institutions are simply required to file a report upon the initial formation of a suspicion, and 
the relevant FlU must necessarily sift through masses of reports in order to identify a 
handful requiring further investigation. Under the majority of AML!CTF regimes, an 
institution will not be automatically required to freeze fund or suspend the provision of 
financial services upon reporting a suspicion. In fact, in many countries (including the 
U.K., the U.S. and Australia), freezing a suspect account immediately upon the submission 
of a report is likely to inflame an institution's AMLICTF legal risk by giving rise to a 
'tipping off' offence. 
Statutory obligations in relation to 'tipping off' 
In many AMLICTF regimes, including those in Australia, Singapore, the U.K. and the 
Cayman Islands, suspicious activity reporting requirements are accompanied by legislative 
provisions criminalising the act of 'tipping off. Whilst its legal construction often differs 
slightly between jurisdictions, tipping off will generally occur where a person who knows or 
suspects that a suspicion has been reported, makes a disclosure that might give the relevant 
suspect customer(s) an opportunity to take evasive action and/or destroy evidence relating to 
their criminal activities.380 In countries such as Australia, the offence of tipping off is broadly 
drafted to involve the communication of information that "could reasonably be expected to 
infer" that a suspicion had been reported to AUSTRAC. 381 Under U.K. AMLICTF 
legislation however, the offence has been constructed more narrowly to include the 
communication of information that may prejudice any subsequent money 
laundering/terrorism financing investigation and/or criminal prosecution. 
Statutory tipping off provisions generally give regulatory and law enforcement authorities 
significant control over how money laundering and terrorism financing cases are handled. 
380 HM Treasury, The UK's Anti-Money Laundering Legislation and the Data Protection Act 1998: 
Guidance Notes for the Financial Sector (2002) 3 <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/mediastore/otherfiles/money laundering.pdf> at 22 November 2007. 
381 See Section 123(2) of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth). 
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They provide such authorities with a formal avenue of redress in respect of those who have 
committed a tipping off offence through direct, verbal communication, as well as those who 
have inadvertently alerted a customer to their suspicions via unspoken acts and omissions. 
Accordingly, the offence of tipping off enables formal enforcement proceedings to be 
launched against any institution/individual whose immediate closure of an account or 
unexplained refusal to process certain transactions alerts a customer to the fact that they have 
aroused suspicion. 
The AMLICTF legal risk represented by legislative tipping off provisions is arguably greater 
with respect to an institution's existing (as opposed to new or prospective) customers. To 
illustrate, if a prospective customer behaves in a way that gives rise to suspicion, an 
institution may simply refuse to "on-board" them -perhaps with an explanation that they 
failed to meet internal customer acceptance standards. However, in circumstances where an 
existing customer arouses suspicion, it may be far more difficult for an institution to conceal 
their suspicion. Apart from the close ties they may have established with their Relationship 
Manager and other internal bank staff, existing and long-standing customers are likely to be 
acutely aware of the time frames within which they usually have certain transactions 
processed. Thus, any deviation from their institution's typical processing patterns and/or any 
sudden unavailability of their funds, may effectively tip them off as to the existence of the 
institution's suspicion. 
In addition to the nature and length of its relationship with a suspect customer, an 
institution's risk of committing a tipping off offence will also be linked to the jurisdictions in 
which it operates. For instance, given that institutions operating in Switzerland are required 
to freeze any funds that the subject of a reported suspicion, their risk of committing a tipping 
off is significantly reduced. Due to the construction of Swiss AMLICTF laws, such 
institutions cannot be held liable for tipping off a customer simply because they have frozen 
that customer's funds in accordance with their other statutory obligations. The legislation 
essentially removes some of the discretion around tipping off and the freezing of accounts 
that occasionally sees entities in other jurisdictions facing formal enforcement actions. 
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4.5.2 Competing contractual and legislative obligations 
In accordance with FATF Recommendation 14, national governments are encouraged to 
enact laws that protect financial institutions from incurring criminal or civil liability as a 
result of breaching any legislative or contractual restriction on the disclosure of information, 
in the course of reporting a suspicion in good faith. In conducting their Mutual Evaluation 
reviews, organisations such as the FA TF and the APGML have previously criticised a 
number of countries for failing to implement measures protecting institutions from incurring 
liability as a consequence of their AMLICTF compliance and proper reporting of suspicious 
activities.382 
Certain countries have long recognised the importance of enabling financial institutions to 
file reports with their FlU free of the fear of reprisals. In the U.S. for instance, Congress 
enacted the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992 (12 U.S.C. §§ 1786, 1821) 
to amend the Bank Secrecy Act. That Act not only compels institutions to report all 
suspicious transactions, but also protects them from facing civil liability from private 
plaintiffs (including disgruntled customers) as a result of doing so. As stated in Jose Daniel 
Ruiz Coronado v. Bank Atlantic Bancorp Inc., 222 F .3d 1315 (lith Cir. 2000), U.S. C. § 
5318(g)(3) enshrines 'safe harbour' provisions that provide "an affirmative defense to claims 
against a financial institution for disclosing an individual's financial records or account-
related activity". They effectively give institutions immunity in relation to three different 
types of disclosures: 
• a disclosure of any possible violation of law or regulation; 
o a disclosure pursuant to§ 5318(g) itself; or 
o a disclosure pursuant to any other authority. 
However, even in countries that have given financial institutions a level of immunity and 
have tried, as far as possible, to align their various legislative requirements, the AMLICTF-
related obligations placed upon institutions have occasionally appeared to be at slight odds 
382 For instance, see Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering, Summaries of Mutual Evaluation Reports 
Adopted in 2002- 2003 (2003) 9 
<http:J/www.apgml.org/documents/docs/8/Summary%20ME%20Reports%202002-03.pdf> at 28 January 
2008. 
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with one another. In recent years, this has been particularly apparent in the U.K., where 
institutions have occasionally identified a misalignment, and sought judicial guidance to 
balance (or at least prioritise), their obligations under AMLICTF legislation, contract law, 
and constructive trust principles. 
In countries with strong tipping off provisions, an institution that reports a suspicion will 
often be instructed to continue conducting business as usual with the relevant suspect 
customer.383 This course of action is often desirable for law enforcement officials as it 
enables them to continue monitoring the customer's activities and potentially identify other 
parties/criminal activities they are connected to.384 Simply closing or suspending a suspect 
customer's accounts may tip them off and prompt them to alter their transactional behaviour, 
thereby destroying any future opportunities for law enforcement to monitor their activities. 
By following the instructions of regulatory and/or law enforcement authorities in relation to a 
suspect customer/account, an institution will typically avoid criminal liability in relation to 
any consequent tipping off offence or facilitation of money laundering/terrorism financing 
activities. However, in some jurisdictions, an institution that follows the directions of law 
enforcement may still be exposed to civil liability in the form of: 
• a contractual claim initiated by a suspect customer, alleging a breach of mandate (i.e. in 
relation to the institution's freezing of their funds or its refusal to conduct business on 
their behalf); and/or 
• an equitable constructive trust claim (most typically, 'knowing assistance' claims) 
initiated by a related third party. 
As illustrated on the following page in Table 3, an obvious tension may exist between an 
institution's legislative obligations, contractual obligations to customers, and constructive 
trust obligations to third parties. Following the reporting of a suspicion, an institution may-
unless operating in a country such as Switzerland, where there are legislatively prescribed 
outcomes- need to choose from a number of different courses of action. Each with their own 
383 Op cit n305. 
384 Gallo, P.A., The Writing on the Bank of Scotland's Wall (2002) Pacific Risk Ltd 6 
<http://www.asiamaze.com/asiamaze%20-%20BoS%20ABC%20Case.pdf> at 20 November 2007. 
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potential benefits and drawbacks, in certain circumstances these courses of action may 
protect an institution under one branch of the law, only to leave it exposed to liability under 
another. 
Table 3- Courses of action available to an institution that has re .orted a suspicion 
Course of Action Positive Results Negative Results 
Report the suspicion and, • Minimal risk of committing • Exposure to equitable 
in accordance with the a tipping off offence as the constructive trust claims 
instructions oflaw customer's transactions are initiated by wronged third 
enforcement/regulatory processed as usual parties 
officials, continue to 
• Likely avoidance of criminal • Filed report may constitute 
conduct transactions on liability in relation to any prima facie evidence that the 
behalf of the suspect consequent facilitation of institution had reasonable 
customer ML/TF activities grounds to suspect that it was 
• Protection from any 'breach handling the relevant funds as 
of contract' claim waged by a constructive trustee.
385 
the suspect customer. 
Report the suspicion and, • Limited exposure to criminal • Seeking formal Directions may 
in the absence of liability as a result of its prove to be expensive 
regulatory instructions, subsequent dealings with the 
• If Directions cannot be sought 
seek court Directions relevant funds and provided immediately, the 
• Greater ability to institution's legal position will 
substantiate in any remain uncertain 
subsequent enforcement • Avoidance of tipping off may 
action, that it took all be difficult where Directions 
reasonable steps in the are still being sought but the 
circumstances. suspect customer wants their 
funds paid immediately into 
another account or geared 
towards another transaction. 
Report the suspicion and, • Protection from equitable • Probable commission of a 
in the absence of constructive trust claims criminal tipping off offence in 
regulatory instructions, initiated by wronged third many jurisdictions 
freeze the suspect parties. • Exposure to a civil, contractual 
customer's funds claim waged by the suspect 
customer, alleging a breach of 
mandate. 
Report the suspicion and, • Minimal risk of committing • Exposure to criminal liability 
in the absence of a tipping off offence as the in relation to the active 
regulatory instructions, customer's transactions are facilitation ofMLITF activities 
continue to conduct processed as usual 
• Exposure to equitable 
transactions on behalf of 
• Protection from any 'breach constructive trust claims 
the suspect customer of contract' claim waged by initiated bv wron~ed third 
385 If a constructive trust claim was launched against an institution, any related Suspicious Activity Report 
filed by that institution would likely be listed for production in an 'Anton Pil1er' Order. 
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Course of Action Positive Results Negative Results 
the suspect customer. parties 
• Filed report may constitute 
prima facie evidence that the 
institution had reasonable 
grounds to suspect that it was 
handling the relevant funds as 
a constructive trustee. 
To understand the operational implications of the possible misalignment between an 
institution's obligations, it is useful to consider the position of a financial institution that 
receives funds into an account in suspicious circumstances, and is instructed by the relevant 
account owner (customer) to immediately pay them on to a third party. After properly 
reporting its suspicions, the institution may be instructed by regulatory or law enforcement 
officials to avoid tipping off the customer by proceeding with the requested transaction. By 
following those instructions and paying away the funds in the manner directed by the 
customer, the institution may avoid criminal liability for a reporting failure, tipping off 
offence and/or a substantive money laundering offence. 386 However, if it were subsequently 
revealed that the suspect funds were in fact the proceeds of a fraud perpetrated by their 
customer, the institution may nevertheless face liability in any constructive trust proceedings 
launched by the defrauded parties. Such parties may attempt to use the institution's initial 
transaction report as prima facie evidence that it: 
• knew or suspected that it was dealing with the proceeds of crime; and 
• had the necessary knowledge to be held liable as a constructive trustee in respect of 
those funds. 
4.5.3 Resolving competing obligations 
In recent years, the U.K. courts have been asked to clarify the AMLICTF obligations 
placed upon institutions and provide guidance on the most appropriate course of action 
should an institution find itself in a precarious legal position with respect to a suspect 
customer or transaction. The resulting legal authorities, a number of which are discussed on 
the following pages, have attempted to address institutions' obligations in a way that does 
386 Op cit n368. 
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not require them to compromise compliance with one branch of the law, in order to 
diminish their AMLICTF legal risk and liability under another. 
The Bank of Scotland case 
One of the most significant U.K. authorities to address institutions' competing obligations, 
is Bank of Scotland v. A Ltd & Ors (2001]3 AllER 58. This case concerned Sections 93A 
to D of the Criminal Justice Actl988 (U.K.)387 and involved a company- identified only 
as 'A Ltd'- that opened an account with the Bank of Scotland in September 1999. Shortly 
after the company became a customer of the bank, its transactional activity aroused 
suspicion.388 Upon properly reporting its suspicions under U.K. AMLICTF legislation, the 
Bank of Scotland learned that A Ltd was being investigated for an alleged fraud. 389 This 
placed the institution in an invidious legal position as it required it to swiftly determine 
whether to: 
• enable A Ltd to access the suspect funds in its account and, in doing so, perhaps incur 
liability as a constructive trustee in respect of any subsequently identified third parties; 
or 
• prevent A Ltd from accessing the suspect funds in its account and, in doing so, perhaps 
face-
(i) a civil action initiated by A Ltd for breach of its contractual mandate; 390 and/or 
(ii) criminal prosecution in relation to the commission of a tipping off offence.391 
In an attempt to resolve its precarious legal position, the Bank of Scotland sought formal 
Directions from a Judge in chambers. At the same time however, two victims of A Ltd's 
alleged fraud (an individual identified as 'B' and a company identified as 'C Ltd') came 
forward. In an apparent attempt to protect the bank from engaging in money laundering 
activities, committing a tipping off offence or facing a constructive trust claim, the Judge 
granted an injunction freezing A Ltd's accounts, and made an Order directing that A Ltd, B 
387 These provisions concerned the offences of money laundering and tipping off. 
388 Carey Olsen, Latest Developments in Anti-Money Laundering Provisions (2006) 2 
<http://www.careyolsen.com/downloads/co100453.pdf> at 13 December 2007. 
389 Op cit n384. 3. 
390 Opcitn388. 
391 Op cit n384, 4. 
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and C Ltd not be informed of, or shown any evidence substantiating, the injunction's 
existence. 
The effect of this was that when A Ltd subsequently brought an action against the Bank of 
Scotland to have its funds released, the bank- constrained by the previous court Order-
was forced to make private submissions to a Judge sitting in the Court of Appeal.392 Rather 
than clearing up the Bank of Scotland's unenvious legal predicament, the Judge declared 
that he would order the release of A Ltd's funds unless the bank lodged an application 
objecting to this course of action. This significantly heightened the Bank of Scotland's 
legal risk as it left the institution exposed to potentially competing court Orders, and 
essentially put A Ltd on notice that it was the subject of a continuing investigation. 
Arguably, it placed the institution in a more delicate legal position than it would have been 
had it simply elected to risk incurring liability in relation to either a breach of a 
constructive trust or a tipping off offence. 
Despite learning of the previous Order's existence and acknowledging the inability oflaw 
enforcement and prosecutorial authorities to disclose confidential information, the U.K. 
Court of Appeal ordered the Bank of Scotland to release A Ltd's funds and pay all relevant 
legal costs. In setting a precedent deemed by some commentators to be "worrying and 
unsatisfactory",393 the court held that its judicial power to grant interim advisory 
declarations could not be regarded as a substitute for financial institutions making decisions 
within their own realms of commercial responsibility (for instance, deciding whether to 
contest proceedings brought by a customer for breach of mandate). 394 
The Court of Appeal noted that whilst a Judge could grant interim declaratory relief in 
similar cases to protect a bank from criminal proceedings, such relief would not 
automatically protect the institution from civil actions waged by disgruntled customers or 
third parties. Thus, any relief granted by a court could only be partial in its application. It 
would protect an institution from the possible imposition of criminal fines and other 
392 Op cit n384, 5. 
393 Op cit n384, 3. 
394 Op cit n388, 3. 
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penalties, but leave it exposed to civil monetary penalties and compensatory judgments 
made in favour of suspect customers and related third parties. Despite its resulting level of 
AMLICTF legal risk however, the Bank of Scotland managed to emerge relatively 
unscathed after its court hearing. British authorities never criminally prosecuted A Ltd, and 
neither B nor C Ltd ever initiated a constructive trust against the institution. Had any of 
these events arisen, the legal ramifications for the bank may have been considerably worse. 
Authorities after tbe Bank of Scotland case 
Whilst the Bank of Scotland case concerned an institution's application for Directions on 
how to handle suspect funds, a subsequent authority known as Amalgamated Metal Trading 
Limited v. City of London Police Financial Investigation Unit & Others [2003) I WLR 2711 
(Amalgamated Metal Trading case) concerned an institution's application for a Declaration 
that suspect funds were not the proceeds of crime. In this case, the court held that in order to 
make such a Declaration (and protect an institution from incurring liability in relation to its 
dealings with certain suspect funds) it required positive evidence that the funds were derived 
from legitimate sources. 
Understandably, this ruling has been relatively unhelpful to most institutions. Given that the 
required evidentiary standard is relatively difficult to meet (if it were not, it is uncertain why 
any institution would make such an application at all), seeking a Declaration may prove to be 
both time consuming and resource-intensive for an institution. In accordance with obiter 
dicta in the Bank of Scotland case, any institution operating in the U.K. must take a 
commercial view regarding whether or not to apply for such a Declaration in the first place. 
Following on from the Amalgamated Metal Trading case, the next major U.K. authority to 
address institutions' various AMLICTF-related obligations was Hosni Tayeb v. HSBC Bank 
pic [2004) EWCH 1529. In this case, Mr Tayeb opened an account with HSBC to receive the 
proceeds of a sale transaction. After these funds were subsequently transferred to his account 
electronically via the Clearing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS), a bank 
employee became suspicious of the transaction and decided to freeze Mr Tayeb's account 
146 
without notice and return the funds to the transferor's account. Mr Tayeb decided to sue 
HSBC after he experienced difficulty recovering the funds. 
At trial, Colman J noted that in addition to the potential criminal liability institutions may 
sustain for breaching AMLICTF laws, those handling suspect customer funds must balance 
two competing civil interests; namely, their contractual obligations to customers and their 
obligations to third parties under equitable constructive trust principles.395 To guide them in 
weighing up these interests, His Honour held that where an institution has doubts as to the 
legitimacy of certain customer funds, it should take the following actions: 
• where it has a genuine suspicion that a customer is about to pay over money derived from 
criminal activity-
(i) make a report in advance to the U.K.'s FlU, the National Criminal Intelligence 
Service (NCIS); or 
(ii) in the case of a CHAPS payment, delay the authentication of the relevant funds 
whilst a report is made to the NCIS. 396 
• where it has a genuine suspicion that a customer has just paid over money derived from 
criminal activity, and such money has already been credited-
(i) apply to the NCIS and wait for directions; or 
(ii) in situations where it is anticipated that the relevant customer will imminently 
request that the suspect funds be transferred out of their account, temporarily freeze 
their account. 
In providing such guidance, Colman J articulated that "although [a] bank may be placed in a 
difficult commercial position vis-a-vis its customer by reason of the need to avoid criminal 
liability including tipping off on the one hand and liability as a constructive trustee on the 
other, there now exists procedures which it is entitled to deploy in order to protect its 
position in both respects ... "397 His Honour held that whilst statutory obligations such as 
tipping off are of real concern to an institution, the Bank of Scotland case provides a process 
395 Perrin, S., 'The Pitfalls of Flagging up Suspect Bank Transactions' (2004) Financial Director 42 
<http://images.vnunet.com/v6 static/oracle/pdf/fd/dec laundering fdbrief.pdf> at 16 August 2007. 
396 Ibid. 
397 See Hosni Tayeb v. HSBC Bank pic [2004] EWCH 1529, para 77. 
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for determining how to resolve the question of what information can be disclosed to avoid or 
defend proceedings brought by a customer for breach of mandate. 
Reconciling conflicting and competing interests 
As evidenced by the previously discussed authorities, U.K. courts now consider the position 
regarding institutions' various AMLICTF-related obligations (and potential liabilities) to be 
settled. Whilst the cases have not disputed that there has at times been a misalignment 
between institutions' obligations under legislation, contract law and constructive trust 
principles, they have generally taken the view that the U.K. Parliament intends for there to be 
a "precise and workable balance of conflicting interests" under municipal AMLICTF 
laws.398 
Though some institutions may still be uncertain regarding how best to balance their 
obligations and resulting risk exposure, a number of commentators have held that their 
primary objective should always be the avoidance of criminal liability under AMLICTF 
laws. 399 Given the penalties, reputational damage and commercial consequences that may 
accompany a criminal conviction under AMLICTF legislation, institutions that have some 
suspicion regarding the legitimacy of a customer's funds, should- first and foremost-
satisfy their reporting obligations and seek further regulatory and/or legal guidance. 
Whilst regulatory advice and/or court Directions will not necessarily protect an institution 
from potential lawsuits initiated by customers and third parties, they may assist it to defeat 
any subsequent civil actions waged against it. Although there is a school of thought that 
seeking the court's guidance will heighten an institution's AMLICTF legal risk by exposing 
evidence that may later be used to affix it with liability as a constructive trustee, there is a 
strong contrary view that doing so might minimise its exposure to such liability. Indeed, by 
properly reporting its suspicions and seeking Directions before paying away certain suspect 
398 See the decision of the U.K. Court of Appeal inK Ltdv. National Westminster Bank pic [2006] EWCA 
Civ 1039. 
399 Op cit n3 88, 12. 
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funds, an institution may be considered to have worn "a badge ofhonesty" 41JO in its dealings 
with the funds. As previously discussed, this may prove to be particularly important in any 
'knowing assistance' case, where the presence of dishonesty will be crucial to the success of 
a claim.401 
It is highly unlikely that any institution acting in accordance with judicial Directions will 
subsequently be held liable as a constructive trustee.402 In Bank of Scotland v. A Limited 
[2001]1 WLR 751, the court held that it would be "almost inconceivable" that any 
institution that proactively sought and followed the court's guidance would subsequently be 
held to have acted dishonestly. Further, in Hosni Tayeb v. HSBC Bank pic [2004] 4 All ER 
1024, the court ruled that it would be "wholly unrealistic" for any institution that complied 
with judicial guidance and did not pay away the relevant funds, to subsequently incur 
liability as a constructive trustee403 
Thus, whilst every case will tum upon its own facts, U.K. case law suggests that any 
institution that has a suspicion regarding certain customer funds and is concerned about its 
various legal obligations, should: 
• report its suspicion to the relevant FlU; 
• where tipping off is an immediate concern (perhaps due to customer instructions to pay 
out or transfer the suspect funds), seek advice from the relevant regulator;404 
• where regulatory or law enforcement officials have directed that the suspect transactions 
should proceed but there is still concern about exposure to civil liability, apply to the 
court for formal Directions;405 and 
400 Op cit n354. 
401 See Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan [1995]3 AllER 97. 
402 Op cit n400. 
403 It should be noted that when Colman J was making this point in Hosni Tayeb v. HSBC Bank pic [2004] 4 
AllER 1024, His Honour was envisaging a situation where the Respondent protected the third party's 
position by not paying the relevant funds away. Thus, a court's view of an institution's potential liability as a 
constructive trustee may differ from this where (a) 'tipping off' concerns are involved, and (b) the institution 
has paid funds away and is facing civil action from an aggrieved third party. 
404 It should be noted that in jurisdictions such as Australia, the role of the regulator and FlU may be carried 
out by the same government body. 
405 Case law from the United Kingdom suggests that an institution may avoid liability as a constructive 
trustee and deflect any claims of dishonesty where it (i) properly reported its suspicions; (ii) was unable to 
apply to the Court for directions because doing so may have 'tipped off the suspect customer; and/or (iii) 
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• strictly follow any Orders made by a court in relation to the handling of the suspect funds 
and the disclosures (if any) that may be made to that customer and/or any associated third 
parties. 
Whilst the steps outlined above might still leave an institution exposed to the initiation of 
civil lawsuits by a suspect customer and/or third parties, in most cases they should protect it 
from incurring criminal liability under applicable AMLICTF legislation. Further, they should 
mitigate the likelihood that an institution will be found to have acted "dishonestly" for the 
purposes of any 'knowing assistance' claim. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Whilst many institutions may focus their AMLICTF compliance efforts upon the avoidance 
of criminal liability under applicable legislation, it is clear that they should not ignore their 
possible liability at civil law. Institutions that disregard or deliberately overlook their civil 
law obligations when undertaking their risk evaluation and treatment activities, may 
(depending on thejurisdiction(s) within which they operate) heighten their AMLICTF legal 
risk and their exposure to civil 'breach of contract' claims and equitable constructive trust 
claims. Further, and perhaps more importantly, they may increase their vulnerability to 
lengthy and intrusive regulatory reviews that are not only resource-intensive, but potentially 
damaging to their reputation and bottom line. 
As previously discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, many AMLICTF regulators currently 
appear to be abandoning criminal AMLICTF enforcement actions in preference to civil 
courses of action. Given their ability to reprimand an institution without the collateral 
damage attached to criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement actions may secure a positive 
result and the imposition of penalties against a non-compliant institution, far more efficiently 
than any criminal lawsuit. The number of civil monetary penalties imposed upon institutions 
in recent years for AMLICTF compliance failures, appears to far outweigh the number of 
comparable criminal fines imposed during the same period. Evidently, where the primary 
complied with Directions to pay the suspect funds away in circumstances where the destination of the funds 
was known to law enforcement. 
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purpose of a particular enforcement action is to 'name and shame' a non-compliant 
institution and rectify its internal control failures, this can just as easily (if not more easily) 
be achieved via a civil suit than a criminal prosecution. 
Undoubtedly, an institution's AMLICTF legal risk at civil law will be heightened where it 
operates in a jurisdiction characterised by: 
• a regulatory propensity to launch civil enforcement actions against institutions in breach 
of their AMLICTF compliance obligations; and/or 
• some uncertainty about the interaction and coexistence of their various AMLICTF -related 
obligations under statute, in contract law and under constructive trust principles. 
As evidenced by the situation in the U.K. during the past few years, institutions operating in 
certain countries may find themselves in a precarious legal position if there is a lack of clarity 
surrounding the interplay between their legislative requirements, contractual obligations to 
customers, and potential liability as a constructive trustee. Any uncertainty around their 
obligations and, more specifically, which obligations should take priority in terms of their 
compliance efforts, may create a situation where some institutions feel compelled to trade off 
compliance with their civil obligations in order to avoid committing criminal AMLICTF 
offences (or vice versa). As demonstrated by the string of U.K. authorities discussed in this 
Chapter, in certain circumstances an institution's compliance with one set oflegal obligations 
may heighten its AMLICTF legal risk with respect to another. 
Whilst this Chapter has primarily focused upon the efforts of the U.K. courts to address the 
apparent misalignment between various AMLICTF obligations, it is hoped that other 
jurisdictions with comparable legal systems and AMLICTF laws will take a similar approach 
to the U.K. Requiring institutions to comply with their AMLICTF legislative obligations, 
only to leave them exposed to lawsuits under contract law or equity, is surely 
counterproductive to creating a robust AMLICTF reporting regime and engendering the 
support of financial institutions in the fight against financial crime. Evidently, the only 
individuals to benefit from any legal uncertainty surrounding institutions' obligations and 
levels of AMLICTF legal risk, would be the money launderers and terrorism financiers trying 
to exploit the financial system for their own purposes. 
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Chapter 5 
Managing and Mitigating AML/CTF Legal Risk 
"Even a correct decision is wrong when taken too late"- Lee lacocca 
5.1 Introduction 
As previously discussed, an institution in breach of its prescriptive or risk-based AMLICTF 
requirements may face AMLICTF legal risk, financial risk and reputational risk. Depending 
on the nature, length and severity of its legislative breaches, and the jurisdiction(s) within 
which they occurred, an institution's risk may translate into a range of formal and/or 
informal enforcement actions406 Typically, the former will create the greatest risk exposure 
for an institution. Unlike more private, informal enforcement actions such as Memorandums 
of Understanding, formal enforcement actions (including criminal prosecutions) often have a 
greater propensity to attract media coverage and invoke public opinion. Accordingly, they 
generally represent a higher level of reputation a! risk than those enforcement tools that 
enable an institution's identity and compliance failures to remain shrouded in secrecy. 
Once an institution's breaches of municipal or extraterritorial AMLICTF legislation have 
come to the attention of regulatory officials, the risk management strategies that it can 
employ may be limited. Clearly, it is too late for the adoption of an avoidance strategy as the 
risk has materialised and compliance failures have already occurred. However, that is not to 
say that an institution that has fallen foul of its legislative obligations, has no risk 
management strategies available to it at all. Indeed, it might still be capable of mitigating its 
ongoing risk and even influencing the regulatory outcomes of its behaviour, by taking certain 
corrective actions in the aftermath of its compliance failure(s). Even after unequivocally 
engaging in contraventions of AMLICTF legislation, an institution's fate will not always be 
predetermined. Given that many AMLICTF regulators have typically dedicated significant 
406 United States Department of the Treasury, BSA/AML- Getting it Right: OTS Formal and Informal 
Enforcement Actions (2006) <http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/480250.pdf> at 6 January 2008. 
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resources to the prevention and early resolution of AMLICTF compliance failures:07 
institutions may be able to avoid protracted and expensive enforcement proceedings by 
proactively identifying, reporting and addressing its legislative contraventions. 
As Chapter 4 of this thesis has already discussed a number of ways in which an institution 
might seek to manage its AMLICTF legal risk at civil law, this Chapter focuses largely on 
the risk management strategies that may be employed to limit an institution's risk of 
incurring criminal liability for a money laundering or terrorism financing offence and/or an 
AMLICTF compliance failure. That being the case, there is undoubtedly a degree of overlap 
between the risk management techniques an institution may use to address its potential 
liability at both civil and criminal law. Whether it is facing civil or criminal enforcement 
action, an institution may minimise its AMLICTF legal risk by taking certain steps to 
convince regulatory and law enforcement authorities of the seriousness with which it regards 
AMLICTF compliance. Thus, whilst this Chapter is primarily concerned with the way in 
which an institution might seek to avoid or limit its criminal liability, it also highlights 
several ways that an institution may seek to limit its potential liability at civil law. 
As Australia is still in the process of implementing the AMLICTF Act 2006 (Cth), it is not yet 
possible to provide any detailed analysis of the risk management techniques and strategies 
that Australian institutions may rely upon when found to be in breach of their legislative 
requirements. To date, no institutions have faced formal enforcement proceedings as a result 
of their non-compliance with the Act's provisions. Accordingly, the commentary contained 
herein with respect to the management of AMLICTF compliance failures and AMLICTF 
legal risk, tends to focus on the experiences of institutions and regulatory authorities in the 
U.S. and the U.K. Essentially, this Chapter: 
• explores the ways in which an institution might seek to manage and mitigate its 
AMLICTF legal risk following a breach of its AMLICTF legislative obligations; 
• outlines the various regulatory outcomes that may arise where an institution is prepared 
to voluntarily report its legislative breaches and take appropriate correction actions; and 
407 Schmidt Bies, S., "Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement' (Testimony before the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs. U.S. Senate, 3 June 2004). 
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• assesses the mitigating factors that might influence the number, type and quantum of 
penalties imposed upon an institution for breaches of AMLICTF legislation. 
5.2 Methods of managing AMUCTF legal risk 
Some commentators have reasoned that institutions cannot viably use transfer, reduction 
(mitigation) or acceptance risk management strategies to manage their legal risk, because 
such strategies inherently recognise that the law may be infringed_4°8 Similarly, several 
commentators have held that whilst a number of traditional risk management techniques 
have become engrained in the fabric of institutional decision-making, many cannot be 
applied to the concept of legal risk because they inadvertently promote breaking the law 
where doing so is more financially profitable than compliance_4°9 The oft-cited example of 
these types of risk management techniques is the cost-benefit approach which, when used in 
isolation from other decision-making tools, may encourage an institution to flout its 
AMLICTF legislative obligations if the total expected benefits of non-compliance outweigh 
the potential penalties (and other costs) it may attract. According to some commentators, 
crimes committed by corporations as a result of "a studied calculation of likely costs and 
benefits" of engaging in criminal behaviour are "especially reprehensible"410 
However, assertions that legal risk can only be viably managed through the use of an 
avoidance strategy appear to be incorrect or, at the very least, limited in their application to 
prescriptive AMLICTF legislative requirements. Even when enacted in risk-based regimes, 
such requirements will apply to institutions equally, irrespective of their individual MLITF 
risk profiles. Typical examples of prescriptive requirements include reporting significant (or 
'threshold') transactions over a stated monetary value, conducting minimum customer due 
diligence, and retaining specific records relating to customers' transactions. Given that 
institutions have no real legal discretion regarding the extent of their compliance with such 
obligations, prescriptive requirements appear to give rise to a clear 'dichotomy of 
408 Trzaskowski, J ., Legal Risk Management- Some Reflections (2005) Legal Risk Management 
<http://www.legalriskmanagement.com/PUBLICATIONS/2005 LRM.pdt> at 28 March 2006. 
409 Ibid. 
"' Opcitn211,2. 
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compliance', insofar as institutions that are not strictly compliant with them, will necessarily 
be non-compliant with them. Unlike the situation that might arise in relation to risk-based 
requirements, there will not be 'degrees of compliance' with prescriptive obligations. 
However, whilst prescriptive legislative requirements may be quite amenable to claims that 
institutions can only prudently address their legal risk through an avoidance risk 
management strategy, it appears that risk-based requirements may give rise to a broader 
palette of possible risk management strategies. By their very nature, risk-based legislative 
requirements implicitly empower institutions to adopt the level of risk they desire, 
commensurate to their level of MLITF risk and their appetite (or otherwise) for such risk. 
As opposed to the 'dichotomy of compliance' that may exist with respect to prescriptive 
legislative requirements, risk-based requirements seemingly lend themselves to a broader 
spectrum of compliance tools and techniques. Despite setting certain baseline standards, they 
enable institutions to determine the extent to which they mitigate their MLITF risk. In some 
cases, they even enable institutions to dispense with the minimum standards, providing that 
they can justify any such deviation on the basis of their risk profile.' 11 For instance, whilst 
Chapter 4 of Australia's Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules 
Instrument 2007 (No. I) (Cth) outlines the minimum identification procedures for low and 
medium risk customers, some institutions have- in a limited number of cases- seemingly 
attempted to use their MLITF risk profile and overarching risk-based approach to justify a 
dispensation from these requirements, and implement less onerous due diligence standards. 
By comparison, more risk averse institutions have sought to manage and mitigate their 
ongoing MLITF risk (and AMLICTF legal risk) by implementing internal KYC processes 
that are far more stringent than the minimum requirements contained in AMLICTF 
legislation. 
411 It should be noted however that any deviation from minimum legislative standards- whether or not it is 
perceived by an institution to be justified- may attract heightened levels of regulatory scrutiny and legal 
risk. This is especially apparent where most other institutions/industry segments have adopted the 
minimum standards. 
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Thus, claims that an institution's legal risk can only be addressed through the adoption of an 
avoidance risk management strategy, are not entirely correct when contextualised in terms of 
risk-based approaches to AMLICTF. Whilst such approaches necessarily entail a number of 
prescriptive requirements, to which an avoidance strategy will ideally be applied, they also 
contain a number of risk-based requirements which enable institutions to determine the 
degree to which they mitigate their risk. As such, risk-based regimes may give rise to a range 
of avoidance and mitigation strategies, all tailored to different legislative obligations and the 
MLITF risk profiles of the institutions addressing them. 
Whilst avoidance and mitigation strategies may provide an effective means of addressing 
AMLICTF legal risk, the management of such risk does not easily lend itself to the use of 
transfer strategies. Whilst it is well established that institutions may use risk transfer 
strategies to limit their reputational and financial risk, they will generally be unable to do the 
same in relation to their AMLICTF legal risk. Operationally outsourcing or transferring some 
of its compliance activities to a third part/12 will generally not relieve an institution from its 
legal obligation to ensure that the AMLICTF requirements underpinning such activities are 
met. The overriding legal responsibility for compliance with AMLICTF legislation (and 
therefore, the AMLICTF legal risk attached to non-compliance) will remain with the 
institution and, unlike the practical execution of certain compliance activities, cannot be 
transferred to another entity. 
Thus, whilst an avoidance risk management strategy should safeguard an institution against 
committing any inadvertent contraventions of AMLICTF legislation, the adoption of a risk 
transfer or mitigation strategy might always leave an institution exposed to a degree of 
AMLICTF legal risk. This is especially evident in risk-based AMLICTF regimes, where 
regulatory authorities may have difficulty determining an institution's MLITF risk profile, 
understanding its risk-based approach, or assessing its level of compliance with legislative 
requirements. As opposed to the use of an avoidance strategy in relation to prescriptive 
AMLICTF requirements, reliance on a mitigation or transfer strategy in relation to risk-based 
412 In accordance with FATF Recommendation 9, many countries now permit institutions to rely upon 
intermediaries and other third parties (such as brokers and financial planners) to carry out customer due 
diligence, screen customers' identities, and create/retain records on their behalf 
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requirements will potentially hamper the ability of regulatory authorities to measure an 
institution's level of AMLICTF compliance. Evidently, the way in which an institution seeks 
to address its risk-based requirements is likely to be hinged upon its own perceptions of 
MLITF risk. 
Even in instances where an institution has fallen short of its risk-based requirements, it may 
still avoid a formal enforcement action if it can demonstrate that it made reasonable and 
genuine attempts to fulfil its obligations. In both the U.K. and the U.S., a number of 
institutions have effectively limited their AMLICTF legal risk by showing regulatory 
authorities that despite their AML/CTF compliance failures, they had assessed their MLITF 
risk and made a concerted effort to implement controls commensurate to that risk.413 
Though it will not always be easy for an institution to demonstrate that it had effective, risk-
based controls in place at the time of an AMLICTF legislative breach, many institutions 
operating in more heavily regulated AMLICTF regimes are now spending copious resources 
on the implementation of their AMLICTF compliance programs. According to a survey of 
more than 60 financial services executives conducted in 2006 by global accounting firm 
KPMG, more than 50 per cent of respondents planned to hire more AMLICTF compliance 
staff and approximately 75 per cent of respondents planned to spend more money on their 
AMLICTF programs during the 2007 calendar year.414 
Whilst limited in its scope and respondent base, the findings of the KPMG survey appear to 
correlate with the increased AMLICTF legal risk seemingly faced by institutions operating in 
the U.S. and other more heavily regulated AMLICTF regimes. Many institutions are now 
emphasising the importance of AMLICTF compliance, and seeking to mitigate their potential 
AMLICTF legal exposure by adopting an avoidance and/or mitigation risk management 
strategy. There is seemingly an upwards trend in the time and money that institutions are 
now spending to design and implement their AMLICTF controls, and safeguard themselves 
against money laundering and terrorism financing activities. Whilst this may partially be 
413 
'FSA Says Demonstrating Controls Can Help Avoid Enforcement', Compliance Reporter, 4 July 2005, I. 
414 Newman, R., "Firms Tackle Money Laundering', Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, 5 October 2006, 
I. 
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done in an attempt to prevent their exploitation at the hands of money launderers and 
terrorism financiers, the underlying motivation for the implementation of such controls is 
likely to be legislative compliance and the mitigation of AMLICTF legal risk. 
5.3 Minimising the fallout from a compliance failure 
Whilst an institution may seek to fulfil its statutory requirements and minimise its AML!CTF 
legal risk by employing an avoidance or mitigation strategy, it might still fall foul of its 
legislative obligations if such a strategy is not properly executed. However, even in 
circumstances where the adoption of a formal risk management strategy has failed to prevent 
the commission of a money laundering/terrorism financing offence and/or an AMLICTF 
compliance failure, an institution can still take certain steps to mitigate and minimise the 
resulting damage. Depending on the severity of its legislative breaches and the jurisdiction(s) 
within which they occurred, an institution might be capable of minimising its ongoing 
AML/CTF legal risk, influencing the type of enforcement action(s) (if any) taken against it, 
and/or reducing the quantum of any penalty ultimately imposed upon it. 
5.3.1 Self-reporting to regulatory authorities 
Where an institution has identified a potential breach of its AMLICTF requirements, it may 
attempt to minimise its AML/CTF legal risk (both at criminal and civil law) by proactively 
disclosing that breach to regulatory authorities. Depending upon the type of legislative 
breach at hand, regulatory officials may decide that no formal enforcement action is required 
because- in the spirit of meta monitoring- the institution is adequately monitoring its own 
AMLICTF compliance and independently taking steps to rectify its control failures. Even in 
circumstances where officials determine that formal enforcement action is necessary because 
the breach is significant or long-standing, self-reporting might enable an institution to receive 
a reduction in the penalties subsequently imposed upon it. Indeed, sentence reductions for 
self-reporting have been around for some time. They have often been taken into account by 
courts willing to acknowledge the time and resource benefits that voluntary admissions of 
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wrongdoing may have not only for regulatory and prosecutorial authorities, but for the legal 
system more generally. 
That said, it should be noted that the ability of an institution to self-report an AMLICTF 
compliance failure may be dependent upon the type of compliance failure at hand. Whilst 
there does not appear to be any academic research on this point, it is presumably far easier 
for an institution to detect and identify breaches of prescriptive AML/CTF requirements, than 
risk-based requirements. As noted, prescriptive requirements give rise to a 'dichotomy of 
compliance' that provides institutions (and, it follows, regulatory authorities) with an 
unambiguous and objective benchmark against which they can judge their compliance or, as 
the case may be, non-compliance. By comparison, risk-based AMLICTF legislative 
requirements are not generally so amenable to such simple assessments of compliance. 
Considering the degree to which institutional risk-based approaches may vary, and the 
spectrum of potential compliance options to which these requirements may give rise, an 
institution's level of compliance or non-compliance will likely be more difficult to identify 
and, as appropriate, proactively report to regulatory officials. 
Given that compliance with risk-based obligations will hinge upon an institution's individual 
ML/TF risk profile, an institution's perception of its own MLITF risk will generally dictate 
how it seeks to achieve AML/CTF compliance. Thus, in cases where an institution's MLITF 
risk assessment methodolog/ 15 is inherently flawed or deliberately geared towards particular 
outcomes, it is unlikely that the entity will be capable of identifying any instances where its 
AMLICTF program falls short of risk-based legislative requirements. In essence, the 
institution will be assessing the adequacy and suitability of its AML/CTF measures on the 
basis of an inaccurate MLITF risk profile. Whilst it may genuinely believe that its AMLICTF 
program and controls are commensurate to its MLITF risk, a risk assessment and compliance 
review conducted by an independent third party/regulatory authority may determine that the 
institution's measures are vastly inadequate. 
415 An institution's ''MLITF risk assessment methodology" refers to the way in which an institution seeks to 
assess its levels of ML/TF risk and, by extension, construct its risk-based approach. Whilst many institutions 
may hinge their risk assessment methodology upon the ''three bases" ofML/TF risk, the precise risk factors 
used by each institution, as well as the relative importance assigned to each of them, wi11 typically vary from 
institution to institution. 
159 
Nevertheless, where a potential breach of AML/CTF legislation has been identified, an 
institution might minimise its AMLICTF legal risk by voluntarily and swiftly reporting that 
breach to regulatory authorities. Regulators in some jurisdictions have seemingly been more 
lenient in their treatment of self-reporting institutions, as opposed to those that have 
deliberately sought to ignore and/or conceal their legislative breaches. A number have been 
prepared to significantly decrease a monetary penalty (or even forego formal enforcement 
action altogether) when an institution has reacted immediately to its legislative breaches and 
taken corrective action to rectify them. 
In the U.S., the ability of institutions to limit their AMLICTF legal risk (as well as their 
financial and reputational risk) by proactively self-reporting their legislative breaches, is 
formalised in the McNulty Memo.416 That Memo, which in December 2006 superseded and 
replaced the Thompson Memo discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, states that by 
voluntarily disclosing their misconduct, institutions may be granted concessions with respect 
to the severity of any enforcement action taken against them. Further, in relation to criminal 
AMLICTF legislative breaches, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines also stipulate that a defendant 
institution may have its offence level reduced where it has: 
• promptly self-reported its offences/compliance failures; 
• cooperated with investigative and regulatory authorities during any resulting 
. • • 417 d mvest1gat10n; an 
• accepted responsibility for its acts (for instance, by entering a guilty plea prior to the 
f . . I . I) 418 commencement o any cnmma tna . 
That said, simply self-reporting its AMLICTF compliance failures will not be sufficient to 
limit an institution's AMLICTF legal risk in circumstances where the disclosure was 
forced 419 and/or only made to regulatory authorities a significant time after the failures arose. 
416 Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Department Components and 
United States Attorneys, 12 December 2006. <http://www.usdoj.gov/daglspeeches/2006/mcnulty memo.pdf> 
at I March 2009. 
417 See Hyewon, H .• and Wagner, N., 'Corporate Criminal Liability' (2007) 44(2) American Criminal Law 
Review 337. 
418 United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guideline Manual (2006) § 8C2.5(g)(l) 
<hlli>://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/tabcon06 l.htm> at 10 October 2007. 
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Self-reporting may clearly assist an institution to demonstrate that its legislative breaches are 
not attributable to any failure to monitor and manage its ongoing AMLICTF compliance. In 
order to properly self-report however, an institution will need to accept responsibility for its 
AMLICTF compliance failures, and implement corrective actions to ensure that such failures 
do not reoccur. Even where self-reporting does not enable an institution to avoid a formal 
enforcement action, it may nevertheless limit its reputational damage and qualify the 
institution for more commercially desirable enforcement outcomes, such as a deferred or 
non-prosecution agreement. 
Whilst it may have a number of benefits however, self-reporting should be regarded as a 
calculated risk.420 Before proactively disclosing any instance of legislative non-compliance 
to regulatory officials, an institution should weigh up both the potential costs and benefits 
attached to such a course of action. Whilst voluntary disclosure may pave the way for a 
deferred or non-prosecution agreement, it may alternatively give rise to criminal 
proceedings- hinged upon the very admissions made by the institution in the course of its 
self-reporting. 
Even where an institution successfully avoids criminal prosecution by self-reporting its 
legislative breaches, it may nevertheless still be exposed to civil law proceedings. Given 
the ability for criminal and civil proceedings to be conducted in parallel, and the enhanced 
information sharing evident between regulatory and law enforcement bodies post-
September II, voluntarily disclosing misconduct to certain authorities may result in others 
also coming into possession of the same information. Thus, unless an institution is prepared 
to contemporaneously report its legislative breaches to all concerned regulatory and law 
enforcement authorities, it should carefully assess the impact that self-reporting may have 
upon its level of AMLICTF legal risk. Voluntary disclosure without any prior consideration 
of the possible consequences may leave an institution exposed to an even greater level of 
risk than it would have faced had it simply failed or refused to disclose its non-compliance. 
419 Self-reporting may appear to be forced and entirely self-serving in cases where it takes place immediately 
after an independent/regulatory review is announced, and/or occurs in a situation where the discovery of the 
institution's AML/CTF compliance failures appears inevitable. 
420 Op cit n208. 1144. 
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5.3.2 Defe"ed and non-prosecution agreements 
The difficulties inherent in waging complex prosecutions against large, well-resourced 
corporations have been widely documented.'21 Apart from the high level of evidentiary 
material required for such actions to be successful, 422 corporate prosecutions may prove to be 
unjustifiably resource-intensive for typically under-resourced regulatory authorities. This is 
particularly so in circumstances where a corporate defendant is financially profitable enough 
to engage a throng oflegal professionals and draw proceedings out over many years using 
various avenues of appeal. Due to these reasons, and the fact that indictment can amount to 
"a virtual death sentence for business entities", 423 prosecutors and AML/CTF regulators 
will not always be eager to launch criminal enforcement actions against non-compliant 
institutions. Accordingly, institutions alleged to have committed a money laundering offence 
and/or a criminal breach of AMLICTF legislation may seek to limit their ongoing AMLICTF 
legal risk by entering into a deferred or non-prosecution agreement. 
Although these types of agreements are functionally very similar, there is one striking point 
of difference between them. Whilst non-prosecution agreements arise in the absence of any 
formal indictment, deferred prosecution agreements arise only after criminal charges have 
been filed against an entity.424 Nevertheless, the practical operation of these agreements is 
ostensibly the same; both can enable an institution to avoid a potentially protracted and 
expensive criminal trial by acknowledging its wrongdoing, 425 undertaking prompt remedial 
action, implementing a compliance program, making restitutionary payments and, as 
necessary, submitting to a federal monitor. If, at the end of the relevant deferred or non-
prosecution period, the terms of such agreements are not strictly met, the U.S. government 
421 For instance, see New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Corporate Offenders (Report 
No 102, NSWLRC, Sydney, 2003). 
422 In many jurisdictions, prosecutors must fully disclose evidentiary material, provide particulars of all 
charges and, perhaps most importantly, prove such charges beyond reasonable doubt. This may be 
particularly challenging with respect to certain money laundering offences, which may involve a number of 
accounts, several layers of transactions, complex financial products, fictitious customer identities, and 
international transfers. 
423 Op cit n208, 1097. 
424 lllovsky, E., Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The Brewing Debate (2006) 21(2) Criminal 
Justice 36. 
425 Altenbaumer-Price, K., Pros and Cons of Deferred Prosecution Agreements [2006] Executive Legal 
Adviser 1. 
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may resuscitate (or, in the case of a non-prosecution agreement, file) the criminal charges 
relating to an institution's misconduct. 
Perhaps demonstrative of the fact that many commentators have inflated views of 
institutions' levels of AML/CTF legal risk, there appears to be a sharp increase in the use of 
deferred and non-prosecution agreements in the U.S. This may be largely attributable to a 
fundamental shift in U.S. enforcement policy following a spate of corporate fraud scandals in 
the early 2000s. After seeing first-hand the potential consequences attached to the indictment 
of large corporations such as Enron and Arthur Andersen, the U.S. Department of Justice has 
seemingly shifted its role from one of indictment and prosecution, to one of "wide!>pread 
structural reform. "426 As opposed to simply prosecuting institutions for their alleged 
wrongdoing, government officials now appear to be more interested in identifYing, and 
requiring the rectification of, the internal control failures that enabled such wrongdoing to 
occur in the first place. 
Whilst the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines have for some years allowed an institution's 
culpability score to be reduced for the purposes of sentencing where it has reported its 
offences and fully cooperated with any subsequent investigation, it was not until the release 
of the Thompson Memo in 2003 that the U.S. Department of Justice formally recognised the 
use of deferred and non-prosecution agreements. At that time, the Department acknowledged 
that U.S. prosecutors could reward an entity's regulatory and investigatory cooperation by 
granting it prosecutorial immunity or amnesty.427 Interestingly, since the publication of the 
Thompson Memo, no criminal charges have been filed against a major U.S. corporation in 
the absence of a deferred or non-prosecution agreement. 428 
In appropriate circumstances, U.S. officials are clearly willing to forego an institution's 
criminal indictment in return for its agreement to enter into a deferred or non-prosecution 
agreement. Between 2002 and 2005 inclusive, U.S. prosecutors executed more than twice as 
'" Op cit n287, 161. 
427 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Op cit n207. 
"' Op cit n287. 167. 
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many ofthese agreements than they did during the preceding decade.429 Further, whilst an 
estimated 13 deferred and non-prosecution agreements were executed during 2006, an 
additional 37 were publicly announced during 2007.430 Of these 37 agreements, four (i.e. 
approximately nine per cent) related to money laundering offences and/or criminal breaches 
of U.S. AML/CTF legislation. Electronic Clearing House Jnc.,'31 United Bank of Africa432 
and Union Bank ofCalifornia433 all entered into agreements to avoid being criminally 
prosecuted for their various money laundering offences, whilst American Express Bank 
International agreed to the execution of such an agreement to avoid criminal proceedings in 
relation to its criminal breaches of the Bank Secrecy Act. 
Although each of these four institutions have since managed to avoid the time and cost 
typically associated with protracted legal proceedings, the terms of their individual 
agreements highlight just how burdensome compliance with a deferred or non-prosecution 
agreement can be.434 Given that the terms of an agreement will be individually stylised to an 
institution and its specific AML/CTF compliance failures, they may necessarily require an 
institution to implement measures that exceed usual industry standards. That said, as the 
alternative to any deferred or non-prosecution agreement will be criminal prosecution, many 
entities may consider themselves lucky to escape formal enforcement proceedings by 
implementing systems and controls that- in operational terms- constitute best practice. 
It is not uncommon for the conditions of a deferred or non-prosecution agreement to be 
sweeping in their scope. For instance, the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement 
executed in the matter of United States of America v. American Express Bank International 
429 Corporate Crime Reporter, Crime without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and Non Prosecution 
Agreements (CCR, New York, 2005). 
410 Op cit n287, 191-193. 
431 See United States of America v Electronic Clearing House Inc., Non-Prosecution Agreement, United 
States Attorney, Southern District of New York, 26 March 2007. 
432 United States Department of Justice, U.S Announces Agreement with United Bank of Africa (Press 
Release, 6 July 2007). 
433 United States Department of Justice, Union Bank of California enters into Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement and Forfeits $21.6 million to Resolve Bank Secrecy Act Violations (Press Release, 17 September 
2007). 
434 That said, it should be noted that none ofthe four institutions' agreements required them to engage a 
federal monitor to secure their future legislative compliance. Had they done so, the ongoing financial burden 
of compliance with their deferred and non prosecution agreements would likely have been far more 
significant. 
164 
on 3 August 2007, required the institution to formally acknowledge its wrongdoing, pay 
USD$55 million in civil forfeiture, and implement an effective AMLICTF program in 
compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act.435 This program necessarily entailed the creation of 
additional policies and procedures, enhancement of transaction monitoring capabilities, 
deployment of further AMLICTF employee training, and engagement of AML compliance 
experts to comprehensively review and overhaul the institution's AMLICTF program.436 
In addition to instigating these structural and remedial reforms, American Express Bank 
International's deferred prosecution agreement also required it to stand silent in the face of 
any public criticism or negative media coverage surrounding its criminal acts/omissions; 
even where such criticism was factually incorrect. According to Clause 3 of the agreement, 
"any such contradictory public statement by [the bank}, its attorneys, board of directors, 
agents, officers or employees" would constitute a breach of the agreement and render the 
institution subject to prosecution. Such clauses are not altogether uncommon in deferred 
prosecution agreements, 437 with many other institutions also finding that their agreements 
prohibited them from countering the reputational damage they might have incurred as a 
result of their criminal offences and legislative breaches. 
Thus, whilst deferred and non-prosecution agreements may spare an institution from 
incurring the reputational damage they would otherwise have faced during the course of a 
lengthy, highly publicised and/or otherwise unfavourable enforcement action, they will not 
entirely safeguard an institution against incurring reputational risk. In fact, it may be 
contended that such agreements actually enflame an institution's reputational risk by 
requiring it to take responsibility for its money laundering offences or AMLICTF compliance 
failures. This risk may be particularly pronounced in those cases where the U.S. Department 
of Justice has publicly announced the execution of the agreement or required the relevant 
company to prominently display the agreement on its website. 
435 United States Department of Justice, American Express Bank International enters into Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement and Forfeits $55 million to Resolve Bank Secrecy Act Violations (Press Release, 6 
August 2007). 
436 See United States of America v. American Express Bank International, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, 
United States District Court in the Southern District of Florida, 3 August 2007. 
437 Op cit n424, 37. 
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Nevertheless, in circumstances where an institution has committed blatant breaches of 
AMLICTF legislation and is likely to be found guilty in any ensuing criminal action, the 
execution of a deferred or non-prosecution agreement may limit its longer term AMLICTF 
legal risk and reputational risk. Whilst taking responsibility for its criminal offences, 
agreeing to pay a monetary penalty and implementing sweeping internal reforms may not at 
first glance be appealing to an institution, entering into such an agreement may enable it to 
avoid prosecution, limit its reputational damage, protect its shareholder value and preserve 
the jobs of its employees.438 Given the collapse of several companies following their 
indictment for financial crimes in the early 2000s, the terms of a deferred or non-prosecution 
agreement would have to be particularly burdensome for an institution to consider forgoing 
the risk management benefits it may provide. 
5.3.3 Reliance on criminal defences 
Where a deferred or non-prosecution agreement has not been forthcoming or complied 
with, an institution may still seek to mitigate its legal exposure by mounting one or more 
defences in any ensuing criminal action. Typically, the number and type of defences that an 
institution (or one of its employees) can rely upon, will hinge upon the construction of 
municipal AMLICTF laws and the legislative drafting of the relevant offence(s). For 
instance, the MLCA stipulates that it is a criminal offence to knowingly engage in (or 
attempt to engage in) transactions involving property derived from "specified unlawful 
activity" with a value greater than USD$1 0,000. As this offence extends to both actual and 
attempted dealings with property gained through unlawful means, institutions and 
individuals are relatively limited in the defences they can use to deflect criminal liability. 
They cannot simply seek to defend themselves on the basis that they never completed the 
transaction in question, and/or that they did not know that the funds involved were derived 
from a specific crime439 Even if such arguments were substantiated in court, they would 
438 Op cit n425. 
439 Under 18 U.S. C.§ 1957 a defendant need only know that the funds in question were derived from some 
type of criminal activity. It is not required that they know the particular crime from which funds were derived. 
See Razzano, F.C., 'American Money Laundering Statutes: The Case for a Worldwide System of Banking 
Compliance Programs' ( 1994) 3(277) Journal of Jnternational Law & Practice 288. 
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not diminish an institution's liability because they would not defeat any of the key elements 
of the offence. 
In addition to the particular drafting of certain legislative provisions, the defences available 
to an institution will generally rest upon the interpretation of those provisions by the courts. 
Through case law and precedent, courts may restrict or expand the pool of defences from 
which a defendant may seek to limit their AMLICTF legal risk. For instance, returning to 18 
U.S. C.§ 1957(a), whilst the drafting of this offence indicates that knowledge is one of its key 
elements, in recent years the U.S. courts have significantly weakened the type and extent of 
knowledge necessary for the commission of this offence. In cases such as United States v. 
Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 155-156 (3d Cir. 2006) and United States v. Epstein, 426 F.3d 431, 440 
(I'' Cir. 2005), the courts have held that 'wilful blindness' will be sufficient to satisfy the 
knowledge requirements of the offence. As a result, the evidentiary burden placed upon U.S. 
prosecutors in such cases has decreased,440 whilst the AMLICTF legal risk faced by potential 
defendants has increased. 
The expansive judicial interpretations given to certain elements of 18 U.S. C. § 1957(a) have 
limited the types of defences available to institutions in any related legal proceedings. As 
such, many of the defences used by institutions to deflect liability and defeat criminal 
charges relating to breaches of the MLCA, have been largely technical in nature. For instance, 
as seen in United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 764-65 (7th Cir. 1993), a number of 
defendants have challenged the necessary knowledge requirements on the basis that they are 
unconstitutionally vague. However, the courts have uniformly rejected this argument on the 
basis that Congress included sufficient guidelines for defendants to understand what conduct 
the legislation prohibits. 
In addition to arguments of unconstitutional vagueness, a number of institutions have also 
tried to minimise their AMLICTF legal risk by attacking the overall construction of 18 
U.S. C.§ 1957(a). As evidenced by United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206 (IO'h Gr. 1991), 
some defendants have argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that the longstanding principles of 
440 Op cit n230, 776. 
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'double jeopardy' should prevent them from being tried for both money laundering and the 
required "specified unlawful activity". 441 Others have challenged the MLCA in its entirety; 
claiming that Congress cannot legally regulate a certain type of criminal activity unless it 
falls within its powers under the constitutional Commerce Clause.442 However, the Courts 
have rejected such arguments on the basis that the use of federally insured banks to transport 
money across state borders creates a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to fall within 
the Congressional powers enshrined in the U.S. Commerce Clause443 
Clearly, the aforementioned defences have all been relatively academic and legalistic in 
nature. Many institutions prosecuted for committing an offence under 18 U.S. C.§ 1957 have 
contested the legislation's formulation and drafting, rather than the substantive elements 
constituting the alleged offence. As opposed to rebutting the necessary mens rea of the 
alleged offence and showcasing their efforts to achieve legislative compliance, a number of 
defendants have sought to minimise their AMLICTF legal risk by relying on highly technical 
defences. That said, whilst these types of defences have often been used in relation to the 
MLCA, they are not relevant and/or arguable with respect to all money laundering and 
terrorism financing offences and/or criminal AMLICTF compliance failures. 
The availability (or otherwise) of highly technical defences will rest upon the relevant 
AMLICTF legislation, the drafting of the relevant offence(s), and the judicial interpretation 
of the elements of that offence. With respect to certain offences, particularly those that carry 
strict liability, an institution may be left with few avenues through which to defend the 
charges against it. It may have little choice but to accept the prosecution's claims and accept 
the legal, financial and reputational ramifications stemming from its AMLICTF compliance 
failures. 
441 In United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206 (I Oth Gr. 1991), the defendant contended that their conviction 
for both conversion and money laundering constituted multiple punishments for the same offence because 
conversion was a necessary element of the money laundering charge. However, the Tenth Circuit rejected that 
claim and held that Congress "intended the money laundering statute to be a separate crime distinct from the 
underlying offence that generated the money to be laundered". 
442 See United States v. Owens, 159 F.3d 221 (6th Cir. 1998). 
443 Op cit n440, 788. 
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However, with respect to breaches of other AMLICTF legislative requirements- particularly 
those relating to risk-based requirements- an institution may be able to deflect its potential 
liability in any subsequent enforcement proceedings on the basis of several arguments. Given 
that compliance with risk-based requirements fundamentally hinges upon a shared regulatory 
and institutional perception of an entity's MLITF risk profile, any alleged breach ofthose 
requirements may be attributed to a number of factors. An institution may seek to defend 
itself by contending that its MLITF risk assessment is accurate and regulatory officials 
simply have an inflated view of its risk levels. Further, it may argue that at the time of the 
alleged AMLICTF compliance failures, it had appropriate risk-based systems and controls in 
place to manage and mitigate the risk that its products/services may be exploited for the 
purposes of money laundering and terrorism financing. Given that each institution will have 
its own MLITF risk assessment methodology and individually stylised risk profile, any 
institution accused of non-compliance with risk-based requirements will presumably have 
some latitude to convince a court or regulatory authority why it should not attract legal 
liability and hefty penalties. 
5.3.4 Mitigating factors affecting criminal penalties 
Where an institution is found by a court to have committed a money laundering/terrorism 
financing offence and/or breached its AMLICTF legislative requirements, it may 
nevertheless reduce its AMLICTF legal risk by highlighting circumstances that justify a 
lesser penalty. Just as defendant institutions may increase their legal culpability through 
certain acts and omissions, in many jurisdictions they may also decrease their AMLICTF 
legal risk, as well as their potential reputational and financial damage, by taking certain steps 
following the identification of their non-compliance. Often, the ways in which an institution 
may limit the quantum of any penalties imposed upon it, will be enshrined in legislation. 
In the U.S., an institution likely to be convicted of criminal breaches of AMLICTF 
legislation should familiarise itself with the country's Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
(as contained in Chapter 8 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines). These Guidelines stipulate 
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that an institution can minimise the likelihood of criminal prosecution444 and/or the quantum 
of any fine ultimately imposed upon it,445 by accepting responsibility for its conduct. In 
practical terms, this means self-reporting its criminal legislative breaches and being 
forthright about its commission of an offence.446 
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines also indicate that an institution may seek a 
reduced offence level (for the purposes of sentencing) where it can demonstrate that at the 
time of its AMLICTF offence, it had an effective "compliance and ethics program" in place 
to prevent and detect any violations of U.S. AML/CTF regulations.447 They recognise that 
even the most diligent institution may not prevent every violation of U.S. law and 
accordingly, a compliance and ethics program may still be a mitigating factor in sentencing-
even in circumstances where it failed to prevent the commission of the relevant offence(s).448 
However, as outlined in§ 8B2.1 of the Guidelines, an institution seeking to limit its 
AMLICTF legal risk through evidence of a compliance and ethics program, must do more 
than simply show that it had designed such a program at the time of the relevant offence(s). 
It must also prove that it had implemented and enforced that program; perhaps by providing 
evidence of the internal controls intended to exercise due diligence, meet its AMLICTF 
compliance obligations, and promote a culture of ethical conduct. An institution's ability to 
avoid criminal prosecution and/or minimise its resulting AMLICTF legal risk will 
undoubtedly be greater where it can demonstrate top-down oversight of its compliance 
activities, the provision of appropriate AMLICTF training to employees, and a process 
444 Whilst the adoption of an effective comp1iance and ethics program will not guarantee an institution 
immunity from prosecution, its existence may influence a prosecutor's decision whether or not to prosecute. 
See United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guideline Manual (2006) § 8B2.1 
<http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/tabcon06 l.htm> at 10 October 2007. 
445 Op cit n418. § 8C2.5(j)(J-3). 
446 As discussed in Section 5.3.1 of this Chapter, self-reporting an AML/CTF offence may serve as a 
deterrent to prosecution or, in circumstances where the relevant offence is perhaps more severe, a mitigating 
factor that lessens an institution's offence level for the purposes of sentencing. See Tucker Mann, T., Op cit 
n443, 792. 
447 Importantly, if high-level personnel have been involved in the relevant AML/CTF offences, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the institution did not have an effective compliance program in place at the time 
of the relevant otfence(s). See United States Sentencing Commission, Op cit n418. § 8C2.5(j)(J)(B). 
448 Op cit n418, § 882.1 (a). 
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through which those employees with operational responsibility for AMLICTF controls can 
report to senior management on their effectiveness. 
Interestingly, whilst the drafting of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines suggests that 
defendant institutions may limit their AMLICTF legal risk through the implementation of a 
compliance and ethics program, it appears that in practice few institutions actually receive 
full credit for their programs. Of the I 08 institutions fined for money laundering and other 
corporate crimes under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines during 2006, not a single one earned 
a reduction in its culpability score for having an effective compliance program in place. 
According to the 'Culpability Factors' table contained in the U.S. Sentencing Commission's 
Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics (2006), the U.S. courts did not consider any of 
the I 08 institutions to have an effective compliance and ethics program in place at the time 
their criminal conduct occurred.449 Evidently, whilst U.S. laws make provision for sentence 
reductions in cases where an effective compliance program had been implemented, 
sentencing statistics indicate that qualifying for those reductions may prove to be particularly 
difficult for defendant institutions. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Clearly, the most reputationally prudent way for an institution to manage its AMLICTF legal 
risk is to simply adopt an avoidance strategy and comply with all relevant AMLICTF laws 
and regulations. However, whether this is also the most cost efficient way for an institution 
to address its risk is perhaps debatable. Whilst a number of commentators and banking 
professionals have claimed that non-compliance with AMLICTF laws can lead to 
significantly steep (if not, financially crippling) monetary penalties, the analysis contained in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis contends that the penalties actually imposed upon institutions for 
AMLICTF compliance failures often appear to be minimal and relatively infrequent. Thus, 
the adoption of an avoidance strategy may not always be the most cost effective risk 
management avenue for an institution. 
449 United States Sentencing Commission, Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statislics (2006) Table 54 
<http://www.ussc.gov/ ANNRPT/2006/SBTOC06.htm> at 10 October 2007. 
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Whilst it is difficult to accurately pinpoint the costs associated with the design and 
implementation of risk-based controls, it appears to be well accepted that full legislative 
compliance with AMLICTF laws will be very costly for some institutions450 (especially those 
operating in more developed AMLICTF regimes and subject to a greater number of 
compliance obligations). Further, as evidenced by the industry surveys periodically 
conducted by international accounting firm KPMG, it appears that in many jurisdictions the 
cost of AMLICTF compliance has risen substantially over the past few years. 
Thus, whilst some institutions may take the view that the potential ramifications associated 
with an AMLICTF compliance failure make a compelling case in favour of an avoidance risk 
management strategy, others may believe that the costs associated with achieving AML!CTF 
compliance are considerably more than the penalties likely to be imposed upon them for non-
compliance. This is particularly so given the apparent reluctance of many regulatory 
authorities to pursue formal enforcement proceedings, and the number of retroactive risk 
management strategies available to a non-compliant institution following an AML!CTF 
compliance failure. 
Putting the issue of cost to one side, because it clearly requires further research and analysis 
beyond this thesis, there seems little doubt that the implementation of appropriate risk-based 
systems and controls may enable an institution to avoid the time and expense associated with 
defending a lengthy formal enforcement action, paying a significant fine or civil monetary 
penalty, and/or rebuilding a tarnished corporate reputation. In most jurisdictions, regulatory 
authorities recognise that even the most carefully implemented AMLICTF systems and 
controls may be exploited by money launderers and terrorism financiers. Accordingly, even 
where an institution's risk management strategy has failed and an AMLICTF compliance 
failure has arisen, evidence of its efforts to meet legislative compliance may nevertheless 
limit its overall level of AMLICTF legal risk. Such evidence may rebut claims that it did not 
genuinely attempt to comply with AMLICTF legislation and even, in some cases, enable it to 
avoid formal enforcement proceedings altogether. Further, in circumstances where an 
450 Mainelli, M., 'Anti-Anti Money Laundering, Feed-Back or Fed-Up' (2005) 6(4) Journal of Risk Finance 
386. 
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institution has been successfully prosecuted for its AMLICTF offences, such evidence may 
minimise the quantum of any penalties ultimately imposed upon it. 
Undoubtedly, there will be some instances where evidence of previously implemented 
AMLICTF systems and controls will not be, in and of itself, sufficient to significantly reduce 
an institution's AMLICTF legal risk. In such cases, it may be that the institution needs to 
self-report its AMLICTF compliance failures, provide evidence of its internal AMLICTF 
control environment, and actively demonstrate that it is prepared to undertake sufficient 
remedial actions. In the case of AMLICTF legislative breaches that constitute a criminal 
offence, taking such steps may pave the way for a deferred or non-prosecution agreement, 
and allow an institution to avoid the legal costs, reputational damage and penalties that may 
stem from a corporate prosecution. 
It should be noted however that an institution will not always be capable of mitigating its 
AMLICTF legal risk following the identification of an AMLICTF compliance failure. As 
demonstrated by the case studies contained in the following two Chapters of this thesis, 
regulatory authorities will typically elect to exercise their formal enforcement powers in 
circumstances where an institution's AMLICTF deficiencies are pervasive, unresolved or of 
serious regulatory concern. Thus, although the last few years have seen several institutions 
escape criminal culpability by voluntarily making a large settlement payment and instituting 
sweeping internal reforms, 'prevention' may be better than 'cure' as far as AMLICTF 
compliance is concerned. Even where an institution breaches AMLICTF legislation and 
manages to limit its AMLICTF legal risk through the adoption of a mitigation strategy, it 
may nevertheless incur considerable reputational and financial damage. Whilst the avoidance 
of formal enforcement proceedings is likely to be a desirable regulatory outcome for an 
institution, it will not necessarily ensure that they remain unscathed in the aftermath of an 
AMLICTF compliance failure. 
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Chapter6 
Riggs Bank: A Criminal Exception to Civil Regulation 
"Banking establishments are more dangerous than standing armies"- Thomas Jefferson 
6.1 Introduction 
Since it first came to the attention of regulatory officials and members of the public, Riggs 
Bank has become a glorified textbook case study in relation to many of the AMLICTF 
challenges facing financial institutions in the wake of September II and the enactment of the 
USA PATRIOT Act.451 Viewed by many as a 'poster child' for non-compliance with 
AMLICTF legislation, the bank provides a practical demonstration of the possible legal, 
reputational and financial consequences stemming from a series of AMLICTF compliance 
failures. Further, it showcases the potential limits on the ability of banking regulators to 
enforce AMLICTF compliance, and raises a number of issues relating to international 
cooperation around the investigation and prosecution of money laundering offences.452 
Whilst several Chapters of this thesis have already discussed the propensity for regulatory 
authorities to pursue AMLICTF compliance through the use of civil enforcement tools, 
Riggs Bank highlights the circumstances in which such authorities may be prepared to 
initiate criminal enforcement proceedings against a non-compliant institution. It 
demonstrates how an institution that fails to manage its AMLICTF legal risk via a risk 
avoidance or risk mitigation strategy, can face a broad spectrum of legal consequences-
including criminal prosecution, civil enforcement actions, foreign lawsuits, shareholder 
derivative suits, and other civil claims filed by related parties. Essentially, the case of Riggs 
Bank provides financial institutions with a clear roadmap of what not to do in terms of 
managing and mitigating their ongoing risk- both prior to, and following, the commission of 
a money laundering/terrorism financing offence and/or an AMLICTF compliance failure. 
451 
'The Pinochet Affair: A Landmark Case Study on AML Controls' (2005) 16(4) Money Laundering Alert 
I. 
452 Ibid. 
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This Chapter uses Riggs Bank as an in-depth case study to demonstrate how a string of 
public and persistent AMLICTF compliance failures can transform an institution once 
considered to be "the most important bank in the most important city in the world",'53 into 
the most criticised bank in the most unforgiving city in the world. It seeks to: 
• detail Riggs Bank's most highly publicised AMLICTF compliance failures, and the 
damage it suffered as a result of those failures; 
• highlight the risks that the bank faced and, in certain circumstances, inflamed as a result 
of its lax AMLICTF controls and its refusal to execute any of the risk mitigation 
strategies outlined in Chapter 5 of this thesis; 
• address the way in which an institution's non-compliance with AMLICTF legislation 
may expose it to a range of unforeseen civil claims, as well as formal regulatory actions; 
and 
• outline the potential limitations on the ability of AMLICTF regulators to monitor and 
enforce compliance in risk-based regimes. 
6.2 Corporate war crimes: Terrorism and corruption 
As previously discussed, money laundering and terrorism financing became critical concerns 
for the U.S. government following the events of September II. Whilst money laundering had 
previously received some government attention courtesy oflegislation such as the MLCA, 
the 2001 terrorist attacks were the catalyst for a new, tougher period of AMLICTF 
regulation. U.S. Congress swiftly introduced the USA PATRIOT Act to strengthen the Bank 
Secrecy Act and bolster the country's AMLICTF framework. In doing so, it brought money 
laundering and terrorism financing into sharper public focus by requiring a range of 
regulated institutions to develop effective compliance programs, implement a range of 
associated AMLICTF controls, and screen their customers against lists of suspected terrorists 
d d . d 454 an estgnate persons. 
453 Op cit n42. 
454 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Money Laundering: A Banker's Guide to Avoiding Problems 
(2002) 2 <http://www.occ.treas.gov/moneylaundering2002.pdf> at 18 June 2007. 
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However, despite the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act and the heightened cultural 
sensitivity surrounding money laundering and terrorism financing, Riggs Bank engaged in 
gross violations of U.S. AML/CTF laws in the years following the September II attacks. 
Many of these violations specifically related to the bank's handling of funds owned by high 
profile, foreign customers. It failed (and at times refused) to conduct adequate customer due 
diligence, monitor the accounts of higher risk customers, and report suspicious transactions 
carried out in relation to higher risk accounts. As a result, the bank heightened its AML/CTF 
legal risk, suffered reputational and financial damage, and faced a spate of previously 
unforeseen civil lawsuits. Most importantly however, it became one of the very few 
institutions to be criminally pursued for its AML/CTF compliance failures. 
6.2.1 Saudi Arabian accounts and the September 11 attacks 
Whilst the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was already strained, the events 
of September II fuelled the U.S. government's criticism of the Middle Eastern country. The 
government decried Saudi Arabia's perceived involvement in terrorism and its alleged 
funding of terrorist organisations through payments disguised as charitable contributions.455 
Spurred on by this criticism, a number of journalists and government officials started to 
investigate the activities of U.S. financial institutions known to conduct business on behalf of 
certain Middle Eastern countries. Their analysis ultimately led to the identification of several 
suspect transactions carried out by Riggs Bank for Saudi Arabian government officials. 
Prior to September II, Riggs Bank provided banking services to most of the foreign 
embassies located in Washington, including the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. Whilst it 
had conducted business on behalf of the Saudi Arabian embassy for more than two decades, 
the terrorist attacks prompted the U.S. House-Senate Joint Intelligence Committee to conduct 
a formal inquiry into the transactions previously processed by the bank for its Saudi Arabian 
customers. The results of that inquiry suggested that Riggs Bank might have partially 
financed the September II attacks by facilitating payments from one of its Saudi Arabian 
customers to the hijackers. 
455 Prados, A.B., and Blanchard, C.M., Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues (Congressional Research 
Service Report for Congress, Washington D.C., 2004) I. 
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Unfortunately for Riggs Bank, the findings of the U.S. House-Senate inquiry received 
widespread public attention after they were published in the November 2002 edition of U.S. 
magazine Newsweek456 The magazine accused the institution of assisting one of its 
customers; Princess Haifa Al-Faisal (Princess Al-Faisal), the wife of Saudi Arabia's long-
standing U.S. ambassador, to send funds to the September II hijackers in the lead-up to the 
attacks. Despite the fact she was a PEP (or, at the very least, a close associate of a PEP), 457 
Riggs Bank seemingly did little to monitor her accounts and/or mitigate the increased 
ML/TF risk she represented. Several months before the September II attacks, the institution 
had begun processing a steady stream of USD$3,500 payments from Princess AI-Faisal to 
students closely associated with Khalid Almidhar and Nawaf Alhazmi; two of the hijackers 
responsible for crashing American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon.458 
That said, even if Riggs Bank had subjected Princess AI-Faisal's transactions to greater 
scrutiny and due diligence, it is unlikely to have identified anything particularly suspicious 
about them prior to the September II attacks. At that time, many Saudi Arabian dignitaries 
provided financial assistance to students studying in the U.S. Further, consistent with the 
hallmarks of terrorism financing, the amounts of money involved in the relevant transactions 
were so small that they are unlikely to have triggered any transaction monitoring alerts. Even 
if the beneficiaries of Princess Al-Faisal's funds had been screened against terrorist or other 
sanctions lists, they would not have provided a positive match. They were not yet considered 
to be terrorists, so the bank's risk-based systems and controls would arguably have been 
unable to identify the real nature of their activities. 
Nevertheless, the speculation surrounding Riggs Bank's potential financing of the 
September II attacks caused reputational damage for the institution and greatly increased its 
AMLICTF legal risk. Shortly after the Newsweek article was published, the F.B.I. launched 
an investigation into Riggs Bank's embassy accounts, its dealings with Saudi Arabian 
456 Isikoff, M., '9-11 Hijackers: A Saudi Money Trail?', NewsWeek, 22 November 2002 
<http://www.truthout.org/docs 02/11.26A.newswk.911.htm> at 12 December 2006. 
457 Section 312 of the USA PATRIOT Act articulates that the tenn applies to senior foreign political figures, 
their immediate family members and their close associates. 
458 Op cit n456. 
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officials, and the transactions it conducted on behalf of Princess Al-Faisal.459 Whilst this 
investigation ultimately identified a number of instances where the bank failed to report 
suspicious transactions conducted by its Saudi Arabian customers, 460 it failed to find any 
evidence that Princess Al-Faisal or Riggs Bank intended to funnel money to the September 
11 h.. k 461 IJac ers. 
Despite the absence of any positive evidence of terrorism financing, the mere suggestion that 
Riggs Bank had somehow helped to fund one of the most brazen terrorist attacks ever carried 
out in the U.S., created further AMLICTF legal risk for the institution. Following the 
publication of the F.B.I.'s findings, U.S. banking regulators launched their own 
investigations into whether the bank's poor control environment led to the processing of 
suspect transactions for other Saudi Arabian political figures. 462 Conducted in early 2003, 
these investigations uncovered improprieties in relation to more than 150 of the institution's 
Saudi Arabian accounts. They identified numerous occasions where Riggs Bank failed to 
adequately screen, monitor the accounts of, and/or properly report the suspicious transactions 
conducted by, many of its Saudi Arabian customers. 
In order to address the institution's various AMLICTF control failures, U.S. regulators issued 
a cease and desist order requiring the bank to undertake extensive corrective action. Whilst 
the order gave Riggs Bank an opportunity to contain its reputational damage and mitigate its 
ongoing AMLICTF legal risk, it was an opportunity the bank did not seize. It continued to 
process questionable transactions for Saudi Arabian customers and, in doing so, further 
459 Op cil n42. See also King, J., 'FBI Probes Possible Saudi, 911 I Money Ties', CNN News. 23 November 
2002 <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/USIII/23/saudi.fbi.911/> at II December 2006. 
460 O'Hara, T .• 'Riggs Bank Agrees to Guilty Plea and Fine', The Washington Post (Washington D.C.), 28 
January 2005, AOI. 
"' New York State Society ofCPA's, Riggs Bank is Sued over 9111 Attacks (2004) 
<http://www.nysscpa.org/home/2004/904/2week/article4.htm> at 14 April2007. See also National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9111 Commission Report (W.W. Norton & 
Company, New York, 2004) 498. According to that report, there was no evidence "that Saudi Princess Haifa 
a/ Faisa/ provided any funds to the [9111] conspiracy. either directly or indirectly'". 
462 Op cit n42. 
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tarnished its corporate reputation, incurred a USD$25 million civil monetary penalty in May 
2004,463 and left itself exposed to two related civil lawsuits. 
6.2.2 The September 11 lawsuits 
The damage suffered by Riggs Bank as a result of its association with two of the September 
II hijackers, was undoubtedly drawn out by two civil lawsuits brought against the institution. 
The first of these law suits; Vadhan, eta/. v. Riggs National Corp., eta/., 04 Civ. 7281 
(RCC) (the Vadhan Action), was filed on 10 September 2004 in the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York. It involved 2,440 claimants464 and sought compensatory, 
punitive and/or exemplary damages from Riggs Bank on the grounds that its deficient 
AMLICTF program led to its failure to identify and report the suspicious transactions related 
to the September II terrorist attacks. According to the claimants, the bank's "constant 
failure to comply with banking oversight laws resulted in funds being forwarded from high 
risk Saudi Embassy accounts at Riggs Bank to at least two September II hijackers". 465 
The Vadhan Action ran until June 2005, when PNC Financial Services Group Inc. (PNC), 
the corporation that had since acquired Riggs Bank, agreed to make a sizeable settlement 
payment to a September II charity. By that time however, the bank had already become 
embroiled in another case regarding its alleged financing of the September II attacks. This 
lawsuit; Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., eta/. v. American Airlines, eta/., 04 Civ. 7318, hinged 
upon almost identical grounds to those asserted in the previous action. Filed on 
13 September 2004 in the New York Federal Court, the suit was instituted by several World 
Trade Centre tenants who sought compensatory, punitive and/or exemplary damages from 
Riggs National Corp. for the property losses they suffered as a consequence of the 
463 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Assessment of Civil Money Penalty in the Matter of Riggs Bank 
NA., No. 2004-01 (2004) <http://www.fincen.gov/riggsassessmentJ.pdJ> at 2 January 2007. 
464 The action was originally initiated by a general, purported class of persons who suffered physical injury 
and/or who represented persons killed as a result of the terrorist attacks. However, on 24 March 2005 an 
amended complaint was filed on behalf of2,440 specific individuals. See In Re Riggs National Corporation, 
Notice of Pendency of Class and Derivative Action, Proposed Settlement of Class and Derivative Action, 
Settlement Hearing and Right to Appear, Court of Chancery for the State of Delaware in and for New Castle 
County, 14 September 2005, 2. 
"' Simpson, G.R., 'Riggs Bank Is Sued over 9/11 Attacks', The Wall Street Journal (New York), 13 
September 2004, B.J. 
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September 11 attacks. Whilst it was conditionally resolved in April 2005 when PNC entered 
into a Memorandum of Understanding with the claimants, this lawsuit caused Riggs Bank to 
incur significant legal and consulting fees, and exacerbated the reputational damage it had 
already suffered during the high-profile Vadhan Action.'66 
6.2.3 Co"uption, profiteering and a dictatorship 
Whilst the F.B.I was reviewing Riggs Bank's handling of various Saudi Arabian accounts, 
another scandal was emerging regarding the institution's poor oversight of its Equatorial 
Guinea accounts. Embarrassingly for U.S. regulators though, this scandal was only brought 
to light following yet another media expose. 
In January 2003, the Los Angeles Times published claims that Riggs Bank had facilitated 
suspicious transactions on behalf of several government officials from Equatorial Guinea. 
According to the newspaper, these transactions had gone largely unmonitored, 
undocumented and unreported by the institution because one its executives, Mr Simon P. 
Kareri (Mr Kareri), maintained a close relationship with the leader of Equatorial Guinea, 
Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasago (Mr Obiang).'67 In addition to being the dictator of 
Equatorial Guinea, a politically tumultuous country plagued by corruption:68 Mr Obiang 
was internationally renowned for committing various human rights abuses. 
Whilst the USA PATRIOT Act does not prohibit financial institutions from on-boarding PEPs 
such as Mr Obiang, 31 U.S. C.§ 5318(i) requires them to conduct enhanced due diligence on 
such individuals during the length of their customer relationship. Typically, this enhanced 
due diligence will involve collecting further information to identify/verify the nature of a 
PEP's business activities, available income and assets, and overall financial position. 
Fundamentally, its purpose is to determine if the funds used by a PEP to conduct financial 
transactions potentially stem from corruption or other illicit activities. 
466 Op cit n464. 
467 Ibid. 
468 The U.S. Department of State, as well as various non-governmental and human rights groups, had 
previously cited the government of Equatorial Guinea as one ofthe most corrupt in the world. 
180 
If Riggs Bank had properly conducted enhanced due diligence with respect to Mr Obiang's 
accounts and transactional activities, it might have noticed a number of highly suspicious 
transactions conducted on his behalf by Mr Kareri. Indeed, whilst he was responsible for 
overseeing the treasury accounts of the Equatorial Guinea government, and the private 
accounts ofMr Obiang and a number of his associates, Mr Kareri assisted his customers to 
launder money by: 
• 
• 
carrying around large amounts of money in suitcases for them;469 
enabling them to make cash transfers to offshore shell corporations; and 
• allowing certain officials to wire more than USD$35 million in oil receipts to companies 
controlled by them and their family members.470 
However, whilst Mr Kareri was personally responsible for processing many suspect 
transactions, Riggs Bank was wilfully blind to evidence that suggested it might have been 
laundering the proceeds of corruption for government officials from Equatorial Guinea. 
Although millions of dollars were funnelled out of the government's accounts, and more than 
USD$13 million was deposited into such accounts between 2000 and 2003 inclusive,471 the 
institution failed to scrutinise and/or report those transactions. This is despite the fact that 
many of the deposits into its Equatorial Guinea accounts were mysteriously deemed to be 
''gifts"' from large U.S. oil companies. 
Following the oil boom experienced by Equatorial Guinea at the tum of the century, U.S. oil 
companies such as Exxon Mobil, Amerada Hess and Marathon Oil, developed close 
relationships with Mr Obiang and his government. According to some sources, the 
companies formed business ventures with Equatorial Guinea government officials, hired 
companies associated with Mr Obiang, and rented property owned by officials and their 
469 According to a U.S. Senate report on Riggs Bank's activities, on one occasion Mr Kareri packed 
approximately USD$3 mi11ion received from Equatorial Guinean leaders into suitcases, and walked the 
money right out of the bank. See O'Brien, T.L., Op cit n42. 
470 See Simpson, G.R., 'Senate Panel Blasts Riggs Bank; Scathing Report Claims Corruption Flourished 
Amid Inadequate Oversight', The Wall Street Journal (New York), 15 July 2004, A.3. 
471 World-Check, Reputation Damage: The Price Riggs Paid3 <http://www.world-
check.com/mediaJd/content whitepaper reference/whitepaper-3.pdf> at 14 December 2006. 
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families.'72 Further, a number of them made large payments- typically referred to as 
"gifts "473 and sometimes in increments as high as USD$250,000- into accounts held by 
Equatorial Guinea officials and their relatives. However, despite evidence that these 
payments may have related to profiteering and corruption,474 Riggs Bank turned a blind eye 
to their suspicious nature and potential illegality under the US. Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, et seq.). This is perhaps largely attributable to the fact that 
the government of Equatorial Guinea had by that time become the bank's largest and most 
important customer, with accounts totalling more than USD$700 million.475 
Whilst Riggs Bank subsequently admitted criminal liability and incurred a USD$16 million 
fine for its failure to monitor and report the suspicious activities undertaken by Equatorial 
Guinea officials, this did not occur until two years after the bank's questionable relationship 
with Mr Obiang was uncovered by reporters. In the meantime, Riggs Bank suffered 
significant political backlash in relation to its lax oversight of Equatorial Guinea accounts. 
Perhaps cemented by the strong public reaction to the institution's activities and the 
indictment of Mr Kareri for money laundering and other charges:76 many U.S. government 
officials sharply criticised the bank's AMLICTF compliance failures. One member of the 
U.S. Senate even publicly declared that the institution's relationship with Mr Obiang was 
"abominable". 477 Whilst this and similar comments caused Riggs Bank reputational damage, 
the institution still refused to take any steps to avoid or mitigate the AMLICTF legal risk 
attached to its dealing with PEPs from Equatorial Guinea. 
472 Blum, J., 'Equatorial Guinea, USA: US Oil Firms Entwined in Equatorial Guinea Deals', The Washington 
Post (Washington D.C.), 9 September 2004 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/launder/regions/2004/0909oilfinns.htm> at 15 April2008. 
471 According to aU .S. Senate Report dated 14 July 2004, at least 60 of the accounts maintained at Riggs 
Bank for Equatorial Guinean officials contained supposed "gifts" made by U.S. oil companies. See Riggs 
Bank N.A., (Written statement before the Penn anent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate, Washington D.C.. 15 July 2004) 8. 
474 Op cit n470. 
475 Op cit n460. 
476 Stemming from an internal Riggs Bank investigation which revealed that Mr Kareri had diverted funds 
from two Equatorial Guinea accounts for his own benefit, on 3 June 2005 Mr Kareri and his wife were 
indicted on 27 counts of conspiracy to defraud the bank and other related charges such as bank fraud, wire 
fraud, money laundering and income tax evasion. 
477 Op cit n42. 
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6.2.4 Civil penalties, civil lawsuits and stranded customers 
Owing to the fact that Riggs Bank's non-compliance with U.S. AML!CTF legislation was 
ongoing and potentially harmful to the public and other financial institutions,478 on 
13 May 2004 the OCC imposed a USD$25 million civil monetary penalty upon the bank.479 
Issued concurrently with a USD$25 million penalty assessed by FinCEN,'80 the penalty 
specifically related to the institution's failure to: 
• monitor and report more than two dozen large and unusual transactions (including "tens 
of millions of dollars in cash withdrawals, international drafts ... and numerous 
sequentially numbered cashiers' checks "481 ) relating to its Saudi Arabian and Equatorial 
Guinean customers;482 and 
• meet its obligations under 31 U.S. C.§ 5318(h)(J) by designing "a program tailored to 
the risks of its business that would ensure appropriate reporting ... and responding to 
classic 'red flags' of suspicious conduct". 483 
Given Riggs Bank's size and profit margins, the USD$25 million civil monetary penalty 
imposed upon it was particularly significant. Indeed, the institution's combined earnings for 
2002 and 2003 were only USD$14 million!84 Thus, the penalty represented a heavy price for 
the institution to pay- both in terms of its bottom line and its reputation. However, it is 
arguable that its imposition should not have come as a surprise for the bank. In accordance 
with the commentary contained in earlier Chapters of this thesis, prior to the invocation of 
the civil monetary penalty U.S. regulatory authorities had attempted to address Riggs Bank's 
compliance failures through the use of less damaging, more cooperative means. 
"' See Assessment of Civil Money Penalty in the Matter of No. 2004-01, United States of America 
Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network v Riggs Bank N.A, 13 May 2004, 8. 
179 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Consent Order of Civil Money Penalty in the MaJter of Riggs 
Bank NA. (2004) <http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/EA2004-44.pdf> at 5 January 2007. 
480 Jn accordance with the "Consent to the Assessment of Civil Money Penalty' entered into between Riggs 
Bank and FinCEN on 13 May 2004, both the FinCEN and OCC penalties were to be satisfied by one payment 
ofUSD$25 million to the Department of the Treasury. 
481 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Assesses $25 Million Penalty against Riggs Bank NA. 
(2004) <http://www.occ.treas.gov/too1kit/newsrelease.aspx0Doc~5AOFP8K.xml> at 20 December 2006. 
482 Boustany, N., and O'Hara, T., 'After Riggs, Embassy Accounts Can't Find a Horne', The Washington 
Post (Washington D.C). 10 June 2004 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A29674-
2004Jun9.html> at 8 December 2006. 
483 Op cit n478. 
484 Op cit n460. 
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On 16 July 2003, almost a year before Riggs Bank was penalised USD$25 million, the 
institution and the OCC entered into a comprehensive Consent Order (the July 2003 
Consent Order). Under this order, the institution agreed to maintain a Board-level 
compliance committee, identify and monitor high-risk transactions, implement written 
policies/procedures, and have its Bank Secrecy Act compliance independently reviewed. 
Whilst Riggs Bank did take some steps towards meeting the requirements of the July 2003 
Consent Order,'85 its obligations remained largely unfulfilled and on 2 March 2004, the OCC 
and FinCEN advised the institution that its persistent disregard for the order would result in a 
. bl . "I I 486 s1zea e CIVI monetary pena ty. 
Ignoring regulators' repeated requests for corrective action not only exposed Riggs Bank to a 
considerable financial penalty, but also heightened its AMLICTF legal risk and left it 
vulnerable to civil lawsuits waged by unhappy shareholders. On 7 April 2004, a shareholder 
derivative action;487 Horgan v. Allbritton, No CA 370-N (Del. Ch. filed Apr. 7, 2004) (the 
Horgan Action), was filed in New York against a number of Riggs Bank's officers and 
directors.'88 Citing the bank's contravention of the July 2003 Consent Order and the 
USD$25 million civil monetary penalty imposed upon it in May 2004, the claimants held 
that by failing to: 
• conduct appropriate due diligence with respect to the institution's Middle Eastern and 
Equatorial Guinea customers, and 
• adequately supervise the institution's compliance with AMLICTF legislation; 
Riggs Bank's officers and directors breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty, honesty and 
care, and caused a waste of corporate assets. To compensate the bank for the losses it 
485 For instance, it fonned a Board-level Bank Secrecy Act Compliance Committee in April 2003, launched 
more than 20 new programs to improve the detection and reporting of suspicious activities in June 2003, and 
rolled out a new technology platform in September 2003. 
486 United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Money Laundering and Foreign 
Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act (Supplemental Staff Report on U.S. Accounts 
used by Augusto Pinochet, Washington D.C., 2005). 
487 These civil lawsuits arise when shareholders launch an action on behalf oftheir corporation, seeking 
damages from parties allegedly causing harm to it. As discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, shareholder 
derivative suits are waged against corporate officers or directors accused of breaching their fiduciary duties to 
shareholders vis-a-vis the corporation. 
488 These included Joe L. Allbritton, Robert L. Allbritton, J. Carter Beese, Jr .• Charles A. Camalier, Timothy 
C. Coughlin, Lawrence I. Hebert, Steven B. Pfeiffer, Robert L. Sloan, Jack Valenti, William L. Walton and 
Eddie N. Williams. 
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allegedly sustained as a result of the directors' breaches of fiduciary duties, the Horgan 
Action sought a disgorgement of the their salaries, declaratory and injunctive relief, and 
additional monetary damages.489 
However, this action was not the only civil lawsuit Riggs Bank ultimately faced as a 
consequence of its non-compliance with U.S. AMLICTF legislation. The Horgan Action 
prompted a number of similar shareholder derivative actions to be launched against the bank, 
including: 
• Dickler v. Allbritton, et al., Civil Action No. 04-0002978, filed on 17 April 2004 in the 
Superior Court of the District of Columbia; and 
• Labaton v. Allbritton, et al., Civil Action No. 404-N, filed on 28 April 2004 in the same 
court.490 
Whilst these shareholder derivative suits caused Riggs Bank financial and reputational 
damage, the negative press coverage they attracted also impacted the embassies of many 
African and South American countries. Riggs Bank dominated a niche area of embassy 
banking and following the widespread publication of its USD$25 million civil monetary 
penalty, there were few financial institutions equipped -or prepared- to take on the 1 00+ 
embassy clients in need of alternative banking arrangements. In fact, these foreign embassies 
found it so difficult to secure new banking arrangements that the U.S. Department of State 
sought regulatory assistance.491 In the wake of the Riggs Bank scandal, it appears that many 
U.S. institutions assessed their embassy banking businesses and determined that the benefits 
attached to offering such services, did not justify the increased MLITF risk they carried and 
the heightened AMLICTF legal risk they attracted. 
489 Op cit n464. 
490 The claims involved with this lawsuit were so similar to those alleged in the Horgan Action that the two 
cases were consolidated on 21 May 2004 under the title In re Riggs National Corporation Litigation, 
Consolidated Case No. 370-N. 
491 Op cit n482. 
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6.3 Dealings with Pinocbet 
The MLITF risk Riggs Bank assumed by providing banking services to PEPs, did not begin 
and end with political figures from Saudi Arabia and Equatorial Guinea. The institution also 
placed itself at significant reputational, financial and legal risk by proactively seeking out the 
business of General Augusto Pinochet Ungarte (General Pinochet); a Chilean military 
leader accused of human rights abuses, corruption, arms sales and drug trafficking. 
Although official Riggs Bank documentation states that General Pinochet and his wife 
became customers of the bank in 1994,492 evidence suggests that the couple actually started 
dealing with the institution as early as 1981, when General Pinochet opened several accounts 
using the aliases "Daniel Lopez .. and "Jose Ramon Ungarte ". In and of itself, there was 
nothing illegal about opening these accounts for General Pinochet and/or providing him with 
banking services. However, Riggs Bank violated U.S. AMLICTF laws by: 
• accepting millions of dollars in deposits from General Pinochet without conducting any 
due diligence in relation to their source and/or reporting such transactions; and 
• assisting General Pinochet to hide millions of dollars in suspect funds in 28 offshore 
accounts and accounts with altered names493 - even after he was detained on criminal 
charges and courts in both Spain and Chile issued orders freezing his assets. 
In July 1996, General Pinochet was indicted in Spain on charges of genocide, terrorism and 
the torture of Spanish citizens494 Nevertheless, Riggs Bank continued to provide him with 
banking services- even establishing two offshore shell corporations; Ash burton Co. Ltd. 
492 According to an internal Riggs Bank memorandum dated 3 November 1994, several bank officials 
travelled to Chile in October 1994 to offer the institution's personal banking services to General Pinochet and 
other officers in Chile's military. Their trip was successful and by 2002, Riggs Bank had combined deposits 
and loans in Chile of more than USD$100 million. 
493 
'Pinochet's Web of Bank Accounts Exposed', Guardian Unlimited, 16 March 2005 
<http://www.guardian.eo.uk/pinochet/Story/O, 1488929,00.html> at 17 December 2006. See also Lopez, J.C .• 
'Pinochet 'Used Wide Bank Network'. CNN News, 16 March 2005 
<http:/ledition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/americas/03/16/pinochet.funds/> at 12 December 2006. 
494 O'Hara. T., and Day. K .• 'Riggs Bank Hid Assets ofPinochet, Report Says', The Washington Post 
(Washington D.C.), 15 July 2004 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dvn/articles/A50222-
2004Jul14.html> at 24 December 2006. 
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(Ashburton) and Althorp Investment Co. Ltd. (Althorp),495 to help him disguise and hide 
his ownership of certain funds from the Spanish authorities. Seemingly, Riggs Bank's 
executives believed that the heightened risks attached to doing business with General 
Pinochet, paled in comparison to the benefits associated with maintaining his customer 
relationship. Even after he was again indicted for human rights violations in Chile on 
I December 2000, Riggs Bank continued to funnel money through General Pinochet's 
corporate accounts without filing any Suspicious Activity Reports. 
Though the institution placed itself at considerable AML/CTF legal risk by opening- and 
then failing to monitor- the Ash burton and Althorp accounts, this risk was only heightened 
by the bank's deliberate attempts to conceal its relationship with General Pinochet from U.S. 
regulatory authorities. In 2000, when the OCC asked Riggs Bank to disclose all the accounts 
it held for political figures, the information ultimately provided by the bank omitted any 
reference to the numerous accounts it maintained for General Pinochet. The institution had a 
history of trying to obscure its dealings with General Pinochet (by changing his name on 
bank records496 and simply referring to him as "a retired professional" who held a "high 
paying position in public sector for many years ")497 and as such, the failure to disclose his 
accounts was presumably no oversight. 
Even as late as 2002, Riggs Bank was still trying to obscure its dealings with General 
Pinochet. When, during the course of a regulatory review, the OCC identified a number of 
suspicious accounts seemingly held by General Pinochet, the bank attempted to close the 
accounts before officials could conduct any in-depth examination ofthem.498 However, the 
institution's dealings with the former Chilean official- and its related AMLICTF compliance 
failures- were inevitably uncovered, and were responsible for the imposition of a 
USD$16 million criminal fine upon the bank on 27 January 2005_499 Whilst U.S. regulatory 
495 Riggs Bank N.A., (Written statement before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ofthe 
Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate, Washington D.C., 15 July 2004) 7. 
496 Op cit n42. 
497 Op cit n494. 
498 Op cit n471, 2. 
499 United States Department of Justice, Riggs Bank Enters Guilty Plea and Will Pay $16 Million Fine for 
Criminal Failure to Report Numerous Suspicious Transactions, Press Release (Press Release, 27 January 
2005). 
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officials had started to rely more heavily upon cooperative enforcement outcomes by that 
time, they seemingly believed that Riggs Bank's deliberate attempts to evade regulatory 
oversight and its persistent disregard for the OCC 's requests, justified more aggressive 
enforcement. 
6.3.1 Repercussions in Spain 
The Spanish inquisition of Riggs Bank begins 
Many of Riggs Bank's legal woes can be traced back to 1996, when a group oflawyers 
representing the President Allende Foundation (an organisation established for victims of 
General Pinochet's regime) asked a Spanish judge, Judge Garzon, to accept jurisdiction 
to criminally prosecute General Pinochet for terrorism, genocide and the torture of 
hundreds of Spaniards. Under Spanish criminal laws that enable anyone in the world to 
be tried for the genocide or torture of Spanish citizens, the claim was successful and 
Judge Garzon agreed to accept such jurisdiction. 
Two years after criminal charges were laid against General Pinochet in Spain, he was 
arrested in London and Judge Garzon issued two orders demanding that all his assets 
(including all bank accounts controlled by him and his immediate family members) be 
frozen 500 These orders had extraterritorial application and were intended to provide a 
guarantee that if General Pinochet was subsequently convicted of human rights abuses by the 
Spanish courts, victims of his regime could receive indemnity payments. However, despite 
their extraterritoriality, Riggs Bank ignored Judge Garzon's orders. 
During 2004, when the Spanish proceedings against General Pinochet were still on foot, the 
U.S. Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations released a report claiming that 
from 1994 to 2002 inclusive, Riggs Bank held more than USD$4-8 million in accounts for 
General Pinochet. On 19 July 2004, shortly after the release of this report, lawyers acting for 
the President Allende Foundation petitioned the Central Investigative Court No.5 of the 
Audiencia Nacional in Spain (Spanish Central Investigative Court), to extend the criminal 
500 These Spanish writs were issued on 19 October 1998 and 10 December 1998 respectively. 
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complaint against General Pinochet to include the alleged concealment of assets and money 
laundering offences carried out by seven Riggs Bank executives. 5°' Given that Spanish law 
does not enable corporations to be tried for criminal offences, it was necessary for 
prosecutors to pursue the institution's officers and directors individually. 
According to the lawyers acting for the President Allende Foundation, the seven Riggs Bank 
executives needed to be held criminally responsible for their deliberate violation of Judge 
Garzon's orders,502 and their attempts to "delay, hamper and impede the efficacy of the 
embargo, blockage and deposit of the bank account balances which Augusto Pinochet held 
in Riggs Bank ... "503 The Spanish Central Investigative Court agreed and on 16 September 
2004 the pre-existing criminal action against General Pinochet was expanded to include the 
executives. According to the court, there was some evidence to indicate that the seven 
executives entered into a 'fraudulent meeting of minds" with General Pinochet to withdraw 
and hide millions of dollars held for him in multiple Riggs Bank accounts. 
Whilst the bank's executives might have foreseen the regulatory scrutiny that their dealings 
with General Pinochet would attract in the U.S., it is unlikely that they ever considered the 
AMLICTF legal risk that their activities could attract in other jurisdictions. In the process of 
establishing and fostering a customer relationship with the former Chilean military leader, it 
is doubtful that they anticipated that their institution's AMLICTF compliance failures could 
one day see them personally facing criminal charges in a foreign jurisdiction. Indeed, it is 
improbable that the extraterritorial reach of Spain's human rights and criminal laws, and 
Riggs Bank's limited potential criminal responsibility in Spain, would ever have factored 
into the executives' decision to accept General Pinochet's business. 
Although Riggs Bank could not be criminally prosecuted in Spain for its handling of General 
Pinochet's funds, it nevertheless faced civil liability for its related AMLICTF compliance 
failures. In petitioning the Spanish Criminal Investigative Court to criminally prosecute the 
501 Under Spanish municipal law, private citizens can initiate criminal proceedings. 
502 See Proceedings Summary 1911997 C, Separate Proceeding III. Operation Condor for the crimes of 
terrorism and genocide, in the Central Investigative Court N° 5, Madrid, before Garcia Gutierrez SIN on 16 
September 2004, 2. 
503 Op cit n502, I. 
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seven Riggs Bank executives, the lawyers for the President Allende Foundation requested 
that both Riggs National Corp. and Riggs Bank be added to the criminal action as 
Defendants with subsidiary civilliability504 The motivations behind this request were likely 
twofold: 
• symbolic- because the addition of the two companies would put other foreign financial 
institutions on notice that their non-compliance with extraterritorial Spanish court orders 
would not be tolerated; and 
• strategic- because the addition of the two companies would ensure that if the officers 
and directors were cleared of criminal liability and/or unable to satisfy any monetary 
penalty assessed against them, the President Allende Foundation could still seek 
compensation from the deep corporate pockets of Riggs National Corp. and Riggs Bank. 
Again, the lawyers' request was upheld and the case against General Pinochet and the seven 
executives was extended to include Riggs Bank. The Spanish court reasoned that the 
extension of the action was indissolubly linked to the Spanish investigation of General 
Pinochet, and that the concealment of General Pinochet's assets would not have existed but 
for the orders made previously by a Spanish court. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the 
Spanish legal system to deal with the bank was protected by the principle of universal 
criminal justice and Article 24.3 of the country's Organic Law ofJudicial Power505 
Riggs Bank pays for Pinochet 
In order to have the charges against Riggs Bank's officers and directors dropped, Riggs 
National Corp. entered into a settlement agreement with the President Allende Foundation on 
27 January 2005. Under this agreement, USD$9 million was to be paid to the Foundation in 
exchange for the abandonment of all criminal charges against the executives and all civil 
charges against Riggs Bank.506 Whilst USD$8 million of this settlement amount was to be 
paid by Riggs Bank, the remaining USD$1 million was to be paid by two of the individual 
504 Op cit n502. 
505 Op cit n502. 2. 
506 O'Hara, T., 'AIIbrittons, Riggs to Pay Victims ofPinochet', The Washington Post (Washington D.C.), 26 
February 2005 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53805-2QQ5Feb25.html> at 18 December 
2006. 
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Defendants; Joseph L. Allbritton, a former CEO of Riggs Bank, and Robert L. Allbritton, the 
institution's controlling shareholder (the Allbrittons).507 
In addition to enabling Riggs Bank to avoid civil liability in Spain, the USD$9 million 
settlement package created two important milestones. Firstly, it marked the first time that 
any individual or institution (i.e. other than the Chilean Government) was legally required to 
compensate the victims of General Pinochet's reign.508 Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, given that the agreement required the Allbrittons to make a payment to the 
President Allende Foundation, it also marked the first and only time that any Riggs Bank 
executive was held personally accountable for the institution's AML/CTF compliance 
failures. 
Despite the settlement agreement and the mitigation of its AML/CTF legal risk, Riggs Bank 
continued to suffer reputational damage in the aftermath of the Spanish court case- not only 
because of its customer relationship with a man charged with human rights abuses, but 
because of its unrelenting refusal to apologise for dealing with him. In stark contrast to 
nearly every other major corporate scandal in recent times, Riggs Bank never attempted to 
limit its reputational damage by releasing a public statement expressing regret for hiding or 
laundering General Pinochet's funds. This is somewhat peculiar given that the settlement 
presumably represented an attempt by Riggs Bank to contain the AMLICTF legal risk, 
financial risk and reputational risk stemming from the Spanish lawsuit and its own handling 
of General Pinochet's funds. 
6.3.2 Repercussions in the U.S. 
Whilst a spokesperson for Riggs Bank held that the USD$9 million settlement agreement 
reached in the Spanish lawsuit essentially "put the matter behind the institution", 509 this was 
only the case in terms of the bank's ongoing AMLICTF legal risk in Spain. The 
507 Landau, S .• and Anderson, S., Blood Deposits and the Riggs Bank: Pinochet's Bank Finally Pays Up 
(2005) Counterpunch <http://www.counterpunch.org/landau03122005.html> at 7 December 2006. 
508 Op cit n506. 
509 Ibid. 
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repercussions stemming from its dealings with General Pinochet continued to reverberate in 
the U.S. long after the Spanish action had concluded. Evidently, the bank's involvement in 
such a significant and highly publicised piece of foreign litigation only increased its 
AMLICTF legal risk back in the U.S. 
Whilst the Spanish action was before the courts, Riggs Bank was facing criminal 
enforcement proceedings back in the U.S. with respect to its dealings with General Pinochet. 
Presumably in an effort to avoid protracted legal proceedings, exorbitant fees and an 
excessive financial penalty, the bank also tried to swiftly conclude this action. On 27 January 
2005 (i.e. the very same day it agreed to pay USD$9 million to victims of General Pinochet), 
it pleaded guilty to a single felony count of violating the Bank Secrecy Act. Representatives 
for the institution conceded that it had failed to file Suspicious Activity Reports in relation to 
transactions undertaken by General Pinochet and several Equatorial Guinea officials,510 and 
conduct sufficient due diligence around the source ofthe funds deposited into the accounts 
held by General Pinochet and other high-risk customers. 511 
The institution's decision to plead guilty and accept a USD$16 million criminal fine for its 
reporting failures, is somewhat unusual considering that U.S. banks pursued for non-
compliance with AMLICTF laws have typically preferred to enter into deferred or non-
prosecution agreements rather than admit any wrongdoing. However, given Riggs Bank's 
long-standing AMLICTF compliance failures and the seriousness of its legislative violations, 
some commentators have speculated that the U.S. Department of Justice insisted on a guilty 
plea in this case.512 Allowing the institution to avoid criminal culpability through such an 
agreement would presumably have undermined the penalty provisions in U.S. AMLICTF 
legislation, and sent a strong message to other institutions that even the most blatant 
AMLICTF compliance failures could be addressed through civil enforcement actions. 
510 Wilke, J.R., and Pacelle. M., 'Riggs Is Set to Plead Guilty to Crime', The Wall Street Journal (New 
York), 26 January 2005 <http://tania.blythe-systems.com/pipermaillnytr/Week-of-Mon-
20050124/012447.html> at 13 December 2006. 
511 Blank Rome LLP, Riggs Bank. N.A. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Bank Secrecy Act Violations and Pay $16 
Million Fine (2005) <http://www.blankrome.com/index.clin?contentiD~37&itemiD~382> at 12 December 
2006. 
512 Ibid. 
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During Riggs Bank's formal hearing in the U.S., District Judge Ricardo M. Urbina 
(Judge Urbina) expressed that he was sceptical of the bank's guilty plea. He sharply 
criticised the institution for being "a greedy corporate henchman of dictators and their 
corrupt regimes", 513 and was so cynical of the motivations underpinning its guilty plea that 
he only provisionally accepted it. His Honour highlighted Riggs Bank's undeniable history 
of AMLICTF deficiencies, and its reputation for placing profits before legislative 
compliance. Throughout the action, Judge Urbina continued to increase the institution's 
reputational damage by making scathing remarks about its refusal to comply with U.S. 
AMLICTF laws, and openly questioning whether the USD$16 million fine imposed upon it 
would simply be regarded as "a business expense" for the bank. 
Judge Urbina's comments regarding the magnitude of Riggs Bank's penalty raise an 
interesting point about AMLICTF legal risk. It has previously been noted in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis that an institution's AMLICTF legal risk is often proportionate to the 
aggressiveness with which AMLICTF laws are enforced in the jurisdictions where it 
operates. However, this statement should perhaps be qualified as the USD$16 million fine 
imposed upon Riggs Bank demonstrates that an institution's AMLICTF legal risk is not only 
a product of the ferocity which with AMLICTF compliance is enforced, but also of the 
quantum of the penalties used to enforce compliance. Even if a particular government were 
to enact and enforce stringent AMLICTF laws, the AMLICTF legal risk faced by financial 
institutions would still be quite low if the penalties for non-compliance were inconsequential 
or insignificant compared to the potential benefits of contravention. Given the profits an 
institution can generate as a result of serving higher risk customers and facilitating money 
laundering activities- particularly in areas of their business such as Private Banking, where 
the funds involved may be significant- the potential penalties attached to such activities 
must be sizeable enough to deter an institution from simply assuming an acceptance risk 
management strategy. 
513 
'Judge: Riggs was 'Henchman of Dictators' (2005) Washington Business Journal 
<http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/2005/03/28/dailyl3.html> at 4 January 2007. 
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Importantly, the damage suffered by an institution in connection with a money laundering 
scandal is unlikely to be limited to a single civil or criminal penalty. Whilst the 
USD$16 million fine imposed upon Riggs Bank may suggest that it suffered minimal legal 
damage relative to its misconduct, the institution's breaches of AML/CTF legislation had 
broader financial and reputational ramifications than this penalty. Stemming directly from its 
suspect dealings with General Pinochet and Equatorial Guinean officials, the bank also faced 
a spate of negative publicity and, during 2004 alone, incurred more than USD$1 00 million in 
civil penalties, criminal fines, and fees attached to its related use oflawyers, consultants and 
auditors. Collectively, these costs contributed largely to the USD$98.3 million loss posted by 
Riggs Bank the following year514 
6.4 How reputational damage turned to legal and financial damage 
for Riggs Bank 
6.4.1 The souring of a significant commercial deal 
Whilst Riggs Bank had historically been viewed as the "cornerstone of the U.S. financial 
community", 515 the significant reputational, financial and legal damage it suffered as a result 
of its AMLICTF compliance failures, left it vulnerable to takeovers and buy-outs. In May 
2004, the bank began reviewing its "strategic alternatives "516 after a number of financial 
services companies expressed an interest in acquiring it. Riggs Bank ultimately accepted an 
offer from PNC, which indicated that it was prepared to acquire the institution for US$27 per 
share of Riggs Bank common stock. 
However, following the imposition of the USD$25 million civil monetary penalty upon the 
institution in May 2004, PNC decided to decrease its offer to just US$24.25 per share. The 
two companies entered into an initial merger agreement to this effect on 16 July 2004 and in 
this agreement, Riggs Bank made explicit representations and warranties that since 
514 O'Hara, T., 'Judge Backs Riggs's $16 Million Plea Deal', The Washington Post (Washington D.C.), 30 
March 2005 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynlarticles/All383-2005Mar29.html> at 23 December 
2006. 
515 Op cit n4 71. 
516 Opcitn510. 
194 
31 December 2003, there had been no events or circumstances which were reasonably likely 
to have a "material adverse effect" on its value517 
Several months later in January 2005 however, Riggs Bank admitted to contravening the 
Bank Secrecy Act's reporting requirements and agreed to pay a USD$16 million criminal 
fine in order to settle the matter.518 Under the "material adverse change" clause in the 
merger agreement, this fine- and the admission of criminal culpability that accompanied it-
constituted the "material regulatory impairments" necessary to give PNC a contractual right 
to terminate the proposed merger. Rather than abandon the deal though, PNC elected to 
substantially revise its previous buyout offer of USD$24.25 per share, lowering it by a 
further 20 percent to USD$19.32 per share. 519 
Riggs Bank rejected this new offer on 7 February 2005 and immediately filed a civil suit 
against PNC for anticipatory repudiation and breach of the initial merger agreement. 520 
Whilst the bank accused the company of bad faith 521 and trying to "virtually steal" it,522 
PNC held that Riggs Bank's tarnished reputation, excessive staffturnover, 523 exorbitant legal 
fees and outstanding involvement in several major lawsuits, had diminished its value so 
greatly that the original contract was redundant. 524 That said, PNC eventually agreed to 
proceed with the proposed merger at a purchase price ofUSD$20.00 per share and in return, 
Riggs Bank withdrew its legal claims against PNC without prejudice. In February 2005, the 
517 Op cit n464. 
518 
'Riggs National Accepts Reduced PNC Merger Deal', Finfacts Ireland, II February 2005 
<http://www.finfacts.com/cgi·bin/irelandbusinessnews/exec/view.cgi?archive=2&num=424> at 20 December 
2006. 
519 
'After Squabble, Riggs Agrees to $643 million Buyout by PNC', The Daily Item (Pennsylvania) 14 
February 2005 <http://archive.dailyitem.com/archive/2005/0214/bizJstories/06biz.htm> at 12 December 
2006. 
520 Op cit n471, 8. 
521 O'Hara, T., Riggs, 'PNC Reach New Merger Agreement', The Washington Post (Washington D.C.), 11 
February 2005 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A 13829-2005Feb I O.html> at 3 December 
2006. 
522 Pacelle, M., 'Riggs Sues PNC as Deal Collapses', The Wall Street Journal (New York), 8 February 2005, 
A.3. 
523 Between August 2004 and September 2005 inclusive, Riggs Bank's fonner Executive Vice President, R. 
Ashley Lee, was put on paid leave (August 2004); COO and Executive Vice President, Robert C. Roane, was 
suspended (September 2004); Chief Legal Officer, Joseph M. Cahill, was replaced (December 2004); and 
CEO, Robert Allbritton, resigned (March 2005). 
524 Reiker, M., 'Riggs-PNC Looking Alive, Though Initial Price Isn't' (2005) I 70(4) American Banker 20. 
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two companies entered into an Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger 
(Amended Merger Agreement), under which Riggs Bank's shareholders would only 
receive a final purchase price of USD$643 million, as opposed to the USD$779 million they 
stood to gain under PNC's original offer. 525 
6.4.2 Shareholder class actions 
In addition to diminishing the value of its shares, Riggs Bank's non-compliance with 
AMLICTF legislation exposed the institution's directors to a string of damaging shareholder 
derivative suits during 2004 and 2005. As previously noted, the first shareholder derivative 
suits were filed on 7 April2004 and 28 April2004 respectively. These actions cast the 
bank's dismal compliance record further into the public eye at a time when it was engaged in 
delicate commercial negotiations and buyout discussions with PNC. 
Generally, there are two broad bases of liability in shareholder derivative suits- breach of a 
fiduciary duty of care and breach of a fiduciary duty of loyalty- and the claimant 
shareholders in this case hinged their actions upon both heads of liability. They sought 
monetary damages and equitable relief on the basis that the Respondents "breached their 
fiduciary duties of loyalty, honesty and care, and caused a waste of corporate assets". 
According to the shareholders, the directors failed to conduct appropriate due diligence on 
Riggs Bank's customers, and exercise reasonable control and supervision in relation to the 
institution's compliance with federal AMLICTF legislation.526 They allegedly breached their 
fiduciary duty of care by failing to manage Riggs Bank's corporate affairs honestly and in 
good faith, and breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by personally profiting at the expense 
of the bank. Strategically, it was important for the shareholders to base their suits upon both 
525 United States Federal Reserve, The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Order 
Approving the Merger of Bank Holding Companies (2005) 
<http://www. federalreserve. gov /boarddocs/press/orders/2005/200504262/ attachm ent.pdt> at 14 December 
2006. 
526 Op cit n464. See also Mazzucca, T., 'Shareholder Suit in Riggs' Future' (2004) 22(51) Washington 
Business Journal 3. 
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heads ofliability because if they were unable to prove that the directors violated their duty of 
care, they could potentially still succeed on the basis of their duty of loyalty claims.527 
Whilst the two lawsuits were later settled, there was little reprieve for Riggs Bank. The 
institution's poor AMLICTF compliance record was again thrust into the public arena 
when another shareholder derivative suit; Freeport Partners, L.L.C. v. Allbritton, No. 04-
CV-02030 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 18, 2004) (the Freeport Partners Action), was filed 
against a number of the bank's executives on 18 November 2004. At that time, Riggs 
Bank had just been sued over its alleged financing of the September II attacks, and was 
facing additional legal proceedings in Spain relating to its questionable dealings with 
General Pinochet. 
The claimants in the Freeport Partners Action alleged that Riggs Bank's directors violated 
the U.S. RICO Act by maintaining a deficient AML program and laundering money on 
behalf of General Pinochet and officials from Equatorial Guinean. In the aftermath of the 
diminished PNC takeover deal, they alleged that the respondents' racketeering activities 
were "the proximate cause of a decline in value .. of Riggs Bank because they "made the sale 
of [the bank} necessary and reduced the price at which that sale could be made". 528 Whilst 
this action was subsequently resolved when the directors agreed to a USD$5.25 million 
settlement,529 a similar class action and derivative complaint had already been filed on 
19 November 2004 by another class of shareholders (the Delaware Plaintiffs). 
The claimants involved in this action argued that the directors' failure to prevent the bank 
from breaching U.S. AMLICTF laws and/or engaging in illegal activities, constituted a 
527 Typically, this latter head ofliability has proven to be far a more effective basis for securing a successful 
shareholder derivative suit. See Advisen, Shareholder Derivative Suits: A Growing Concern for Corporate 
Directors and Officers (2005) I <http://www.cnapro.com/pdf/ShareholderDeriviativeSuits Advisen.pdf> at 
25 June 2006. 
528 O'Hara, T., 'PNC Settles Last Riggs Shareholder Suit', The Washington Post (Washington D.C.), 13 
October 2005 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/I0/12/AR2005101202163 pf.html> at 23 December 2006. 
529 See Freeport Partners LLC v. Joseph L. Allbritton, Notice of Pendency of Class Action and Proposed 
Settlement, Settlement Hearing, Motion for Attorneys' Fees and of Right to Appear, Civil Action No. 04-2030 
(GK), United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 30 November 2005. See also Cohen, 
Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll P.L.L.C., PNC Settles Last Riggs Shareholder Suit (2005) 
<http://www.cmht.com/cases rlggsarticle.vhp> at 12 December 2006. 
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breach of their fiduciary duties. With specific reference to the PNC agreement, the 
shareholders accused the directors of breaching their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by 
trying to sell Riggs Bank in a ''fire sale" at an "unfair price" 53° Further, in an amended 
shareholder class action and derivative suit subsequently filed by the claimants on 
22 February 2005 (the Second Amended Complaint), they alleged that the directors 
breached their duty to maximise shareholder value by failing to auction the bank after PNC 
attempted to abandon the original buyout agreement. 
In addition to damages and legal costs, the Delaware Plaintiffs sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the finalisation of the proposed agreement with PNC.531 However, in 
March 2005, PNC agreed to pay the claimants USD$2.7 million.532 Given that shareholder 
derivative actions are notoriously disruptive to institutions,533 this was seemingly a strategic 
move on the part of PNC. By agreeing to settle the lawsuit, the company effectively kept its 
commercial deal afloat and avoided some of the ongoing AMLICTF legal risk it would 
otherwise have faced following the execution of that deal. If the suit had arisen earlier, it 
might have been better for PNC to stay removed from the proceedings. Doing so may have 
subjected Riggs Bank to further regulatory scrutiny and reputational damage, and further 
lowered its value so that any buyout price could again be revised downwards. However, as 
PNC and Riggs Bank had already formalised their merger agreement before the 
commencement of the shareholder suit, it was in PNC's best interests to bring about a quick 
and quiet resolution. 
Undoubtedly, the numerous shareholder derivative actions launched against Riggs Bank's 
executives during 2004 and 2005, impacted the bank's commercial negotiations with PNC. 
However, they also had broader compliance implications for other institutions. Such actions 
sent a strong message to other directors that the responsibility for oversight of their 
institutions' AMLICTF compliance fell squarely on their shoulders. They could no longer 
hide behind an opaque corporate veil to avoid accountability for AMLICTF compliance 
530 Op cit n464, 3. 
531 Op cit n464, 3. 
532 In order to resolve the Second Amended Complaint, the Delaware Plaintiffs, Riggs Bank and the 
individual Defendants executed a Memorandum of Understanding on or about 1 March 2005. 
533 Op cit n527. 
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failures- regulators and shareholders could now hold them to a far higher standard of 
knowledge regarding their organisation's activities534 
6.5 The resulting regulatory environment 
The impact that September II has had on the U.S. financial system and regulatory 
environment cannot be overstated535 The events of that day prompted the enactment of the 
USA PATRIOT Act and provided the catalyst for a dramatic widening of the responsibilities 
and powers of U.S. banking regulators. Essentially, they created an environment in which the 
U.S. Federal Government and the public now expect: 
• institutions to strictly adhere to AMLICTF laws by implementing robust AML programs 
and internal controls; and 
• regulatory authorities to swiftly identify, pursue and reprimand any institution that fails 
to comply with its legislative AMLICTF obligations. 
Whilst Riggs Bank clearly failed to meet these expectations, so too did the regulatory 
officials charged with overseeing its AMLICTF compliance. After the bank's egregious 
violations of AMLICTF laws were uncovered, U.S. banking regulators were harshly and 
very publicly criticised for failing to be more interventionist with respect to the identification 
and punishment of its compliance failures. 536 This criticism was particularly emotive in the 
wake of September II, and in the midst of the U.S. Government's campaign to prevent 
terrorists, corrupt leaders and other criminals from misusing the country's financial system. 
Although Riggs Bank had been cited for technical deficiencies in its Bank Secrecy Act 
compliance program as early as 1997, the OCC did not start to closely supervise the 
institution until 2002, when a number of media reports were published by journalists who 
seemingly knew more about the bank's suspect dealings than regulatory authorities did. 
Repeatedly, key enforcement actions against Riggs Bank were simply reactive; having been 
534 Keenan, C., Weighty Challenges: Legal Issues for Bank Boards (2004) 14(3) Bank Director Magazine 36. 
535 Bakerplatt, Riggs Bank the fall of an Institution- A Salutary Lesson for All? (2005) 3 
<http://www.bakerplatt.com/upload/public/Files/l/artriggsbank.pdf> at 15 May 2007. 
536 Op cit n470. 
199 
taken only after negative press reports publicly questioned the institution's AMLICTF 
control environment. For example, the OCC's detailed reviews of the bank's Saudi Arabian 
accounts and its Equatorial Guinea accounts were both prompted by the publication of 
articles connecting those accounts to undesirable customers and potentially illicit activity. 
Even when U.S. regulatory authorities did take some steps towards addressing Riggs Bank's 
legislative breaches, they did not act as decisively or aggressively as might have been 
expected by an ever-watchful public audience. Despite the institution's ongoing disregard for 
its AMLICTF requirements, no officer or director of the bank was ever held criminally liable 
for its AMLICTF failings. Whilst several of Riggs Bank's directors were prosecuted in Spain 
with respect to their dealings with General Pinochet, the charges against them were 
subsequently abandoned subject to a settlement agreement. No comparable charges were 
ever brought against the institution's executives in the U.S., despite the fact that there was 
likely enough evidence to justify the initiation of criminal proceedings. 
Nevertheless, U.S. regulatory authorities did launch criminal enforcement proceedings 
against Riggs Bank and that is more than they have done in many other cases of corporate 
non-compliance with domestic AMLICTF laws. As discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the 
difficulties inherent in mounting criminal proceedings against well-resourced corporations 
(and the possible ramifications attached to corporate prosecutions) have seen most 
institutions escape criminal liability for their AMLICTF compliance failures. However, 
owing to its flagrant disregard for U.S. AMLICTF regulations and its continued attempts to 
evade regulatory oversight, Riggs Bank provides a rare exception to the common practice of 
pursuing institutions through the use of civil actions. 
Despite facing a range of enforcement actions and lawsuits, it is uncertain why Riggs Bank 
never felt the full force of the harsh civil and criminal penalties available under U.S. 
AMLICTF legislation. Although it was subject to large criminal fines and civil monetary 
penalties, some commentators may believe that the severity of the bank's AMLICTF 
compliance failures justified greater punishment. When the penalties are viewed in isolation, 
this may in fact be true. Indeed, no restrictions were ever placed on the institution's banking 
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licence, and at no stage did its deposit insurance appear to be at risk as a result of its 
admissions of criminal liability. However, when viewed collectively and in light of their 
broader commercial consequences, others may consider that the penalties imposed upon 
Riggs Bank were in fact appropriate. Undoubtedly, they created such reputational and 
financial damage for Riggs Bank that the institution was ultimately bought by a competitor 
for far less than its original value. 
Ultimately, the criticism U.S. banking regulators received for their retroactive and 
lackadaisical approach to Riggs Bank's compliance failures, prompted a reappraisal of their 
effectiveness in combating money laundering and terrorism financing activities. Following 
the Riggs Bank scandal, some commentators accused FinCEN and the OCC of failing to 
ensure that the institution met its AMLICTF requirements in a satisfactory and timely 
manner.537 Several high-profile political figures went further than this; condemning the 
regulatory authorities for taking ''five years to act in any substantive way" with regards to 
the bank's grossly inadequate AMLICTF program.538 They held that the damage stemming 
from Riggs Bank's activities could have been greatly minimised, had regulatory officials 
taken swifter and more decisive enforcement action against the bank.539 
The allegedly inadequate response of regulatory authorities to Riggs Bank's AMLICTF 
compliance failures has prompted the U.S. Government to consider overhauling the way in 
which they oversee the activities of financial institutions. Following the Riggs Bank scandal, 
the U.S. Senate Banking Committee has questioned the capability of regulators to effectively 
identify and address institutions' non-compliance with AMLICTF regulations. Further, the 
U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has placed increased pressure on 
federal banking regulators to: 
• require the prompt correction of all AMLICTF deficiencies; 
• make greater use of their formal enforcement tools; and 
537 Borchersen-Keto, S., OCC says Mistakes Made in Oversight of Riggs Bank "s Compliance with BSA 
(2004) Compliance Headquarters 
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• publish the results of their AMLICTF assessments in the annual Report on Examination 
they provide to U.S. banks540 
Arguably, if U.S. banking regulators had previously taken such steps and been more 
assertive in their enforcement of AMLICTF laws, Riggs Bank's directors might have 
prioritised their AMLICTF compliance and made a concerted effort to implement 
appropriate safeguards. 
Though no major structural changes have yet been made to the U.S. regulatory landscape, 
banking regulators have certainly suffered a backlash as a result of their poor handling of 
Riggs Bank's AMLICTF deficiencies. In the coming years, this may translate into a more 
aggressive AMLICTF regulatory approach and give rise to additional AMLICTF legal risk 
for other institutions. It is anticipated that regulators such as the OCC and FinCEN will try to 
avoid further reputational damage in the future by demonstrating that they are proactively 
using their enforcement powers to correct institutions' AMLICTF shortcomings. Whilst this 
does not necessarily mean they will be more willing to initiate criminal enforcement actions 
against non-compliant institutions, this would seemingly become a desirable (or at least, a 
more plausible) outcome if another institution were to engage in legislative breaches as 
numerous and flagrant as those of Riggs Bank. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Given its chequered AMLICTF compliance record and its merger with PNC, Riggs Bank has 
become a striking and oft-cited example of how an institution that spent nearly two centuries 
building a reputation for integrity, security and trustworthiness, shattered it by engaging in a 
string of AMLICTF compliance failures. It has become emblematic oflax compliance with 
AMLICTF laws and weak Board oversight. Whilst many pieces of municipal AMLICTF 
legislation now stipulate that Boards of directors and senior management bear the ultimate 
responsibility for the success (or otherwise) of their institution's AMLICTF program,541 the 
540 Op cit n486, 7. 
541 Office of the Superintendent of Financial lnstitutions, Guidelines on Deterring and Detecting Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Sound Business and Financial Practices (2003) 6 <http://www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/sound/guidelines/B8 e.pdf> at 29 April 2008. 
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directors of Riggs Bank sought to ignore its glaring AMLICTF compliance failures. They did 
not take an active interest in AMLICTF compliance and they fostered a corporate culture 
where profit making was prioritised before legislative adherence.542 
Given Riggs Bank's strong embassy banking business and high profile customer base, the 
institution was always going to be exposed to heightened levels of MLITF risk. However, its 
risk profile would not have created so much regulatory exposure had it actually sought to 
design and implement controls commensurate to its MLITF risk. Whilst Riggs Bank actively 
solicited business from PEPs and other individuals based in higher risk jurisdictions, it 
seemingly did little, if anything, to monitor their accounts or report their suspicious 
transactions. Though it may have coveted the business of PEPs such as General Pinochet in 
an era when they were in fact highly desirable customers, the institution should nevertheless 
have subjected its customers to ongoing due diligence in the aftermath of September II and 
the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
As previously noted, risk-based approaches to AMLICTF are not intended to restrict the 
activities of institutions to lower risk products/channels, customers and jurisdictions. On the 
contrary, they implicitly empower institutions to assume the levels ofMLITF risk that they 
are comfortable with. However, the legislative qualification on this freedom is the 
requirement that institutions address their levels of risk through appropriate AMLICTF 
systems and controls. If they are essentially exposing themselves- and the financial system 
-to increased levels of MLITF risk, then they must take additional steps to ensure that the 
risk is adequately mitigated (for instance, through additional staff training, greater due 
diligence, and closer monitoring activities). 
Evidently, the ML/TF risk that Riggs Bank faced was not just a result of external factors but 
also its internal employees. Whether driven by his friendship with Mr Obiang or perverse 
financial incentives offered within the bank, Mr Kareri was able to facilitate money 
542 By many accounts, Riggs Bank's management created a corporate culture where some staff were 
encouraged to dissociate their ethics from their conduct, and worked amidst 'fear of reprisal and of losing 
their jobs" if they lost a client. See O'Hara, T., •Jn Cultivating International Clients, Riggs Went Down a 
Perilous Path', The Washington Post (Washington D.C.), 21 March 2005 
<http://www. was hi ngtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/ A52084-2005Mar20?language=printer> at 24 December 2006. 
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laundering activities for his Equatorial Guinean customers over an extended period of time. 
Though Riggs Bank could not have pre-empted Mr Kareri' s activities via any kind of 
employee screening, it could nevertheless have monitored them more closely (if it had 
wanted to of course) via an AMLICTF employee due diligence program. 
By prioritising profits and customer retention before legislative compliance, Riggs Bank 
increased its legal, financial and reputational risk. Its disregard for U.S. AMLICTF laws, as 
well as its persistent failure to take corrective action and employ a risk management strategy, 
not only heightened the bank's AMLICTF legal risk but also exposed it to a number of civil 
enforcement proceedings, monetary penalties, shareholder derivative suits and even criminal 
prosecution. Its flagrant breaches of AMLICTF legislation saw U.S. prosecutors dispense 
with their preference for deferred and non-prosecution agreements, and the institution 
become one of the few entities to be criminally pursued for its AML/CTF compliance 
failures in the aftermath of several significant corporate collapses. 
Importantly, Riggs Bank's repeated AMLICTF compliance failures not only had 
implications for the bank itself, but also created reputational risk for U.S. banking regulators, 
and increased the risk for other financial institutions. The bank's questionable dealings 
prompted a campaign by the U.S. Government to urge federal banking regulators to more 
actively enforce the Bank Secrecy Act and other AML/CTF legislation. In turn, this triggered 
a crackdown on money laundering by U.S. financial institutions, and led to the immediate 
investigation of more than half a dozen other banks for AMLICTF violations similar to those 
facilitated by Riggs Bank. Evidently, Riggs Bank's non-compliance with federal AMLICTF 
legislation had far wider, systemic repercussions than the bank, regulatory authorities, or 
other financial institutions may have initially foreseen. 
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Chapter7 
Banco Delta Asia: USA PATRIOT Games 
"Reputation is an idle and most false imposition; oft got without merit, and lost without 
deserving"- William Shakespeare, Othello 
7.1 Introduction 
Retribution for certain AMLICTF offences can, on occasion, be swift and extensive. As 
previously discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, individuals and institutions in 
breach of their AMLICTF requirements may face a range of civil and criminal enforcement 
proceedings, and associated penalties. As evidenced from cases such as Riggs Bank, an 
institution that has fallen foul of AMLICTF laws may incur criminal and civil penalties, and 
face a range of related lawsuits initiated by interested third parties (including, in jurisdictions 
such as the U.S., its own shareholders). Interestingly however, the experience of Banco Delta 
Asia, a small financial institution based in Macau, demonstrates that an institution's 
AMLICTF legal risk is not always confined to the initiation- and resolution- of formal 
legal proceedings. 
Even in the absence oflegal proceedings, formal fact-finding exercises, the presentation of 
evidence or a final determination of guilt, an institution may still face considerable 
AMLICTF legal risk. Banco Delta Asia's designation as a "primary money laundering 
concern" under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act543 provides a striking illustration of 
the way in which an institution deemed to be associated with money laundering activities 
might be impacted by extraterritorial laws, unsubstantiated regulatory claims, and public 
opinion. Further, it showcases the extent to which an institution's AMLICTF legal risk may 
be hinged upon international relations and the delicate political relationships between 
particular nation states. 
543 See 31 USC§ 5318A. 
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As opposed to the quantifiable criminal and civil penalties typically imposed upon 
institutions under AMLICTF legislation, the effects of a designation under Section 311 may 
be unpredictable, unreliable and uncertain. In contrast to a number of standard enforcement 
tools, an institution's designation as a '"primary money laundering concern" cannot be kept 
confidential from the public. Indeed, the practical effect of such a designation, as well as any 
accompanying government rulemaking, is to use publicity as a criminal sanction; 
stigmatising and imposing some degree of shame on the designated entity.544 
This Chapter outlines the allegations against Banco Delta Asia, the activities leading to its 
designation under U.S. extraterritorial legislation, the political environment in which the 
designation occurred, and the events that have subsequently unravelled since the institution's 
expulsion from the U.S. financial system. It seeks to use the bank as an in-depth case study 
to: 
• demonstrate the scope and influence of U.S. extraterritorial AMLICTF laws; 
• showcase the interrelationship that may arise between AMLICTF laws, politics, 
government-sponsored crime and national security; 
• identify the potential limitations on an institution's risk management capabilities; and 
• address the claims of many commentators that links to money laundering may cause 
irreparable reputational damage to an institution. 
7.2 The beginning of the end for Banco Delta Asia 
As at I4 September 2005, Banco Delta Asia was a small, family-owned institution operating 
in Macau's Special Administrative Region. 545 Rather than handling large cash deposits in 
foreign currency, the bank's operations were geared towards the receipt of small retail 
deposits and consumer loans in Macau's pataca currency. 546 Less than 24 hours later 
544 Netter, B., • Avoiding the Shameful Backlash: Social Repercussions for the Increased Use of Alternative 
Sanctions' (2005) 96(1) Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 187. 
545 
'U.S. Money Laundering Accusation Ignites Resentment in Macau', People's Daily Online (Beijing), 17 
September 2005 <http://eng1ish.peop1edai1y.com.cn/200509117/eng20050917 209027.htm1> at 9 January 
2007. 
546 Lawder, D., 'Macau Bank Struggles to Shake Off North Korea Links', Reuters UK, 21 December 2006 
<http://uk.reuters.com/article/featuresNews/idUKSP 15073620061222> at 25 April 2007. 
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however, this seemingly unremarkable financial institution became entangled in an 
international money laundering scandal that would ultimately attract unwanted regulatory 
attention and diminish the bank's reputation in the eyes of both the media and the public. 
On 15 September 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department deemed Banco Delta Asia to be of 
"primary money laundering concern" under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. It 
publicly accused the bank of representing an "illicit financial threat" to U.S. financial 
institutions, and acting as "a willing pawn for the North Korean government to engage in 
corrupt financial activities through Macau" 547 According to the U.S. Treasury Department, 
Banco Delta Asia had a long history of assisting North Korean government agencies and 
front companies to place counterfeit currency in the international financial system, 548 make 
surreptitious cash deposits and withdrawals, 549 and launder funds derived from fake 
cigarettes, drug trafficking and the proliferation ofweapons. 550 
Given that Banco Delta Asia received no notice of its impending designation, it was perhaps 
incapable of appreciating the extent of its AMLICTF legal risk under U.S. extraterritorial 
legislation. Further, given its potential inability to gauge its AMLICTF risk, the bank was 
unlikely to have been in a position to mitigate or avoid such risk by engaging with U.S. 
regulatory officials, terminating all of its relationships with North Korean customers, or 
implementing stricter KYC and transaction monitoring controls. The U.S. Treasury 
Department seemingly intended for its Section 3 I I designation to cause maximum impact 
and prejudice to the bank. 
547 United States Department of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money 
Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act (Press Release, 15 September 2005). 
548 United States authorities alleged that between 1989 and 2005 inclusive, Banco Delta Asia was the primary 
outlet for more than USD$45 million in North Korean-made counterfeit American $100 bills. See Gertz, B., 
'U.S. Sanctions Cost North Korea Millions', The Washington Times (Washington D.C.), 16 June 2006 
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20060615- I 05l45-9374r.htm> at 18 January 2007. 
549 
'Laundering Charge Hits Macau Bank'. BBC News, 19 September 2005 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/426l450.stm> at 30 December 2006. 
550 Greenless, D., 'Macau Inquiry Clears Bank of Money Laundering for N. Korea', International Herald 
Tribune- Asia Pacific (New York), 12 March 2007 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/J 2/news/bank.php> at 20 March 2007. 
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Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act empowers the U.S. Secretary ofthe Treasury to 
designate any foreign money laundering or terrorism financing threats a ''primary money 
laundering concern". Under the Act, these threats may include: 
• foreign jurisdictions perceived to have an inadequate AMLICTF regime; 
• classes of foreign accounts or transactions deemed to represent an unacceptably high 
money laundering risk; or 
• in the case of Banco Delta Asia, foreign financial institutions believed to support (either 
knowingly or unwittingly) money laundering or terrorism financing activities. 55 ' 
Evidently, the provisions enshrined in Section 311 are somewhat underpinned by the notion 
that the integrity of a nation state's AMLICTF regime, is partially dependent upon the quality 
(and the relative strength) of the AMLICTF controls in neighbouring countries. They are 
innately hinged upon a perception that weaknesses in the control environments of foreign 
institutions and foreign countries have the ability to place others at risk. In essence, they 
convey a belief that as far as effective AMLICTF regulation is concerned, the 'chain' is only 
as strong as its weakest 'link' .552 
Whilst supporters of Section 311 regard it as a "diplomatic sledgehammer that gets 
results ",553 many critics consider it to be simply a tool for the U.S. Treasury Department to 
sidestep international and national legal practices by using an Executive Branch 
administrative procedure to accuse- and find a foreign institution or jurisdiction guilty- of 
certain wrongdoing.554 They claim that any designation made under the Section not only 
551 See Aufhauser, D., 'Terrorism: Growing Wahhabi Influence in the United States' (Testimony before the 
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 26 June 2003). 
552 Interestingly however, some commentators have argued that a country's lax or unregulated control 
environment will not necessarily attract greater levels of money laundering or terrorism financing. On the 
contrary, investors- even those with il1icit motives- want to ensure that their funds are safe and not 
vulnerable to theft, corruption and other crimes. See Rodrigues, A.G., 'The Prevention and the Combat of 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A Social Responsibility' (Speech delivered at the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Conference 2009, Managing Risk: Australian and International 
Perspectives, Sydney, I April 2009). 
553 Hall, K.G., 'Under Patriot Act, Treasury Casts a Wide Net', McClatchy Newspapers (Sacramento), 12 
March 2007 <http://www.mcclatchydc.comll48/story115754.html> at 26 January 2009. 
554 Hauben, R., North Korea's $25 Million and Banco Delta Asia: Another Abuse under the U.S. Patriot Act 
(200 I) (2007) NewsGroups 2 <http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com/pdfl Archive/Soc/soc.cu I ture.korean/2007-
03/msg00027.pdl> at 26 January 2009. 
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presumes an institution's guilt,555 but denies it the due process otherwise afforded to U.S. 
citizens by the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, the actions 
taken by the U.S. Treasury Department under Section 311 are not managed, reviewed, 
overseen or adjudicated by a local or foreign court or legislature.556 
Once a foreign institution is deemed to be of "primary money laundering concern" under 
Section 311, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury may order U.S. financial institutions to take 
one or more "special measures". 557 The Act contains five special measures which, 
collectively, provide a graduated tool that the U.S. government can use to strategically focus 
and intensify its AMLICTF efforts in relation to a single institution, financial sector, or 
aspect of a foreign government's operations558 These measures range in severity from 
enhanced due diligence, recordkeeping and reporting, up to and including the termination of 
correspondent banking relationships. Whilst Section 311 stipulates that these measures "may 
be imposed in such sequence or combination as the Secretary shall determine", it is 
interesting to note that the most severe special measure was applied in the case of Banco 
Delta Asia. Prior to that time, only four other institutions (i.e. Myanmar Mayflower Bank, 
Asia Wealth Bank, the Commercial Bank of Syria and VEF Banka) and one jurisdiction (i.e. 
Myanmar) had felt the full force of the same measure. 559 
Shortly after the bank's designation, FinCEN issued a proposed rulemaking that, if 
subsequently formalised, would prohibit U.S. financial institutions from establishing, 
maintaining, administering or managing any correspondent account in the U.S. for, or on 
behalf of, Banco Delta Asia. This proposed rule evidently carried significant financial risk 
555 Ibid. 
556 Op cit n553. 
557 See 31 USC§ 5318A(b)(J)-(5). 
558 See United States Department of the Treasury- Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Department 
Designates Burma and Two Burmese Banks to be of "Primary Money Laundering Concern" and Announces 
Proposed Countermeasures Under Section 31 I of the USA PATRIOT Act (Press Release. 19 November 2003) 
1. 
559 Although several other institutions and jurisdictions had previously been the subject of Notices of 
Proposed Rulemaking in relation to the same special measure, they all managed to avoid the imposition of a 
Final Ruling by undertaking the U.S. government's desired remedial actions. See McGlynn, J., 'Banco Delta 
Asia, North Korea's Frozen Funds and US Undermining of the Six-Party Talks: Obstacles to a Solution', 
Japan Focus, 9 June 2007 <http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2446> at 29 June 2008. 
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for the bank, given that it maintained a number of correspondent accounts in Europe, Asia, 
Australia, Canada and the U.S at that time.560 
Although representatives of Banco Delta Asia and the Macau government lobbied the U.S. 
Treasury Department to rescind the bank's designation and the proposed rulemaking, 
FinCEN finalised the rule on 14 March 2007. It again accused the bank of providing 
financial services to corrupt North Korean entities, and conducting such grossly inadequate 
due diligence that those entities were able to: 
• suppress the identity and location of their transaction originators; 
• repeatedly transfer large, round-figure sums with no apparent legitimate purpose to and 
from accounts held at other banks; and 
• routinely use cash couriers to move around significant sums of currency, in the absence 
of any credible explanation as to the origin or purpose of such transactions.561 
The final rule, which came into force on 13 April 2007, prevents Banco Delta Asia from 
accessing the U.S. financial system.562 It not only prohibits U.S. financial institutions from 
directly opening or maintaining correspondent accounts for the bank, but also compels them 
to take reasonable steps to ensure that they do not allow the bank to indirectly access the U.S. 
financial system via another one of their correspondent accounts. As this final rule effectively 
constitutes a U.S. federal regulation, it can only be withdrawn by the U.S. Treasury 
Department following the publication of a 'Notice to Rescind' in the U.S. Federal 
Register.563 Though this would not be an overly arduous task for the U.S. Treasury 
Department, it is unlikely to occur any time in the imminent future. In the history of 
560 These accounts were held at a range of financial institutions, including Wachovia in the U.S., Standard 
Chartered in Hong Kong, and ANZ Bank in Australia. 
561 United States Department of the Treasury, Treasury Finalizes Rule Against Banco Delta 
Asia: BDA Cut Off From U.S. Financial System (Press Release, 14 March 2007). 
562 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Advisory: Guidance to Financial Institutions on the Provision of 
Banking Services to North Korean Government Agencies and Associated Front Companies Engaged in //licit 
Activities (2005) <http://www.tincen.gov/advisorv.pdf> at 14 March 2007. 
563 Whilst the U.S. Treasury Department can apply and/or rescind the four less severe special measures at 
wi11, the process to withdraw a final rule in relation to the fifth special measure is more fonnal. 
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Section 311, there is no precedent for the withdrawal of a final rule made against a foreign 
financial institution.564 
7.2.1 Banco Delta Asia's response to the allegations 
Immediately following its designation as a ''primary money laundering concern", Banco 
Delta Asia attempted to mitigate its AMLICTF legal risk and reputational risk by 
vigourously denying the accusations levelled against it and dismissing them as a blatantly 
unsubstantiated, "ridiculous joke". 565 Whilst the bank's representatives admitted to 
conducting business on behalf of some North Korean entities, they claimed that various U.S. 
agencies (and even the monetary authorities in Hong Kong and Macau), had known about its 
trade relationship with North Korea for many years.566 Further, they held that prior to the 
bank's designation, it had never been approached or questioned by any U.S. government 
agency regarding its dealings with North Korea.567 
Despite rejecting the U.S. Treasury Department's allegations however, the groundswell of 
public and commercial pressure generated by them forced Banco Delta Asia to implement 
enterprise-wide controls. Shortly after its designation, the bank froze all of its North Korean 
accounts and agreed to "enhance [its} operational stability as well as facilitate the 
addressing of the allegations raised by the US Treasury Department". 568 It 
comprehensively overhauled its AMLICTF procedures, replaced the heads of its nine 
business departments, and handed control of its management to a three-person 
Administrative Committee appointed by the Macau government. 569 Additionally, and 
perhaps in an attempt to seek the U.S. Treasury Department's favour and mitigate its 
564 Op cit n559. 
565 Op cit n549. 
566 Coleman, Z., 'Banco Delta Board Yields Control', The Standard(Hong Kong), 29 September 2005 
<http://www.thestandard.eom.hk/news detail.asp?we cat~4&art id~2338&sid~4782658&con type~ I &d st 
F20050929> at 23 January 2007. 
567 Op cit n545. 
568 Ibid. 
569 The Macau government took control of Banco Delta Asia's affairs after all the mem hers of the bank's 
Board of directors suspended the exercise of their responsibilities, and entrusted management of the 
institution to a government-appointed committee. This committee included members of the Monetary 
Authority of Macau. 
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ongoing regulatory risk, it publicly pledged that it would never deal with North Korean 
entities again in the future. 
In light of these remedial actions, Macau government officials and representatives of the 
bank urged FinCEN to revoke its notice of proposed rulemaking. However, given that the 
U.S. Treasury Department subsequently finalised the proposed rule, it evidently did not 
believe that Banco Delta Asia's organisational changes were sufficient to rescind the 
proposed rulemaking and withdraw the special measure. That said, it is unclear what 
additional steps the bank could have taken to quell the U.S. Treasury Department's ongoing 
concerns about its activities with those North Korean customers considered to be unsavoury 
by the U.S. government. The desirability of Banco Delta Asia's customer relationships was 
seemingly judged in hindsight. If this is the case, apart from the due diligence presumably 
carried out by Banco Delta Asia at the time of on-boarding its North Korean customers, no 
number of additional controls could have spared the institution from the U.S. government's 
subsequent claims that its customers were connected with organised crime. 
7.2.2 The broader attack on Macau 
Whilst the U.S. Treasury Department held that the Section 311 designation was specifically 
leveled at Banco Delta Asia as an institution, rather than Macau as a jurisdiction, its claims 
against the bank were accompanied by harsh criticism of the country's lax and immature 
AML regime.570 In publishing its notice of proposed rulemaking in the U.S. Federal Register, 
the U.S. Treasury Department held that money laundering had been a long-standing and 
"significant problem" in Macau, and one which had enabled a number of the country's 
institutions to "launder counterfeit currency and the proceeds from government-sponsored 
illegal drug transactions" for North Korean government entities and front companies. 571 
570 Op cit n549. 
571 See United States Department of the Treasury, 'Finding That Banco Delta Asia SARL is a Financial 
Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern', Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 181, 20 September 2005, 
55215. 
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Interestingly however, this criticism of Macau came about less than 12 months after the U.S. 
Department of State praised the country's government for supporting global anti-terrorism 
efforts, drafting new AMLICTF legislation, and continuing to open up its economy.572 
According to a report issued by the U.S. Department of State in 2004, in the aftermath of 
September II the Macau government had, amongst other things: 
• prepared a draft AML law creating a national FlU; 
• increased the customer screening and due diligence standards, and extended the suspicious 
activity reporting requirements, imposed upon institutions; 
• created an AML legal framework in line with international standards and United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs); and 
• worked collaboratively with U.S. law enforcement agencies on AMLICTF issues.573 
The U.S. Treasury Department's criticism of Macau's AMLICTF efforts in 2005, is clearly 
in contrast to the U.S. Department of State's praise of such efforts only a year earlier. 
Arguably, the vast disparity between the views held by these U.S. government agencies 
suggests that the bank's designation was part of a broader, country-specific strategy in the 
fight against money laundering and terrorism financing. A country's economy is only as 
strong as its financial system, and by tainting the reputation of Banco Delta Asia and 
launching a stinging attack against Macau's broader AMLICTF environment, the U.S. 
Treasury Departmentjeopardised the stability of Macau's entire economy. 
The Macau government attempted to refute the U.S. Treasury Department's criticism by 
arguing that the country strictly observes all UNSCRs aimed at thwarting financial crime, 
and has a stringent regulatory framework where all authorised financial institutions are 
supervised by the Monetary Authority of Macau (MAM).574 However, the national 
government's claims were seemingly deafened by the media releases questioning its 
AMLICTF control environment, and disregarded by the many financial institutions and 
572 United States Department of State, U.S.-Macau Policy Act Report (2004) 
<http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/35706.htm> at 27 January 2007. 
573 Ibid. 
574 Op cit n545. 
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national AMLICTF regulators prepared to accept the U.S. Treasury Department's claims 
without any supporting evidence or analysis. 
Ultimately, the negative publicity generated by the U.S. Treasury Department's proposed 
rulemaking meant that the Macau government had little choice but to announce an 
independent investigation into Banco Delta Asia's activities. Whilst Macau's government 
officials urged depositors to ''have faith and confidence in the financial system of Macau, 
and continue to support the long-term stability and prosperity" of the region,575 there was 
seemingly little else the government could do to instil confidence in the U.S. Treasury 
Department and the international community that it regarded money laundering as a serious 
global issue. 
7.3 The fallout from the designation 
Although the U.S. Treasury Department's proposed rulemaking was not finalised until March 
2007, Banco Delta Asia had already suffered immense reputational and financial damage 
following its September 2005 release. The adverse publicity that accompanied the U.S. 
Treasury Department's proposed rulemaking had stigmatised the bank and significantly 
undermined customer confidence in both its operations, and the safety and security of their 
funds. As is typical in many cases of severe reputational damage,576 this in turn led to an 
erosion of Banco Delta Asia's brand value, a reduction in its deposits, and a decrease in its 
customer base. 
Whilst the proposed rulemaking did not legally compel U.S. financial institutions to cut all 
commercial ties with Banco Delta Asia, it immediately prompted an informal financial 
embargo of the bank; one of the few independent financial institutions left in Macau.577 Less 
than 24 hours after it was deemed to be of ''primary money laundering concern", depositors 
575 Lee, J., 'Macau Calls for Calm in Wake of U.S. Money-Laundering Charge', Radio Free Asia, 17 
September 2005 <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/2005/09/17/Macau bank/> at 10 January 2007. 
576 Klein, A., 'Losses Rise lfReputation is Compromised' (2007) 20(3) Bank Technology News 38. 
577 
'HK PRESS: Macau's Banco Delta Asia Seeking Buyer', The Standard(Hong Kong), 27 February 2006 
<http://asia.news.yahoo.com/060227/5/2ghrt.html> at 4 January 2007. 
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collectively withdrew more than USD$5 million from the institution.578 The bank's 
AMLICTF legal risk had swiftly translated into reputational and financial damage, and 
despite calls for calm from both the bank and the Macau government, the situation only 
escalated. Less than 48 hours after the U.S. Treasury Department accused the bank of 
laundering funds for corrupt North Korean entities, concerned customers had withdrawn 
more than USD$37.5 million (i.e. approximately ten per cent) of the institution's total 
deposits.579 The run on Banco Delta Asia's deposits continued and eventually depleted the 
institution's funds by USD$133 million; about one third of its total deposits.580 It caused the 
bank to borrow USD$62.5 million from the Macau government, and seek additional funds 
~ . h dl h . . 581 trom 1ts parent company to an e t e cns1s. 
The severity and extent of the financial damage suffered by the bank as a result of its 
designation under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, was evident just several months 
later, in the financial reports of its parent company. At the end of the 2005 financial year, the 
Delta Asia Financial Group reported revenues of 182.6 million patacas against 214.3 million 
patacas in expenses, with a negative balance of 31.7 million patacas582 This was in contrast 
to the significant profits made by Banco Delta Asia and the Delta Asia Financial Group 
during the preceding financial year, and the most apparent justification for this notable 
turnaround in the companies' financial standing is the damage they suffered as a result of the 
U.S. Treasury Department's proposed rulemaking.583 
The financial hardship suffered by Banco Delta Asia in the aftermath of its designation was 
not simply attributable to the run on its deposits but also the freezing of several of its 
accounts. Shortly after Macau authorities took control of the bank, they froze approximately 
578 Op cit n545. 
579 Batchelor, M., 'Macau Gets Control of Banco Delta', Bloomberg News, 29 September 2005 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/09/29fhloomberg/sxbanco.php> at I January 2007. 
580 Greenless, D., and Lague, D., 'Trail Led to Macao as Focus of North Korean Corruption', The New York 
Times (New York), 13 April 2007 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/world/asia/13macao.html? r~2&oref~slogin&oref'oslogin> at 16 April 
2007. 
581 Op cit n545. 
582 
'Owning Up: Delta Asia Admits Selling Pyongyang Gold', Macau Business, I January 2007 
<http://www.macaubusiness.com/index.php?id=672> at 28 April 2007. 
583 Delta Asia Financial Group, Delta Asia Financial Group 2004 Annual Report (DAFG, Hong Kong, 
2005). 
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50 accounts held on behalf of North Korean citizens, corporations and government 
entities.584 Collectively, these accounts contained an estimated USD$25 million.585 
The freezing of accounts impacted Banco Delta Asia's North Korean customers, as well as 
its broader customer base. A number of its corporate customers had their accounts frozen 
even though the funds in their accounts were traceable to legitimate business practices. One 
corporate customer; a foreign-operated bank in Pyongyang called Daedong Credit Bank 
(Daedong), had more than USD$6 million frozen at Banco Delta Asia at the behest of the 
U.S. Treasury Department. This was despite the fact that: 
• Daedong's owners could demonstrate that the funds were derived from legitimate 
business dealings in North Korea;586 and 
• of the USD$49 million in cash moved by Daedong through Banco Delta Asia in recent 
years, "only three individual, old $100 bills were labeled as suspect. Not counterfeit, 
only suspect". 587 
For Daedong and a number of Banco Delta Asia's other customers, there were few legal 
avenues they could pursue to have their funds unfrozen. Until the U.S. Treasury Department 
made a final determination regarding Banco Delta Asia's status as a "primary money 
laundering concern", the funds had to remain as they were. 
7.4 All for one and one for all: Unilateral sanctions 
Technically, the U.S. Treasury Department's notice of proposed rulemaking should not, in 
and of itself, have carried the degree of AMLICTF legal risk that it ultimately did. Indeed, 
the notice did not require U.S. financial institutions to cease their commercial dealings with 
Banco Delta Asia. It was simply a public statement putting such institutions on notice that in 
the future, restrictions may be placed upon their activities with the bank. Operationally 
'" Op cit n580. 
585 Chinoy, M., 'Macau Focus of Push on NK Activity', CNN News, 23 July 2006 
<http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcfl05/18/nkorea.Macau/index.html> at 2 January 2007. See also 
Greenless, D., Op cit n550. 
586 Johnson, T., 'Seizure of a Tiny Bank Linked toN. Korea May Soon End', Monterey Herald (Monterey), 8 
March 2007 <http://www.montereyherald.com/mld/montereyheraldlnews/world/16862840.htm> at 12 March 
2007. 
587 Ibid. 
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however, the proposed rulemaking carried significant AMLICTF legal risk and had an 
immediate impact on the willingness of institutions to conduct business with Banco Delta 
Asia. Many institutions treated the notice as a formal, legal prohibition against dealings with 
the bank, and immediately began taking steps to terminate their relationships with Banco 
Delta Asia. 
Several AMLICTF specialists have privately suggested that U.S. institutions started cutting 
all ties to Banco Delta Asia as a defensive or self-protective measure to limit their related 
AMLICTF legal risk. Given the extensive requirements placed upon them with respect to 
their correspondent banking relationships under the USA PATRIOT Act, it is possible that in 
the course of conducting their own due diligence on Banco Delta Asia, a number of U.S. 
institutions learned ofthe bank's dealings with North Korean government entities. If this is 
the case, then it is understandable from a risk mitigation perspective that these institutions 
might have sought to terminate their commercial dealings with Banco Delta Asia as soon as 
the U.S. Treasury Department's notice of proposed rulemaking was published588 
Without any clear evidence to the contrary, both U.S. and foreign financial institutions 
bestowed a de facto legal status upon the notice of proposed rulemaking in an effort to 
mitigate their own legal exposure. Whilst a proposed rulemaking under Section 3I I is neither 
formally binding nor enforceable, it certainly does indicate to institutions that the U.S. 
Treasury Department considers a particular entity/jurisdiction to represent an unacceptably 
high level of MLITF risk. As previously noted in this thesis, AML/CTF regulators and 
institutions operating under risk-based regimes might occasionally have different views on 
the products/channels, customers and jurisdictions representing a particularly pronounced 
MLITF risk. Notices of proposed rulemaking may be considered to partially close the gap 
between public and private sector perceptions of MLITF risk because they provide 
institutions with a clear indication of the level of MLITF risk assigned to a designated entity 
by U.S. regulatory authorities. Therefore, any failure on the part of a U.S. institution to 
address that perceived level of risk- even if not legally required to do so until the relevant 
588 That said, there is no publicly available evidence to support the theory that particular institutions knew of, 
or condoned, the bank's relationships with allegedly corrupt North Korean customers. 
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rulemaking is finalised- may leave that institution exposed to a degree oflegal and 
reputational risk. 
In the aftermath of the U.S. Treasury Department's notice of proposed rulemaking, U.S. 
institutions were not the only entities to sever their commercial ties to Banco Delta Asia. 
Fearing their own exclusion from the U.S. banking system, many foreign financial 
institutions (including Korea Exchange Bank, Bank ofTokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ and Mizuho 
Corporate Bank)589 also ceased their dealings with the bank;590 effectively locking it out of 
USD business and much of the international financial system.591 These institutions set off an 
informal financial embargo of the bank and Macau,592 despite the fact that no U.S. law, 
regulation or rule actually prohibited them (or U.S. institutions for that matter) from 
conducting business with Banco Delta Asia at that time. 593 The deterrent and indirect effects 
of this embargo were arguably as damaging, if not more damaging, than the ruling made by 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury in the first place. 
The fact that many foreign financial institutions chose to voluntarily comply with the notice 
of proposed rulemaking as a matter of course is understandable. Since September II, such 
institutions have increasingly been incorporating the U.S. Treasury's rules and designation 
lists into their own due diligence processes. This is not because they have been strictly 
required to follow the U.S. Treasury Department's directives, but because they have wanted 
to protect their own fiduciary interests594 Though most foreign financial institutions are 
geared towards profit-creation, the past few years have increased the need for them to 
balance their financial goals with their shareholder responsibility to manage commercial 
risks. Foreign institutions that ignore the U.S. Treasury Department's designations and 
5
" Anonymous, Hong Kong Joins Delta Asia's Unhappy Club, Macau Business, I March 2006. Accessed at 
http://www.Macaubusiness.com/index.php?id~402 on 18 January 2007. 
590 Op cit n585. on 2 January 2007. 
591 
'No Sign of Thaw for Delta Asia', Macau Business, I January 2006 
<http://www.Macaubusiness.com/index.php?id=367> at 3 January 2007. 
592 Op cit n580. 
593 Heller Ehrman LLP, Banco Delta Asia has Terminated its North Korean Business and Will Implement a 
JVew Anti-Money Laundering Program (2006) 
<http://www.hellerehrman.com/en/news/press/press 3289.html> at 3 January 2007. 
594 Levitt, M., Pulling Tehran's Purse Stings: Leveraging Sanctions and Market Forces to Alter Iranian 
Behavior (2007) The Washington Institute <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=333> 
at 8 April 2007. 
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proposed rulemakings may find themselves locked out of the U.S. financial system as a 
result of a designation under Section 311 of the USA PATRiOT Act. 
The significant extraterritorial leverage that the U.S. Treasury Department has with respect 
to the activities of foreign institutions595 is cemented by the dominance of the U.S. in the 
international financial system. Whilst the U.S. remains at the core of the global economy, 
any institution seeking to conduct business internationally must be able to conduct 
transactions in USD. It follows that any jurisdiction seeking to protect (or indeed, grow) its 
economy must ensure that its financial institutions can access the U.S. financial system. 
Evidently, this is what a number of jurisdictions sought to do following the release of the 
U.S. Treasury Department's notice of proposed rulemaking. Shortly after Banco Delta Asia's 
initial designation as a "primary money laundering concern" under Section 311, a number of 
foreign FlUs (including the Hong Kong Monetary Authority) requested that all their local 
banks formally report any relationship they had with the bank.596 
Some foreign regulatory bodies and FlUs were slightly less direct in their guidance to 
financial institutions. For instance, Australia's AMLICTF regulator and FlU, AUSTRAC, 
released an Information Circular: 
• informing Australian financial institutions of Banco Delta Asia's designation; 
• giving such institutions access to the U.S. Treasury Department's related advisory; and 
perhaps most importantly 
• informing them that they should take the U.S. government's advisory into account when 
"considering whether particular transactions should be reported to A USTRAC as 
suspicious". 597 
Whilst the Information Circular did not instruct Australian institutions that transactions 
involving Banco Delta Asia or Macau should be regarded as suspicious, in practical terms it 
is likely to have had such an effect. As with the U.S. Treasury Department's advisory and its 
595 Ibid. 
596 Op cit n566. 
597 Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, AUSTRAC lnfonnation Circular No. 45- U.S. 
Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)- Advisory Regarding North 
Korea (2006) <http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/aic 45 fincen advisory regarding north korea.pdf> at 27 
January 2009. 
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non-binding notice of proposed rulemaking, the Information Circular explicitly 
communicated to institutions the fact that AUSTRAC may be inclined to attach a higher level 
ofMLITF risk to dealings with the Macau bank, or Macau more generally. 
7.5 PATRIOT Act politics 
Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act has typically been characterised as a legal shield; an 
administrative procedure that can be used by the U.S. Treasury Department to protect the 
U.S. financial system from significant money laundering threats. However, the action taken 
against Banco Delta Asia demonstrates that whilst it may have initially been designed as a 
defensive measure, Section 311 is nevertheless capable of being wielded as a political sword 
for the purposes of attacking financial institutions and jurisdictions. This is particularly 
apparent when the events surrounding the bank's designation are viewed in terms of the 
political environment within which they occurred. 
Whilst Banco Delta Asia's activities had allegedly been under the watchful gaze of several 
U.S. government agencies (including the U.S. Secret Service) since 1994,598 scrutiny of the 
bank's practices seemingly increased as the U.S. government intensified its efforts against 
North Korea. During 2005, the U.S. ushered in a political campaign that sought to curb 
North Korea's illicit activities by cutting off the country's access to foreign financial 
institutions and the international banking system.599 As this campaign gained greater 
momentum, so too did the regulatory and commercial pressure placed upon Banco Delta 
Asia. 
598 At this time, several officials of Zokwang Trading Co., a Macau firm run by North Koreans, were arrested 
by Macau police on suspicion of attempting to pass a large number of counterfeit U.S. bills. Some of these 
bills were later traced to Banco Delta Asia. 
599 Gertz, B., 'U.S. Sanctions Cost North Korea Millions', The Washing/on 7/mes (Washington D.C.), 16 
June 2006 <http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20060615-105145-9374r.htm> at 18 January 2007. 
See also Chinoy, M., Op cit n585. 
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7.5.1 The involvement of North Korea 
At the time the U.S. Treasury Department published its notice of proposed rulemaking under 
Section 311, the U.S. and North Korea had long been embroiled in a dispute regarding North 
Korea's nuclear program and alleged criminal activities.600 Interestingly however, Banco 
Delta Asia's designation occurred just as the U.S. had commenced delicate multilateral 
negotiations (the six-party talks)601 in relation to North Korea's nuclear weapons 
development program.602 This timing raises some suspicion about whether the bank simply 
became a victim of a strategic game of'cat and mouse' led by the U.S. and intended to 
isolate North Korea throughout the nuclear negotiations.603 
As previously discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, since the events of September II the 
U.S. government has increasingly used economic sanctions and other financial measures to 
degrade the "ability of state sponsors of terror and [weapons] proliferators to access the 
international and U.S. financial system". 604 In recent years, the U.S. has demonstrated a 
heightened interest in combating nuclear proliferation by: 
• taking steps to implement UNSCRs 1540, 1695, 1718, 1737 and 1747; 
• encouraging other jurisdictions to implement activity-based financial prohibitions 
against countries with nuclear programs; and 
• designating ten individuals and entities as supporters of North Korea's missile and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction programs. 
The FA TF has generally supported and supplemented these actions by adding nuclear 
proliferation financing to its focus of attention, developing a study on the trends and 
600 
'Macau Bank drops North Korean Clients', BBC News, 16 February 2006 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/4718922.stm> at 2 January 2007. 
601 These negotiations were referred to as the "six-party talks" because they involved six jurisdictions; North 
Korea, China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States. 
602 Simpson, G.R., Fairclough, G., and Solomon, J., 'U.S. Probes Banks' North Korea Ties', The Wall Street 
Journal (New York), 8 September 2005, A.3. 
603 Op cit n59J. 
604 Glaser, D., and Szubin, A.J., 'Isolating Proliferators and Sponsors of Terror: The Use of Sanctions and the 
International Financial System to Change Regime Behavior' (Joint Testimony before the Joint Hearing of the 
Terrorism, Non-proliferation & Trade Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee & the 
Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade & Technology Subcommittee of the House Financial 
Services Committee, !lOth Congress, 18 April2007). 
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techniques associated with proliferation financing activities, 605 and releasing guidance on the 
implementation of relevant UNSCRs.606 
The timing of Banco Delta Asia's designation suggests that the U.S. Treasury Department's 
notice of proposed rulemaking was not intended to safeguard the U.S. financial system but 
rather, was fundamentally designed to weaken North Korea's negotiation powers in the lead-
up to the six-party talks. As at September 2005, Banco Delta Asia was one of the few 
remaining institutions providing banking services to North Korean government entities. As a 
result, the notice of proposed rulemaking not only placed significant pressure on the Macau 
bank to cease dealing with North Korea, but also prompted a number of foreign financial 
institutions to do the same.607 According to one of the U.S. Treasury Department's senior 
officials, Banco Delta Asia's designation as a ''primary money laundering concern" was 
essentially a "shot heard round the world for national bankers who cut off relations with 
North Korea,fearing that something like what happened to [the Macau bank} could happen 
to them"608 In practical terms, Banco Delta Asia's designation dismantled North Korea's 
financial flows and cut off one of the impoverished country's few remaining lifelines to the 
international banking system.609 
If the U.S. Treasury Department's ultimate goal was to exert financial pressure on North 
Korea in the lead-up to the six-party talks, it succeeded- if not a little too spectacularly. The 
implications of its notice of proposed rulemaking affected North Korea so greatly that the 
country blatantly refused to join the nuclear negotiations until the financial constraints upon 
Banco Delta Asia were removed. Whilst this ultimatum may have been designed to stall 
North Korea's participation in the six-party talks, it had negative repercussions for the bank. 
At the very least, it further blackened Banco Delta Asia's reputation by validating that the 
605 Sassoon, J., 'Chainnan's Address' (Paper delivered at the Financial Action Task Force, Paris Plenary, 12 
October 2007) 3 <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/0/23/39485130.pdt> at 5 February 2008. 
606 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Advisory: Guidance to Financial Institutions on the Increasing 
Money Laundering Threat Involving Illicit Iranian Activity, FIN-2007-AOOl, 16 October 2007. Accessed at 
http://www .fincen.gov/guidance fi increasing mit iranian.pdf on 5 February 2008. 
607 Op cit n600. 
608 McGlynn, J., Banco Delta Asia, North Korea's F'rozen Funds and US Undermining oft he Six-Party 
Talks: Obstacles to a Solution. Part III (2007) Japan Focus <http://www.japanfocus.org/-John-
McGiynn/2446> at 5 May 2009. 
609 Op cit n546. 
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steps taken against it by the U.S. government were having a material affect upon North 
Korea. 
To convince the traditionally intransigent North Korea to rejoin the stalled six-party talks, 
the U.S. government agreed to explore the possibility of removing the financial constraints it 
had placed upon Banco Delta Asia.61° Following this, the nuclear negotiations again resumed 
until North Korea demanded that the USD$25 million it had frozen in accounts at Banco 
Delta Asia, be unfrozen and deposited into an account held at the North Korean Foreign 
Trade Bank61 1 This could not occur until such time as U.S. authorities made a final 
determination with respect to Banco Delta Asia's alleged activities. Thus, in an effort to 
further progress the discussions around North Korea's nuclear program, the U.S. government 
agreed to swiftly conclude its investigation into Banco Delta Asia's alleged money 
laundering activities. Whilst the investigation had previously proceeded at a relatively 
sluggish pace for the preceding 18 months, it was completed less than one month after the 
U.S. government's agreement with North Korea. 
Shortly after the conclusion of its investigation, the U.S. Treasury Department finalised its 
proposed rulemaking on 14 March 2007. In doing so, it cleared the way for North Korea to 
reclaim its frozen funds and gave Macau authorities the power to determine whether to 
release those funds. However, whilst the finalisation of the rulemaking technically 
rendered the MAM responsible for deciding whether to release the frozen funds to its 
North Korean customers, its ability to make such a decision impartially was undermined by 
the U.S. government. Even before any such determination could be made by the MAM, the 
U.S. Department of State had already assured North Korean officials that the funds would 
be transferred to a North Korean-owned account held at the Bank of China. 
Given the agreement between the U.S. and North Korean governments, it is highly 
debateable whether the Macau authorities ever had any real discretion regarding the release 
61° Cody, E., 'U.S. Says Macau to Release $25M in Frozen N. Korean Funds', The Washington Post 
(Washington D.C.), I 0 April 2007 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/04/l 0/ AR2007041 000165.html?hpid-moreheadlines> at 17 April 2007. 
611 United States Department ofthe Treasury, Statement by DAS Glaser on the Disposition of DPRK-Related 
Funds Frozen at Banco Della Asia (Press Release, 19 March 2007). 
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of the frozen funds. North Korea had already declared that it would not shut its main 
nuclear reactor until the frozen funds were released,612 and the MAM would have been 
acutely aware of the fact that any delay in returning the USD$25million may have derailed 
the six-party talks and further aggravated the situation between Macau and the U.S.613 By 
that stage, the Macau government already understood first-hand just how much damage 
could be suffered by jurisdictions seen to be non-cooperative in the U.S.-led war on terror. 
At the time of finalising the proposed rule against Banco Delta Asia, the U.S. Treasury 
Department stressed its ability to review and rescind the special measure prohibiting U.S. 
institutions from maintaining correspondent or interbank accounts on behalf of the bank.614 
Given that the U.S. government had already beaten Macau and Banco Delta Asia with a very 
big 'stick' before dangling an equally big 'carrot' in front of them, it is understandable that 
Macau officials decided to release the frozen funds to North Korea. Strategically, freeing up 
those funds would enable the MAM to pacify the U.S. government, minimise its reputational 
damage, and lessen its ongoing AML/CTF legal risk. 
7.5.2 A trial with a jury (but without evidence) 
By making certain allegations against Banco Delta Asia, the U.S. government was clearly 
able to place significant economic pressure upon North Korea in the lead-up to delicate 
nuclear negotiations. As noted earlier, this calls into question whether the U.S. government 
made unverified or exaggerated claims against the bank in order to strain North Korea's 
finances and freeze more than USD$25 million in its accounts.615 Suspicions regarding the 
U.S. Treasury Department's motives are merely bolstered by the timing of the six-party 
talks, the apparent lack of evidence supporting its allegations, and the fact that two 
612 
"China says it Regrets US Treasury Decision on N. Korea', CNN News. 15 March 2007 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2007 /WORLD/asiapcf/03115/china.macau.bank.reut/index.html> at 20 March 2007. 
613 Lague, D., 'Macao Set to Resolve North Korea Snag, U.S. Says', The New York Times (New York), II 
April2007 <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/ll/world/asia/llkorea.html> at 17 April 2007. 
614 The U.S. Treasury indicated that this would perhaps be the case where Banco Delta Asia took further 
remedial steps to change its business methods, and was brought under the long-term control of responsible 
management and ownership. 
615 Landay, J.S., and Hall, K.G., 'U.S. Claims about Macau Bank Questioned', The Seattle Times (Seattle), 2 
March 2007 <http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-
bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug~nkorea02&date~20070302> at 12 March 2007. 
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subsequent investigations into the bank's activities failed to find any evidence that it 
laundered money for North Korean customers. 
Within days of the release of the U.S. Treasury Department's notice of proposed rulemaking 
in September 2005, the Macau government engaged international accounting firm Ernst & 
Young to investigate Banco Delta Asia's supposed activities. At the conclusion of that 
investigation, Ernst & Young criticised the bank's internal record keeping procedures, poor 
information technology systems and lack of written AML policies, but held that it could find 
no evidence of the bank laundering money for North Korean government agencies or front 
companies.616 Another investigation carried out by the Macau Government confirmed this 
finding and was also unable to identify any evidence of criminal misconduct by Banco Delta 
Asia or its employees. 
Regardless of the findings (or lack thereof) stemming from these two external investigations 
however, the U.S. Treasury Department has continued to stand by its original allegations 
against Banco Delta Asia. Without mentioning either investigation into the bank's dealings, 
officials from the U.S. Treasury Department have declared that their own 18-month 
investigation confirmed Banco Delta Asia's alleged "willingness to turn a blind eye to illicit 
activity, notably by its North Korea-related clients"611 However, U.S. authorities have never 
publicly provided further evidence to substantiate this assertion. 
7.5.3 Justification for the lack of evidence 
Whilst the U.S. Treasury Department has continually held that Banco Delta Asia is of 
"primary money laundering concern", it has garnered little evidence to support its claims. 
To this day, the results of the U.S. Treasury Department's extensive 18-month investigation 
into Banco Delta Asia remain confidential. The Macau institution has never been given an 
616 Hall, K.G., 'Accounting Firm Finds No Evidence of Money Laundering', McClatchy Newspapers 
(Sacramento), I March 2007 <http://www .realcities.com/mld/krwashington/ 1681223l.htm> at 12 March 
2007. 
617 
'Treasury Bars Deals with Macau's Banco Delta', CNN News, 14 March 2007 
<http://money.cnn.com/2007 /03/14/news/international/macau.reut/index.htm?postversion=200703 1417> at 
20 March 2007. 
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opportunity to see, let alone evaluate or challenge, the evidence used to justify its designation 
under Section 311.618 However, this is not particularly unusual for an action taken under 
Section 311. Given that many designations under that Section have been hinged upon 
classified information, institutions deemed to be of ''primary money laundering concern" 
have generally been denied access to, and an ability to refute, the alleged evidence against 
them. 
What makes the situation with respect to Banco Delta Asia so troubling is that the U.S. 
Treasury Department has not only refused to release any incriminating evidence it has about 
the bank to the public, but also to present any such evidence to U.S. Congress- in either an 
open or closed session of one of its oversight committees.619 This has prompted some 
commentators to speculate that in the course of making the bank the subject of a Section 311 
designation, the U.S. government simply conducted a 'kangaroo court', with its "verdict 
being justified retrospectively through a drip feed of innuendo and speculation that would be 
considered scandalous and defamatory were it directed against a bigger bank in a more 
powerful jurisdiction". 620 
Arguably, the U.S. Treasury Department's evasiveness regarding the justification for its 
proposed and final rules makes Banco Delta Asia's designation appear more like part of a 
political campaign than any substantive regulatory action. It also raises questions around 
whether the U.S. government's refusal to provide evidence of the bank's alleged activities is 
fair or just, considering the financial and reputational damage suffered by the institution in 
the aftermath of the proposed rulemaking. 
Nowhere does the USA PATRIOT Act require the U.S. government to formally unveil any 
evidence it has to support an action taken against a foreign financial institution under 
Section 311. Thus, despite any perception of unfairness towards Banco Delta Asia, the U.S. 
Treasury Department has acted within its legal rights when refusing to present evidence 
supporting the bank's designation. Due to the foreign nature of the threats covered by 
618 Op cit n553. 
619 Op cit n559. 
620 Op cit n591. 
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Section 311, the evidence underpinning a designation may be comprised of sensitive 
intelligence that is classified and protected from public disclosure. Accordingly, the U.S. 
Treasury Department was entitled to deem Banco Delta Asia a "primary money laundering 
concern" without furnishing any evidence to substantiate its accusations. 
The issue over how much evidence, if any, should be provided with respect to allegations 
made against a designated institution, is an interesting one. As already established, 
Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act effectively enables the U.S. Treasury Department to 
'defame' a foreign entity or jurisdiction without publicly presenting any supporting evidence. 
It legally empowers the U.S. government to punish and reprimand any foreign institution of 
its choosing, and simply hide behind an opaque veil of 'national security' to prevent the 
subjects of its designations from formally contesting their status as a ''primary money 
laundering concern". 
That said, given that money laundering relies upon the creation of transactional veils of 
anonymity, perhaps the withholding of evidence is simply a way for the U.S. Treasury 
Department to 'fight fire with fire' so to speak; addressing money laundering using one of its 
key elements- secrecy. It may be argued that presenting comprehensive evidence in support 
of a designation or proposed rule could actually weaken the U.S. government's ability to 
combat money laundering and terrorism financing abroad. Sharing intelligence with respect 
to an institution's illicit activities could enable other entities to modify their money 
laundering methods in order to evade similar detection. 
Conversely however, it may be contended that publicly releasing such intelligence will only 
strengthen the U.S. Treasury Department's ability to combat financial crime. As evidenced 
by the various typologies released by national regulators and international bodies such as the 
FA TF, one of the most effective tools in the fight against money laundering is knowledge 
about its existence and the ways it may be facilitated. Whilst the provision of evidence may 
enable some institutions to reengineer their money laundering methods, it may allow many 
more to appropriately refine their AMLICTF detection scenarios, strengthen their transaction 
monitoring capabilities and improve their staff training. 
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Regardless of the various arguments regarding whether or not the U.S. Treasury Department 
should provide evidence to justify a foreign financial institution's designation under the USA 
PATRIOT Act, there has been a growing push for the U.S. government to publicly release 
evidence of Banco Delta Asia's allegedly illicit dealings. However, even if it were now to 
release its evidence against the bank and, as anticipated by Macau officials and Banco Delta 
Asia's management, such evidence was deemed to be fabricated or flawed, it is questionable 
what this would achieve- beyond perhaps assisting the bank to claim a moral victory and 
rebuild some of its diminished credibility. Much ofthe damage suffered by Banco Delta Asia 
occurred in the immediate aftermath of its designation. 
As perception is generally considered to be reality in today's commercial environment, the 
lack of evidence provided by the U.S. Treasury Department around its notice of proposed 
rulemaking, did not prevent the Macau bank from incurring a run on its deposits, or suffering 
significant reputational and financial damage. The mere suggestion that Banco Delta Asia 
had laundered money for North Korea was enough to blacken its name and empty its 
accounts. Any evidence to the contrary now would do little, if anything, to recoup the losses 
already sustained by the Macau institution. 
7.5.4 Banco Delta Asia's legal position 
Whilst a spokesperson for the U.S. Treasury Department has claimed that accused 
institutions have rights and maintain the ability to challenge any action taken against them 
under Section 311,611 this only appears to be true in theory as opposed to in practice. Two 
years after the U.S. Treasury Department finalised its proposed rulemaking, the legal 
wrangling around Banco Delta Asia's designation and the release of any supporting material 
retained by the U.S. government, continues. Shortly after the final rule was codified, legal 
representatives for both Banco Delta Asia and its parent company submitted petitions to the 
U.S. Treasury Department claiming that the final rule was "arbitrary and capricious", and 
demanding that it be "rescinded immediately". 622 However, the arguments underpinning 
these petitions remain almost as shrouded in secrecy as the U.S. Treasury Department's 
621 Op cit n553. 
622 Op cit n559. 
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supposed evidence. The full contents of the petitions have never been formally released and 
those members of the public seeking to access them must file a Freedom of Information 
request in the U.S. 
Whilst it is uncertain whether the U.S. Treasury Department has ever formally responded to 
the petitions, Banco Delta Asia still appears to have one primary legal avenue open to it. 
Whilst it cannot pursue damages for the reputational and financial damage it sustained 
following its designation, the bank can file a suit in a U.S. Federal Court seeking the removal 
of the final rule on both substantive and legal grounds. In accordance with its petition, the 
bank could theoretically contend that the imposition of the special measure was "arbitrary 
and capricious". Further, it could argue that the U.S. Treasury Department did not have 
reasonable grounds under Section 311 to conclude that it was a "primary money laundering 
concern". 623 
However, despite the technical availability of this legal avenue, it is debateable whether 
Banco Delta Asia could ever succeed with such an action. This is particularly so, given that 
the bank's legal representatives are unlikely to be given full access to the U.S. government's 
alleged evidence. The U.S. Treasury Department's 18-month investigation into the 
institution was heavily reliant upon classified sources, and according to a footnote 
accompanying the final rule, "[c}lassified information used in support of a [Section 311 
designation} and imposition of special measure(s) may be submitted by Treasury to a 
reviewing court ex parte and in camera". Thus, in any court proceedings, the U.S. 
government could potentially present its evidence behind closed doors, depriving Banco 
Delta Asia of the opportunity to hear the evidence against it.624 
Banco Delta Asia cannot take any decision about the initiation of legal proceedings lightly. 
There is no guarantee that such proceedings would be successful, and there is every 
probability that they would be costly, resource intensive and further damaging to the bank's 
reputation. Considering that no foreign institution has ever been successful in seeking to 
623 Ibid. 
624 Ibid. 
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have a final rule rescinded by the U.S. Treasury Department, the institution may consider its 
legal options and determine that the best way to mitigate its ongoing legal, financial and 
reputational risk is in fact not to formally contest the rulemaking through the U.S. legal 
system. 
7.6 Risk implications 
Banco Delta Asia's designation as a "primary money laundering concern" under 
Section 311 of the USA P ARTIOT Act illustrates the significant AMLICTF legal risk faced 
by institutions with supposed ties to customers and/or jurisdictions considered by the U.S. 
government to be conducting illicit activities. It also showcases the significant financial loss 
and reputational damage that may stem from the imposition of a special measure under U.S. 
extraterritorial AMLICTF laws. Whilst an institution's AMLICTF legal risk typically hinges 
upon formal legal proceedings, fact-finding exercises, the provision of supporting evidence 
and formal judgments, Banco Delta Asia's designation demonstrates the extent to which it 
may arise in isolation from these factors; instead being determined by political agendas and 
international relations. 
The case highlights how an institution that is never sent to trial for money laundering 
offences, can nevertheless be tried and convicted of such offences in the courts of public 
opinion. The U.S. Treasury Department's claims that Banco Delta Asia laundered money on 
behalf of North Korean agencies and front companies, were sufficient to cause the bank 
significant reputational and financial damage. Although unsupported by publicly available 
evidence, they caused an extensive run on the bank's deposits and prompted its customers to 
empty their accounts. Essentially, the U.S. Treasury Department's allegations saw Banco 
Delta Asia publicly convicted of money laundering- even though the bank never had an 
opportunity to see the evidence against it or defend itself in the course of formal legal 
proceedings. 
Banco Delta Asia also demonstrates the way in which an institution's size and AMLICTF 
legal risk may be inversely proportionate. According to a former official of the U.S. 
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Department of State, despite the fact that the U.S. Treasury Department had evidence that 
several Macau institutions had laundered counterfeit funds for North Korean entities, Banco 
Delta Asia proved to be an easy target for the imposition of a special measure.625 The bank 
was large and important enough to have an impact on North Korea's financial flows, but not 
so large and important that its blacklisting or failure would cause excessive damage to 
Macau's financial system or create significant political tension between the U.S. and 
China.626 lfthis is correct, then it may be that the size of Banco Delta Asia's operations left it 
exposed to a greater level of AMLICTF legal risk than other institutions with a more notable 
presence in Macau's financial system and/or international commerce. 
In addition to its teachings on the potential relationship between an institution's size and its 
level of AMLICTF risk, Banco Delta Asia provides a striking example ofthe various 
ramifications that may stem from an institution's alleged involvement in money laundering 
activities and/or on-boarding of customers deemed by the U.S. to be undesirable. It also 
proves that an institution can survive the imposition of the harshest sanction under U.S. 
extraterritorial AML/CTF legislation. Despite having its reputation shredded and its deposits 
withdrawn following its designation as a "primary money laundering concern" in September 
2005, Banco Delta Asia is still -years later- operational in Macau. Whilst it may not have 
the extensive network of correspondent banking relationships that it once did, the fact that it 
still provides banking services to customers, demonstrates that an institution may recover 
from even the most strenuous attack on its credibility. It also undermines the common claims 
that an institution believed to be involved in money laundering activities may face 
irreparable damage and, in severe cases, closure. Banco Delta Asia has survived the 
imposition of one of the most extreme extraterritorial sanctions; namely, exclusion from 
USD business and the U.S. financial system. 
Whilst illustrating the practical operation of a bank's legal, financial and reputational risk, 
the events surrounding Banco Delta Asia's designation illustrate the systemic risk that may 
625 Op cit n559. 
626 Greenlees, D., and Lague, D., 'The Money Trail That Linked North Korea to Macao', The New York 
Times (New York). II April2007 <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/ll/world/asia/llcnd-macao.html> at 5 
July 2008. 
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emanate from an institution's dealings with supposedly tainted funds and/or jurisdictions 
considered to represent an unacceptably high level of MLITF risk. Almost 18 months after 
the U.S. Treasury Department's notice of proposed rulemaking, HSBC found itself the 
subject of unflattering media reports after sources revealed that it had been responsible for 
screening all the large cash deposits made by Banco Delta Asia's North Korean customers. 
In early 2007, a lawyer for Banco Delta Asia told U.S. investigators that HSBC's New York 
branch analysed all wholesale USD deposits for the bank before they were credited to 
depositors' accounts.627 As Banco Delta Asia did not have the technology necessary to 
screen large batches of U.S. currency for fake bills, it relied upon HSBC's sophisticated 
processing technology to identify any counterfeit funds entering its accounts 628 However, 
whilst it has never denied screening the suspect North Korean funds for Banco Delta Asia, 
HSBC has never been reprimanded- formally or inforrnally- by the U.S. Treasury 
Department. Even if it had incurred similar financial and reputational consequences to Banco 
Delta Asia, it is highly unlikely to have felt them considering its size, the scope of its 
international operations, and the profits enshrined in its balance sheets. 
Nevertheless, the fact that HSBC screened all wholesale USD cash deposits for Banco Delta 
Asia strongly supports the view that the U.S. government's case against the Macau 
institution is weak. It not only raises concerns regarding the potential unreasonableness of 
the bank's designation as a ''primary money laundering concern", but brings into sharp 
focus the unaccountability of the U.S. government in the broader international fight against 
money laundering. 
7.6.1 Risk management for institutions 
In terrns of risk management, it is unclear exactly what Banco Delta Asia could have done to 
avert, or even better mitigate, the fallout arising from its dealings with North Korean entities. 
Unlike Riggs Bank and other institutions found to be in breach of their AMLICTF legislative 
627 Courtenay, A., 'HSBC Screened N Korean Assets for Macau Bank' (2007) 14 Money Laundering 
Intelligence 4. 
628 Op cit n615. 
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obligations, there were few risk mitigation tools available to Banco Delta Asia. Given the 
expansive construction of Section 3 I I and the fact that designations under that Section do 
not entail or require fonnallegal proceedings, many of the risk management techniques 
detailed in Chapter 5 of this thesis have not been available to the bank. Given the absence of 
formal legal proceedings, it could not self-report its allegedly suspect customer transactions 
to U.S. authorities (and indeed, it was under no obligation to), seek a deferred or non-
prosecution agreement, or deflect its liability by mounting a legally recognised defence. The 
action taken against Banco Delta Asia under the USA PATRIOT Act was virtually 
incontestable; shrouded in secrecy and backed by one of the most powerful governments in 
the world. 
Not all of the four traditional risk management strategies could have been effectively used by 
the bank to safeguard its reputation, deposit base and commercial standing. Risk avoidance 
might have been a financially viable option for Banco Delta Asia if, as held by some of its 
representatives, the relevant North Korean accounts only constituted three per cent of its total 
business. Whilst losing that percentage of its funds is likely to have been undesirable for any 
bank, for a small, family-owned institution such as Banco Delta Asia, three per cent of its 
total business is clearly far less than the financial damage it ultimately sustained as a result of 
its designation as a "primary money laundering concern". 
That said, given that the U.S. government supposedly knew of the bank's long-standing 
relationship with North Korea for more than 20 years before publishing its notice of 
proposed rulemaking in September 2005, Banco Delta Asia is unlikely to have believed that 
the adoption of a risk avoidance strategy- and the consequent termination of its commercial 
ties to North Korea- was necessary. This is apparent considering that Banco Delta Asia had 
only encountered one instance of counterfeit U.S. currency prior to its designation. That was 
in 1994, when the bank identified two deposits of counterfeit U.S. currency and immediately 
infonned the Macau police and the MAM of its suspicions regarding the legitimacy of the 
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funds. Its proactive reporting led to criminal charges being laid against the relevant account 
holders, and Banco Delta Asia never suffered any repercussions as a result of the incident.629 
Although the adoption of a risk acceptance strategy might have sounded like an 
inappropriate option for Banco Delta Asia, this is seemingly the approach taken by the bank. 
For several decades, the bank continued to accept customers domiciled in North Korea- a 
jurisdiction fiercely at odds with the U.S. over a range of domestic and international issues. 
Whilst the U.S. government may have known of this fact for many years before designating 
Banco Delta Asia a ""primary money laundering concern", the significant financial and 
reputational damage stemming from that designation demonstrates that the adoption of a risk 
acceptance strategy left the institution exposed to a number of risks, and related 
consequences. 
Whilst Banco Delta Asia's employment of a risk acceptance strategy was likely to be 
unintentional and inadvertent (arguably, the institution never appreciated the risks it was 
accepting in the first place), so too was its partial adoption of a risk transfer strategy. By 
engaging HSBC New York to screen all large cash deposits received from its North Korean 
customers, Banco Delta Asia was able to transfer some of the MLITF risk inherent in its 
business dealings with North Korean customers. Whilst the bank's decision to outsource its 
deposit screening functions was most likely a commercial decision driven by a lack of 
technological capability rather than any risk management concerns, its practical effect was to 
transfer a degree of AMLICTF legal risk to HSBC New York. Though it ultimately did not 
spare Banco Delta Asia from becoming the subject of a designation under Section 311, the 
revelation that HSBC New York actually vetted the suspect deposits should have lessened-
at least theoretically- some of the fierce criticism previously shouldered by Banco Delta 
Asia. 
Given the limitations of a risk transfer strategy, Banco Delta Asia may have supplemented its 
risk transfer activities with a number of controls designed to mitigate its AMLICTF legal risk 
629 It should be noted however, that this situation occurred prior to September 1 1 and before AML/CTF 
issues were thrust upon the global stage and elevated in terms of their importance to U.S. national security. 
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under U.S. extraterritorial AMLICTF legislation. Whilst two investigations into the bank's 
dealings have failed to identify any evidence that it laundered money for North Korean 
government entities or front companies, they have highlighted ways in which the bank could 
have better managed its MLITF risk through the implementation of tighter AMLICTF 
controls. For instance, the bank could have mitigated its MLITF risk exposure by improving 
its transaction monitoring capabilities, conducting enhanced due diligence on its North 
Korean customers, and implementing a more effective AMLICTF program. 
However, despite the AMLICTF controls and risk management strategies ultimately 
employed by Banco Delta Asia, the bank's designation might have arisen irrespective of the 
additional safeguards it implemented. Due to the political context and environment within 
which the designation occurred, employing stronger AML/CTF controls may have ultimately 
made little difference to the detriment inevitably suffered by the institution. If, as believed by 
many commentators, Banco Delta Asia was simply "a pawn on the chessboard of {the six-
party] talks ",630 it is unlikely that any risk management strategy would have been capable of 
sparing the bank from its designation and the notice of proposed rulemaking issued by the 
U.S. Treasury Department in September 2005. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Banco Delta Asia's designation as a "primary money laundering concern" under Section 
311 ofthe USA PATRIOT Act, demonstrates the way in which business, politics, state-
sponsored crime and AMLICTF legislation may intersect on the global stage. It highlights 
the fact that an institution's AMLICTF legal risk is not limited by geographic borders or the 
confines of domestic AMLICTF legislation. Such risk may also arise as a result of 
extraterritorial laws, the activities of foreign AMLICTF regulators and even, on occasion, 
political tensions between foreign jurisdictions. 
Section 311(c)(2)(B) explicitly states that the purpose of Section 311 is to "guard against 
international money laundering and other financial crimes". However, whilst the special 
630 Op cit n546. 
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measures enshrined in the USA PATRIOT Act may be intended to provide the U.S. 
government with an economic shield that can be used to protect the country's financial 
system, their invocation in relation to Banco Delta Asia suggests that they may also be used 
as a political sword to pursue the government's international agenda. Given the relative 
timing of Banco Delta Asia's designation and the commencement of the six-party talks, it 
may be contended that the U.S. Treasury Department ostensibly used Section 311 to weaken 
North Korea's bargaining power in the lead-up to the delicate nuclear negotiations. The 
bank's designation and the publication of a proposed rulemaking had undeniable financial 
consequences for North Korea at a time when greater financial stability would have enabled 
the typically intransigent country to resist the U.S. government's persistent attempts to shut 
down its nuclear program. 
Thus, although the U.S. Treasury Department has repeatedly claimed that Banco Delta Asia 
represents an unacceptable money laundering risk, some commentators have questioned 
whether its designation is solely attributable to the U.S. government's concerns about 
"Macau, Macau's government, China, the Chinese government and their complicity and 
their accommodative behavior toward North Korea's illegal activities, proliferation 
activities and leadership financial activities"631 lfthis is indeed the case, the U.S. Treasury 
Department's actions under the USA PATRIOT Act might have somewhat undermined 
international AMLICTF efforts. By politicising AML and taking actions that may be viewed 
as an abuse of power (even if such actions fall within the boundaries of municipal U.S. 
legislation), support for U.S. enforcement proceedings and AMLICTF activities may 
diminish amongst other foreign governments. If it appears that the U.S. government and U.S. 
regulatory authorities are enforcing their AMLICTF laws selectively and according to the 
political climate at any point in time, foreign officials may believe that their own AMLICTF 
efforts are potentially powerless to prevent their country/financial institutions from feeling 
the wrath of a Section 311 designation. 
In the event that Banco Delta Asia simply became an unwitting pawn in the U.S. 
government's strategy to fight the war on terror via corporate balance sheets, it is likely to 
631 Op cit n580. 
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have been inconsequential what risk management strategy/strategies the institution employed 
with respect to its AMLICTF legal risk under the USA PATRIOT Act. Its inherent ability to 
identify, mitigate and manage its ongoing risk would have always been constrained by the 
U.S. government's political imperatives and international influence. Even if the bank had 
previously implemented an AMLICTF program, it may nevertheless been deemed a 
"primary money laundering concern" under Section 311. 
The case of Banco Delta Asia illustrates that whilst institutions can design and employ 
elaborate risk management tools and strategies, these will generally be unable to anticipate or 
counter strong external forces such as foreign politics and international relations. Where a 
powerful, foreign government decides to declare, retrospectively, that an institution has 
engaged in questionable business practices and/or otherwise dealt with undesirable 
customers, the institution will generally be powerless to defend itself. As the case of Banco 
Delta Asia demonstrates, no risk management tool or strategy-will ever be capable of entirely 
safeguarding an institution against potential reputational damage, particularly in 
circumstances where members ofthe global community are willing to accept something for 
which they have no hard evidence. 
As opposed to many other recent, high profile cases of corporate money laundering, there is 
a distinct lack of transparency with respect to Banco Delta Asia's designation, and the 
apparent activities leading to that designation. There is surprisingly little documentation 
available to the public in relation to those factors identified by the U.S. Treasury Department 
as rendering the bank a "primary money laundering concern··. However, in addition to the 
lack of supporting evidence provided by the U.S. Treasury Department, the MAM has also 
offered little information in relation to its subsequent reviews of Banco Delta Asia's dealings 
with North Korean customers. Both the MAM's 2005 and 2006 annual reports fail to 
mention the bank or the actions taken against it by the U.S. Treasury Department. This is 
despite the size of Macau's economy, the limited number of independent financial 
institutions operating there, and the fact that the U.S. Treasury Department's actions against 
Banco Delta Asia would have created one of the most pressing international regulatory 
issues for the MAM in recent times, if not ever. 
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In the absence of publicly available, incriminating evidence with respect to its alleged money 
laundering activities, Banco Delta Asia was seemingly convicted of such activities by 
members of the international community willing to accept the U.S. Treasury Department's 
claims without question. Evidently, the U.S. government has an unparalleled ability to enact 
municipal orders that are so sweeping in scope that they ultimately translate into informal 
international sanctions. The run on Banco Delta Asia's deposits and the termination of many 
of its correspondent banking relationships occurred because the U.S. Treasury Department's 
notice of proposed rulemaking assumed a de facto legal standing beyond U.S. borders. 
Though not legally bound to do so, many foreign financial institutions promptly cut 
commercial ties to, and many foreign AMLICTF regulators discouraged dealings with, the 
Macau bank. 
As a result, Banco Delta Asia suffered significant reputational and financial damage in the 
aftermath of its designation under Section 311. As a result of the U.S. Treasury Department's 
unsupported accusations and innuendos, the bank lost a significant number of its customers, 
deposits and commercial relationships. Nevertheless, it should be noted that two years after 
the U.S. Treasury Department finalised its rulemaking and formally barred U.S. institutions 
from conducting business with Banco Delta Asia, the Macau bank is still operating. This 
tends to dispel the common assertion that an institution's alleged involvement in a money 
laundering scandal may prove to be institutionally fatal. The bank's continued existence 
shows that even where an institution incurs the most severe penalty available under 
extraterritorial AMLICTF laws, it may still survive commercially- albeit in a greatly 
restricted capacity. 
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ChapterS 
Conclusion 
"We need to ensure that we do not impose regulatory requirements on the industry without 
the promise of real anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist funding benefits"-
Robert W emer 
8.1 The front line 
Risk-based approaches to AMLICTF inherently recognise the ability- and indeed, the 
responsibility- of financial institutions to reinforce international security. Accordingly, 
whilst the popularity of risk-based regimes continues to grow, institutions are increasingly 
expected to act as the first line of defence against money laundering and terrorism financing 
activities.632 They are required to manage their ongoing MLITF risk, and take responsibility 
for implementing systems and controls commensurate to that risk. Whilst risk-based 
approaches to AMLICTF do not anticipate that institutions will necessarily be able to prevent 
all possible instances of money laundering and terrorism financing, they do expect that such 
entities will mitigate the MLITF risk represented by their businesses. 
In risk-based AMLICTF regimes, an institution's risk is not confined to situations where it 
has actively facilitated money laundering or terrorism financing activities. It may also extend 
to circumstances where it has flouted or fallen short of compliance with legislative risk-
based requirements (for instance, by failing to train or screen employees in accordance with 
the MLITF risk represented by their role/business unit). Although non-compliance with risk-
based requirements may not carry the same emotional response or attract the same 
reputational risk as the commission of a money laundering/terrorism financing offence, it 
may nevertheless see an institution suffer legal, financial and reputational damage. 
632 Hoffman, K.E., "AML Security Emphasizes Detection and Prevention' (2005) 81 (1) Banking Strategies 
54. 
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Whilst institutions in many jurisdictions have lobbied for risk-based AMLICTF regimes, it is 
clear that compliance with risk-based legislative requirements may at times prove 
challenging for regulated entities. They might find it operationally difficult to identify their 
MLITF risk profile, and conceptually difficult to determine what they should consider to be 
an acceptable risk and an acceptable cost633 Given the various points of view from which the 
acceptability (or otherwise) of particular MLITF risks can be judged, some institutions might 
be at a loss to identify the potential consequences attached to accepting, mitigating or 
avoiding different risks. 
Drawing on the conclusions reached in the preceding Chapters of this thesis, this Chapter 
seeks to: 
• identify the types of risk- and the levels of risk- that institutions operating under certain 
risk-based regimes are likely to face; 
• challenge the common assertion that breaches of AMLICTF legislation may lead to the 
imposition of financially debilitating, or even commercially fatal, penalties; 
• discuss and critically analyse some of the apparent benefits of risk-based approaches to 
AMLICTF; and 
• provide an overview of the way in which AMLICTF issues and risk-based AMLICTF 
regimes can help enrich institutional understandings of the phenomena of risk. 
8.2 The importance of understanding and assessing MLffF risk 
Considering that risk-based AMLICTF regimes require regulated entities to be accountable 
for their own MLITF risk profile, it is imperative that financial institutions understand how to 
(and indeed, how they are expected to) identify, assess, evaluate and treat their MLITF risk 
exposures. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the assessment and ongoing 
management of MLITF risk has received heightened attention during the past two decades as 
risk-based approaches to AMLICTF have been adopted in a number of jurisdictions. 
633 Op cit n15. 8. 
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Although money laundering received some legislative attention during the 1980s, it was not 
until the 1990s that the scope and the broader ramifications of this crime were 
acknowledged. At that time, national governments and international bodies began to 
acknowledge that money laundering was not simply a 'local' crime related to the drug trade, 
but an 'international' crime associated with many kinds of illicit activities. Further, they 
became increasingly aware of the need to work cooperatively with financial institutions to 
combat money laundering activities and prevent money launderers from accessing the 
broader financial system. Whilst the release of the FATF 40 Recommendations and similar 
guidance saw government interest in AML grow during the 1990s, it is the following decade 
that is largely responsible for defining modern day approaches to MLITF risk management. 
As reiterated throughout this thesis, the events of September II have had a profound effect 
on the way that national governments address AMLICTF, and the way in which many 
financial institutions are now expected to conduct their operations and manage their MLITF 
risk. The 200 I terrorist attacks became the precursor for a raft of new corporate risk 
management obligations, and are largely responsible for the sizeable role that financial 
institutions are currently expected to play in protecting national and international financial 
systems from abuse. They heightened government awareness of terrorism financing issues, 
generated unprecedented concern for AMLICTF, and provided the catalyst for the enactment 
of legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act. In many ways, the events of September II 
ushered in a new era of risk-based AMLICTF regulation. 
Since 200 I, a number of international bodies including the Basel Committee, FA TF and 
Wolfsberg Group, have issued guidance with respect to the ongoing management of MLITF 
risk. As increasing numbers of jurisdictions and institutions have followed the international 
best practice standards published by these bodies, pressure has mounted upon others to also 
do the same634 In tum, this has created greater demand for more streamlined approaches to 
MLITF risk management, and cemented a deliberate shift away from prescriptive regulation 
634 Chapman, A., and Guerts, J., Working in an Anti-Money Laundering Environment: The Banker's View, 
Presentation delivered at the Money Laundering Symposium, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney, 30 
September 2002. Accessed at http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/2002-ml/chapman.pdf on 24 February 2008. 
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towards risk-based approaches that render financial institutions accountable for identifying, 
assessing, mitigating and managing their ML/TF risk. 
Whilst many institutions are currently assessing their MLITF risk in terms of the 'three 
bases', they should not confine their perceptions of risk (or their risk evaluation and 
treatment activities) to such inward-looking risk assessment exercises. Whilst institutions 
certainly need to understand the levels ofMLITF risk represented by their products/channels, 
customers and different jurisdictions, there are a number of more traditional risk types that 
they should also consider when trying to comprehensively manage their risk exposures and 
design more holistic risk management controls. As detailed in Chapter 2, viewing their 
MLITF risk in the context of reputational risk, financial risk and other traditional risk types 
should enable financial institutions to better assess the 'consequence risk' stemming from 
particular breaches of AMLICTF legislation. Further, it should enable them to make more 
informed decisions about how far they should extend their individual risk-based approaches 
and tighten their internal AMLICTF controls. Institutions that become preoccupied with their 
internal ML/TF risk may believe that taking a minimalist approach to the design of their 
systems and controls is satisfactory for the purposes of mitigating their risk. However, 
institutions that seek to broaden their understanding ofMLITF risk by framing it in terms of 
more traditional risk types, may determine that a minimalist approach is unsatisfactory 
because it will only mitigate their legal risk, and not their related reputational or financial 
risk. 
Given that an individual's or an organisation's perception ofMLITF risk will generally 
depend upon where they stand in the broader regulatory system,635 institutions operating 
under risk-based regimes should seek to clarify the way in which regulatory authorities view 
such risk. Where there is uncertainty around how regulatory officials define and assess 
ML/TF risk, institutions may end up implementing risk-based systems and controls that, 
whilst seemingly adequate by all internal measures, are vastly inadequate when framed in 
terms of the risk models and benchmarking exercises employed by the regulator. Thus, by 
expanding their knowledge ofMLITF risk and broadening their understanding of how 
635 Op cit nl4, 111. 
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regulatory authorities view such risk, institutions may better understand how to achieve 
AMLICTF compliance and avoid any unwanted regulatory or media scrutiny. 
8.3 The diminishing risk of incurring criminal liability 
Given the extent to which the regulatory terrain has changed in many jurisdictions following 
the events of September II, the AMLICTF legal risk faced by financial institutions has risen 
considerably during the past decade. In the years immediately following the terrorist attacks, 
governments in the U.S., the U.K. and a host of other countries including Australia, enacted 
new AMLICTF legislation and demonstrated a willingness to institute criminal enforcement 
proceedings against those entities in breach of their requirements. The provision of 
AMLICTF international best practice standards, coupled with the emotion underpinning 
legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act, ensured that many institutions faced -both 
theoretically and operationally- a greater degree of AMLICTF legal risk than they had prior 
to the 200 I terrorist attacks. 
According to some AMLICTF professionals and media commentators, institutions face more 
AMLICTF legal risk today than ever before. There are a myriad of AMLICTF laws now in 
place in many jurisdictions and, as noted in Chapter 3 of this thesis, a significant proportion 
of these provide harsh criminal penalties for breaches of particular AMLICTF obligations. 
These penalties include large fines and, in more severe cases of non-compliance, lengthy 
terms of imprisonment for responsible officers/employees. 
Whilst there is no formally recognised hierarchy of AMLICTF offences, it is clear that 
breaches of certain legislative provisions generally carry heavier penalties than others. As 
opposed to breaches of risk-based requirements, which will typically only attract civil 
penalties, breaches of prescriptive requirements can often attract criminal liability. By way of 
example, given how pivotal transaction reporting is to the identification of predicate 
offences, in many AMLICTF regimes a failure to properly file Suspicious Activity Reports is 
seemingly more likely to be accompanied by criminal penalties. A review of recent 
AMLICTF enforcement proceedings in countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. highlights 
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how many regulatory actions hinge upon reporting failures, and how those financial 
institutions with inadequate reporting controls might directly assume far higher levels of 
AMLICTF legal risk. 
Although a number of regulatory officials, AMLICTF professionals and industry participants 
have held that the imposition of criminal penalties (and its reputational implications) may be 
financially debilitating or even commercially fatal for an institution, the veracity of these 
claims is debatable. Whilst the past few years have seen a number of governments enact risk-
based legislation and widen the risk management responsibilities placed upon financial 
institutions, the extent of the AMLICTF legal risk currently faced by many institutions is 
questionable. Providing criminal penalties for certain offences is one thing, but actually 
imposing these penalties upon non-compliant institutions appears to be another entirely. 
Whilst the level of AML/CTF risk faced by institutions was quite pronounced in the 
immediate aftermath of September II, it appears to have been scaled back somewhat in the 
past few years. Even in the U.S., a jurisdiction widely regarded as the international vanguard 
for AMLICTF regulation and enforcement, the likelihood of an institution being prosecuted 
today for a money laundering offence or a criminal AMLICTF compliance failure is 
relatively low. (Arguably, the likelihood of an institution being convicted of a money 
laundering-related offence is even lower.) Though the criminal penalties available for certain 
breaches of AMLICTF legislation may be significant, recent sentencing statistics suggest that 
criminal actions against non-compliant institutions are currently the exception rather than the 
rule in the U.S. 
Given the many issues often associated with prosecuting corporate entities (particularly in 
recent years), regulatory and Jaw enforcement authorities are deliberately shifting their 
activities away from the initiation of criminal proceedings. This appears to be the case even 
in circumstances where such proceedings have a high probability of success. In the U.S., 
increased reliance is being placed upon cooperative regulatory outcomes such as deferred 
and non-prosecution agreements. Such agreements not only enable regulatory officials to 
avoid the time and expense typically associated with corporate prosecutions, but also enable 
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them to demonstrate the presence of an active regulatory/enforcement environment by 
mandating that certain entities undertake sweeping institutional reforms. 
Whilst the apparent lack of prosecutions is attributable to a number of factors, it has certainly 
been influenced by the "catastrophic collateral consequences "636 that may stem from 
launching a sweeping criminal enforcement action against a major financial institution. After 
prosecuting several large corporations for their misdeeds earlier this decade, U.S. regulatory 
authorities have become acutely aware of the consequences that a criminal action may have 
for an institution's reputation, financial standing, employees and creditors. After witnessing 
the significant systemic fallout caused by the aggressive pursuit of companies such as Arthur 
Andersen, regulatory officials now appear reluctant to prosecute corporate crimes and 
potentially hold employees, shareholders and even other institutions to ransom for the 
legislative failures of one institution. 
Indeed, there are a number of potential complications involved with prosecuting large 
corporate entities and they all raise interesting questions about the relationship that may exist 
between an institution's size/importance, and its levels of AMLICTF legal risk. A number of 
AMLICTF professionals working in larger institutions may perceive that their AMLICTF 
legal risk is greater because their activities are subject to closer regulatory scrutiny and their 
compliance failures can be exploited by regulatory officials keen to demonstrate that non-
compliance will not be tolerated. 
However, rather than facing heightened levels of AMLICTF legal risk, larger institutions 
may find that their size and the scale of their operations actually shields them from a certain 
degree of AMLICTF legal risk. In jurisdictions such as Australia, where just four major 
banks dominate the financial services landscape, these larger institutions may find 
themselves in an unrivalled regulatory position with respect to protection from forceful 
criminal actions. Were AUSTRAC to prosecute any of the 'Four Pillars' of the Australian 
financial services sector for AMLICTF compliance failures, the consequences could be 
636 Lichtblau, E., 'Leniency for Big Corporations in the U.S.', International Herald Tribune (New York), 9 
April2008 <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/09/business/iustice.php> at 16 May 2008. 
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devastating- not just for the relevant institution and its associated parties, but for the 
Australian financial system as a whole. 
Complex 'collateral damage' issues aside, the financial resources and political sway 
maintained by some institutions may render them particularly unattractive targets for 
criminal enforcement actions. Depending upon the alleged contraventions committed by an 
institution, the risk appetite of its executives and their willingness to incur possible 
reputational damage during court proceedings, regulatory officials may find themselves tied 
up in court proceedings for many years against a large, well-resourced entity. Evidently, this 
is an altogether undesirable outcome for a regulatory authority that may well be under 
funded, under resourced, and under pressure from the public to achieve results. 
Rather than criminally pursuing larger entities for their legislative breaches, regulatory 
officials may choose to only prosecute smaller institutions without the same levels of 
financial backing as their peers. Doing so may enable them to demonstrate their 
regulatory/enforcement powers to the public, conclude proceedings faster (and without the 
political wrangling potentially associated with larger entities), and send a strong message to 
smaller institutions that whilst they may not be subject to the intense oversight often afforded 
to major banks, they are not immune from regulatory action. Their relative MLITF risk may 
be lower than that of other regulated entities, but it must nevertheless be addressed through 
appropriate risk-based systems and controls. 
8.4 The increasing risk of incurring civil liability 
Whilst an institution's level of AMLICTF legal risk largely hinges upon its exposure to 
criminal penalties and enforcement actions, it also rests upon its risk of facing civil 
proceedings in relation to any AMLICTF compliance failure and/or contravention of 
AMLICTF legislation. Whilst there has been an evident decline in the willingness of 
regulatory authorities to criminally prosecute breaches of AMLICTF legislation, institutions 
should not be lulled into believing that their resulting AMLICTF legal risk is minimal. 
Indeed, regulatory authorities have not altogether abandoned their pursuit of non-compliant 
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institutions; they have simply changed their modus operandi and shifted their activities 
towards the civil resolution of AMLICTF compliance failures. 
As discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, the less onerous civil standard of proof enables 
regulatory authorities to secure a positive result (and the imposition of appropriate 
penalties) far more easily than they might have been able to through the use of criminal 
enforcement proceedings. Criminal prosecutions attract a higher standard of proof and must 
be conducted within the confines of particularly strict rules of evidence. Accordingly, 
where the primary purpose of a particular enforcement action is simply to embarrass a non-
compliant institution and cause it to rectify its internal control environment, regulatory 
officials can just as easily, if not more easily, achieve this outcome via civil proceedings. 
An institution's exposure at civil law is not limited to its compliance or non-compliance with 
applicable AMLICTF legislation. It will generally also extend to the existence of third party 
rights and the ongoing interaction between AMLICTF legislation and other areas of the law. 
For instance, in addition to civil enforcement actions, an institution might also- depending 
upon the jurisdiction(s) within which it operates- face AMLICTF legal risk in the form of 
various civil claims. For instance, whilst institutions in the U.S. may face liability in the form 
of shareholder derivative suits, institutions operating in the U.K. may face liability in the 
form of constructive trust claims initiated by third parties.637 
In certain countries, an institution may be deemed to be a constructive trustee in 
circumstances where it knows that customer funds in its possession are connected to a 
breach of trust or fiduciary duty, but it nevertheless pays them away or deals with them in a 
manner that is inconsistent with, or detrimental to, the interests of a beneficiary.638 In recent 
years, the enactment of tougher AMLICTF legislation might have increased the potential 
637 As discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, constructive trust claims technically arise in equity and not 
under the umbrella of civil law. However, for ease of reference, these types of actions are addressed at the 
same time as a range of civil proceedings and enforcement actions. 
638 Financial Services Commission Mauritius, Code on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing (Intended for Management Companies) (2003) 25 
<http:/172.14.253.104/search?q~cache:cQ Y Al2-
dooJ :www .gov. m u/portal/sites/ncb/fsc/ down load/am lcftmc. pdf+ U.S. +constructive+trust+money+ laundering 
&)ll~en&ct~clnk&cd~24&gl~au> at 26 August 2007. 
247 
exposure of institutions under constructive trust principles. By outlining precise compliance 
obligations, certain AMLICTF laws may have given courts a solid, objective standard upon 
which to judge the honesty and reasonableness of an institution's actions. To illustrate, if 
an institution blindly accepted and paid away the proceeds of a fraud without conducting 
adequate K YC procedures and/or otherwise monitoring their customers' transactional 
behaviour, a U.K. court might find that- in addition to contravening its explicit legislative 
requirements- the institution did not act as an honest and reasonable banker might have 
been expected to in the same circumstances. 
It should be noted that an institution's AMLICTF legal risk and potential liability under 
constructive trust principles is likely to be higher where there is some uncertainty or 
tension between its contractual obligations to customers, and its statutory requirements to 
report suspicious activities and not 'tip off' a customer about whom a SAR has been filed. 
As evidenced by recent case law in the U.K., institutions may find themselves in a 
precarious legal position where there is a lack of clarity around the interplay between their 
contractual and legislative obligations, and their potential liability as a constructive trustee. 
Any uncertainty around their legal obligations and, more specifically, which obligations 
should take precedence over others, may lead some institutions to compromise (or entirely 
forego) compliance with their civil law obligations in order to avoid liability for breaches 
of their criminal law obligations (or vice versa). As demonstrated by the string of 
authorities discussed in Chapter 4, in certain circumstances an institution's compliance 
with one set oflegal requirements (for instance, its statutory reporting and 'tipping off 
requirements), may heighten its AMLICTF legal risk with respect to others (for instance, its 
contractual requirements and its obligations to third parties under constructive trust 
principles). 
Although many institutions are likely to focus their AMLICTF compliance efforts upon the 
avoidance of criminal liability, it is clear that they should not ignore their potential liability 
at civil law. Institutions that deliberately disregard their exposure at civil law may, 
depending on the jurisdiction(s) within which they operate, unnecessarily increase their 
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AMLICTF legal risk and their exposure to civil 'breach of contract' claims and equitable 
constructive trust claims. Further, and perhaps more importantly, they may heighten their 
vulnerability to lengthy and intrusive regulatory reviews/audits that are not only resource-
intensive, but also potentially damaging to their reputation. 
8.5 AML/CTF legal risk and enforcement 
Whilst an institution's AMLICTF legal risk is largely determined by the criminal and civil 
penalties available under AMLICTF legislation, it also hinges upon the enforcement 
environment(s) within which they operate. In the absence of a strong regulatory and 
enforcement environment, national AMLICTF laws are- regardless of how tightly they are 
drafted- unlikely to have a material effect on the way institutions conduct their activities 
and manage their MLITF risk. Whilst the benefits of AMLICTF controls have frequently 
been noted (for instance, KYC procedures have often been held to help entities identify other 
financial crimes such as fraud), many institutions may believe that the costs associated with 
implementing these controls can be justified without any apparent ramifications for non-
compliance. 
Unless there is an appreciable level of AMLICTF legal risk, some institutions might 
deliberately take a minimalistic approach with respect to the fulfilment of their risk-based 
requirements. This is because in some cases it is likely to be AMLICTF legal risk- and not 
risk-based approaches- that are driving institutional attitudes towards AMLICTF 
compliance. As opposed to prioritising their compliance activities based upon their relative 
MLITF risk, a number of institutions may determine their compliance objectives solely on 
the basis of recent enforcement actions and their accompanying legal risk (i.e. those 
AMLICTF compliance failures and enforcement proceedings that have recently been pursued 
b I h . . ) 639 y regu atory aut ont1es . 
639 Davis, E., 'What's Wrong With a Risk-Based Approach?' (2007) 8( II) OpRisk & Compliance 
<http://www.opriskandcompliance.com/public/showPage.html?page=479962> at 20 January 2009. 
249 
In jurisdictions where efforts to curb organised crime are disorganised or disjointed, 
institutions are likely to face much lower levels of domestic AMLICTF legal risk. By 
comparison, in jurisdictions such as the U.S., where regulatory and enforcement efforts have 
become increasingly coordinated in recent years, institutions are likely to face far higher 
levels of risk. Although several money laundering scandals (including the Riggs Bank affair) 
have exposed weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the U.S. enforcement environment, 
institutions operating there at still at risk of being penalised for non-compliance with 
domestic AMLICTF laws. Many banking regulators are currently involved in the 
enforcement of U.S. AMLICTF legislation, and whilst the resulting mosaic of regulatory 
powers has at times led to duplications of process on the one hand, and buck-passing and 
blame shifting on the other, it has generally created a more aggressive enforcement 
environment since the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act.640 
That said, the AMLICTF legal risk faced by many institutions does not appear to be as high 
as many regulatory officials, AMLICTF practitioners, consultants and institutions seem to 
believe. Whilst it may be technically true that an institution's non-compliance with 
AMLICTF legislation might attract an array of criminal and civil penalties, the frequency 
with which such penalties are imposed in practice, remains contentious and raises questions 
about the real levels of risk faced by entities. Although the last few years have seen a number 
of institutions reprimanded for their AMLICTF compliance failures, these institutions have 
typically incurred civil monetary penalties for breaches of their prescriptive, as opposed to 
their risk-based, legislative requirements. Contrary to the claims of commentators, none of 
these penalties have been institutionally fatal. 
The lack of harsh criminal penalties and AMLICTF enforcement actions taken in recent 
years is perhaps reflective of a regulatory environment that is now less geared towards strict 
command and control, and more geared towards a strong regulatory dialogue in which 
institutions are encouraged (if not expected) to participate. If AMLICTF regulation and 
enforcement was viewed in terms of a continuum that stretches from exacting and strong rule 
640 Op cit n 190, 56. 
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at one end, through to maintenance of the status quo at the other/41 the current regulatory 
environment would seemingly fall between the middle and latter end of that spectrum. As 
opposed to launching formal enforcement proceedings against non-compliant institutions, a 
number of regulatory authorities appear to have developed -or are in the process of 
developing- a management regulatory approach that emphasises education and cooperation. 
Considering the uncertainty that may accompany risk-based legislative requirements, the 
regulatory preference for education and reform -as opposed to prosecution and penalties- is 
understandable. Just as some institutions may find it difficult to accurately assess and address 
their MLITF risk, regulatory authorities might find it equally challenging to identify and 
substantiate any perceived shortcomings in an institution's risk-based AML/CTF program. 
This is perhaps demonstrated by the minimal number of civil lawsuits concerning 
institutional contraventions of risk-based legislative requirements. 
Nevertheless, whilst the AMLICTF legal risk faced by institutions in the U.S. and the U.K. 
appears to have diminished in the past few years, the risk faced by foreign institutions may 
have risen during the same period. Since the events of September II, the U.S. government 
has continually demonstrated a willingness to invoke special measures in relation to foreign 
entities deemed to represent an unacceptable risk to the U.S. financial system. Under 
Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the U.S. Treasury Department can take- and has 
taken- such action against foreign entities without needing to concern itself with due 
process, legal proceedings, or collateral damage. 
In addition to their exposure under extraterritorial legislation, the AMLICTF legal risk faced 
by many institutions has risen in recent years as a number of jurisdictions have sought to 
implement and strengthen their AMLICTF regimes. This is particularly evident with respect 
to institutions operating in the Asia-Pacific region, where several countries have tried to 
secure membership of the FA TF (or similar, regional-style bodies) by improving the 
drafting, design and enforcement of their local AML/CTF laws. In recent years, new 
641 Serrano, M., and Kenny, P., 'The International Regulation of Money Laundering' (2003) 9(4) Global 
Governance 433. 
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AMLICTF laws have been enacted in India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, and 
additional AMLICTF regulations have been implemented in Thailand, Taiwan and Korea. If 
this trend in AMLICTF law reform continues, the enforcement of AML/CTF legislation may 
become more stringent and the AML/CTF legal risk faced by many institutions is likely to be 
heightened. 
According to some banking professionals, regulators in the U.S. and many other jurisdictions 
are expected to monitor and enforce AMLICTF compliance more tightly in the coming years. 
It is anticipated that they will draft regulations more stringently, supervise institutional 
AML/CTF efforts more intensely, conduct investigations more regularly, and address 
compliance lapses more fiercely. 642 It should be noted however that this may take several 
years to occur in countries such as Australia, where AMLICTF laws are still being 
implemented and regulatory officials are likely to- at least for the next two or three years-
address any legislative breaches through the use of negotiated outcomes (i.e. rather than 
formal enforcement proceedings). 
In some respects though, it is perhaps undesirable that the international enforcement 
environment moves too quickly- or too far- towards exacting and strong rule. Whilst such 
an environment may cause institutions to spend more time designing, implementing and 
maintaining their risk-based AMLICTF controls, it might also give rise to over-compliance 
and encourage institutions to file a barrage of SARs643 that ultimately detract from real 
instances of money laundering. Although strong and persistent enforcement efforts may 
reinforce the importance of AMLICTF compliance, they are only likely to heighten 
institutions' AMLICTF legal risk up to a certain point, beyond which they might actually 
decrease such risk by impeding regulatory authorities from properly monitoring AMLICTF 
compliance and executing their functions. 
"' Byrne, J., 'How AMLICTF is Being Managed in the United States: The Impact of the Global Market 
Crisis on AML/CTF Including Information Sharing Between Jurisdictions and Institutions' (Paper presented 
at the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Conference 2009, Sydney, 2 April 2009). 
643 Clearly, if institutions respond to zealous enforcement efforts by defensively filing Suspicious Activity 
Reports, this may be just as problematic as institutions filing too few reports. See Krebsbach, K., 'Policing 
Global Pirates on the River of Money' (2004) 17(4) Bank Technology News 20. 
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8.6 Risk-based regimes in theory and practice 
A risk-based approach should mean just that. From a regulatory perspective, it should enable 
authorities to gear their resources towards those institutions, industries and business activities 
deemed to represent the greatest MLITF risk. From an institutional perspective, it should 
theoretically provide flexibility, deliver cost-savings, and encourage thoughtful engagement 
with the concepts of AML and CTF. As opposed to rigid, checklist-driven compliance 
exercises, a risk-based approach should require institutions to have a greater awareness and 
understanding of the MLITF risk attached to their provision of financial services. 
Interestingly however, the alleged benefits of risk-based approaches may not always be 
evident when such approaches are viewed in practice. Firstly, whilst risk-based approaches 
inherently provide institutions with flexibility regarding the design and implementation of 
their AMLICTF programs, the degree of flexibility that they allow for is questionable. 
Whilst the FA TF has held that such approaches "mean that no two financial institutions 
are likely to adopt the exact same detailed practices",644 it appears that the flexibility 
afforded to institutions under risk-based regimes may have been eroded in recent years by 
institutional and regulatory attempts to benchmark AMLICTF compliance. 
8.6.1 Benchmarking by regulatory authorities and institutions 
Whilst a basic premise of risk-based approaches is that institutions' AMLICTF systems and 
controls should be individually stylised to- and judged in light of- their own MLITF risk 
profiles, a number of regulatory authorities have been particularly transparent regarding 
their use of benchmarking exercises. For instance, the U.K. FSA has explicitly 
acknowledged its use of benchmarking to "enable supervisors to compare a firm's anti-
money laundering arrangements with those of its peers, with a view to informing [their} 
judgement of the quality of the firm's controls". 645 Such an approach to AMLICTF 
regulation appears to be sanctioned by international bodies such as the FA TF, which has 
644 Op cit nl6, 4. 
645 Opcitnl9,5. 
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previously conceded that risk-based approaches to supervision should ''permit relevant 
comparisons between financial institutions". 646 
The adoption of vastly different AMLICTF programs amongst institutions may clearly pose 
a significant challenge for regulatory officials. In effect, it may require them to identify and 
understand the individual MLITF risk profile of each institution subject to their 
review/oversight. Given that this is not operationally feasible, it is understandable that 
many regulatory authorities do- if not consciously then at least inadvertently- compare 
and contrast the AMLICTF programs implemented by different institutions. This may be 
problematic however, where it enables regulatory comparisons between institutions that are 
alike in terms of their size, operations and product offerings, but considerably different in 
terms of their customer bases, risk appetites and jurisdictional reach. 
That said, it should be noted that in risk-based AMLICTF regimes, regulatory authorities 
are not necessarily alone in their use of benchmarking exercises. In Australia for instance, 
many institutions are currently undertaking their own benchmarking activities as a way of 
ensuring that their AMLICTF controls and risk appetites do not deviate greatly from those 
of their competitors. Evidently, the aim of such exercises is to ensure that they are not 
exposed to a greater degree of legal and reputational risk by having dissimilar AMLICTF 
programs. Importantly though, whilst benchmarking may go some way towards protecting 
institutions against undue and unwanted regulatory attention, it will likely undermine their 
ability to fully capitalise on the potential flexibility and cost benefits provided by risk-
based approaches. 
Given the advent of benchmarking as a common compliance exercise amongst many 
regulatory authorities and institutions, it may be that risk-based approaches are actually 
setting the bar for compliance far higher than it would otherwise have been under 
prescriptive approaches to AMLICTF. In some jurisdictions, it appears that 'best practice' 
AMLICTF standards are now becoming the 'norm' amongst certain types of financial 
institutions. In the U.S., a number of U.S. banking executives have already expressed 
646 Opcitnl6, 10. 
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concern that the 'best practice' sections of regulatory guides and examination manuals are 
being construed as the standard benchmark for institutions' AMLICTF compliance.647 As 
opposed to specifically tailoring their AMLICTF programs to their own business activities, 
some institutions are holding themselves to (and/or finding themselves held to) more arduous 
standards than their MLITF risk profiles may require. This is perhaps the case in the U.K., 
where a 2006/2007 PricewaterhouseCoopers survey revealed that 82 per cent of financial 
institutions believed that they had not experienced any cost benefits since the implementation 
of their country's risk-based regime.648 
8.6.2 Uncertainty around the nature and scope of risk-based requirements 
In addition to the use of benchmarking and comparative compliance exercises, the cost 
savings allegedly provided by risk-based approaches may be undermined by a lack of 
clarity around what some regulatory authorities will deem to be appropriate risk-based 
controls. In jurisdictions where there are potential inconsistencies between the expectations 
and understandings of regulators and the regulated,649 institutions may try to demonstrate 
the seriousness with which they regard AMLICTF compliance by implementing systems 
and controls that are far more elaborate than those required by their MLITF risk profile. 
Even in countries where the financial services sector has lobbied for a risk-based 
AMLICTF regime, the lack of clarity and precision around some risk-based obligations has 
at times led institutions to call for additional regulatory guidance. This currently appears to 
be the case in Australia, where many financial institutions and industry bodies continue to 
approach AUSTRAC for more detailed explanations around the nature and scope of their 
obligations. Previously, it has also been the case in the U.K., where the U.K. FSA has 
inevitably had to provide institutions with more detailed guidance regarding how to achieve 
compliance with risk-based legislative requirements.650 On 15 December 2007, new AML 
"' Op cit n639. 
648 Fagg, S., Risk-based Laundering Approach Yields Little Fruit (2007) Lawyers Weekly 
<http://www .lawyersweekly .com .au/articles/Risk -based-launderi ng-approach-yields-1 itt! e-fruit z70 I 71 .htm> 
at 29 April 2008. 
649 Chalmers, R., Risk-based Approach to AMUCTF, United Kingdom Financial Services Authority 
<http://www.fscey.gov.tw/public/ AttachmenV7103115302771.pdt> at 30 September 2008. 
650 Op cit n283, 8. 
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Regulations were brought into effect in the U.K. to clarify a number of legislative customer 
due diligence obligations651 Though these Regulations are still hinged upon risk-based 
decision-making and controls, their level of detail suggests that U.K. institutions have 
required further guidance in respect of how to meet- operationally if not strictly legally-
their AML requirements. 
That said, especially in newer or developing AMLICTF regimes such as Australia, 
institutions should always strategically consider whether they approach regulatory 
authorities for additional guidance on particular legislative requirements. Whilst some 
organisations may perceive that the provision of more detailed guidance will lower their 
individual AMLICTF legal risk, such guidance may in fact heighten the level of risk for all 
institutions. Though a clearer regulatory direction may assist entities to design their risk-
based systems and controls, it might also give regulatory authorities clear and unequivocal 
benchmarks against which they can assess institutions' compliance with AMLICTF 
legislation. Detailed guidance can remove some of the discretion otherwise given to 
institutions, and see them held to a far higher standard of compliance than they would have 
applied to themselves under their individual risk-based approaches. 
Even where institutions have designed and implemented risk-based AMLICTF controls, they 
will not necessarily be immune from formal enforcement proceedings. Just as some 
AMLICTF regulatory authorities have held that their own action (or, at times, their inaction) 
in relation to certain banking failures has been judged retrospectively,652 it appears that so too 
has the risk-based decision-making of many financial institutions. Following the commission 
of a money laundering/terrorism financing offence and/or an AMLICTF compliance failure, 
an institution's past risk-based decisions may be judged in light of current understandings of 
MLITF risk and risk exposures. 
If an institution's risk assessment methodology previously determined that a certain part of 
its business represented a lower MLITF risk, regulatory authorities may question the 
651 HM Treasury, Money Laundering Regulations 2007: An Information Sheet/or Firms (2007) 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/~/6/moneylaunderine.: guidel50807.pdf> at 26 July 2008. 
652 See McCarthy, C., Op cit n20. 
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soundness of that methodology if the relevant business area is later found to have facilitated 
money laundering or terrorism financing activities. Even in circumstances where regulatory 
officials decide that the institution's risk methodology is defensible, they might nevertheless 
question the appropriateness of the institution's systems and controls commensurate to its 
risk model. Despite regulatory recognition of the fact that institutions may be unable to 
prevent all instances of money laundering/terrorism financing, where such crimes have 
occurred it may be difficult (reputationally, if not legally) for an institution to sufficiently 
justify why they had previously deemed their internal, risk-based controls to be sufficient for 
the purposes of mitigating their MLITF risk. 
8.6.3 The retrospective application of rules-based models 
Evidently, the risk-based approaches enshrined in legislation are not always reflected in 
accompanying regulatory efforts. Rather than applying risk-based models and decision-
making to regulation, some authorities might occasionally seek to assess an institution's 
compliance by applying a rules-based approach retrospectively. As discussed in Chapters 
6 and 7 of this thesis, this was seemingly the case with Riggs Bank and Banco Delta Asia, 
which both had the desirability of their customers judged in hindsight by U.S. government 
and regulatory officials. 
Whilst Banco Delta Asia's relationship with certain North Korean entities ultimately led to 
its expulsion from the U.S. financial system, the legitimacy of the bank's customer 
relationships was seemingly judged in retrospect. If officials from Banco Delta Asia are 
correct and U.S. authorities did in fact know about the institution's ties to North Korean 
companies for approximately two decades, then FinCEN clearly had a significant amount of 
time to communicate and address any concerns about those companies. However, rather than 
proactively raising any issues with Banco Delta Asia and enabling the bank to take corrective 
action and/or otherwise employ an appropriate risk management strategy, the U.S. 
government publicly denounced the bank without warning. Perhaps driven by their desire to 
force the closure of North Korea's nuclear program, U.S. authorities issued a proposed rule 
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under Section 311 of the USA PATRiOT Act designed to cause maximum prejudice to Banco 
Delta Asia and Macau. 
However, the subsequent application of rules-based models has not been strictly reserved for 
foreign entities. In the aftermath of September II, U.S. regulatory authorities have also 
retrospectively judged the desirability of certain customer relationships entered into by local 
institutions. This was seemingly the case in relation to Riggs Bank's relationship with 
General Pinochet. Whilst the institution's relationship with the Chilean military official 
attracted unflattering publicity and unwanted regulatory attention, General Pinochet was 
actually a highly desirable customer when the bank coveted his business. At that time, he was 
a wealthy public figure and a vocal supporter of the U.S., and the laws in relation to PEPs 
had not yet been enacted. Even if they had, General Pinochet's status as a foreign, senior 
military official might not have caused any great concern for Riggs Bank. After all, the 
institution had long built its business- and its reputation -around providing banking services 
to prominent public figures. 
Despite his initial desirability, when the U.S. government subsequently decided that General 
Pinochet was not a particularly esteemed customer, Riggs Bank became the subject of intense 
regulatory scrutiny. By that time, risk-based approaches had started to gain momentum, as 
had regulatory expectations that institutions would undertake additional due diligence and 
take extra steps to identifY and monitor the activities of PEPs. Thus, whilst the bank 
contravened U.S. AMLICTF legislation by failing to carry out adequate ongoing customer 
due diligence with respect to General Pinochet's transactions, its decision to pursue him as a 
customer appears to have been criticised unfairly. At the time his business was sought in the 
1980s, the institution was not likely to believe that it was assuming an unacceptably high 
MLITF risk. Indeed, the concept ofMLITF risk management had not yet emerged. It is only 
when the decision to provide banking services to General Pinochet was judged in hindsight 
using rules-based models that it appeared questionable to regulatory authorities. 
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8.6.4 Risk-based approaches and te"orismjinancing 
In addition to highlighting the way in which regulatory actions may not always reflect the 
risk-based approaches enshrined in AMLICTF legislation, the Riggs Bank scandal also 
demonstrates the limitations of applying risk-based approaches to the issue of terrorism 
financing. Although the bank was scrutinised by regulatory authorities and media 
commentators for failing to identify transactions potentially related to the terrorist acts 
carried out on September II, the institution's ability to properly screen and identify such 
transactions is questionable. Indeed, whilst risk-based approaches are generally held to apply 
to both AML and CTF, terrorism financing is notoriously more difficult to identify than 
money laundering. As it can often involve small amounts of money derived from entirely 
legitimate sources, MLITF risk assessments and risk-based controls may be of little 
assistance in isolating those transactions and customers related to terrorism financing. 
Risk-based approaches to CTF may be considered to place unrealistic expectations upon 
institutions; requiring them to identify activities and transactions that are unlikely to exhibit 
the hallmarks of conventional money laundering. Whilst many financial institutions are 
equipped to screen the names of their customers against terrorism-related sanctions lists, any 
obligation to conduct such screening is typically mechanical and not a function ofMLITF 
risk. In practice, risk-based approaches to AMLICTF will generally only assist an institution 
to identify and report terrorism financing activities insofar as they involve illegally derived 
monies and exhibit the use of traditional money laundering methods.653 
In the case of Riggs Bank, screening the names of Khalid Almidhar and Nawaf Alhazmi; the 
beneficiaries of Princess Al-Faisal's transactions and two of the September II hijackers, 
would not have resulted in a positive match. It is only after the terrorist attacks took place 
that these individuals were positively identified as terrorists and, retrospectively, Princess AI-
Faisal's transactions could be connected with possible terrorism financing activities. Even 
with a sophisticated transaction monitoring system in place, the relatively anonymous 
beneficiaries and the small amounts of money being sent to them each month, would have 
653 The Wolfsberg Group, Wolfsberg Statement on the Suppression f!flhe Financing of Terrorism, January 
2002. Accessed at httpJ/www.wolfsberg-principles.com/financing-terrorism.html on 15 May 2006. 
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been unlikely to trigger any alerts or arouse the suspicions of Riggs Bank staff prior to 
September II. 
8.6.5 Self-regulation 
Clearly, the enforcement of risk-based AMLICTF requirements may be problematic for both 
institutions and regulatory authorities alike. Whilst risk-based regimes require institutions to 
assess their levels of MLITF risk, they also require regulatory officials to understand the 
MLITF profiles of regulated entities. This may prove to be exceedingly difficult for 
regulatory authorities and might explain why a number of risk-based regimes are continuing 
to move further towards meta monitoring and models of institutional self-regulation. By 
relying on institutions to manage and monitor their compliance with AMLICTF legislation, it 
is not always necessary for regulatory officials to become involved in the granular 
assessment of an institution's MLITF risk profile. 
As opposed to actively understanding and identifying each regulated entity's MLITF risk 
profile, some regulatory authorities may prefer to monitor the success (or otherwise) of an 
institution's internal monitoring activities. However, whilst this might reaffirm the notion 
that risk-based approaches should be flexible and hinged upon institutions' individual levels 
of MLITF risk, it may have a number of unintended regulatory consequences that actually 
undermine other fundamental premises of risk-based regimes. As previously discussed, meta 
monitoring may in fact encourage the use of benchmarking exercises amongst both 
institutions and regulatory officials (thereby undermining the potential cost benefits 
associated with risk-based approaches), and enable regulators to measure institutions' 
AMLICTF compliance by applying rules-based models in hindsight. 
8. 7 AML/CTF and the phenomena of risk 
Despite some of their challenges and potential shortcomings, it is clear that risk-based 
approaches- as well as the concepts of AML and CTF- can enhance institutional 
understandings of the phenomena of risk. At the most basic level, risk-based approaches 
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require institutions to consciously consider the issue of risk. They require them to 
acknowledge the existence of MLITF risk, and assess and mitigate the MLITF risk that they 
might reasonably face through their provision of financial products/services. Whilst some 
regulatory authorities have a broad range of supervisory and enforcement powers, risk-based 
AMLICTF regimes squarely place responsibility for the ongoing management of MLITF risk, 
with regulated entities. 
Given their emphasis on risk management and self regulation, risk-based approaches to 
AMLICTF encourage institutions to more thoughtfully engage with the concept of risk. 
Unlike prescriptive legislative obligations, risk-based requirements cannot simply be 
regarded as mechanical compliance exercises. The scope of such requirements necessarily 
rests upon an institution's MLITF risk profile and as such, they require regulated entities to 
periodically assess the risk represented by different areas of their business. Under risk-based 
regimes, it is not sufficient for institutions to simply assess their risk at the time of designing 
their original systems and controls. Due to the fact that institutions' risk profiles (and thus, 
the quality of their AMLICTF compliance) will vary from time to time, risk-based regimes 
require them to continuously manage their risk. 
Whilst the 'three bases' of risk will assist institutions to identify their areas of greatest 
MLITF exposure, gaining greater knowledge about the types and levels of risk apparent in 
different risk-based regimes, will better enable them to assess and address their individual 
risk exposures. Further, it will assist them to more accurately determine the potential 
consequence risk represented by their non-compliance with risk-based legislation. 
Institutions that fail to undertake their own assessment of the potential reputational, financial 
and legal risk accompanying their activities under a risk-based regime, may simply accept the 
claims of many industry professionals and media commentators that non-compliance with 
AMLICTF legislation is likely to attract unwanted regulatory attraction, aggressive 
enforcement action and, in certain cases, closure. However, by actually undertaking an 
analysis of the levels of risk apparent in several risk-based AMLICTF regimes, they may 
recognise that the past few years have seen a deliberate shift away from such severe 
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enforcement actions. Rather than penal ising employees, shareholders and other institutions 
for the misdeeds of a non-compliant entity, some regulatory authorities are now pursuing 
more collaborative and less commercially disruptive enforcement options. 
This evident regulatory trend away from aggressive AM L/CTF regulation appears to 
undermine many of the alleged consequences of non-compliance with AMLICTF legislation. 
It is certainly not doubted that AMLICTF compliance failures can result in large-scale 
regulatory actions and the imposition of severe criminal and civil penalties. However, it 
appears that institutions and media commentators have a tendency to overstate their risk 
exposures under risk-based AMLICTF regimes. Seemingly, they have become ''acutely 
sensitive to the business risks attached to illicit financial activity"654 Whether this is due to a 
number of well-publicised enforcement actions and/or the increased political attention paid to 
AMLICTF issues in the wake of September II, it is clear that the perceived vulnerability of 
institutions to regulatory actions and legal penalties has been inflated. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that financial institutions should not ignore their various risks under 
risk-based regimes. To ensure their continued operation in some of the world's largest and 
most important financial centres, many institutions will need to identify their levels of risk 
under both domestic and extraterritorial AMLICTF laws, and local and foreign enforcement 
environments. Further, they will need to employ a risk management strategy (or a selection 
of risk management strategies) that mitigates their levels of risk without compromising their 
ability to continue operating and providing financial services to customers. 
Whilst an avoidance strategy will undoubtedly provide institutions with the greatest level of 
protection under AMLICTF legislation, the adoption of such a risk management strategy will 
not be desirable or financially viable for all institutions, especially those based in smaller 
jurisdictions with less stringent AMLICTF regimes. Compliance with the AMLICTF 
obligations enshrined in legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act is likely to prove both 
burdensome and expensive for a number of institutions in less wealthy nations. This is 
especially so in circumstances where the costs required to comply with extraterritorial 
054 Op cit 254, 17. 
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AMLICTF laws will leave them operating at a competitive disadvantage in their own 
jurisdiction. 
Even in cases where avoidance is an appropriate risk management strategy for an institution, 
the successful execution of such a strategy may be unclear with respect to risk-based 
legislative requirements. As previously noted, risk-based obligations do not necessarily give 
rise to a 'dichotomy of compliance' in the same way that prescriptive requirements generally 
do. Rather, their innate breadth and their dependency upon institutions' MLITF risk profiles, 
tends to give rise to a spectrum of potential compliance options. 
Thus, institutions without an acute understanding of their MLITF risk and/or the operation of 
risk-based approaches may inevitably adopt a flawed risk management strategy and 
implement poorly designed AMLICTF programs. lfthey underestimate their risk, they are 
likely to implement lax controls that actually heighten their AMLICTF legal risk and 
regulatory exposure. By comparison, if they overestimate their risk by accepting the popular 
(but relatively untested) rhetoric about the consequence risk associated with legislative non-
compliance, they are likely to spend copious amounts of time and money implementing 
controls that are not commensurate to their MLITF risk profile. Evidently, both these 
compliance options tend to undermine the alleged benefits of risk-based regimes- flexibility, 
cost-effectiveness, and enhanced engagement with the concepts of AML and CTF. 
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